JournalTOCs

Sophia
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.122

Number of Followers: 6

Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1873-930X - ISSN (Online) 0038-1527
Published by Springer-Verlag

[2469 journals]

Correction to: ‘Humankind. The Best of Molds’—Islam
Confronting Transhumanism
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  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Finite-Length Timelike Paths and Kalām Cosmological Argument
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  Abstract: Abstract Suppose one accepts the argument that past infinity is not acceptable. This does not eliminate the possibility that the beginning of time is not equivalent across objects. Along with breakdown of absolute simultaneity of events in relativity, there may even be no agreement on whether an event existed. There may be no consistent way to totally order events. In such a case, despite every object, conscious or not, having finite lifetime, there may be no single point called “the beginning,” and the universe stays as it is without requiring a cause of existence.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
A Theory of Creation Ex Deo
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  Abstract: Abstract The idea that God creates out of Himself seems quite attractive. Many find great appeal in holding that a temporally finite universe must have a cause (say, God), but I think there’s also great appeal in holding that there’s pre-existent stuff out of which that universe is created—and what could that stuff be but part of God' Though attractive, the idea of creation ex deo hasn’t been taken seriously by theistic philosophers. Perhaps this is because it seems too vague—‘could anything enlightening be said about what those parts are'’—or objectionable—‘wouldn’t creating out of those parts lessen or destroy God'’ Drawing from Stephen Kosslyn and Michael Tye’s work on the ontology of mental images, I respond to the above questions by developing a theory on which God creates the universe out of His mental imagery.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
The Phenomenon of Sentiments and Love in Non-human Animals from the
Ontological Point of View of Mulla Sadra
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  Abstract: Abstract In the whole universe, from the lowest beings to the highest ones, love permeates through the entire world of existence. Love is one of the hallmarks and perfections of existence in animals. This survey was done to illuminate and explain Mullah Sadra’s ontological viewpoint on the entity of sentiments and the inborn and innate love in the existence of non-human animals. The analytic and descriptive method (library documentary) was used to conduct this study and research. An animal is one of the creatures in the essence of the existence that possesses its own perfect attributes. Animals have souls, the effects of which are life, perception, free choice, and emotions (love). Animals have an order for their existence, and they are attributed with perfection to the extent of their intensity and weakness. That is to say, all animals are not at the same level. Their perfection is also the same as their existence is. There is life, perception, and love in animals, but it depends on their proportion of existence. All animals are in love, but every animal having the highest share of its rank enjoys more love. Mullah Sadra’s ontological principles in proving the existence and flow of love in animals are that the existence is ‘original,’ ‘non-composite,’ ‘equivocal,’ and ‘coextensive’ with life, conception and love, and ‘God, the Almighty, is the true Beloved of all beings including animals’ souls.’ Evolutionarily, animals can only move to the point where humanity of human beings begins.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
The Existence of Arguments in Classical Islamic Thought: Reply to Hannah
Erlwein
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  Abstract: Abstract In recent years, there has been notable interest in Islamic philosophy and theology from an analytic and not merely historical perspective. One important area of research that has garnered a great deal of research is the arguments for the existence of God. Recent work by Hannah Erlwein seeks to argue that this research has been in vain, for there are no arguments for the existence of God in classical Islamic thought. This paper analyzes Erlwein’s strategies in justifying this position, revealing that her research ignores an enormous amount of evidence that runs contrary to her thesis, in addition to demonstrating many of the errors and shortcomings in her work. Most disturbingly, the book seeks to present the Islamic philosophical tradition as fideistic and unintellectual based on a series of contrived interpretations of rather clear texts. In response, this paper demonstrates the importance of independent inquiry in the Islamic tradition by looking at a wide range of different relevant texts.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Gratitude Is Only Fittingly Targeted Towards Agents
