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- Neo-Logicism and Gödelian Incompleteness
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Pages: 1055 - 1082
Abstract: AbstractThere is a long-standing gap in the literature as to whether Gödelian incompleteness constitutes a challenge for Neo-Logicism, and if so how serious it is. In this paper, I articulate and address the challenge in detail. The Neo-Logicist project is to demonstrate the analyticity of arithmetic by deriving all its truths from logical principles and suitable definitions. The specific concern raised by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is that no single sound system of logic syntactically implies all arithmetical truths. I set out some responses that initially seem appealing and explain why they are not compelling. The upshot is that Neo-Logicism either offers an epistemic route only to some truths of arithmetic; or that it has to move from a syntactic to a semantic notion of logical consequence, which risks undermining its epistemic goals. I conclude by considering Crispin Wright’s recent attempt to address Gödelian incompleteness, which I argue is not satisfactory.
PubDate: Sat, 28 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac044
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2023)
- Logical Realism and the Riddle of Redundancy
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Pages: 1083 - 1107
Abstract: AbstractAccording to an influential view, when it comes to representing reality, some words are better suited for the job than others. This is elitism. There is reason to believe that the set of the best, or elite, words should not be redundant or arbitrary. However, we are often forced to choose between these two theoretical vices, especially in cases involving theories that seem to be mere notational variants. This is the riddle of redundancy: both redundancy and arbitrariness are vicious, but there are cases in which one must be picked. Logical realists admit that there are some logical constants among the elite words. This leads to awkward questions, such as which among conjunction and disjunction is elite. In this paper, I show how the riddle of redundancy arises for logical realists, and offer a solution. This approach requires us to change how we represent negation. Instead of using some particular symbol, we represent negation by flipping formulae over the horizontal axis.
PubDate: Sat, 28 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac025
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2023)
- Crossmodal Basing
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Pages: 1163 - 1194
Abstract: AbstractWhat kinds of mental states can be based on epistemic reasons' The standard answer is only beliefs. I argue that perceptual states can also be based on reasons, as the result of crossmodal interactions. A perceptual state from one modality can provide a reason on which an experience in another modality is based. My argument identifies key markers of the basing relation and locates them in the crossmodal Marimba Illusion (Schutz & Kubovy 2009). The subject’s auditory experience of musical tone duration is based on the reason provided by her visual representation of the length of the musician’s gesture and other stored perceptual principles.
PubDate: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac030
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2022)
- Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem
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Pages: 1247 - 1278
Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, I identify a central problem for conceptual engineering: the problem of showing concept-users why they should recognize the authority of the concepts advocated by engineers. I argue that this authority problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to the increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues of engineered concepts. Outside contexts in which we already aim to realize theoretical virtues, solving the authority problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of concepts. But this then presents us with the problem of how to specify a concept’s function. I argue that extant solutions to this function specification problem are unsatisfactory for engineering purposes, because the functions they identify fail to reliably bestow authority on concepts, and hence fail to solve the authority problem. What is required is an authoritative notion of conceptual function: an account of the functions of concepts which simultaneously shows why concepts fulfilling such functions should be recognized as having authority. I offer an account that meets this combination of demands by specifying the functions of concepts in terms of how they tie in with our present concerns.
PubDate: Thu, 01 Dec 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac028
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2022)
- Reconsidering Reparations, by Olúfẹ́mi O.
Táíwò-
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Pages: 1321 - 1330
Abstract: Reconsidering Reparations, by TáíwòOlúfẹ́mi O.. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. x + 261.
PubDate: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac055
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2022)
- Vagueness and Thought, by Andrew Bacon
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Pages: 1375 - 1386
Abstract: Vagueness and Thought, by BaconAndrew. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xviii + 340.
