 Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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- Attention and (Painful) Interest: Revisiting the Interest Theory of
Attention-
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Pages: 327 - 347
Abstract: The nineteenth century saw the development of reductive views of attention. The German philosopher and psychologist Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) proposed an original reductive view according to which attention is nothing but interest and interest itself is a positive feeling. Stumpf’s view was developed by Francis Bradley (1846-1924), George Frederick Stout (1860-1944), and Josiah Royce (1855-1916), but has been overlooked in the recent literature. In this paper, I will expound Stumpf’s view of attention, trace it back to its Aristotelian roots and defend the version offered by Stout and Royce. In this version a new kind of feeling, feelings of interest, and value, intellectual value, take centre stage.
PubDate: Mon, 02 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac059
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- Being Somehow Without (Possibly) Being Something
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Pages: 348 - 371
Abstract: Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a relation does not even require possibly being something.
PubDate: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac052
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- On Deniability
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Pages: 372 - 401
Abstract: Communication can be risky. Like other kinds of actions, it comes with potential costs. For instance, an utterance can be embarrassing, offensive, or downright illegal. In the face of such risks, speakers tend to act strategically and seek ‘plausible deniability’. In this paper, we propose an account of the notion of deniability at issue. On our account, deniability is an epistemic phenomenon. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways. To avoid predictable confusion, we distinguish deniability from a practical correlate we call ‘untouchability’. Roughly, a speaker has untouchability if she can make it practically irrational for her audience to act in certain ways. These accounts shed light on the nature of strategic speech and suggest countermeasures against strategic speech.
PubDate: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac056
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains
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Pages: 402 - 427
Abstract: The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first programme in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which this limitation can be overcome. Building on the best arguments in finite domains, I present two accuracy arguments for probabilism that are perfectly general—they apply to credence functions with arbitrary domains. I then discuss how the arguments’ premisses can be challenged. We will see that it is particularly difficult to characterize admissible accuracy measures in infinite domains.
PubDate: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac053
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- Valid Arguments as True Conditionals
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Pages: 428 - 451
Abstract: This paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As will be argued, once some basic features of our naïve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence between valid arguments and true conditionals makes perfect sense. The account of validity outlined here, which displays one coherent way to articulate the Stoic intuition, accords with standard formal treatments of deductive validity and encompasses an independently grounded characterization of inductive validity.
PubDate: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac026
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- A Scheme Foiled: A Critique of Baron’s Account of Extra-mathematical
Explanation-
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Pages: 479 - 492
Abstract: Extra-mathematical explanations explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. Philosophers disagree about whether there are extra-mathematical explanations, the correct account of them if they exist, and their implications (for example, for the philosophy of scientific explanation and for the metaphysics of mathematics) (Baker 2005, 2009; Bangu 2008; Colyvan 1998; Craver and Povich 2017; Lange 2013, 2016, 2018; Mancosu 2008; Povich 2019, 2020; Steiner 1978). In this discussion, I present three desiderata for any account of extra-mathematical explanation and argue that Baron’s (2020) U-Counterfactual theory fails to meet each of them. I conclude with some reasons for pessimism that a successful account will be forthcoming.
PubDate: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac019
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- Finding Wrong
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Pages: 493 - 504
Abstract: In his interesting article ‘Evaluative Discourse and Affective States of Mind’, Nils Franzén argues that non-cognitivism gets support from the fact that we use certain verbs when we attribute moral judgments. More specifically he argues that our use of the subjective attitude verb ‘finds’ – as in ‘he finds dancing morally wrong’ – provides reason to think that moral judgments are affective attitudes. While I agree that there might be things to learn from the way we attribute moral judgments, I will argue that cognitivists can offer good explanations of the phenomena that Franzén points to. I also suggest that the proposed cognitivist explanatory framework can be used to explain often overlooked nuances in moral judgment attributions connected to the use of different attitude verbs.
PubDate: Sat, 04 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac041
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- Trespassing Testimony in Scientific Collaboration
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Pages: 505 - 522
Abstract: The term ‘epistemic trespassing’ has recently been coined to denote a person’s judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number of distinctions, I argue that while intra-scientific trespassing testimony may seriously hamper scientific collaboration, it does not invariably do so and may even be beneficial to it.
PubDate: Sun, 05 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac072
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2023)
- Aesthetic Humility: A Kantian Model
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Pages: 452 - 478
Abstract: Unlike its moral and intellectual counterparts, the virtue of aesthetic humility has been widely neglected. In order to begin filling in this gap, I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is a promising resource for developing a model of aesthetic humility. Initially, however, this may seem like an unpromising starting point as Kant’s aesthetics might appear to promote aesthetic arrogance instead. In spite of this prima facie worry, I claim that Kant’s aesthetics provides an illuminating model of aesthetic humility that sheds light not only on the self- and other-directed attitudes it involves, but also on how aesthetic humility can serve as a corrective to the vices of aesthetic arrogance and aesthetic servility. In addition to revealing the ways in which Kant’s aesthetics prizes humility rather than arrogance, I aim to show that the Kantian model of aesthetic humility can enrich our understanding of humility more generally and contribute to the on-going effort in aesthetics to analyse specific aesthetic virtues and vices.
PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac010
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2022)
- Constructing Practical Reasons, by Andreas Müller
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Pages: 531 - 539
Abstract: Constructing Practical Reasons, by MüllerAndreas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. vii + 241.
PubDate: Thu, 06 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab089
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2022)
- Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy, by
Sanford Shieh-
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Pages: 539 - 548
Abstract: Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy, by ShiehSanford. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xxiv + 441.
PubDate: Fri, 07 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab093
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2022)
- Immigration and Freedom, by Chandran Kukathas
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Pages: 595 - 604
Abstract: Immigration and Freedom, by KukathasChandran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. Pp. xv + 364.
PubDate: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac005
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2022)
- Aristotle on Shame and Learning to be Good, by Marta Jimenez
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Pages: 523 - 531
Abstract: Aristotle on Shame and Learning to be Good, by JimenezMarta. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. x + 214.
PubDate: Mon, 25 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab072
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2021)
- The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs, by Lisa Bortolotti
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Pages: 549 - 558
Abstract: The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs, by BortolottiLisa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 162.
PubDate: Wed, 03 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab037
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2021)
- The Ethical Demand, by K. E. LøgstrupEthical Concepts and Problems,
by K. E. Løgstrup-
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Pages: 558 - 567
Abstract: The Ethical Demand, by LøgstrupK E. Translated with an introduction and notes by Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. liv + 239.
PubDate: Thu, 14 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab043
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2021)
- Descartes and the Ontology of Everyday Life, by Deborah J. Brown and
Calvin G. Normore-
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Pages: 568 - 577
Abstract: Descartes and the Ontology of Everyday Life, by BrownDeborah J and NormoreCalvin G. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. x + 255.
PubDate: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab059
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2021)
- Portraits and Philosophy, edited by Hans Maes
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Pages: 577 - 586
Abstract: Portraits and Philosophy, edited by MaesHans. New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987. Pp. xi + 303.
PubDate: Thu, 28 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab068
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2021)
- The Shape of Agency, by Joshua Shepherd
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Pages: 586 - 594
Abstract: The Shape of Agency, by ShepherdJoshua. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. ix +184.
PubDate: Mon, 27 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab090
Issue No: Vol. 132, No. 526 (2021)
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