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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Mind
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.686
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 64  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0026-4423 - ISSN (Online) 1460-2113
Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [424 journals]
  • Gender without Gender Identity: The Case of Cognitive Disability

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      Pages: 836 - 862
      Abstract: What gender are you' And in virtue of what' These are questions of gender categorization. Such questions are increasingly at the core of many contemporary debates about gender, both within philosophy and in public discourse.
      PubDate: Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab086
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2022)
       
  • Does Chance Undermine Would'

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      Pages: 747 - 785
      Abstract: AbstractCounterfactual scepticism holds that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. The main argument for this view appeals to a ‘chance undermines would’ principle: if ψ would have some chance of not obtaining had ϕ obtained, then ϕ □→ ψ is false. This principle seems to follow from two fairly weak principles, namely, that ‘chance ensures could’ and that ϕ □→ ψ and ϕ ⋄→ ¬ ψ clash. Despite their initial plausibility, I show that these principles are independently problematic: given some modest closure principles, they entail absurdities. Moreover, on the most promising strategy for saving these principles, they do not, in the relevant sense, entail the chance-undermines-would principle. Instead, they entail a principle that only supports counterfactual indeterminism, the view that most ordinary counterfactuals are chancy, that is, not settled true. I demonstrate this by developing an indeterminist semantics that vindicates the clash and chance-ensures-could principles but not the chance-undermines-would principle. This view, I argue, offers a better account of our credal and linguistic judgements than counterfactual scepticism.
      PubDate: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab055
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • All the time in the world

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      Pages: 786 - 804
      Abstract: The second premise of the Kalām cosmological argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, has two supporting arguments; the Hilbert’s Hotel argument and the successive addition argument. In this paper we consider a counterexample to the successive addition argument, first put forward by Fred Dretske. We look at six possible objections to this counterexample, and find each of them problematic. In the end, we conclude that the successive addition argument is unsound.
      PubDate: Sun, 28 Feb 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa086
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Observation Sentences Revisited

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      Pages: 805 - 825
      Abstract: AbstractI argue for an alternative to Quine’s conception of observation sentences, one that better satisfies the roles Quine envisages for them, and that otherwise respects Quinean constraints. After reviewing a certain predicament Quine got into in balancing the needs of the intersubjectivity of observation sentences with his notion of the stimulus meaning of an observation sentence, I push for replacing the latter with what I call the ‘stimulus field’ of an observation sentence, a notion that remains ‘proximate’ but is shared between different language users. Throughout, I emphasize the epistemological role of observation sentences.
      PubDate: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa103
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Does the Unity of Grounding Matter'

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      Pages: 826 - 835
      Abstract: AbstractIs the notion of grounding arguably prevalent throughout moral philosophy the same as that found in metaphysics' Selim Berker has argued it is. This, he claims, has a ‘surprising’ consequence: many central claims in normative ethics become claims within both normative ethics and meta-ethics. I argue that whatever important consequences the unity of grounding may have for moral philosophy, it does not, pace Berker, entail anything significant regarding the relationship between normative ethics and meta-ethics.
      PubDate: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab008
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers

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      Pages: 863 - 891
      Abstract: AbstractThis paper outlines an account of numbers based on the numerical equivalence schema (NES), which consists of all sentences of the form ‘#x.Fx=n if and only if ∃nx Fx’, where # is the number-of operator and ∃n is defined in standard Russellian fashion. In the first part of the paper, I point out some analogies between the NES and the T-schema for truth. In light of these analogies, I formulate a minimalist account of numbers, based on the NES, which strongly parallels the minimalist (deflationary) account of truth. One may be tempted to develop the minimalist account in a fictionalist direction, according to which arithmetic is useful but untrue, if taken at face value. In the second part, I argue that this suggestion is not as attractive as it may first appear. The NES suffers from a similar problem to the T-schema: it is deductively weak and does not enable the derivation of any non-trivial generalizations. In the third part of the paper, I explore some strategies to deal with the generalization problem, again drawing inspiration from the literature on truth. In closing this paper, I briefly compare the minimalist to some other accounts of numbers.
      PubDate: Sat, 13 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab060
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances

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      Pages: 892 - 916
      Abstract: Abstract–We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural way for them to receive imprecise probabilities. The mathematics of non-measurable sets is arcane, but its epistemological import is far-reaching; even apparently mundane propositions are liable to be affected by non-measurability. The phenomenon of non-measurability dramatically reshapes the dialectic between critics and proponents of imprecise credence. Non-measurability offers natural rejoinders to prominent critics of imprecise credence. Non-measurability even reverses some of the critics’ arguments—by the very lights that have been used to argue against imprecise credences, imprecise credences are better than precise credences.
      PubDate: Mon, 08 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab031
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Practical Knowledge without Luminosity

