Subjects -> PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS (Total: 29 journals)
Showing 1 - 9 of 9 Journals sorted alphabetically
Berkeley Technology Law Journal     Free   (Followers: 17)
Expert Opinion on Therapeutic Patents     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 20)
GRUR International     Full-text available via subscription  
IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
International Data Privacy Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
International Journal of Innovation Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
International Journal of Intellectual Property Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
IP Theory     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
JIPITEC Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law     Open Access   (Followers: 26)
John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law     Free   (Followers: 10)
Journal of Copyright in Education & Librarianship     Open Access   (Followers: 35)
Journal of Data Protection & Privacy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 30)
Journal of Intellectual Property Rights (JIPR)     Open Access   (Followers: 24)
Journal of Knowledge-based Innovation in China     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Law, State and Telecommunications Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 14)
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Propiedad Intelectual     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Recent Patents on Anti-Cancer Drug Discovery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Recent Patents on Anti-Infective Drug Discovery     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark Cases     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Revista La Propiedad Inmaterial     Open Access  
The Journal of World Intellectual Property     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Web Journal of Current Legal Issues     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
World Patent Information     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Similar Journals
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Berkeley Technology Law Journal
Number of Followers: 17  

  Free journal Free journal
ISSN (Print) 1086-3818
Published by U of California Berkeley School of Law Homepage  [6 journals]
  • Complete Volume 34, Special Issue
    • Authors: Berkeley Technology Law Journal
      PubDate: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 23:39:00 PDT
  • The Role of the Courts in Shaping Patent Law & Policy
    • Authors: Andrei Iancu
      PubDate: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 23:38:53 PDT
  • One Judge’s Historical View of a Changing Patent World
    • Authors: Alan D. Lourie
      PubDate: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 23:38:46 PDT
  • Complete Volume 34, Issue 1
    • Authors: Berkeley Technology Law Journal
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:08:11 PDT
  • The Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property
    • Authors: Peter S. Menell
      Abstract: The information revolution has brought demand-side effects to the fore of economic activity, business strategy, and intellectual property jurisprudence and policy. Intellectual property doctrines play a central role in harnessing network effects, promoting innovation to overcome excess inertia, and balancing consumer welfare, competition, and innovation. This Article surveys and integrates the economic, business strategy, and legal literatures relating to network effects and intellectual property. Part I introduces the topic of network effects and provides an overview of the Article. Part II describes the functioning of network markets. Part III examines the interplay of business strategy, contract, standard setting organizations, intellectual property, and competition policy. Part IV presents three principles for tailoring intellectual property regimes and competition policy to network technologies. Part V traces the evolution of intellectual property protection for network features of systems and platforms. Part VI discusses the interplay of intellectual property protection and competition policy. Part VII assesses the extent to which intellectual property protection and competition policy align with the normative design principles. Part VIII identifies promising areas for future research.
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:08:04 PDT
  • The Right to Explanation, Explained
    • Authors: Margot E. Kaminski
      Abstract: Many have called for algorithmic accountability: laws governing decision-making by complex algorithms, or artificial intelligence (AI). The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) now establishes exactly this. The recent debate over the “right to explanation” (a right to information about individual decisions made by algorithms) has obscured the significant algorithmic accountability regime established by the GDPR. The GDPR’s provisions on algorithmic accountability, which include a right to explanation, have the potential to be broader, stronger, and deeper than the requirements of the preceding Data Protection Directive. This Article clarifies, including for a U.S. audience, what the GDPR requires.
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:07:56 PDT
  • Rethinking Explainable Machines: The GDPR’s “Right to Explanation”
           Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise
    • Authors: Bryan Casey et al.
      Abstract: The public debate surrounding the General Data Protection Regulation’s (GDPR) “right to explanation” has sparked a global conversation of profound social and economic significance. But from a practical perspective, the debate’s participants have gotten ahead of themselves. In their search for a revolutionary new data protection within the provisions of a single chapter of the GDPR, many prominent contributors to the debate have lost sight of the most revolutionary change ushered in by the Regulation: the sweeping new enforcement powers given to European data protection authorities (DPAs) by Chapters 6 and 8 of the Regulation. Unlike the 1995 Data Protection Directive that it replaced, the GDPR’s potent new investigatory, advisory, corrective, and punitive powers granted by Chapters 6 and 8 render DPAs de facto interpretive authorities of the Regulation’s controversial “right to explanation.” Now that the DPAs responsible for enforcing the right have officially weighed in, this Article argues that at least one matter of fierce public debate can be laid to rest. The GDPR provides a muscular “right to explanation” with sweeping legal implications for the design, prototyping, field testing, and deployment of automated data processing systems. The protections enshrined within the right may not mandate transparency in the form of a complete individualized explanation. But a holistic understanding of the interpretation by DPAs reveals that the right’s true power derives from its synergistic effects when combined with the algorithmic auditing and “data protection by design” methodologies codified by the Regulation’s subsequent chapters. Accordingly, this Article predicts that algorithmic auditing and “data protection by design” practices will likely become the new gold standard for enterprises deploying machine learning systems both inside and outside of the European Union.
