JournalTOCs

Synthese
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.966

Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 20

Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1573-0964 - ISSN (Online) 0039-7857
Published by Springer-Verlag

[2467 journals]

Questioning and addressee knowledge
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  Abstract: Abstract There are norms for asking questions. Inquirers should not ask questions to which they know the answer. The literature on the norms of asking has focused on such speaker-centered norms. But, as I argue, there are addressee-centered norms as well: inquirers should not ask addressees who fall short of a certain epistemic status. That epistemic status, I argue here, is knowledge.
  PubDate: 2023-03-20
The meta-metaphysics of group beliefs: in search of alternatives
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  Abstract: Abstract The aim of this paper is to argue that our understanding of the issue of institutional group minds might be broadened if we consider alternative meta-metaphysical frameworks to those which are presently presupposed in the field. I argue that the two major camps in the contemporary philosophical debate about group beliefs, namely strong realism and eliminative reductionism, share a commitment to some form of meta-philosophical realism. Two alternative metaontological frameworks for the discussion of the issue of group belief are outlined: fictionalism and deflationism. Fictionalism about group minds, although unpopular in the philosophical debate, is still a much-discussed option in legal theory and the theory of the firm in economics. I argue that, once formulated properly, the fictionalist position deserves serious consideration. The other alternative option is deflationism: I develop a sketch of the deflationary approach to group beliefs that is based on Thomasson’s approach to the existence of groups. The final parts of the paper are devoted to a discussion of the resulting four-element classification of the possible views on the reality of group minds: realism, eliminative reductionism, fictionalism, and deflationism. I offer some proposals with regard to the criteria that might be used to choose between these theories.
  PubDate: 2023-03-16
Teleology and function in non-living nature
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  Abstract: Abstract There’s a general assumption that teleology and function do not exist in inanimate nature. Throughout biology, it is generally taken as granted that teleology (or teleonomy) and functions are not only unique to life, but perhaps even a defining quality of life. For many, it’s obvious that rocks, water, and the like, are not teleological, nor could they possibly have stand-alone functions. This idea - that teleology and function are unique to life - is the target of this paper. I begin with an overview of McShea’s field theoretic account of teleology. I start with the field theoretic account because it presents a promising analysis of teleological systems. It is promising because, in not making any assumptions about life’s special status in teleological systems, it avoids counterexamples that have problematized other accounts. I then consider some of the prominent efforts that some have made to avoid ascribing functions or teleology to some form of inanimate nature. In my assessment, none of the efforts are successful. I conclude by offering mineral evolution as a case study to show how inanimate nature can be both teleological and functional. The evolution of mineral species reveals that teleology and function extend to inanimate nature, and that teleology and function come in degrees.
  PubDate: 2023-03-16
The deep neural network approach to the reference class problem
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  Abstract: Abstract Methods of machine learning (ML) are gradually complementing and sometimes even replacing methods of classical statistics in science. This raises the question whether ML faces the same methodological problems as classical statistics. This paper sheds light on this question by investigating a long-standing challenge to classical statistics: the reference class problem (RCP). It arises whenever statistical evidence is applied to an individual object, since the individual belongs to several reference classes and evidence might vary across them. Thus, the problem consists in choosing a suitable reference class for the individual. I argue that deep neural networks (DNNs) are able to overcome specific instantiations of the RCP. Whereas the criteria of narrowness, reliability, and homogeneity, that have been proposed to determine a suitable reference class, pose an inextricable tradeoff to classical statistics, DNNs are able to satisfy them in some situations. On the one hand, they can exploit the high dimensionality in big-data settings. I argue that this corresponds to the criteria of narrowness and reliability. On the other hand, ML research indicates that DNNs are generally not susceptible to overfitting. I argue that this property is related to a particular form of homogeneity. Taking both aspects together reveals that there are specific settings in which DNNs can overcome the RCP.
  PubDate: 2023-03-15
Internalist priorities in a philosophy of words
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  Abstract: Abstract Words appear to be denizens of the external world or, at any rate, not wholly mental, unlike our pains. It is the norm for philosophical accounts of words to reflect this appearance by offering various socio-cultural conditions to which an adequate account of wordhood must cleave. The paper argues, to the contrary, that an adequate account of word phenomena need avert to nothing other than individual psychology along with potential external factors that in-themselves do not count as linguistic. My principal leverage will be that, by everyone’s lights, whatever words are, they are syntactically combinable and possess structural properties. But such conditions cannot be externally realised; instead, they are aspects of our internally realised cognitive capacity. It will also be argued, however, that the position is consistent with much of our common lore about words, albeit sans an externalist linguistic ontology.
