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  Subjects -> ANIMAL WELFARE (Total: 107 journals)
Showing 1 - 22 of 22 Journals sorted by number of followers
Journal of Veterinary Internal Medicine     Open Access   (Followers: 29)
Animal Welfare     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 27)
Animal Nutrition     Open Access   (Followers: 21)
Ethics and Social Welfare     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Animal Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Journal of Comparative Social Welfare     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Society and Animals     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
European Journal of Wildlife Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Social Choice and Welfare     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Journal of Experimental Psychology : Animal Learning and Cognition     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Animals     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Wildfowl     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Alternatives to Laboratory Animals     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Veterinary Clinical Pathology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Acrocephalus     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Companion Animal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Australian Mammalogy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Asian Journal of Animal and Veterinary Advances     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Animal Studies Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Canadian Journal of Animal Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Journal of Research in Forestry, Wildlife and Environment     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
African Journal of Wildlife Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Journal of Applied Animal Research     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Agrivet : Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Pertanian dan Peternakan / Journal of Agricultural Sciences and Veteriner)     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Equine Health     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Animal - Science Proceedings     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Asian Journal of Cell Biology     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Bangladesh Journal of Animal Science     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Natural History Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Wildlife and Biodiversity     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Botany     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Nutrición Animal Tropical     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Animal Frontiers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Asian Journal of Animal Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Animal Science and Biotechnology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Animal Research International     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
British Poultry Abstracts     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Animal Health and Production in Africa     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Pest Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
South African Journal of Animal Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Research Journal of Parasitology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Health, Animal Science and Food Safety     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
International Journal for Parasitology : Parasites and Wildlife     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Pastoralism : Research, Policy and Practice     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Botanical Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Jurnal Veteriner     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Majalah Ilmiah Peternakan     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Animal Diseases     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jurnal Agripet     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Buletin Veteriner Udayana     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
TRACE ∴ Finnish Journal for Human-Animal Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Animal Science and Products     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Applied Animal Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Pet Behaviour Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Derecho Animal. Forum of Animal Law Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Indonesian Journal of Animal and Veterinary Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Threatened Taxa     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Scientific Papers Animal Science and Biotechnologies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Australian Holstein Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Global Journal of Animal Scientific Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Advances in Botanical Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Pecuarias     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Jurnal Ilmu dan Kesehatan Hewan (Veterinary Science and Medicine Journal)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Italian Journal of Animal Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Online Journal of Animal and Feed Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revista Brasileira de Higiene e Sanidade Animal     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revue de primatologie     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Nigerian Journal of Animal Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Buletin Peternakan : Bulletin of Animal Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archivos de Medicina Veterinaria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Pecuarias (Colombian journal of animal science and veterinary medicine)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
veterinär spiegel     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Animal Sentience : An Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal Feeling     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Iranian Journal of Applied Animal Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Zoological and Botanical Gardens     Open Access  
Archiva Zootehnica     Open Access  
Veterinary and Animal Science     Open Access  
Proceedings of the Vertebrate Pest Conference     Open Access  
Journal of Veterinary Science & Medicine     Open Access  
Human-Wildlife Interactions     Open Access  
Turkish Journal of Veterinary Research     Open Access  
Revista Colombiana de Ciencia Animal     Open Access  
Jurnal Sain Peternakan Indonesia     Open Access  
People and Animals : The International Journal of Research and Practice     Open Access  
Journal of Veterinary and Animal Sciences     Open Access  
Uluslararası Tarım ve Yaban Hayatı Bilimleri Dergisi / International Journal of Agricultural and Wildlife Sciences     Open Access  
Journal of Anatolian Environmental and Animal Sciences     Open Access  
Hayvansal Üretim     Open Access  
Revista de Producción Animal     Open Access  
Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Peternakan     Open Access  
Translational Animal Science     Open Access  
Corpoica Ciencia y Tecnología Agropecuaria     Open Access  
RUDN Journal of Agronomy and Animal Industries     Open Access  
Science and Animal Health     Open Access  
Wartazoa. Indonesian Bulletin of Animal and Veterinary Sciences     Open Access  
Spei Domus     Open Access  
Annual Review of Animal Biosciences     Full-text available via subscription  
Rangifer     Open Access  
Revista de Salud Animal     Open Access  

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Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Social Choice and Welfare
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.644
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 11  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1432-217X - ISSN (Online) 0176-1714
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2469 journals]
  • Valuation of ecosystem services and social choice: the impact of
           deliberation in the context of two different aggregation rules

