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  Subjects -> ANIMAL WELFARE (Total: 103 journals)
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Social Choice and Welfare
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.644
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 12  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1432-217X - ISSN (Online) 0176-1714
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2467 journals]
  • Mechanism design with model specification

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider a setting in which additional parameters that determine preference characteristics are unknown. The mechanism designer specifies a model for possible type distributions and utility functions. We consider mechanisms that are uniformly incentive compatible with respect to a domain of possible utility functions. We identify conditions on the utility domain in which mechanisms always prescribe the same distribution over outcomes. These conditions have implications for optimal mechanism design with max-min objectives, and may be interpreted as capturing different forms of preference heterogeneity.
      PubDate: 2023-01-27
       
  • Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures

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      Abstract: Abstract We investigate a specific type of group manipulation in two-tier elections, which involves pairs of voters agreeing to exchange their votes. Two-tier elections are modeled as a two-stage choice procedure. In the first stage, voters are distributed into districts, and district preferences result from aggregating voters’ preferences district-wise through some aggregation rule. Final outcomes are obtained in the second stage by applying a social choice function that outputs one or several alternatives from the profile of district preferences. Combining an aggregation rule and a social choice function defines a constitution. Voter preferences, defined as linear orders, are extended to complete binary relations by means of some extension rule. A constitution is swap-proof w.r.t. a given extension rule if one cannot find pairs of voters who, by exchanging their preferences get better off (w.r.t. their extended preference over sets). We consider four specific extension rules: Nehring, Kelly, Fishburn, and Gärdenfors. We establish sufficient conditions for the swap-proofness of a constitution w.r.t. each extension rule. Special attention is paid to majority constitutions, where both the aggregation rule and the social choice function are based on simple majority voting. We show that swap-proofness for majority constitutions pertains to a specific weakening of group strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize swap-proof majority constitutions w.r.t. each extension rule. Finally, we show that no constitution based on scoring methods is swap-proof.
      PubDate: 2023-01-25
       
  • Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism
           design approach

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      Abstract: Abstract We propose a new method, that we call an allocation perturbation, to derive the optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with multidimensional individual characteristics on which taxes cannot be conditioned. It is well established that, when individuals differ in terms of preferences on top of their skills, optimal marginal tax rates can be negative. In contrast, we show that with heterogeneous behavioral responses and skills, one has optimal positive marginal tax rates, under utilitarian preferences and maximin.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Ordinal allocation

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      Abstract: Abstract A generalization of the well-known Vickrey auctions are lottery qualification auctions–where the m highest bidders win the good with uniform probability, and pay the \(m+1\) st highest bid upon winning. A random lottery qualification mechanism decides the integer m randomly. We characterize the class of mechanisms which are payoff equivalent to the random lottery qualification auctions. The key property characterizing this class of mechanisms is one which states that only the ordinal comparison of willingness-to-pay across individuals is relevant in determining the allocation. The mechanisms can be seen as compromising between ex-post utility efficiency and monetary efficiency.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • New perspectives on the Gini and Bonferroni indices of inequality

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper rigorously demonstrates that for any unequal income distribution, the well-known Gini index of inequality is bounded above by the recently revived Bonferroni inequality index. The bound is exactly attained if and only if out of n incomes in the society, n − 1 poor incomes are identical. The boundedness theorem is shown to possess a duality-type inequality implication. These two inequality metrics, two popular members of a general class of inequality indices generated by Aaberge’s (J Econ Inequal 5:305–322, 2007) ‘scaled conditional mean curve’, may lead to different directional rankings of alternative income distributions because of some important differences between them. We then explicitly examine their sensitivity to Weymark’s (Math Soc Sci 1:409–430, 1981) ‘comonotonic additivity’ postulate.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Taxation behind the veil of ignorance

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      Abstract: Abstract We explore the design of impartial tax schemes in a simple setup where agents’ incomes are completely determined by their inborn talents. Building on Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance approach, we conceptualize an impartial observer who chooses a tax scheme without knowing her own preferences and the distribution of talents, and whose vNM preferences behind the veil obey Harsanyi’s principle of acceptance and are independent, in terms of utility-scale, of the distribution of talents. Our results in the resulting framework provide three main messages: (i) the veil of ignorance implies anonymity of tax schemes; (ii) the veil of ignorance generically rejects utilitarian tax schemes; (iii) the veil of ignorance endorses the (Rawlsian) leveling tax scheme.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems

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      Abstract: Abstract For sequencing problems, we identify the set of all mechanisms satisfying queue efficiency, strategy-proofness and budget balance. Such mechanisms are balanced VCG (or B-VCG) mechanisms up to an agent specific function that does not depend on the waiting cost of a concerned agent and for each problem these agent specific constants must add up to zero. The B-VCG mechanism is a generalization of the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism analyzed in the queueing context. However, unlike its queueing counterpart, it fails to satisfy even the basic fairness requirement of equal treatment of equals.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven
           migrations

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      Abstract: Abstract We study majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of workers who can migrate between two competing jurisdictions. Both skill level and migration cost are the private information of each worker who will propose an allocation schedule that maximizes the utility of her own type. We identify reasonable scenarios in which the first-order approach applies and hence the second-order sufficient condition for incentive compatibility is fulfilled; otherwise, we need to apply the ironing surgery developed by Brett and Weymark (Games Econ Behav 101:172–188, 2017). Under quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, we show that the tax schedule proposed by the median skill type is the Condorcet winner, and provide a complete characterization of this tax schedule. While this schedule features negative marginal tax rates for low-skilled workers, it features positive rates for high-skilled workers with small migration elasticities; the marginal tax rates at the bottom and top skill levels cannot be unambiguously signed. Moreover, we detail the conditions under which migration induces uniformly higher or lower equilibrium marginal tax rates facing both low- and high-skilled workers than their counterparts in autarky, which leads us to conclude that geographic mobility does not always limit the government’s ability to redistribute incomes via tax-transfer systems.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post
           revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Tailored recommendations