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  Abstract: Abstract The paper argues that ‘All varieties of gratitude are only overall fitting when targeted towards agents,’ for instance that any variety of gratitude for the beautiful sunset is only overall fitting if a supernatural agent such as God exists. The first premise is that ‘Prepositional gratitude is overall fitting only when targeted towards agents.’ For this premise, intuitive judgments are offered. The second premise is that ‘Prepositional gratitude is the paradigmatic variety of gratitude.’ For this premise, an aspect of the common consent of philosophers about gratitude is noted and the metaphysical basicness of prepositional gratitude is argued for. This gives the intermediate conclusion that ‘The paradigmatic variety of gratitude is overall fitting only when targeted towards agents.’ The fourth premise is that ‘If the paradigmatic variety of gratitude is overall fitting only when targeted towards agents, then all varieties of gratitude are overall fitting only when targeted towards agents.’ To supply the conditional of this premise, the Paradigmatic Fittingness Principle is offered, which states that ‘Paradigmatic emotions set the fittingness conditions for their non-paradigmatic varieties.’ This principle is argued for by noting that it vindicates some popular and plausible intuitive judgements and gives an error theory of why one might think that gratitude could be fittingly targeted towards non-agents, and by suggesting the absence of any other plausible source of fittingness conditions for non-paradigmatic emotions.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Faith and Doubt at the Cry of Dereliction: a Defense of Doxasticism
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  Abstract: Abstract Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith that p entails belief that p. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. One common objection is that faith is compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. One version of this objection, recently employed by Beth Rath (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 81, 161–169, 2017), is to use a particular story, in this case Jesus Christ’s cry of dereliction, to argue that someone had propositional faith while ceasing to believe. Thus, doxasticism is false. Rath’s approach of analyzing a case from scripture has the advantage of allowing her to provide evidence for the claim that a subject had propositional faith but lost belief. However, I argue that Rath faces a dilemma: on the interpretation of the passage necessary for her argument, either Christ did lose his propositional faith that God was with him, or else he did not lose his belief that God was with him. Either way, she must reject a key premise in her argument.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
The Divine Knowledge in Relation to Determinism in the Philosophy of
Avicenna
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  Abstract: Abstract Two major views attempt to solve the problem of predestination and human free will: a ‘predestinarian view’ and a ‘deterministic perspective’. The first view emphasizes on God’s direct intervention in the creation of existents. The second view is based on Aristotelian idea which states that destiny (qadar) and the determination of all existents are basically due to their inherent natures rather than being dependent on the occasionalistic inference of the deity. This article, however, will limit its discussion to a determinism of Avicenna only. This paper will also provide major works of Avicenna, then the explanation and evaluation of Avicenna’s view of God’s knowledge.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Horrendous Evil and the Loving God: a Reply to Joshua Thurow
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  Abstract: Abstract Marilyn McCord Adams has defended theodicy by appeal to the idea of post-mortem compensation for the victims of horrendous evil. I have argued that this overlooks the dissociation of theodicy from moral reality that she concedes in her response to criticism of theodicy by D Z Phillips. Joshua Thurow has recently defended Adams against my argument. Here I defend and strengthen that argument against Thurow.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Eternally Choosing Hell: Can Hard-Heartedness Explain Why Some Remain in
Hell Forever'
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  Abstract: Abstract Recently, Eric Yang and Stephen Davis have defended what they call the separationist view of hell against an objection leveled by Jeremy Gwiazda by invoking the concept of hard-heartedness as an account of why some would eternally choose to remain in hell. Gwiazda’s objection to the separationist view of hell is an instance of a broader strategy of objection invoked by other universalists to argue that God could guarantee universal salvation while respecting libertarian freedom—an objection that Kronen and I have dubbed the Infinite Opportunity Argument. Yang’s and Davis’s reply to Gwiazda thus amounts to a response to the Infinite Opportunity Argument, and the merits of their reply bear on the feasibility of the freedom-respecting version of universalism that the argument supports. I argue that the kind of hard-heartedness that must be posited in order to derail the Infinite Opportunity Argument—the kind of absolute hard-heartedness that Yang and Davis explicitly invoke—suffers significant problems that prevent it from posing a serious challenge to freedom-respecting universalism.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Answering Pilate: Options for Interpreting Religious Truth