PubDate: Sat, 12 Nov 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac050
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2022)
- Foundational Grounding and Creaturely Freedom
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Pages: 1108 - 1130
Abstract: AbstractAccording to classical theism, the universe depends on God in a way that goes beyond mere (efficient) causation. I have previously argued that this ‘deep dependence’ of the universe on God is best understood as a type of grounding. In a recent paper in this journal, Aaron Segal argues that this doctrine of deep dependence causes problems for creaturely free will: if our choices are grounded in facts about God, and we have no control over these facts, then we do not control our choices and are therefore not free. This amounts to a grounding analogue of the Consequence Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. If successful, it would have application beyond classical theism: similar concerns would apply to any view that takes our choices to be grounded in a deeper reality which is beyond our control. However, I show that the argument is not successful. Segal’s Grounding Consequence Argument is so closely analogous to the Causal Consequence Argument that any response to the one provides a response to the other. As a result, if you don’t think that prior causes (whether deterministic or indeterministic) undermine free will, you shouldn’t think that prior grounds undermine free will.
PubDate: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab024
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- Why Ideal Epistemology'
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Pages: 1131 - 1162
Abstract: Ideal epistemologists investigate the nature of pure epistemic rationality, abstracting away from human cognitive limitations. Non-ideal epistemologists investigate epistemic norms that are satisfiable by most humans, most of the time. Ideal epistemology faces a number of challenges, aimed at both its substantive commitments and its philosophical worth. This paper explains the relation between ideal and non-ideal epistemology, with the aim of justifying ideal epistemology. Its approach is meta-epistemological, focusing on the meaning and purpose of epistemic evaluations. I provide an account on which the fundamental difference between ideal and non-ideal epistemic evaluations is that only the non-ideal epistemic ‘ought’ implies any substantive ‘can’. I argue that only ideal epistemic evaluations are ‘normatively robust’: they are neither conventional nor seriously context-sensitive. Non-ideal epistemic evaluations are normatively non-robust, exhibiting both conventionality and serious context-sensitivity from an interesting variety of distinct sources. For this reason, non-ideal epistemic evaluations won’t characterize the fundamental nature of epistemic rationality. Non-ideal epistemic rationality depends, not merely on what’s epistemically valuable, but also on modally contingent epistemic conventions and contextually contingent constraints on epistemic options. If we want a normatively robust theory of epistemic rationality, ideal epistemology is the only game in town.
PubDate: Fri, 08 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab023
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- From Physical to Metaphysical Necessity
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Pages: 1216 - 1246
Abstract: AbstractLet Nomological Bound be the thesis that there is nothing objectively possible beyond what is physically possible. Nomological Bound has struck many as a live hypothesis. Nevertheless, in this article I provide a novel argument against it. Yet even though I claim that Nomological Bound is false, I argue that the boundaries of objective possibility can still be characterized intimately in terms of physical necessity. This is philosophically significant, for on a natural understanding it constitutes the powerful anti-sceptical result that those who believe in physical necessity should not harbour any scepticism towards merely metaphysical possibilities.
PubDate: Wed, 08 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab032
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- Essence, Modality, and Identity*
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Pages: 1279 - 1302
PubDate: Thu, 07 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab017
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- Aristotle and the Eleatic One, by Timothy Clarke
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Pages: 1303 - 1311
Abstract: Aristotle and the Eleatic One, by ClarkeTimothy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 227.
PubDate: Thu, 14 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab070
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- Everything, More or Less: A Defence of Generality Relativism, by J. P.
Studd-
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Pages: 1311 - 1321
Abstract: Everything, More or Less: A Defence of Generality Relativism, by StuddJ. P.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 279.
PubDate: Fri, 18 Jun 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa096
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- Action, Knowledge, and Will, by John Hyman
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Pages: 1330 - 1339
Abstract: Action, Knowledge, and Will, by HymanJohn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. xi + 255.
PubDate: Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab039
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, by Sebastian Rödl
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Pages: 1339 - 1347
Abstract: Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, by RödlSebastian. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018, Pp. 198.
PubDate: Sat, 20 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab001
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- There Are No Such Things as Theories, by Steven French
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Pages: 1347 - 1357
Abstract: There Are No Such Things as Theories, by FrenchSteven. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xvi + 266.
PubDate: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab003
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism, by Alastair
Wilson-
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Pages: 1357 - 1364
Abstract: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism, by AlastairWilson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xi + 219.
PubDate: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab004
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
- The Primacy of Metaphysics, by Christopher Peacocke
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Pages: 1364 - 1375
Abstract: The Primacy of Metaphysics, by PeacockeChristopher. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xiii + 218.
PubDate: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab028
Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 524 (2021)
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