Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 0026-4423 - ISSN (Online) 1460-2113 Published by Oxford University Press[425 journals]
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Pages: 605 - 630 Abstract: kk states that knowing entails knowing that one knows, and K¬K states that not knowing entails knowing that one does not know. In light of the arguments against kk and K¬K, one might consider modally qualified variants of those principles. According to weak kk, knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. And according to weakK¬K, not knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one does not know. This paper shows that weak kk and weakK¬K are much stronger than they initially appear. Jointly, they entail kk and K¬K. And they are susceptible to variants of the standard arguments against kk and K¬K. This has interesting implications for the debate on positive introspection and for deeper issues concerning the structure and limits of knowability. PubDate: Thu, 06 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac048 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 631 - 658 Abstract: Acts of futile resistance—harms against an aggressor which could not reasonably hope to avert the threat the aggressor poses—give rise to a puzzle: on the one hand, many such acts are intuitively permissible, yet on the other, these acts fail to meet the justificatory standards of defensive action. The most widely accepted solution to this puzzle is that victims in such cases permissibly defend against a secondary threat to their honour, dignity, or moral standing. I argue that this solution fails, because futile resistance is not plausibly regarded as defensive in the relevant sense. I propose instead that futile resistance is justified as a form of protest, where protest is analysed as an expression of rejection of victims’ wrongs. Such protest is justified, I argue, when and because it is the fitting response to the circumstances of futility. PubDate: Sun, 11 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad015 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 659 - 679 Abstract: William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his razor will, Chatton argues, either prove unacceptably dull when it comes to determining ontological commitment or prove unacceptably sharp when it comes to determining commitments entailed by certain theological doctrines. While Chatton’s objection is subtle and interesting in its own right, the broader significance of the debate between these thinkers lies in the light it sheds on medieval approaches to issues surrounding metaphysical methodology. PubDate: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad007 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 680 - 705 Abstract: What degree of justification should be required of epistemological cognition, the kind of cognition by which epistemological problems are to be solved' I consider the question by examining Husserl’s view of the matter. Challenging the current consensus, I argue that he is committed to the infallibility of epistemological cognition. I first present what he takes to be the leading problem of epistemology, which he designates as the ‘problem of transcendence’ or the problem of how ‘transcendent cognition’ is possible. I then give an account of what I call his Non-Transcendence Constraint, on which the problem cannot be solved by means of cognitions of the kind whose possibility it concerns, and so cannot be solved by means of transcendent cognition. Pointing out that he provides four specifications of the problem, I go on to argue that on the most fundamental of these it concerns the general possibility of fallible cognition. By the Non-Transcendence Constraint, however, this entails that the problem of transcendence cannot be solved by means of fallible cognition. I conclude that central aspects of Husserl’s metaepistemology commit him to the infallibility of epistemological cognition, at least as far as solving the supposedly leading problem of epistemology is concerned. PubDate: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad001 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 706 - 729 Abstract: This paper seeks to clarify one of the deepest questions about the source or ground of normativity, while also presenting an essence-based approach to answering it. We call it the ‘Arché Question.’ Though all metanormative theories must address this question, very few realists have explicitly grappled with the challenge it poses; those who have appear to deny any need to give an answer. After critically discussing extant realist responses, this paper outlines an essence-based approach to answering the Arché Question that draws on theoretical resources forged in recent advances in post-modal metaphysics. PubDate: Sat, 07 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac063 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 730 - 761 Abstract: I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination, an action can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an action can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. And in cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your action, even though your action cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict, and for the right reasons. PubDate: Wed, 19 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac060 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 762 - 788 Abstract: An old and well-known objection to non-classical logics is that they are too weak; in particular, they cannot prove a number of important mathematical results. A promising strategy to deal with this objection consists in proving so-called recapture results. Roughly, these results show that classical logic can be used in mathematics and other unproblematic contexts. However, the strategy faces some potential problems. First, typical recapture results are formulated in a purely logical language, and do not generalize nicely to languages containing the kind of vocabulary that usually motivates non-classical theories—for example, a language containing a naive truth predicate. Second, proofs of recapture results typically employ classical principles that are not valid in the targeted non-classical system; hence non-classical theorists do not seem entitled to those results. In this paper we analyse these problems and provide solutions on behalf of non-classical theorists. To address the first problem, we provide a novel kind of recapture result, which generalizes nicely to a truth-theoretic language. As for the second problem, we argue that it relies on an ambiguity, and that once the ambiguity is removed there are no reasons to think that non-classical logicians are not entitled to their recapture results. PubDate: Thu, 01 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad006 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 789 - 802 Abstract: Pereboom’s ‘wild coincidences’ argument against agent-causal libertarianism is based on the claim that in a world governed by statistical laws, the dovetailing of indeterministic physical happenings with the free actions of agent causes would be a coincidence too wild to be credible. In this paper it is shown that the conclusion is valid for deterministic laws, but that it fails for statistical laws. Therefore, the ‘wild coincidences’ argument does not provide the promised empirical refutation of agent-causal libertarianism. PubDate: Fri, 28 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad002 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
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Pages: 803 - 827 Abstract: As most philosophers recognize, the body’s central role in touch differs from the role it plays in the other sense modalities. Any account of touch must then explain the pivotal nature of the body’s involvement in touch. Unlike most accounts of touch, this paper argues that the body’s centrality in touch is not phenomenological or experiential: the body is not felt in any special way in tactile experiences. Building on Aristotle’s account in De Anima, I argue that the body is central in touch because it is the medium of tactile perception. Touch depends on the body as vision and audition depend on air or any medium that can transmit light or sound waves. I show that it is precisely because the body must be transparent in order to transmit tangible properties that it cannot be perceived or experienced in tactile perception. Although this account conflicts with the widespread view that tactile perception is mediated by bodily sensations, I maintain that it explains how the structure and constitution of the human body contribute directly to what we feel in tactile experiences and that it provides a better understanding of the relation between the sense of touch and our bodily feelings. PubDate: Sat, 08 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad005 Issue No:Vol. 132, No. 527 (2023)
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
