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Abstract: A vast body of research examines the impact of international investment agreements (IIAs) on foreign direct investment (FDI). Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), the investment chapters of free trade agreeme... PubDate: 2025-06-07
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Abstract: We explore, both theoretically and through a laboratory experiment, the impact of different forms of higher-order punishment on third-party behavior and cooperation levels within a public goods game. This investigation may shed light on how norms influence national governments, as monitored by international organizations or disciplined by electoral competition, and how these norms are subsequently enforced on and followed by domestic agents, e.g., businesses. Specifically, we compare two main treatments that represent the effects of competitive elections and external monitors in a stylized form. These treatments are contrasted with a control condition that lacks an additional layer of norm enforcement. While both higher-order punishment institutions enhance cooperation compared to the control, our findings reveal differences between the two scenarios: Evaluation of the third party by an uninvolved agent leads to heightened punishment and reduced free-riding, whereas competition between two third-party candidates results in more strategic and selective punitive actions. PubDate: 2025-05-09
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Abstract: This article examines why some states emerging through decolonization are more actively contributing to international organizations (IOs) than others, focusing on their voluntary financial contributions to the United Nations System (UN). I argue that the birth legacies of states, particularly modes of decolonization, significantly influence their subsequent financial contributions to the UN. A regression analysis of 95 former colonies, mandates, and dependencies suggests that states with a negative legacy – derelict decolonization – provide larger financial contributions to the UN. This finding highlights the impact of colonial history on state behavior within IOs and suggests that former colonies may seek active participation in global governance, valuing international resources highly. PubDate: 2025-05-06
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Abstract: This introduction to the Special Issue reviews the existing literature on the domestic politics of international organizations (IOs), presenting them within a unified theoretical framework. We emphasize the central role of domestic forces in the study of IOs: how individual preferences are channeled through domestic political institutions, and ultimately inform a government’s foreign policy decisions toward and within IOs. We show that these forces can be distilled into a game between citizens in which they select welfare weights to be assigned to citizens across the globe. We refer to this as the Citizens’ IO Game. The contributions in this Special Issue and previous studies are discussed in the framework of the Citizens’ IO Game, which offers fresh insights into the intersection of domestic constitutions, politics, resource distribution, and IO membership and policy. We construct a specific application to trade policy to further clarify the role of the framework. Using this example, we show that global externalities can never be fully internalized through IOs when sovereignty is prioritized. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research on the domestic politics of IOs. PubDate: 2025-04-29
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Abstract: International law reparations follow the principle of restitutio in integrum — to make the victim whole. But how do human rights judges apply this principle in practice when the victims are not states, but people whose lives may have been irreparably damaged' We examine this question in the context of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, where judges have frequently dealt with cases of forced disappearance, extrajudicial execution, and other severe physical integrity violations. Inter-American Court judges have substantial discretion in determining the value of awards, which provides the opportunity to create and apply their own criteria for justness. We argue that the awarding of damages is best understood as judges attempting to quantify, and, therefore, compensate suffering. However, judges must balance the goal of compensating suffering with economic and political considerations. We test these implications using an original dataset of monetary damages and victims in Inter-American Court of Human Rights cases through 2019 and find that the severity of rights violations, the number of victims involved in a case, and the identity of victims are associated with the value of monetary damages awarded by the IACtHR. PubDate: 2025-03-31
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Abstract: This study explores the influence of national leaders’ educational backgrounds, particularly Western education, on their engagement with Chinese official finance (OF) in developing nations. As China’s financial outreach continues to expand, understanding the factors that shape recipient leaders’ financial preferences is increasingly important. We argue that Western-educated leaders are less likely to accept Chinese OF, a tendency rooted in the socialization effects of exposure to Western values and institutional practices. By analyzing data from 2000 to 2020 on leaders’ education and Chinese OF, we find that countries led by Western-educated leaders receive less Chinese funding on average compared to those led by leaders with other educational backgrounds. This finding highlights how educational experiences influence governance preferences and alignment with different international financial sources. These insights contribute to our understanding of how leader-specific characteristics shape international finance dynamics, offering fresh perspectives on the soft power mechanisms underlying global financial relations amid strategic competition among major powers. PubDate: 2025-03-25