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  Abstract: Abstract Pilate asked an important and pertinent question of Jesus regarding truth. A simple answer to his question would be ‘a statement is true only if it says what is the case.’ What that means, however, is another matter. By exploring options, I hope to elucidate some common disagreements among believers and non-believers, as well as squabbles between different religious positions. While most attention will be given to examples within Christianity, similar sorts of disagreements also occur in other religions. It is hoped that exploring such options will also help contribute to improved dialogue among the various contenders.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
From the Appearance to the Reality of Excessive Suffering: Theodicy and
Bruce Russell’s ‘Matrix’ Example
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  Abstract: Abstract In a popular paper, Bruce Russell argues that our nonperception of divine reasons for apparently pointless suffering justifies belief in the nonexistence of God. Russell generally accepts the common interpretive norm that we are justified in believing that something does not exist when we do not perceive it, if and only if we have reason to believe that we would perceive it if it did exist. However, on the strength of an example from the film The Matrix, Russell argues that this interpretive norm does not apply to the belief in God’s nonexistence based on our nonperception of reasons that would justify apparently pointless suffering. My paper undermines Russell’s effort to restrict the scope of this interpretive norm. It thereby leaves open the door to agnosticism.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Why the Horrendous Deeds Objection Is Still a Bad Argument
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  Abstract: Abstract A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Causal Relations and Abraham’s Dilemma: a Qur’anic Perspective
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  Abstract: Abstract Abraham’s Dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s commands are never morally wrong, (ii) God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and (iii) killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition (ii) in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition (ii) tend to appeal to epistemic failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called accordion effect in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in such a way that God has not commanded Abraham to kill his son nor has Abraham tried to do so, although the challenging and difficult nature of the test and thus Abraham’s status as the ‘father of faith’ are retained.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
Islamic Beliefs and Epistemic Defeaters: a Response to Baldwin and McNabb
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  Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I outline some exegetical and philosophical problems with Baldwin and McNabb’s epistemic defeater for Islamic beliefs. I maintain that their argument is based upon a misinterpretation of Quranic verses. I also argue that exceptional instances of divine deception inflicted upon the senses, if they indeed happen, should not undermine the general trust in our cognitive faculties. I conclude that virtually all Muslims are immune from Baldwin and McNabb’s proposed defeater and from the threat posed by divine deception in general.
  PubDate: 2022-06-01
The Binding Problem for Strong Experiential Monism
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  Abstract: Abstract In this article, I explicate a new problem for a variant of panpsychism, strong experiential monism, that is the view that all being is experiential. I contrast the view with weak experiential monism, a softer variant that allows for non-experiential bare particulars to act as the carriers of properties. I argue that strong experiential monism can’t explain what works as the ontological commonality between the referents of one experience of something and another experience of that same thing; in other words, in virtue of what are those experiences about the same thing at all. If they aren’t about the same ontological existent at all, the apparent mutual coherence between these experiences (as manifest in our ability to discuss about them in a seemingly coherent way, for example) requires explanation. I argue that strong experiential monism necessitates a more or less brute kind of parallelism between the experiences to explain their mutual coherence. Alternatively, the strong experiential monist must either retreat to weak experiential monism and non-experiential bare particulars or to a more robust kind of property dualism or dual-aspect monism.
  PubDate: 2022-05-18
The Modal-Epistemic Argument Defended: Reply to Wintein
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  Abstract: Abstract Recently, Stefan Wintein published an article in which he presents four objections to my modal-epistemic argument for the existence of God. His first objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s first premise, and the second objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s second premise. Wintein’s third objection attempts to show that the modal-epistemic argument is circular. Finally, the fourth objection is a parody objection. In this paper, I show that Wintein’s four objections all fail.
  PubDate: 2022-04-21
In Memoriam
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  PubDate: 2022-04-15
Review of The Nature of Reality: Philosophical Discourses on Language,
Religion and Culture, edited by Jyotsna Saha, Jhadeswar Ghosh, and
Purbayan Jha
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  PubDate: 2022-04-13
Religious Doubt in New Zealand
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  PubDate: 2022-04-13