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Journal Cover Econometrica
  [SJR: 12.485]   [H-I: 139]   [208 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 0012-9682 - ISSN (Online) 1468-0262
   Published by John Wiley and Sons Homepage  [1579 journals]
  • Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 85 Iss. 2
    • PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:13.253883-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA852FM
       
  • Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 85 Iss. 2
    • PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:12.876693-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA852BM
       
  • Issue Information
    • Pages: 143 - 147
      PubDate: 2017-03-01T05:05:50.063501-05:
      DOI: 10.1111/etap.12248
       
  • Research on Crowdfunding: Reviewing the (Very Recent) Past and Celebrating
           the Present
    • Authors: Jeremy C. Short; David J. Ketchen, Aaron F. McKenny, Thomas H. Allison, R. Duane Ireland
      Pages: 149 - 160
      Abstract: Crowdfunding is a rapidly growing phenomenon wherein entrepreneurs seek funding for their entrepreneurial activities from a potentially large audience of interested individuals. Crowdfunding has exploded in popularity over the last decade and now accounts for tens of billions of dollars annually. But despite the importance and growth of crowdfunding, little scholarly knowledge exists about the topic. To address this gap, this special issue includes five articles that each advance knowledge about crowdfunding in important ways. We briefly review past work on crowdfunding in leading entrepreneurship and management journals. We then highlight the diverse contributions offered in the special issue articles.
      PubDate: 2017-02-07T22:17:46.13063-05:0
      DOI: 10.1111/etap.12270
       
  • Serial Crowdfunding, Social Capital, and Project Success
    • Authors: Vincenzo Butticè; Massimo G. Colombo, Mike Wright
      Pages: 183 - 207
      Abstract: In this paper, we focus attention on serial crowdfunders, that is, entrepreneurs who repeatedly turn to crowdfunding to finance their projects. We argue that serial crowdfunders take advantage of the social contacts with those that backed their previous campaigns. This internal social capital developed within the platform, which is not available to “normal” serial entrepreneurs, makes serial crowdfunders' campaigns more successful than those launched by novice crowdfunders. However, this type of social capital is a substitute for the internal social capital built by backing other campaigns, and has a limited lifespan. Econometric results on a sample of 31,389 Kickstarter campaigns confirm our contentions. Implications for research, practice, and policy are discussed.
      PubDate: 2017-02-02T01:45:51.648619-05:
      DOI: 10.1111/etap.12271
       
  • The Influence of Internal Social Capital on Serial Creators’ Success
           in Crowdfunding
    • Authors: Vitaly Skirnevskiy; David Bendig, Malte Brettel
      Pages: 209 - 236
      Abstract: Interactions between project creators and backers on the crowdfunding platform represent the linchpin of every campaign. However, the resulting internal social capital has received little academic attention. To address this topic, we frame how internal social capital can develop through project track record and how internal social capital can spill over to external online communities. Focusing on the long-term implications of these manifestations of social capital, we empirically assess whether they can increase funding success beyond a single campaign. We test our hypotheses with two data sets derived from platform and survey sources and find support for the proposed relationships.
      PubDate: 2017-01-31T01:11:37.775227-05:
      DOI: 10.1111/etap.12272
       
  • Crowdfunding Innovative Ideas: How Incremental and Radical Innovativeness
           Influence Funding Outcomes
    • Authors: C. S. Richard Chan; Annaleena Parhankangas
      Pages: 237 - 263
      Abstract: We investigate the effect of innovativeness on crowdfunding outcomes. Because crowdfunding campaigns characterized by greater incremental innovativeness are more comprehensible and generate more user value for typical crowdfunders, incremental innovativeness may result in more favorable funding outcomes. By comparison, campaigns that feature greater radical innovativeness are riskier to develop, harder for crowdfunders to understand and result in less favorable funding outcomes. This negative effect of radical innovativeness may be mitigated by incremental innovativeness, which may help crowdfunders to understand and appreciate radical innovativeness more. A sample of 334 Kickstarter campaigns provides support for our hypotheses.
      PubDate: 2017-02-07T22:13:54.051216-05:
      DOI: 10.1111/etap.12268
       
  • How Should Crowdfunding Research Evolve? A Survey of the Entrepreneurship
           Theory and Practice Editorial Board
    • Authors: Aaron F. McKenny; Thomas H. Allison, David J. Ketchen, Jeremy C. Short, R. Duane Ireland
      Pages: 291 - 304
      Abstract: The explosion of crowdfunding within entrepreneurial circles is attracting increased academic interest in the nature of crowdfunding, its antecedents, and its consequences. In an effort to help researchers concentrate their inquiry on the most promising questions and theories involving crowdfunding, we surveyed key thought leaders within the entrepreneurship field—the Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice editorial review board—regarding what inquiry they believe is needed. Their responses offer implications for crowdfunding research. For example, cross-disciplinary work is one approach that board members believe holds high potential. In response, we outline a cross-disciplinary research agenda that can inform scholarly efforts.
      PubDate: 2017-02-07T22:17:40.428713-05:
      DOI: 10.1111/etap.12269
       