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      Pages: 917 - 934
      Abstract: AbstractAccording to a rich tradition in philosophy of action, intentional action requires practical knowledge: someone who acts intentionally knows what they are doing while they are doing it. Piñeros Glasscock (2020) argues that an anti-luminosity argument, of the sort developed in Williamson (2000), can be readily adapted to provide a reductio of an epistemic condition on intentional action. This paper undertakes a rescue mission on behalf of an epistemic condition on intentional action. We formulate and defend a version of an epistemic condition that is free from any luminosity commitments. While this version of an epistemic condition escapes reductio, it comes with substantive commitments of its own. In particular, we will see that it forces us to deny the existence of any essentially intentional actions. We go on to argue that this consequence should be embraced. On the resulting picture, intentional action is not luminous. But it still entails practical knowledge.
      PubDate: Fri, 08 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab041
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • How Common Knowledge Is Possible

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      Pages: 935 - 948
      Abstract: AbstractThe two of us commonly know a proposition just in case (i) we both know it, (ii) we both know that we both know it, (iii) we both know that we both know that we both know it, and so on. In a recent paper titled ‘Uncommon Knowledge’, Harvey Lederman (2018) argues against the possibility of common knowledge. His argument rests on the empirical claim that there are minor individual variations in how we perceive things. This motivates a principle about perception: when two people are perceiving something and it perceptually appears a certain way to one of them, then for all that person knows, it perceptually appears a slightly different way to the other. In this paper, I challenge Lederman’s perceptual principle and thereby his argument. In particular, I argue that there are some circumstances in which things perceptually appear a certain way to me and nonetheless I know that they don’t perceptually appear in a slightly different way to you. Indeed, I argue that not only are there exceptions to the perceptual principle, but they are widespread.
      PubDate: Sun, 17 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa090
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • The Birth of Ethics: Reconstructing the Role and Nature of Morality, by
           Philip Pettit, edited by Kinch Hoekstra

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      Pages: 949 - 957
      Abstract: The Birth of Ethics: Reconstructing the Role and Nature of Morality, by PettitPhilip, edited by HoekstraKinch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 400.
      PubDate: Tue, 06 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab013
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • The Morality of Defensive Force, by Jonathan Quong

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      Pages: 958 - 967
      Abstract: The Morality of Defensive Force, by QuongJonathan. New York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 217.
      PubDate: Thu, 13 May 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab022
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities: Essays on the Influence of Larry
           Alexander, by Hurd Heidi, ed.

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      Pages: 968 - 977
      Abstract: Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities: Essays on the Influence of Larry Alexander, by HeidiHurd, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xxvi + 488.
      PubDate: Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab033
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Debating the A Priori, by Paul Boghossian and Timothy Williamson

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      Pages: 977 - 985
      Abstract: Debating the A Priori, by BoghossianPaul and WilliamsonTimothy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xi +259.
      PubDate: Mon, 05 Jul 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab035
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • The Complex Reality of Pain, by Jennifer Corns

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      Pages: 986 - 995
      Abstract: The Complex Reality of Pain, by CornsJennifer. New York: Routledge, 2020. Pp. xi + 217.
      PubDate: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab025
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • The Ethics of Joy: Spinoza on the Empowered Life, by Andrew Youpa. New
           York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 208.

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      Pages: 995 - 1005
      Abstract: The Ethics of Joy: Spinoza on the Empowered Life, by YoupaAndrew. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 208.
      PubDate: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab002
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Being Rational and Being Right, by Juan Comesaña

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      Pages: 1005 - 1015
      Abstract: Being Rational and Being Right, by ComesañaJuan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xii + 240.
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab010
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • The Metaphysics of Representation, by J. Robert G. Williams

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      Pages: 1015 - 1024
      Abstract: The Metaphysics of Representation, by RobertJWilliamsG. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xxii + 213.
      PubDate: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab015
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • The Structure of Truth: The 1970 John Locke Lectures, by Donald Davidson,
           edited with an introduction by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini and Ernie
           Lepore

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      Pages: 1025 - 1036
      Abstract: The Structure of Truth: The 1970 John Locke Lectures, by DavidsonDonald, edited with an introduction by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini and Ernie Lepore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 120.
      PubDate: Tue, 01 Jun 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab019
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Games: Agency as Art, by C. Thi Nguyen

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      Pages: 1037 - 1044
      Abstract: Games: Agency as Art, by Thi NguyenC.. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 256.
      PubDate: Sun, 14 Feb 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa060
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
  • Joyce’s Ulysses’ Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Philip
           Kitcher

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      Pages: 1044 - 1053
      Abstract: Joyce’s Ulysses’ Philosophical Perspectives, edited by KitcherPhilip. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xvii + 257.
      PubDate: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab011
      Issue No: Vol. 131, No. 523 (2021)
       
 
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