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      Abstract: Abstract Many popular internet platforms use so-called collaborative filtering systems to give personalized recommendations to their users, based on other users who provided similar ratings for some items. We propose a novel approach to such recommendation systems by viewing a recommendation as a way to extend an agent’s expressed preferences, which are typically incomplete, through some aggregate of other agents’ expressed preferences. These extension and aggregation requirements are expressed by an Acceptance and a Pareto principle, respectively. We characterize the recommendation systems satisfying these two principles and contrast them with collaborative filtering systems, which typically violate the Pareto principle.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of
           the Boston school choice mechanism

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      Abstract: Abstract The Boston mechanism (BOS) is widely used for the assignment of students to schools. Yet, BOS is highly manipulable and, therefore, may lead to Pareto inferior assignments. We propose a new indirect matching mechanism ( \({{ NBOS }}\) ) that is a slight variant of BOS. \({{ NBOS }}\) is less manipulable than BOS in two important ways: (i) students always have a best reply featuring truthful reported preference, (ii) rational students avoid particular re-rankings that are typical in BOS. Most importantly, the lower manipulability of \({{ NBOS }}\) helps reaching more efficient assignments than those reached by BOS. We show that each equilibrium of BOS is associated to a set of equilibria of \({{ NBOS }}\) , all of which are Pareto superior. \({{ NBOS }}\) generalizes to a class of mechanisms whose members are even less manipulable than \({{ NBOS }}\) .
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based

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      Abstract: Abstract In college admission, financial aid plays an important role in students’ enrollment decision as well as their preparation for college application. We analyze how different types of financial aid affect these decisions and admission outcomes. We consider two financial aid regimes—need-based and merit-based—in a simple college admission model and characterize respective equilibria. We find that a more competitive college has a higher admission cutoff under a need-based regime than under a merit-based regime. A less competitive college, on the other hand, benefits from a merit-based regime as it admits students with a higher average ability than it does under no aid. We next allow colleges to choose their own financial aid system so as to account for a stylized fact in the US college admissions. We show that when one college is ranked above the other, it is a dominant strategy for the higher-ranked college to offer need-based aid and for the lower-ranked college to offer merit-based aid.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction

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      Abstract: Abstract Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and a form of weak continuity. Roberts (Rev Econ Stud 47(2):421–439, 1980) claimed that the induced welfare ordering on social states has a one-way representation by a continuous, monotonic real-valued welfare function defined on the Euclidean space of interpersonal utility vectors—that is, an increase in this welfare function is sufficient, but may not be necessary, for social strict preference. A counter-example shows that weak continuity is insufficient; a minor strengthening to pairwise continuity is proposed instead and its sufficiency demonstrated.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules

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      Abstract: Abstract Considering optimal non-linear income tax problems when the social welfare function only depends on ranks as in Yaari (Econometrica 55(1):95–115, 1987) and weights agreeing with the Lorenz quasi-ordering, we extend the analysis of Simula and Trannoy (Am Econ J Econ Policy, 2021) in two directions. First, we establish conditions under which bunching does not occur in the social optimum. We find a sufficient condition on individual preferences, which appears as a reinforcement of the Spence-Mirrlees condition. In particular, the marginal dis-utility of gross income should be convex, but less convex the higher the productivity. We also show that, for all productivity distributions with a log-concave survival function, bunching is precluded under the maximin, Gini, and “illfare-ranked single-series Ginis”. Second, we turn to a discrete population setting, and provide an “ABC” formula for optimal marginal tax rates, which is related to those for a continuum of types found in Simula and Trannoy (2021), but remain essentially distinct.
      PubDate: 2023-01-01
       
  • Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members

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      Abstract: Abstract We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect not only the incentives of challengers to get involved in the conflict (intra-group effect), but also the mobilization of status-quo defenders (inter-group effect). We disentangle these two effects and show that the degree of polarization (distance between the alternative and the status-quo policy) depends on how the efforts that groups exert in the contest affect their winning probabilities. Our results illustrate how the conflict resolution rules may affect the degree of polarization in political confrontations.
      PubDate: 2022-12-30
       
  • Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads

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      Abstract: Abstract We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing common harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact in a public bad setting and must choose ex ante how much to contribute in order to reduce the probability of causing a common damage. If a damage occurs, subjects bear a part of the loss according to the liability-sharing rule in force. We consider two existing rules: a per capita rule and a proportional rule. Our aim is to analyze the relative impact of information disclosure under each rule. We show that information disclosure increases contributions only under a per capita rule. This result challenges the classical results regarding the positive effects of information disclosure, since we show that this impact may depend upon the legal context. We also show that while a proportional rule leads to higher contributions than a per capita one, the positive effect of disclosure on a per capita rule makes it as efficient as a proportional rule without information disclosure.
      PubDate: 2022-12-27
       
  • Special Issue in Honour of John A. Weymark

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      PubDate: 2022-11-29
       
  • Where should your daughter go to college' An axiomatic analysis

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of choosing a location in an interval so as to best take into account the preferences of two agents who will use this location. One has single-peaked preferences and the other single-dipped preferences. The most preferred location for the agent with single-peaked preferences is known and it is the least preferred location for the agent with single-dipped preferences. We show that the only efficient and strategy-proof rules are dictatorial.
      PubDate: 2022-11-18
      DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01438-y
       
  • The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s
           independence of irrelevant alternatives

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      Abstract: Abstract Social choice functions are generalized to handle Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established.
      PubDate: 2022-11-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z
       
 
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