  • Search for Yield
    • Authors: David Martinez-Miera; Rafael Repullo
      Pages: 351 - 378
      Abstract: We present a model of the relationship between real interest rates, credit spreads, and the structure and risk of the banking system. Banks intermediate between entrepreneurs and investors, and can monitor entrepreneurs' projects. We characterize the equilibrium for a fixed aggregate supply of savings, showing that safer entrepreneurs will be funded by nonmonitoring banks and riskier entrepreneurs by monitoring banks. We show that an increase in savings reduces interest rates and spreads, and increases the relative size of the nonmonitoring banking system and the probability of failure of monitoring banks. We also show that the dynamic version of the model exhibits endogenous boom and bust cycles, and rationalizes the existence of countercyclical risk premia and the connection between low interest rates, tight credit spreads, and the buildup of risks during booms.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:14.062707-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14057
       
  • Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
    • Authors: Kate Ho; Robin S. Lee
      Pages: 379 - 417
      Abstract: The impact of insurer competition on welfare, negotiated provider prices, and premiums in the U.S. private health care industry is theoretically ambiguous. Reduced competition may increase the premiums charged by insurers and their payments made to hospitals. However, it may also strengthen insurers' bargaining leverage when negotiating with hospitals, thereby generating offsetting cost decreases. To understand and measure this trade-off, we estimate a model of employer-insurer and hospital-insurer bargaining over premiums and reimbursements, household demand for insurance, and individual demand for hospitals using detailed California admissions, claims, and enrollment data. We simulate the removal of both large and small insurers from consumers' choice sets. Although consumer welfare decreases and premiums typically increase, we find that premiums can fall upon the removal of a small insurer if an employer imposes effective premium constraints through negotiations with the remaining insurers. We also document substantial heterogeneity in hospital price adjustments upon the removal of an insurer, with renegotiated price increases and decreases of as much as 10% across markets.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:13.916343-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13570
       
  • Bargaining With Asymmetric Information: An Empirical Study of Plea
           Negotiations
    • Authors: Bernardo S. Silveira
      Pages: 419 - 452
      Abstract: This paper empirically investigates how sentences to be assigned at trial impact plea bargaining. The analysis is based on the model of bargaining with asymmetric information by Bebchuk, 1984. I provide conditions for the nonparametric identification of the model, propose a consistent nonparametric estimator, and implement it using data on criminal cases from North Carolina. Employing the estimated model, I evaluate how different sentencing reforms affect the outcome of criminal cases. My results indicate that lower mandatory minimum sentences could greatly reduce the total amount of incarceration time assigned by the courts, but may increase conviction rates. In contrast, the broader use of non-incarceration sentences for less serious crimes reduces the number of incarceration convictions, but has a very small effect over the total assigned incarceration time. I also consider the effects of a ban on plea bargains. Depending on the case characteristics, over 20 percent of the defendants who currently receive incarceration sentences would be acquitted if plea bargains were forbidden.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:12.593527-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA12974
       
  • Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
    • Authors: Gabriel Carroll
      Pages: 453 - 488
      Abstract: A principal wishes to screen an agent along several dimensions of private information simultaneously. The agent has quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across the various components. We consider a robust version of the principal's problem, in which she knows the marginal distribution of each component of the agent's type, but does not know the joint distribution. Any mechanism is evaluated by its worst-case expected profit, over all joint distributions consistent with the known marginals. We show that the optimum for the principal is simply to screen along each component separately. This result does not require any assumptions (such as single crossing) on the structure of preferences within each component. The proof technique involves a generalization of the concept of virtual values to arbitrary screening problems. Sample applications include monopoly pricing and a stylized dynamic taxation model.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:13.104913-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14165
       
  • Aspirations and Inequality
    • Authors: Garance Genicot; Debraj Ray
      Pages: 489 - 519
      Abstract: This paper develops a theory of socially determined aspirations, and the interaction of those aspirations with growth and inequality. The interaction is bidirectional: economy-wide outcomes determine individual aspirations, which in turn determine investment incentives and social outcomes. Thus aspirations, income, and the distribution of income evolve jointly. When capital stocks lie in some compact set, steady state distributions must exhibit inequality and are typically clustered around local poles. When sustained growth is possible, initial histories matter. Either there is convergence to an equal distribution (with growth) or there is perennial relative divergence across clusters, with within-cluster convergence. A central feature that drives these results is that aspirations that are moderately above an individual's current standard of living tend to encourage investment, while still higher aspirations may lead to frustration.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:13.31875-05:0
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13865
       
  • Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in Decision-Making
    • Authors: Jakub Steiner; Colin Stewart, Filip Matějka
      Pages: 521 - 553
      Abstract: We solve a general class of dynamic rational inattention problems in which an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model, but it is biased toward an optimal default rule that is independent of the realized state. The model provides the same fit to choice data as dynamic logit, but, because of the bias, yields different counterfactual predictions. We apply the general solution to the study of (i) the status quo bias; (ii) inertia in actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks; and (iii) the tradeoff between accuracy and delay in decision-making.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:12.373875-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13636
       
  • When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?
    • Authors: Thomas Wiseman
      Pages: 555 - 584
      Abstract: I study repeated competition among oligopolists. The only novelty is that firms may go bankrupt and permanently exit: the probability that a firm survives a price war depends on its financial strength, which varies stochastically over time. Under some conditions including no entry, an anti-folk theorem holds: when firms are patient, so that strength levels change relatively quickly, every Nash equilibrium involves an immediate price war that lasts until at most one firm remains. Surprisingly, the possibility of entry may facilitate collusion, as may impatience. The model can explain some observed patterns of collusion and predation.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:13.776598-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13121
       
  • Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for
           Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
    • Authors: Bruno Strulovici
      Pages: 585 - 616
      Abstract: What does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible? This paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts in this environment. The model extends the framework of the Coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods. As frictions become negligible, all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating, efficient, and straightforward to characterize.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:13.595227-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13637
       
  • Forecasting With Model Uncertainty: Representations and Risk Reduction
    • Authors: Keisuke Hirano; Jonathan H. Wright
      Pages: 617 - 643
      Abstract: We consider forecasting with uncertainty about the choice of predictor variables. The researcher wants to select a model, estimate the parameters, and use the parameter estimates for forecasting. We investigate the distributional properties of a number of different schemes for model choice and parameter estimation, including: in-sample model selection using the Akaike information criterion; out-of-sample model selection; and splitting the data into subsamples for model selection and parameter estimation. Using a weak-predictor local asymptotic scheme, we provide a representation result that facilitates comparison of the distributional properties of the procedures and their associated forecast risks. This representation isolates the source of inefficiency in some of these procedures. We develop a simulation procedure that improves the accuracy of the out-of-sample and split-sample methods uniformly over the local parameter space. We also examine how bootstrap aggregation (bagging) affects the local asymptotic risk of the estimators and their associated forecasts. Numerically, we find that for many values of the local parameter, the out-of-sample and split-sample schemes perform poorly if implemented in the conventional way. But they perform well, if implemented in conjunction with our risk-reduction method or bagging.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:14.176554-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13372
       
  • Robust Confidence Intervals for Average Treatment Effects Under Limited
           Overlap
    • Authors: Christoph Rothe
      Pages: 645 - 660
      Abstract: Limited overlap between the covariate distributions of groups with different treatment assignments does not only make estimates of average treatment effects rather imprecise, but can also lead to substantially distorted confidence intervals. This paper argues that this is because the coverage error of traditional confidence intervals is driven by the number of observations in the areas of limited overlap. Some of these “local sample sizes” can be very small in applications, up to the point that distributional approximations derived from classical asymptotic theory become unreliable. Building on this observation, this paper constructs confidence intervals based on classical approaches to small sample inference. The approach is easy to implement, and has superior theoretical and practical properties relative to standard methods in empirically relevant settings.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:13.492456-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13141
       
  • Single-Crossing Random Utility Models
    • Authors: Jose Apesteguia; Miguel A. Ballester, Jay Lu
      Pages: 661 - 674
      Abstract: We propose a novel model of stochastic choice: the single-crossing random utility model (SCRUM). This is a random utility model in which the collection of preferences satisfies the single-crossing property. We offer a characterization of SCRUMs based on two easy-to-check properties: the classic Monotonicity property and a novel condition, Centrality. The identified collection of preferences and associated probabilities is unique. We show that SCRUMs nest both single-peaked and single-dipped random utility models and establish a stochastic monotone comparative result for the case of SCRUMs.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:12.72467-05:0
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14230
       
  • Altruism in Networks
    • Authors: Renaud Bourlès; Yann Bramoullé, Eduardo Perez-Richet
      Pages: 675 - 689
      Abstract: We provide the first analysis of altruism in networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed network and care about the well-being of their network neighbors. Depending on incomes, they may provide financial support to their poorer friends. We study the Nash equilibria of the resulting game of transfers. We show that equilibria maximize a concave potential function. We establish existence, uniqueness of equilibrium consumption, and generic uniqueness of equilibrium transfers. We characterize the geometry of the network of transfers and highlight the key role played by transfer intermediaries. We then study comparative statics. A positive income shock to an individual benefits all. For small changes in incomes, agents in a component of the network of transfers act as if they were organized in an income-pooling community. A decrease in income inequality or expansion of the altruism network may increase consumption inequality.
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:12.966034-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13533
       
  • Forthcoming Papers
    • Pages: 691 - 691
      PubDate: 2017-03-21T09:12:12.549229-05:
      DOI: 10.3982/ECTA852FORTH
       
 
 
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