Subjects -> ANIMAL WELFARE (Total: 107 journals)
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 Social Choice and WelfareJournal Prestige (SJR): 0.644 Citation Impact (citeScore): 1Number of Followers: 11      Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 1432-217X - ISSN (Online) 0176-1714 Published by Springer-Verlag  [2469 journals]
• Habit formation and the pareto-efficient provision of public goods

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the implications of habit formation in private and public goods consumption for the Pareto-efficient provision of public goods, based on a two-period model with nonlinear taxation. Under weak leisure separability, and if the public good is a flow-variable such that the government directly decides on the level of the public good in each period, habit formation leads to a modification of the policy rule for public good provision if, and only if, the degrees of habituation differ for private and public good consumption. By contrast, if the public good supply is time-invariant, the presence of habit formation generally alters the policy rule for public good provision.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters

Abstract: Abstract We use a model of impressionable voters to study multi-candidate elections under different electoral rules. Instead of maximizing expected utility, voters cast their ballots based on impressions. We show that, under each rule, there is a monotone relationship between voter preferences and vote measures. The nature of this relationship, however, varies by electoral rule. Vote measures are biased upwards for socially preferred candidates under plurality rule, but biased downwards under negative plurality. There is no such bias under approval voting or Borda count. Voters always elect the socially preferred candidate in two-way races for any electoral rule. In multi-candidate elections, however, the ability to elect a Condorcet winner varies by rule. The results show that multi-candidate elections can perform well even if voters follow simple behavioral rules. The relative performance of specific electoral institutions, however, depends on the assumed behavioral model of voting.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model

Abstract: Abstract The paper presents a coalitional bargaining model, the Burning Coalition Bargaining Model, having a peculiar type of partial breakdown. In fact, in this model, the rejection of a proposal causes the possibility of the proposed coalition to vanish, rather than triggering the end of all negotiations or the exclusion of some players from the game, as already proposed in the literature. Under this type of partial breakdown and adopting a standard rejecter-proposes protocol, 0-normalized, 3-players games are examined for extreme values of the breakdown probability. When such probability is equal to one, efficiency is more difficult to obtain than in models adopting discounting and the first mover advantage is strongly diminished. Furthermore, when an efficient outcome is attained, the final distribution of payoffs reflects the strength of players in the game, with strength being represented by belonging to more valuable coalitions. The same feature is retained when considering a probability of breakdown approaching zero.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• Round-robin tournaments with limited resources

Abstract: Abstract We propose a theoretical model of a round-robin tournament with limited resources motivated by the fact that in real-world sport round-robin tournaments, participating teams are sometimes forced to distribute their effort over multiple matches. We assume that participating teams have a limited amount of effort that must be distributed between all matches of the tournament. We model the outcome of each match as a first-price all-pay auction. The prizes are awarded according to the ranking at the end of the tournament, based on the number of wins. The tournament with three teams is solved. In the case of identical budgets and low first prize, we find two types of equilibria—‘effort-saving’ and ‘burning-out’—both leading to unequal payoffs; when the first prize is large, we find multiple families of equilibria with both equal and non-equal payoffs. In the case of non-identical budgets, we show that there exist equilibria where a team with a lower budget gets a higher payoff than a team with a larger budget.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment

Abstract: Abstract Natural resources such as water, for which the availability to users is random, are often shared according to predefined rules. What determines users’ choice of a sharing rule' To answer this question, we designed an experiment in which subjects: (1) vote on sharing rules; (2) choose the technology that transforms the resource into payoffs; and (3) respond to a survey on their adhesion to principles of fairness. We find that although subjects tend to vote for the sharing rule that is aligned with their self-interest, they become more egalitarian if they report their views on the fairness principles before voting. Furthermore, the adhesion to fairness principles affects the subjects’ votes not directly but rather indirectly through the choice of technology.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests

Abstract: Abstract We study a three-player Tullock contest in an endogenous-timing framework, focusing on the players’ decisions on timing of effort exertion. In this model, there are two points in time at which the players may choose their effort levels. The players decide independently and announce simultaneously when they each will expend their effort, and then each player chooses her effort level at the point in time which she announced. We find that, given moderate asymmetries among the players, each of the players announces the first point in time, and thus they all choose their effort levels simultaneously at the first point in time. This finding is in sharp contrast to a well-known result obtained from two-player asymmetric contests with endogenous timing.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori
information

Abstract: Abstract We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some partial order. This partial order might differ for different individuals. Necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated under which these restricted domains admit unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions

