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Journal Cover IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine
  [SJR: 0.463]   [H-I: 43]   [145 followers]  Follow
    
   Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
   ISSN (Print) 0885-8985
   Published by IEEE Homepage  [191 journals]
  • Inside front cover
    • PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Inside back cover
    • PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Back cover
    • PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • In this issue — technically
    • Pages: 2 - 2
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • From the editors of the navigation and positioning systems special issue
    • Authors: Andrew Dempster;
      Pages: 3 - 3
      Abstract: This special issue on Navigation and Positioning Systems was proposed by the editors at an interesting time for satellite navigation. Independent satellite-based positioning systems have been developed including Glonass by Russia, Galileo by the European Union, Beidou by China and IRNSS by India. As the newer GNSS constellations are gradually populated, a variety of research is being conducted to investigate performance. Multi-constellation GNSS receivers, for example, are being developed to provide users with increased robustness.
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Feature paper: Enhancement of safety measures to prevent air accidents
    • Authors: Ramanpreet Singh Ahluwalia;Sukhwinder Singh;
      Pages: 4 - 9
      Abstract: In today's world, with time at a premium, people increasingly use aircraft for travel and for transporting goods from one place to another. This has resulted in greater chances of aircraft accidents. There are many reasons for these accidents, ranging from pilot error to instrument or machinery failure. Basically, there are five phases of air travel during which these accidents can occur: take off, initial climb, en-route, landing-approach, and touchdown. In the last few years, the accidents during the en-route phase are on the increase, e.g., from 2012 till 2014 they have increased from 3 in 2012 to 8 in 2013 to 13 in 2014.
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Feature article: Flight data assessment of tightly coupled PPP/INS using
           real-time products
    • Authors: Ryan M. Watson;Jason N. Gross;Yoaz Bar-Sever;William I. Bertiger;Bruce J. Haines;
      Pages: 10 - 21
      Abstract: Airborne geodetic techniques are superior to their terrestrial counterparts with respect to both economy and efficiency [1]. In addition, airborne geodesy allows mapping of remote areas that would otherwise be inaccessible. A cornerstone for most airborne geodetic measurements is the accurate determination of the aircraft position and orientation. Therefore, airborne geodesy was not widely used until the advent of global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs). Now, with precise GNSS positioning techniques, airborne geodesy is booming within several domains, including solid Earth monitoring (e.g., crustal deformation) [2]–[4], fluid Earth monitoring (e.g., ice sheet or sea-level monitoring) [5]–[7], and geoid determination [8], [9]. Despite the success of these airborne geodetic methods, the increased availability and reliability of accurate aircraft positioning remains an important enabling technology in support of future scientific endeavors.
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Advertisements
    • Pages: 37 - 37
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Feature article: Control theoretic approach to gyro-free inertial
           navigation systems
    • Authors: Uriel Nusbaum;Itzik Klein;
      Pages: 38 - 45
      Abstract: In general, an inertial navigation system (INS) consists of a navigation computer and an inertial measurement unit (IMU). Given initial conditions and IMU measurements, the INS provides the position, velocity, and orientation of its carrying platform. The inertial sensors, namely, the accelerometers and gyroscopes (gyros), are part of the IMU. A classical IMU architecture has three accelerometers (to measure specific force) and three gyros (to measure angular velocity) arranged in orthogonal triads.
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Feature article: High sensitivity acquisition of GNSS signals with
           secondary code on FPGAs
    • Authors: Jérôme Leclère;Cyril Botteron;Pierre-André Farine;
      Pages: 46 - 63
      Abstract: The modern global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) signals, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) L5 and L1C, and Galileo E5 and E1, have brought several innovations: the introduction of a pilot channel that does not contain any data to allow very long coherent integrations; the introduction of a secondary code to offer better cross-correlations, to facilitate the synchronization with the data, and to help interference mitigation; the introduction of new modulations to reduce the impact of multipath; and the use of higher chipping rates to have better accuracy and interference mitigation.
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • Feature article: An approach to detect GNSS spoofing
    • Authors: Ali Broumandan;Ranjeeth Siddakatte;Gérard Lachapelle;
      Pages: 64 - 75
      Abstract: GNSS signal quality monitoring and authenticity verification is gaining importance as different types of interference signals including jamming and spoofing are becoming more likely. There have been several studies on jamming and spoofing detection at various levels of GNSS receiver operation layers. Spoofing signals are structural interference that take advantage of the known structure of legitimate signals and try to deceive their target receiver into a false position and/or timing solution. This becomes much more important if the receiver is used in safety-of-life applications [1]–[5]. The features of spoofing signals are similar to those of authentic GNSS signals; therefore, a stand-alone GNSS receiver may face challenges in detecting this type of interference. Spoofing signals can be designed to mislead the tracking procedure of GNSS receivers by generating synchronized pseudo random noise (PRN) codes, thereby leading to counterfeit correlation peaks. This means that the PRN index and signal parameters such as Doppler frequencies and code delays of spoofing signals match those of the authentic ones. These fake correlation peaks can overlay the authentic ones, distort the normal shape of authentic correlation peaks, and gradually misdirect the tracking process of the target receiver. Detection and mitigation of spoofing attacks on GNSS receivers in tracking mode have become one of the important antispoofing topics. In [4]–[6], the effect of interaction between authentic and spoofing peaks on the tracking process of a GNSS receiver is analyzed. Most spoofing detection metrics are designed to detect a spoofing attack assuming there are only two states, namely, clean data or a spoofing attack [7]–[10]. More specifically the spoofing detection threshold for a given probability of false alarm is set in the presence of a clean data set. However, in real operational conditions there might be several -ituations in which the spoofing detection test statistics exceed the predefined threshold due to other sources of interference signals and cause false spoofing detection. For instance, [3] has proposed a spoofing countermeasure method based on monitoring the receiver's automatic gain control (AGC) gain level. It is shown that the presence of spoofing signals increases the power content of the received signals, leading to changes in the AGC level. However, the AGC gain can be disrupted by various interfering signals.
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • AESS resource center
    • Pages: 76 - 76
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • AESS senior members
    • Pages: 78 - 78
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • AESS video tutorials
    • Pages: 79 - 79
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
  • AESS professional networking and mentoring program
    • Pages: 80 - 80
      PubDate: Aug. 2017
      Issue No: Vol. 32, No. 8 (2017)
       
 
 
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