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract This paper describes an empiric study of aggregation and deliberation—used during citizens’ workshops—for the elicitation of collective preferences over 20 different ecosystem services (ESs) delivered by the Palavas coastal lagoons located on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea close to Montpellier (S. France). The impact of deliberation is apprehended by comparing the collectives preferences constructed with and without deliberation. The same aggregation rules were used before and after deliberation. We compared two different aggregation methods, i.e. Rapid Ecosystem Services Participatory Appraisal (RESPA) and Majority Judgement (MJ). RESPA had been specifically tested for ESs, while MJ evaluates the merit of each item, an ES in our case, in a predefined ordinal scale of judgment. The impact of deliberation was strongest for the RESPA method. This new information acquired from application of social choice theory is particularly useful for ecological economics studying ES, and more practically for the development of deliberative approaches for public policies.
      PubDate: 2022-08-02
       
  • Social identity and risky leisure activities: implications for welfare and
           policy

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we build on theories in psychology and economics and link positional preferences to private agents’ identification with a social group, and the social norms present in that group. The purpose of our paper is to analyze behavioral, welfare, and policy implications of a link between private agents´ social identity and a risky leisure activity. Our results suggest that, when the outcome of the positional activity is uncertain, the over-consumption result that is associated with positional preferences in a deterministic framework need not apply to all agents in a social equilibrium. The reason is that agents have incentives to act with caution in order to avoid failure when the outcome of the socially valued activity is uncertain. We also show how policy can be used to improve the welfare within a social group where the risky leisure activity is positional.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French
           presidential elections

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      Abstract: Abstract A voting rule is monotonic if a winning candidate never becomes a loser by being raised in voters’ rankings of candidates, ceteris paribus. Plurality with a runoff is known to fail monotonicity. To see how widespread this failure is, we focus on French presidential elections since 1965. We identify mathematical conditions that allow a logically conceivable scenario of vote shifts between candidates that may lead to a monotonicity violation. We show that eight among the ten elections held since 1965 (those in 1965 and 1974 being the exceptions) exhibit this theoretical vulnerability. To be sure, the conceived scenario of vote shifts that enables a monotonicity violation may not be plausible under the political context of the considered election. Thus, we analyze the political landscape of these eight elections and argue that for two of them (2002 and 2007 elections), the monotonicity violation scenario was plausible within the conjuncture of the time.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index

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      Abstract: Abstract A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after lengthy deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, the committee member who introduced it does not cooperate in any effort to replace it. For a player, not cooperate means to vote against a proposal when the rule identifies him or her as one of those who are entitled to make a decision. The one-core is a solution concept that captures that idea. It is never empty if the committee has less than five individuals, but might be empty if there are five or more individuals. I identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the one-core no matter the number of alternatives, the preference profile or the number of players in a committee game, under any qualified majority rule.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Institutional reform, technology adoption and redistribution: a political
           economy perspective

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      Abstract: Abstract We examine technology adoption and growth in a political economy framework where two alternative mechanisms of redistribution are on the menu of choice for the economy. One of these is a lump-sum transfer given to agents in the economy. The other is in the form of expenditure directed towards institutional reform aimed at bringing about a reduction in the cost of technology adoption in the presence of uncertainty. The choice over these mechanisms is examined under three alternative approaches to collective decision making, namely a voting mechanism, and social planning with a Benthamite and Rawlsian social welfare function respectively. We find that the extent of uncertainty, and initial inequality, working through the political economy mechanism, have a positive impact on long run average wealth levels in the economy in all settings. All economies converge to the same inequality and growth rates in the long run; however, the speed of transition is fastest with the voting mechanism and slowest in the case of social planning with the Rawlsian social welfare function. Transitional inequality is highest in the Rawlsian framework, suggesting that egalitarian objectives in collective decision making do not necessarily correspond to egalitarian outcomes for the economy.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in
           Approval Voting

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider synchronous iterative voting, where voters are given the opportunity to strategically choose their ballots depending on the outcome deduced from the previous collective choices. We propose two settings for synchronous iterative voting, one of classical flavor with a discrete space of states, and a more general continuous-space setting extending the first one. We give a general robustness result for cycles not relying on a tie-breaking rule, showing that they persist under small enough perturbations of the behavior of voters. Then we give examples in Approval Voting of electorates applying simple, sincere and consistent heuristics (namely Laslier’s Leader Rule or a modification of it) leading to cycles with bad outcomes, either not electing an existing Condorcet winner, or possibly electing a candidate ranked last by a majority of voters. Using the robustness result, it follows that those “bad cycles” persist even if only a (large enough) fraction of the electorate updates its choice of ballot at each iteration. We complete these results with examples in other voting methods, including ranking methods satisfying the Condorcet criterion; an in silico experimental study of the rarity of preference profiles exhibiting bad cycles; and an example exhibiting chaotic behavior.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider a reduced-form implementation problem where two players bargain over how to allocate some resources among a finite set of social alternatives. Each player’s payoff depends on how much of the resources is allocated towards each alternative. Distributional constraints on some targeted groups of alternatives are allowed. Using a network flow approach, we provide a characterization of the reduced-form implementability condition. We show that our results can be useful to study public good problems with budget constraints where a joint implementation of private and public alternatives is possible.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic'