Abstract: Abstract We propose new axiomatizations of the core and three related solution concepts that also provide predictions for (classes of) games in which the core itself is empty. Our results showcase the importance of the reduced game formulation and identify the corresponding converse consistency property as the differentiating characteristic between the core and its various extensions. Existing axiomatizations of the core and similar concepts include the required form of feasibility in the generic definition of a solution concept and/or are restricted to the domain of games for which existence is guaranteed. We dispense of both practices, thus opening up the possibility of comparing, via basic axioms, solution concepts that have different feasibility constraints and domains.
PubDate: 2022-10-01

• Universalization and altruism

Abstract: Abstract The $$\kappa$$ -universalization of a symmetric game is the game in which each player considers that any other player chooses with probability $$\kappa$$ the same stategy as she. To any normal form game, we associate the symmetric two-stage game in which, in a first stage, the roles to be played in the base game are randomly assigned. We show that any pure strategy equilibrium of the $$\kappa$$ -universalization of this extended game is an equilibrium of the base game played by altruistic players (“ex ante Homo Moralis equilibrium is altruistic”), and that the converse is false. The paper presents the implications of this remark for the philosophical nature of ethical behavior (Kantianism behind the veil of ignorance implies but is stronger than altruism) and for its evolutionary foundations.
PubDate: 2022-09-21

• Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies single-peaked domains where the designer is uncertain about the underlying alignment according to which the domain is single-peaked. The underlying alignment is common knowledge amongst agents, but preferences are private knowledge. Thus, the state of the world has both a public and private element, with the designer uninformed of both. I first posit a relevant solution concept called implementation in mixed information equilibria, which requires Nash implementation in the public information and dominant strategy implementation in the private information given the public information. I then identify necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice rules (SCRs) to be implementable. The characterization is used to identify unanimous and anonymous implementable SCRs for different forms of designer uncertainty, which basically boils down to picking the right SCRs from the large class identified by Moulin (Public Choice 35(4):437–455, 1980), and hence this result can be seen as identifying which of Moulin’s SCRs are robust to designer uncertainty.
PubDate: 2022-09-15

• On Sugden’s normative economics and the comparison of non-nested
opportunity sets

Abstract: Abstract In his book The Community of Advantage, Sugden proposes a form of normative economics that is almost free of the concept of preferences. Specifically, Sugden relies on the idea that everyone can accept the principle that more opportunities is better than less. Yet, this approach cannot be easily applied to the choice of economic reforms that fail to provide more opportunities for everyone. This paper complements an approach proposed by Sugden to deal with non-nested opportunity sets. We rely on the idea that people should take responsibility for the choices that were not endorsed before the reform takes place. In this perspective, a reform project is admissible if it allows people to stick to their initial choices and provides them with a rich set of opportunities (that is, the new opportunity regime must also satisfy Sugden’s Strong Interactive Opportunity Criterion). As an illustration, we show how routine redistribution schemes can make free trade be preferred to autarky even if it does not provide more opportunities for everyone.
PubDate: 2022-09-12

• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Abstract: Abstract Our objective is to analyze the relationship between the Shapley value and the core of cooperative games with transferable utility. We first characterize balanced games, i.e., the set of games with a nonempty core, through geometric properties. We show that the set of balanced games generates a polyhedral cone and that a game is balanced if and only if it is a nonnegative linear combination of some simple games. Moreover, we show that the set of games whose Shapley value lies in the core also yields a polyhedral cone and that a game obeys this property if and only if it is a nonnegative linear combination of simple games satisfying certain properties. By-products, we also show that the number of games that correspond to the extreme rays of the polyhedron coincides with the number of minimal balanced collections.
PubDate: 2022-09-10

• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights

Abstract: Abstract Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the strong core. The planner’s exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. We provide a complete characterization of the implementable social choice rules.
PubDate: 2022-09-10

• The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem

Abstract: Abstract A permit sharing problem is described by a list of countries, each of which owns a certain amount of emission permits and has a unique technology that requires permits to produce output. We consider the solutions of sharing the optimal global surplus generated beyond the autarky economy output. We divide countries into two groups based on the types of contribution, the technology contributors and the permit contributors. Suppose that the division of the total surplus between the two groups is fixed at an arbitrary ratio $$\alpha \in [0,1]$$ (Separation Principle of parameter $$\alpha$$ ). The fixed amount of surplus assigned to each group is distributed based on the contributions of the members of the group. By requiring that no subgroup of countries can increase their share by reallocating the total amount of their contributions among themselves (Permit Reallocation-Proofness and Technology Reallocation-Proofness), we characterize a family of solutions indexed by parameter $$\alpha \in [0,1]$$ , called the proportional solution of parameter $$\alpha$$ . By further requiring that each country receives at least the level of output it can produce with its own technology and permit (Voluntary Participation), we show that only the solution with $$\alpha =1/2$$ , called the equal share proportional solution, meets this requirement. Under this solution, the technology contributors and the permit contributors are treated equally.
PubDate: 2022-09-06