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Abstract: Why do rising powers maintain a more limited earmarked funding portfolio compared to established (Western) powers' How do emerging powers, within their limited financial contributions, determine the allocation of resources across various UN entities' This paper proposes a theoretical framework to explain how these funding decisions reflect both its motivations and constraints faced by rising powers. We argue that rising powers confront a fundamental dilemma when engaging with established international institutions. While earmarked funding allows them to pursue foreign policy goals—such as enhancing influence and advancing geopolitical interests—it also entails opportunity costs. Funds allocated to one institution cannot be redirected to others, and the risks are significant: substantial financial contributions may ultimately prove ineffective or be discounted due to entrenched power structures within these organizations. Using an original dataset covering 69 UN entities from 2013 to 2022, we find that China employs a limited and selective approach to earmarked funding. China is more likely to direct funds toward entities with a higher number of Chinese nationals or where the executive heads have a high level of policy alignment, and less likely to fund entities that primarily benefit high-income countries. Our findings provide new insights into how rising powers, such as China, navigate multilateral institutions and seek influence, contributing to ongoing debates on great power competition, China’s rise and Chinese foreign policy. This study expands the emerging literature on how rising powers try to reshape established (Western-dominated) organizations, complementing research on earmarked funding, which has predominantly focused on Western donor behaviors. PubDate: 2025-03-10
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Abstract: This study presents the “Russia Visits Dataset,” which records high-level visits by Russian leaders to foreign countries from 1991 to 2023, including official trips by presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers. Using probit regression analysis, the study reveals that strategic interests—such as political, economic, and military factors—predominantly shape the distribution of Russian leader visits, while domestic influences are found to have a limited role. The analysis also emphasizes the importance of international organizations, particularly the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), as a key driver of Russian state visits. The results suggest that previous visits by different leaders influence subsequent visits, indicating a coordinated and sequential approach to Russian diplomacy. The “Russia Visits Dataset” serves as a valuable resource for understanding the dynamics of Russian foreign policy and provides a foundation for future research into the motivations, impacts, and diplomatic strategies of Russian leader visits. PubDate: 2025-02-14
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Abstract: We explore the role of global value chains (GVCs) in the design of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We propose a theory that focuses on firms involved in GVC activities to identify the main actors pushing for deep trade integration. To address the critical issue of endogeneity of GVC trade flows for trade policy, our identification strategy exploits a transportation shock: the sharp increase in the maximum size of container ships, which more than quadrupled between 1995 and 2017. The key variation in our instrument hinges on the fact that only deep-water ports can accommodate these new larger ships. Armed with this instrument, we find that GVC trade increases the probability of forming deep PTAs that include provisions regulating both trade-related policies and domestic regulatory regimes. GVC trade is a driver of deep preferential trade liberalization. PubDate: 2025-02-11
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Abstract: Member state participation is essential in global governance, affording international organizations (IOs) legitimacy and translating member state preferences into institutional attention. We contend that institutional leadership positions bolster states’ authority via “proxy representation,” in which states are grouped together and indirectly represented by one leader. We argue that by serving as proxy group leaders, even relatively weak states can obtain greater influence in IOs. We examine these expectations in the context of the IMF’s Executive Board, where wealthy states represent themselves directly while other states belong to multi-member constituencies in which leadership often rotates among members. Focusing on issues related to climate change discussions at the IMF—a key concern for Global South countries and an increasingly important issue in international finance—we examine the extent to which countries’ preferences over climate issues are expressed at IMF Board meetings. Using textual data based on 52,551 internal IMF documents from 1987-2017, we find evidence to support our theoretical expectations; states more effectively advance their preferences when they are proxy leaders — this finding holds robustly even for otherwise weak states. These results suggest that even in IOs with highly asymmetric decision-making, weaker states can gain voice through proxy representation. This has important and positive implications for IO legitimacy, as member state participation is integral to the livelihood of these institutions. PubDate: 2025-02-04
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Abstract: Under what conditions are new democracies more committed to human rights' Existing explanations focus on the logic of the democratic lock-in as elites in new democracies commit their countries to international human rights treaties and organizations to safeguard against future nondemocratic threats. However, this proposition receives mixed empirical support within the literature, and suffers of endogeneity as it treats all democratization episodes as equivalent. Building on insights from the democratization literature, this paper develops a novel theoretical framework that provides a more direct explanation on the conditions under which political elites in new democracies are more likely to commit to human rights treaties. Using a new measure of returning autocratic elites and an instrumental variable design, the results show that democratic cabinets with a higher share of former autocratic elites are less committed to the international human rights regime. These results have implications for democratic consolidation and human rights compliance. PubDate: 2025-02-04