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      Abstract: Abstract In a classical “jury theorem” setting, the collective performance of a group of independent decision-makers is maximized by a voting rule that assigns weight to individuals compatibly with skills. The primary concern is that such weighted voting interferes with majoritarianism, since excessive power may be granted to a competent minority. In this paper, we address a surprisingly undertheorized issue of much significance to collective decision-making: the overlap of optimal weighted voting and the democratic, ubiquitous simple majority rule which is typically adopted in public decision-making. Running Monte Carlo simulations on the distribution of skills in large groups, our main findings are rather counterintuitive. In terms of procedure, the optimal allocation of weights is almost always democratic or “semi-democratic”, in that it satisfies or draws close to “one person, one weight”. In terms of outcome, the chosen alternative under optimal weighted voting is almost always the one that would have been selected by the simple majority rule, which satisfies “one person, one vote”. We thereby submit that the decision rules supported by the proceduralist and epistemic approaches to collective decision-making, effectively coincide more often than one would expect.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Stable preference aggregation with infinite population

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we explore the stability of the aggregation procedure of individual preferences. In particular, we propose the stability under the addition of social preference, which is a normative property of democratic collective decision making. We establish impossibility and possibility theorems for non-dictatorial aggregation procedures.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to
           İnal (2015)

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      Abstract: Abstract In this note, we consider sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the core partitions of coalition formation games. İnal (Soc Choice Welf 45:745–763, 2015) introduces a sufficient condition called k-acyclicity and claims that this condition is independent of another sufficient condition called top-coalition property. We show that this claim is incorrect and, in particular, k-acyclicity is equivalent to the common ranking property introduced by Banerjee et al. (Soc Choice Welf 18:135–153, 2001), which is a stronger condition than the top-coalition property.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school
           choice

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      Abstract: Abstract School districts commonly ration public school seats based on students’ preferences and schools’ priorities. Priorities reflect the school districts’ objectives for reducing busing costs (walk-zone priority) or utilizing siblings’ learning spillovers (sibling priority). I develop a simple modification of the well-studied Top Trading Cycles mechanism that matches schools to higher priority students while preserving the mechanism’s desirable efficiency and incentives properties.
      PubDate: 2022-07-27
       
  • The theory of straight ticket voting

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper explores the effects of the straight-ticket voting option (STVO) on the positions of politicians. STVO, present in some US states, allows voters to select one party for all partisan elections listed on the ballot, as opposed to filling out each office individually. We analyse the effects of STVO on policy-making by building a model of pre-election competition. STVO results in greater party loyalty of candidates, while increasing the weight of non-partisan voters’ positions in candidate selection. This induces an asymmetric effect on vote shares and implemented policies in the two-party system.
      PubDate: 2022-07-26
       
  • Borda-optimal taxation of labour income

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      Abstract: Abstract I numerically compute Borda-optimal, i.e., optimal based on the Borda count as the normative criterion, labour-income tax schedules for the United States. I do so in the context of a Mirrlees-style model with quasilinear preferences and a constant elasticity of labour supply. Because the Borda count is defined for finitely many alternatives, the computations restrict attention to a finite subset of the set of continuous, piecewise linear tax schedules with (in the baseline analysis) four or fewer pieces.
      PubDate: 2022-07-24
       
  • Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

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      Abstract: Abstract A social choice correspondence is Nash self-implementable if it can be implemented in Nash equilibrium by a social choice function that selects from it as the game form. We provide a complete characterization of all unanimous and anonymous Nash self-implementable social choice correspondences when there are two agents or two alternatives. For the case of three agents and three alternatives, only the top correspondence is Nash self-implementable. In all other cases, every Nash self-implementable social choice correspondence contains the top correspondence and is contained in the Pareto correspondence. In particular, when the number of alternatives is at least four, every social choice correspondence containing the top correspondence plus the intersection of the Pareto correspondence with a fixed set of alternatives, is self-implementable.
      PubDate: 2022-07-18
       
  • Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules

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      Abstract: Abstract We introduce a new condition for social choice functions, called “equal treatment of congruent distributions.” It requires some invariance between two preference profiles that share a type of congruity property with respect to the associated distributions of votes. It also implies two equal treatment conditions: one is a natural weakening of anonymity, which is the most standard equal treatment condition for individuals, and the other is a natural weakening of neutrality, which is the most standard equal treatment one for alternatives. Thus, equal treatment of congruent distributions plays the role of weak equal treatment conditions both for individuals and for alternatives. As our main results, we characterize a class of social choice functions that satisfy equal treatment of congruent distributions and some mild positive responsiveness conditions, and it is shown to coincide with the class of tie-breaking plurality rules, which are selections of the well-known plurality rule.
      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Liberal political equality does not imply proportional representation