  PubDate: 2023-03-15
How localized are computational templates' A machine learning approach
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  Abstract: Abstract A commonly held background assumption about the sciences is that they connect along borders characterized by ontological or explanatory relationships, usually given in the order of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the social sciences. Interdisciplinary work, in this picture, arises in the connecting regions of adjacent disciplines. Philosophical research into interdisciplinary model transfer has increasingly complicated this picture by highlighting additional connections orthogonal to it. But most of these works have been done through case studies, which due to their strong focus struggle to provide foundations for claims about large-scale relations between multiple scientific disciplines. As a supplement, in this contribution, we propose to philosophers of science the use of modern science mapping techniques to trace connections between modeling techniques in large literature samples. We explain in detail how these techniques work, and apply them to a large, contemporary, and multidisciplinary data set (n=383.961 articles). Through the comparison of textual to mathematical representations, we suggest formulaic structures that are particularly common among different disciplines and produce first results indicating the general strength and commonality of such relationships.
  PubDate: 2023-03-13
Hinge commitments as arational beliefs
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  Abstract: Abstract Hinge epistemology is a family of views that offers a novel approach to avoiding skeptical conclusions about the possibility of a posteriori justification of our empirical beliefs. They claim that at the basis of our empirical beliefs lie certain commitments whose rational status is not determined by our evidence. These are called hinge commitments. Prominent hinge epistemologists have claimed that hinge commitments are either rational or arational but yet not beliefs. I argue that such views are subject to decisive objections. I then offer what I consider to be the best version of hinge epistemology. On this view, hinge commitments are best understood as arational beliefs that contingently inform our worldview. I call this view the Arational Beliefs View.
  PubDate: 2023-03-13
Truetemp cooled down: the stability of Truetemp intuitions
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  Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we report the results of three high-powered replication studies in experimental philosophy, which bear on an alleged instability of folk philosophical intuitions: the purported susceptibility of epistemic intuitions about the Truetemp case (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge. Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) to order effects. Evidence for this susceptibility was first reported by Swain et al. (Philos Phenomenol Res 76(1):138–155, 2008); further evidence was then found in two studies by Wright (Cognition 115(3):491–503. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.02.003, 2010) and Weinberg et al. (Monist 95(2):200–222, 2012). These empirical results have been quite influential in the recent metaphilosophical debate about the method of cases. However, none of Swain et al.’s (2008) predictions concerning order effects with Truetemp cases could be consistently and robustly replicated in our three experiments, and it is thus at best unclear whether Truetemp intuitions are in fact unstable. So, if proponents of the negative program in experimental philosophy still want to use order effects to challenge the reliability of philosophical case judgments, they would be well advised to look elsewhere instead. In any case, given the more robust empirical evidence that we present in this paper, the metaphilosophical flurry created by Swain et al. (2008) and Wright’s (2010) influential studies looks like mere alarmism in hindsight.
  PubDate: 2023-03-13
Universalism and extensionalism revisited
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  Abstract: Abstract We present a new notion of mereological sum that is inequivalent to extant ones in the literature and does not fall prey to reasonable complaints that can be raised against some such notions. In light of this notion, we then revisit the relation between mereological universalism and extensionalism. In particular we argue that Varzi’s claim to the point that universalism entails extensionalism is justified only insofar as one sticks to Varzi’s notion of sum. In effect, we distinguish different versions of extensionalism and argue that universalism—when cashed out in terms of our new notion of sum—entails some versions but not others. Most significantly it does not entail extensionality of proper parthood. In the light of the above we set forth a new mereological system, Universalist Quasi-Supplemented Mereology, that can be considered a worthy alternative to different mereological systems in the literature.
  PubDate: 2023-03-10
Vice epistemology, norm-maintenance and epistemic evasiveness
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  Abstract: Abstract Vice epistemology studies how character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles systematically get in the way of knowledge, while doxastic responsibility is concerned with what kinds of responses are appropriate towards agents who believe badly. This paper identifies a new connection between these two fields, arguing that our propensity to take responsibility for our doxastic failures is directly relevant for vice epistemology, and in particular, understanding the social obstacles to knowledge that epistemic vices can create. This is because responses to norm violations are an important mechanism by which norms are upheld, and maintaining epistemic norms is crucial for our collective epistemic successes. This paper then identifies a new kind of vice, one which is bad precisely because of the way it undermines the epistemic norms that our blaming practices help maintain, and thus the benefits that said norms create. I call this vice epistemic evasiveness, and it concerns the attitude that one takes towards their own performance as an epistemic agent. Evasiveness is bad because it creates uncertainty about which agents are reliable, it prevents holders of this attitude from learning from their mistakes, and it signals to third parties that the norm is not being upheld, making them less likely to follow the norm.