• Electoral turnout with divided opposition

Abstract: Abstract We model costly, strategic voting in an electorate divided between a single pro-incumbent and multiple pro-opposition groups, and study the effect of the homogeneity of preferences within the opposition electorate on voter turnout. If each opposition group is represented by a separate candidate, there is a free-rider effect: the opposition turnout is lower if different opposition candidates are more substitutable. If there is a single pro-opposition candidate, the effect is the opposite under the proportional representation, and under a winner-tale-all system it depends on the size of the opposition, weighted by the intensity of preferences toward the opposition candidate. The weighted size of the opposition electorate also matters for how preference homogeneity affects incumbent vote share under proportional representation.
PubDate: 2022-08-17

• Robust dissimilarity comparisons with categorical outcomes

Abstract: Abstract The analysis of many phenomena requires partitioning societies into groups and studying the extent at which these groups are distributed with different intensities across relevant non-ordered categorical outcomes. When the groups are similarly distributed, their members have equal chances to achieve any of the attainable outcomes. Otherwise, a form of dissimilarity between groups distributions prevails. We characterize axiomatically the dissimilarity partial order of multi-group distributions defined over categorical outcomes. The main result provides an equivalent representation of this partial order by the ranking of multi-group distributions originating from the inclusion of their zonotope representations. The zonotope inclusion criterion refines (that is, is implied by) majorization conditions that are largely adopted in mainstream approaches to multi-group segregation or univariate and multivariate inequality analysis.
PubDate: 2022-08-16

• Valuation of ecosystem services and social choice: the impact of
deliberation in the context of two different aggregation rules

Abstract: Abstract This paper describes an empiric study of aggregation and deliberation—used during citizens’ workshops—for the elicitation of collective preferences over 20 different ecosystem services (ESs) delivered by the Palavas coastal lagoons located on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea close to Montpellier (S. France). The impact of deliberation is apprehended by comparing the collectives preferences constructed with and without deliberation. The same aggregation rules were used before and after deliberation. We compared two different aggregation methods, i.e. Rapid Ecosystem Services Participatory Appraisal (RESPA) and Majority Judgement (MJ). RESPA had been specifically tested for ESs, while MJ evaluates the merit of each item, an ES in our case, in a predefined ordinal scale of judgment. The impact of deliberation was strongest for the RESPA method. This new information acquired from application of social choice theory is particularly useful for ecological economics studying ES, and more practically for the development of deliberative approaches for public policies.
PubDate: 2022-08-02

• Social identity and risky leisure activities: implications for welfare and
policy

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we build on theories in psychology and economics and link positional preferences to private agents’ identification with a social group, and the social norms present in that group. The purpose of our paper is to analyze behavioral, welfare, and policy implications of a link between private agents´ social identity and a risky leisure activity. Our results suggest that, when the outcome of the positional activity is uncertain, the over-consumption result that is associated with positional preferences in a deterministic framework need not apply to all agents in a social equilibrium. The reason is that agents have incentives to act with caution in order to avoid failure when the outcome of the socially valued activity is uncertain. We also show how policy can be used to improve the welfare within a social group where the risky leisure activity is positional.
PubDate: 2022-08-01

• Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French
presidential elections

Abstract: Abstract A voting rule is monotonic if a winning candidate never becomes a loser by being raised in voters’ rankings of candidates, ceteris paribus. Plurality with a runoff is known to fail monotonicity. To see how widespread this failure is, we focus on French presidential elections since 1965. We identify mathematical conditions that allow a logically conceivable scenario of vote shifts between candidates that may lead to a monotonicity violation. We show that eight among the ten elections held since 1965 (those in 1965 and 1974 being the exceptions) exhibit this theoretical vulnerability. To be sure, the conceived scenario of vote shifts that enables a monotonicity violation may not be plausible under the political context of the considered election. Thus, we analyze the political landscape of these eight elections and argue that for two of them (2002 and 2007 elections), the monotonicity violation scenario was plausible within the conjuncture of the time.
PubDate: 2022-08-01

• Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index

Abstract: Abstract A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after lengthy deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, the committee member who introduced it does not cooperate in any effort to replace it. For a player, not cooperate means to vote against a proposal when the rule identifies him or her as one of those who are entitled to make a decision. The one-core is a solution concept that captures that idea. It is never empty if the committee has less than five individuals, but might be empty if there are five or more individuals. I identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the one-core no matter the number of alternatives, the preference profile or the number of players in a committee game, under any qualified majority rule.
PubDate: 2022-08-01

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