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      Abstract: Abstract In their article ‘Liberal political equality implies proportional representation’, which was published in Social Choice and Welfare 33(4):617–627 in 2009, Eliora van der Hout and Anthony J. McGann claim that any seat-allocation rule that satisfies certain ‘Liberal axioms’ produces results essentially equivalent to proportional representation. We show that their claim and its proof are wanting. Firstly, the Liberal axioms are only defined for seat-allocation rules that satisfy a further axiom, which we call Independence of Vote Realization (IVR). Secondly, the proportional rule is the only anonymous seat-allocation rule that satisfies IVR. Thirdly, the claim’s proof raises the suspicion that reformulating the Liberal axioms in order to save the claim won’t work. Fourthly, we vindicate this suspicion by providing a seat-allocation rule which satisfies reformulated Liberal axioms but which fails to produce results essentially equivalent to proportional representation. Thus, the attention that their claim received in the literature on normative democratic theory notwithstanding, van der Hout and McGann have not established that liberal political equality implies proportional representation.
      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Optimal lobbying pricing

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      Abstract: Abstract We study a game with two candidates and two interest groups. The groups offer two kinds of costly contributions to achieve political influence: (a) pre-election campaign contributions to their favourite candidates that increase their probability of winning the election and (b) post-election lobbying contributions to the winning candidate to affect the implemented policy. The candidates are the first to act by strategically choosing the lobbying prices they will charge the groups if they are elected. We characterise the equilibrium values of the lobbying prices set by the candidates as well as the equilibrium levels of the campaign and lobbying contributions chosen by the groups. We show, endogenously, that in the case with symmetric groups and symmetric politicians, a candidate announces to charge the group that supports her in the election a lower lobbying price, justifying this way the preferential treatment to certain groups from the politicians in office. We also consider two extensions (asymmetric groups and politicians who do not commit to the announced prices) and show that the results of the benchmark model hold under specific conditions.
      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Childlessness, childfreeness and compensation

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      Abstract: Abstract We study the design of a fair family policy in an economy where parenthood is regarded either as desirable or as undesirable, and where there is imperfect fertility control, leading to involuntary childlessness/parenthood. Using an equivalent consumption approach in the consumption-fertility space, we show that the identification of the worst-off individuals depends on how the social evaluator fixes the reference fertility level. Adopting the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst off in realized terms), we study the compensation for involuntary childlessness/parenthood. Unlike real-world family policies, the fair family policy does not always involve positive family allowances, and may also include positive childlessness allowances. Our results are robust to assuming asymmetric information and to introducing Assisted Reproductive Technologies.
      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Voter conformism and inefficient policies

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      Abstract: Abstract A reelection-seeking politician makes a policy decision that can reveal her private information. This information bears on whether her political orientation and capabilities will be a good fit to future circumstances. We study how she may choose inappropriate policies to hide her information, even in the absence of specific conflicts of interests, and how voters’ conformism affects her incentives to do so. Conformism is independent from policies and from voters’ perceptions. Yet we identify a ‘conformism advantage’ for the incumbent that exists only when there is also an incumbency advantage. Conformism changes the incentives of the incumbent and favors the emergence of an efficient, separating equilibrium. It may even eliminate the pooling equilibrium (that can consist in inefficient persistence). Conformism has a mixed impact on social welfare however: it improves policy choices and the information available to independent voters, but fosters inefficient reelection in the face of a stronger opponent. When the incumbent is ‘altruistic’ and values social welfare even when not in power, she partly internalizes this latter effect. The impact of conformism is then non monotonous.
      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments

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      Abstract: Abstract We propose a novel tournament design that incorporates some properties of a round-robin tournament, a Swiss tournament, and a race. The new design includes an all-play-all structure with endogenous scheduling and a winning threshold. Considering a standard round-robin tournament as a baseline model, we first characterize the equilibrium strategies in round-robin tournaments with exogenous and endogenous schedules. Afterward, following an equilibrium analysis of the new tournament design, we compare thirty-six tournament structures inherent in our model with round-robin tournaments on the basis of expected equilibrium effort per battle. We show that a round-robin tournament with an endogenous schedule outperforms all the other tournament structures considered here. We further note that if expected total equilibrium effort is used as a comparison criterion instead, then the new tournament design has a potential to improve upon round-robin tournaments.
      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
 
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