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:07:48 PDT
  • Cloud Infrastructure-as-a-Service as an Essential Facility: Market
    • Authors: Kamila Benzina
      Abstract: This Note examines whether public cloud infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) has a market structure that incentivizes a small number of cloud providers to engage in anticompetitive conduct to the detriment of competitors, competition, and ultimately consumers. As cloud IaaS becomes the dominant model for configuring and delivering computing resources in our increasingly cloud-based economy, the U.S. IaaS market is consolidating around a small number of players. These dominant players—Amazon, Microsoft and Google—also have a significant presence in downstream markets, which creates strong incentives for these providers to leverage their IaaS market power to distort competition in the diverse markets that depend on access to IaaS. While there is the potential for IaaS providers to act anticompetitively, the larger challenge is a structural one—ineffective competition, which results in a market structure that incentivizes anticompetitive conduct. Given the increasingly vital role cloud IaaS plays in our economy, as well as in our connected lives, important questions emerge as to whether national regulators should take steps to ensure consumers and competition are protected in the emerging cloud-based economy. This Note gives an overview of the IaaS market and examines whether the cost structure of the market has facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, the dominance of a small number of IaaS providers. It goes on to explore how consolidated control over IaaS incentivizes conduct that is potentially harmful to consumers and competitors in varied other markets that depend on access to IaaS. This Note finally explores possible industry and regulatory solutions for ensuring consumers and competition are protected in the emerging cloud-based economy.
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:07:40 PDT
  • Algorithms as Illegal Agreements
    • Authors: Michal S. Gal
      Abstract: Algorithms offer a legal way to overcome some of the obstacles to profit-boosting coordination, and create a jointly profitable status quo in the market. While current research has largely focused on the concerns raised by algorithmic-facilitated coordination, this Article takes the next step, asking to what extent current laws can be fitted to effectively deal with this phenomenon. To meet this challenge, this Article advances in three stages. The first Part analyzes the effects of algorithms on the ability of competitors to coordinate their conduct. While this issue has been addressed by other researchers, this Article seeks to contribute to the analysis by systematically charting the technological abilities of algorithms that may affect coordination in the digital ecosystem in which they operate. Special emphasis is placed on the fact that the algorithms is a “recipe for action,” which can be directly or indirectly observed by competitors. The second Part explores the promises as well as the limits of market solutions. In particular, it considers the use of algorithms by consumers and off-the-grid transactions to counteract some of the effects of algorithmic-facilitated coordination by suppliers. The shortcomings of such market solutions lead to the third Part, which focuses on the ability of existing legal tools to deal effectively with algorithmic-facilitated coordination, while not harming the efficiencies they bring about. The analysis explores three interconnected questions that stand at the basis of designing a welfare-enhancing policy: What exactly do we wish to prohibit, and can we spell this out clearly for market participants' What types of conduct are captured under the existing antitrust laws' And is there justification for widening the regulatory net beyond its current prohibitions in light of the changing nature of the marketplace' In particular, the Article explores the application of the concepts of plus factors and facilitating practices to algorithms. The analysis refutes the claim that current laws are sufficient to deal with algorithmic-facilitated coordination.
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:07:32 PDT
  • Grants
    • Authors: W. Nicholson Price II
      Abstract: Innovation is a primary source of economic growth and is accordingly the target of substantial academic and government attention. Grants are a key tool in the government’s arsenal to promote innovation, but legal academic studies of that arsenal have given them short shrift. Although patents, prizes, and regulator-enforced exclusivity are each the subject of substantial literature, grants are typically addressed briefly, if at all. According to the conventional story, grants may be the only feasible tool to drive basic research, as opposed to applied research, but they are a blunt tool for that task.Three critiques of grants underlie this narrative: grants are allocated by government bureaucrats who lack much of the relevant information for optimal decision-making; grants are purely ex ante funding mechanisms and therefore lack accountability; and grants misallocate risk by saddling the government all the downside risk and giving the innovator all the upside. These critiques are largely wrong. Focusing on grants awarded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the largest public funder of biomedical research, this Article delves deeply into how grants actually work. It shows that—at least at the NIH—grants are awarded not by uninformed bureaucrats, but by panels of knowledgeable peer scientists with the benefit of extensive disclosures from applicants. It finds that grants provide accountability through repeated interactions over time. And it argues that the upside of grant-investments to the government is much greater than the lack of direct profits would suggest.Grants also have two marked comparative strengths as innovation levers: they can support innovation where social value exceeds appropriable market value, and they can directly support innovation enablers—the people, institutions, processes, and infrastructure that shape and generate innovation. Where markets undervalue some socially important innovations, like cures for diseases of the poor, grants can help. Grants can also enable innovation by supporting its inputs: young or exceptional scientists, new institutions, research networks, and large datasets. Taken as a whole, grants do not form a monolithic, blunt innovation lever; instead, they provide a varied and nuanced set of policy options. Innovation scholars and policymakers should recognize and develop the usefulness of grants in promoting major social goals.
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:07:25 PDT
  • Complete Volume 34, Issue 3
    • Authors: Berkeley Technology Law Journal
      PubDate: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:41:09 PDT
  • Survey of Additional IP and Technology Law Developments
    • Authors: Berkeley Technology Law Journal
      PubDate: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:41:02 PDT
  • Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the CFAA: The Revocation
           Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization
    • Authors: Annie Lee
      PubDate: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:40:53 PDT
  • BPCIA Update: Entropy Is the Price of an Ordered Framework
    • Authors: Rithika Kulathila
      PubDate: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:40:45 PDT
  • “Hello, My Name Is User #101”: Defining PII Under the VPPA
    • Authors: Yarden Z. Kakon
      PubDate: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:40:33 PDT
  • Fourth Amendment Particularity in the Cloud
    • Authors: Bihter Ozedirne
      PubDate: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:40:25 PDT
  • If Disparagement is Dead, Dilution Must Die Too
    • Authors: Zahraa Hadi
      PubDate: Mon, 06 May 2019 13:40:17 PDT
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