  PubDate: 2023-03-10
Critical ordinary language philosophy: A new project in experimental
philosophy
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  Abstract: Abstract Several important philosophical problems (including the problems of perception, free will, and scepticism) arise from antinomies that are developed through philosophical paradoxes. The critical strand of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as practiced by J.L. Austin, provides an approach to such ‘antinomic problems’ that proceeds from an examination of ‘ordinary language’ (how people ordinarily talk about the phenomenon of interest) and ‘common sense’ (what they commonly think about it), and deploys findings to show that the problems at issue are artefacts of fallacious reasoning. The approach is capable, and in need of, empirical development. Proceeding from a case-study on Austin’s paradigmatic treatment of the problem of perception, this paper identifies the key empirical assumptions informing the approach, assesses them in the light of empirical findings about default inferences, contextualisation failures, and belief fragmentation, and explores how these findings can be deployed to address the problem of perception. This facilitates a novel resolution of the problem of perception. Proceeding from this paradigm, the paper proposes ‘experimental critical OLP’ as a new research program in experimental philosophy that avoids apparent non-sequiturs of OLP, extends and transforms experimental philosophy’s ‘sources program’, and provides a promising new strategy for deploying empirical findings about how people ordinarily talk and think about phenomena, to address longstanding philosophical problems.
  PubDate: 2023-03-09
Deepfakes and the epistemic apocalypse
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  Abstract: Abstract It is widely thought that deepfake videos are a significant and unprecedented threat to our epistemic practices. In some writing about deepfakes, manipulated videos appear as the harbingers of an unprecedented epistemic apocalypse. In this paper I want to take a critical look at some of the more catastrophic predictions about deepfake videos. I will argue for three claims: (1) that once we recognise the role of social norms in the epistemology of recordings, deepfakes are much less concerning, (2) that the history of photographic manipulation reveals some important precedents, correcting claims about the novelty of deepfakes, and (3) that proposed solutions to deepfakes have been overly focused on technological interventions. My overall goal is not so much to argue that deepfakes are not a problem, but to argue that behind concerns around deepfakes lie a more general class of social problems about the organisation of our epistemic practices.
  PubDate: 2023-03-09
Two approaches to naturalistic social ontology
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  Abstract: Abstract Social ontological inquiry has been pursued in analytic philosophy as well as in the social scientific tradition of critical realism. These traditions have remained largely separate despite partly overlapping concerns and similar underlying strategies of argumentation. They have also both been the subject of similar criticisms based on naturalistic approaches to the philosophy of science, which have addressed their apparent reliance on a transcendental mode of reasoning, their seeming distance from social scientific practice, and their (erroneous') tendency to advocate global solutions to local and pragmatic problems. Two approaches aiming to naturalize these two traditions of social ontology have been proposed in recent years: one drawing on a Gierean, model-based approach to scientific practice, the other drawing on inference to the best explanation. In our paper, we compare and contrast these naturalistic approaches to social ontology in terms of their capacity to respond to the aforementioned challenges. We also defend a form of methodological pluralism, according to which there are multiple different naturalistically acceptable approaches to social ontology, which emphasize contrasting procedural continuities between social scientific research and philosophical practice.
  PubDate: 2023-03-09
Equalized odds is a requirement of algorithmic fairness
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  Abstract: Abstract Statistical criteria of fairness are formal measures of how an algorithm performs that aim to help us determine whether an algorithm would be fair to use in decision-making. In this paper, I introduce a new version of the criterion known as “Equalized Odds,” argue that it is a requirement of procedural fairness, and show that it is immune to a number of objections to the standard version.
  PubDate: 2023-03-08
Art, imagination, and experiential knowledge
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  Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that art can help us imagine what it would be like to have experiences we have never had before. I begin by surveying a few of the things we are after when we ask what an experience is like. I maintain that it is easy for art to provide some of them. For example, it can relay facts about what the experience involves or what responses the experience might engender. The tricky case is the phenomenal quality of the experience or what it feels like from the inside. Thus, in the main part of the paper, I discuss how art can provide us with this as well. I conclude by situating my view in the context of the broader debate over transformative experiences. I maintain that art can solve some but not all of the problems that arise when deciding whether to undergo a transformation.