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Abstract: Past studies in political economy have established a link between domestic property rights protection and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. However, the underlying mechanism remains unclear, given that foreign investors often enjoy more robust property rights protection through international arbitration under investment treaties or potential intervention by their home governments. In this article, we develop a demand-side theory of how domestic property rights affect the flow of FDI into authoritarian regimes. Specifically, dictators with weaker property rights can extract more rents through restrictive FDI policies due to their greater ability to expropriate domestic enterprises than foreign ones. As competition from foreign investors decreases domestic firms’ profits, these dictators tend to impose stricter FDI regulations to maximize rent extraction, despite the potential benefits of FDI for regime stability through wage increases. Therefore, the relationship between domestic property rights and FDI is driven by dictators’ demand, even if foreign investors’ supply remains constant. This article advances our understanding of the determinants of economic liberalization and the effects of FDI in authoritarian regimes. PubDate: 2025-01-20
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Abstract: This data article introduces IOParlspeech, an original dataset of over 600,000 statements on international organizations (IOs) in parliamentary debates in six countries between 1990 and 2018. We explain the creation of the dataset and demonstrate the value of IOParlspeech through two exploratory studies. First, we examine which actors convey more positive and more negative sentiment regarding IOs in parliamentary discourse. Contributing to research on IO contestation, we demonstrate that parliamentarians from the radical right and left, as well as parliamentarians in opposition, use more negative language in their IO-related communication. Second, we explore the salience of IOs in national parliaments. Speaking to debates about the democratic deficit of IOs, we show that IOs with higher authority and those with an international parliamentary institution are more likely to be discussed in parliament. We conclude by suggesting further uses for IOParlspeech. PubDate: 2025-01-06
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Abstract: Existing United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting databases provide excellent coverage of UNGA voting on resolutions adopted by roll-call vote. These databases, however, have known limitations: The United Nations Digital Library only covers final decisions on adopted resolutions, not prior resolution-related decisions nor decisions on failed resolutions. Coverage of roll-call votes in the widely-used database provided by Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten is broader but reflects limitations in the historical datasets on which the database is built (e.g., the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research dataset). As a result, voting coverage and what is reported vary over time. In this paper, we present a new dataset that expands and improves the consistency of the UNGA decisions covered. We provide comparisons of our database with other UNGA datasets and explore the implications of more complete data for existing and future research. PubDate: 2025-01-06
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Abstract: In response to the impasse caused by the US blockade of the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement body, 52 Member-states have converged on a innovative workaround: the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). This article asks two questions related to this singular, yet overlooked initiative in global governance: first, what determines who joins a novel enforcement mechanism in the midst of a global “backlash” against trade liberalization' Secondly, does the MPIA work' Examining countries’ trade policy in the run-up to the MPIA’s creation suggests that the main motivation for MPIA participation is the possibility to challenge trade partners’ measures; vulnerability to others’ challenges, conversely, does not deter joining. The same analysis can be used to predict subsequent MPIA entrants, in ways that match anecdotal evidence. A corollary finding is that insofar as the US reasons similarly to other countries, its trade profile suggests it does not stand to gain much from more credible enforcement, which may explain its lack of zeal during WTO reform negotiations. Secondly, looking at dyadic trade measures over time, we offer evidence that even at this early stage, the MPIA generates deterrence among its members, and this effect is growing. From an institutional standpoint, the experiment appears to be working: the MPIA is not only an interim solution, but also a prototype for institutional innovation in the face of backlash. PubDate: 2024-12-20
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Abstract: This paper seeks to explain why some investor-state dispute cases are settled before reaching the ruling stage in democracies, focusing on disputes triggered by regulatory changes made by host government. Our argument is grounded in the domestic politics of the respondent country, specifically the partisan orientation of the incumbent government. When faced with regulatory investor claims, respondent governments must balance protecting domestic social welfare with promoting investment. Our theory is that right-leaning governments are more likely to settle because they are more willing to make regulatory concessions to appease foreign investors and attract investment. In contrast, left-leaning governments prefer arbitral rulings over settlements, as they view settlements as a capitulation to foreign investors’ demands at the expense of public welfare. Using original data from 335 investor-state disputes involving democratic host countries between 1994 and 2020, we find support for this claim. Moreover, we provide qualitative evidence from the investor-state dispute between TC Energy Corporation, a Canadian energy company, and the United States, as well as the investor-state disputes triggered by Argentina’s 2002 emergency measures, to confirm our hypothesized causal pathway linking government partisanship to the likelihood of settlement. PubDate: 2024-12-09
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