  PubDate: 2023-03-08
Quasi-Conventions
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  Abstract: Abstract I consider a generalizarion of Vanderschraaf's correlated conventions to Quasi-Conventions, using the concept of coarse correlated equilibria. I discuss the possibility of improved payoffs and the question of learnability by simple uncoupled learning dynamics. Laboratory experiments are surveyed. The generalization introduces strains of commitment, which can be see from different points of view. I conclude that the strains of commitment preclude using the generalization as a stand-alone definition of convention, but that in certain settings Quasi-Conventions can be important modules within larger true conventions.
  PubDate: 2023-03-03
Answering the conceptual challenge: three strategies for deflationists
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  Abstract: Abstract We defend deflationism about truth against a pressing challenge, which is to explain how deflationists can understand the role that the concept of truth appears to play in accounts of several other philosophically important concepts. We provide three strategies that deflationists can employ in response to the specific challenge regarding assertion that has been raised in several recent articles, viz., that the truth concept plays an ineliminable explanatory role in an account of assertion. We then show how to extend our strategies to accounts of other central philosophical concepts, by applying them to accounts of belief, knowledge, and logical validity. The result is a set of recipes for deflationists about truth to employ in developing responses to worries that might be raised about the explanatory role of the truth concept.
  PubDate: 2023-03-02
Deepfakes and depiction: from evidence to communication
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  Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I present an analysis of the depictive properties of deepfakes. These are videos and pictures produced by deep learning algorithms that automatically modify existing videos and photographs or generate new ones. I argue that deepfakes have an intentional standard of correctness. That is, a deepfake depicts its subject only insofar as its creator intends it to. This is due to the way in which these images are produced, which involves a degree of intentional control similar to that involved in the production of other intentional pictures such as drawings and paintings. This aspect distinguishes deepfakes from real videos and photographs, which instead have a non-intentional standard: their correct interpretation corresponds to the scenes that were recorded by the mechanisms that produced them, and not to what their producers intended them to represent. I show that these depictive properties make deepfakes fit for communicating information in the same way as language and other intentional pictures. That is, they do not provide direct access to the communicated information like non-intentional pictures (e.g., videos and photographs) do. Rather, they convey information indirectly, relying only on the viewer's assumptions about the communicative intentions of the creator of the deepfake. Indirect communication is indeed a prominent function of such media in our society, but it is often overlooked in the philosophical literature. This analysis also explains what is epistemically worrying about deepfakes. With the introduction of this technology, viewers interpreting photorealistic videos and pictures can no longer be sure of which standard to select (i.e., intentional or non-intentional), which makes misinterpretation likely (i.e., they can take an image to have a standard of correctness that it does not have).
  PubDate: 2023-03-02
Against a normative asymmetry between near- and future-bias
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  Abstract: Abstract Empirical evidence shows that people have multiple time-biases. One is near-bias; another is future-bias. Philosophical theorising about these biases often proceeds on two assumptions. First, that the two biases are independent: that they are explained by different factors (the independence assumption). Second, that there is a normative asymmetry between the two biases: one is rationally impermissible (near-bias) and the other rationally permissible (future-bias). The former assumption at least partly feeds into the latter: if the two biases were not explained by different factors, then it would be less plausible that their normative statuses differ. This paper investigates the independence assumption and finds it unwarranted. In light of this, we argue, there is reason to question the normative asymmetry assumption.
  PubDate: 2023-03-01
Agent-centered epistemic rationality
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  Abstract: Abstract It is a plausible and compelling theoretical assumption that epistemic rationality is just a matter of having doxastic attitudes that are the correct responses to one’s epistemic reasons, or that all requirements of epistemic rationality reduce to requirements on doxastic attitudes. According to this idea, all instances of epistemic rationality are instances of rational belief. Call this assumption, and any theory working under it, belief-centered. In what follows, I argue that we should not accept belief-centered theories of epistemic rationality. This is an argument in three acts. In the first, I present counterexamples that problematize the belief-centered assumption: cases whose protagonists (i) fail to meet any plausible requirements on belief but (ii) nevertheless appear epistemically rational. In the second act, I consider alternative explanations of the counterexamples, friendly to the belief-centered theorist, and find them wanting. In the third and final act, I show that there are significant theoretical benefits to acknowledging a distinct agent-centered dimension of epistemic rationality and sketch a candidate agent-centered approach: a view that grounds an agent’s epistemic rationality in the possession of good epistemic policies. In the end, we see that a complete theory of epistemic rationality is as much of a theory of rational agents as it is of rational belief.
  PubDate: 2023-03-01