Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 0026-4423 - ISSN (Online) 1460-2113 Published by Oxford University Press[419 journals]
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Santorio P. Pages: 59 - 98 Abstract: AbstractThe literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don’t express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported by strong arguments, but they are incompatible on their standard formulations. Hence it appears that we have to choose between mutually exclusive options. But the options are not exclusive. This paper develops a theory of the semantics and assertability of conditionals that is both selectional and informational. The theory vindicates the signature inferences of both selectional and informational theories, including so-called Conditionals Excluded Middle and principles about the interplay between conditionals and ‘might’. It also predicts some interesting and puzzling facts about the assertion of conditionals. PubDate: Thu, 06 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa101 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2022)
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Klecha P. Pages: 1 - 33 Abstract: AbstractThis paper is about Sobel sequences, which are sequences of counterfactuals that supposedly display two interesting properties: first, they are consistent, as accounted for by the famous Lewis-Stalnaker analysis; but second, they are not consistent in the reverse order, which is not accounted for by Lewis-Stalnaker. I argue that there has been an empirical oversight in the literature on these sequences: there are consistent sequences (which I call true Sobel sequences), and there are irreversible sequences (which I call Lewis sequences), but no sequence is both. The Lewis-Stalnaker theory neatly captures Sobel sequences, and also captures the inconsistency (in both directions) of Lewis sequences. But there is still a dynamic asymmetry at work with Lewis sequences, which I account for by appeal to the pragmatic phenomenon of imprecision. Lewis sequences seem consistent because they do not belie factual disagreements, but rather metalinguistic disagreements about how precise to be. This also accounts for their irreversibility—such metalinguistic disagreements about the standard of precision are only possible in one direction, as famously observed by Lewis (1979), who observed them in discourses not containing counterfactuals. PubDate: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab012 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2021)
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Wilhelm I. Pages: 35 - 58 Abstract: AbstractI explore the relationship between a prominent analysis of intrinsic properties, due to Langton and Lewis, and the phenomenon of quantum entanglement. As I argue, the analysis faces a puzzle. The full analysis classifies certain properties of entangled particles as intrinsic. But when combined with an extremely plausible assumption about duplication, the main part of the analysis classifies those properties as non-intrinsic instead. I conclude that much of Lewis’s metaphysics is in trouble: Lewis based many of his metaphysical views—his thesis of Humean supervenience, for instance, and his account of recombination—on an analysis of intrinsicality which does not sit well with quantum phenomena. PubDate: Thu, 28 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa091 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2021)
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Gallow J. Pages: 99 - 127 Abstract: AbstractI present a decision in which causal decision theory appears to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behaviour and long-run poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge caution. This decision should lead causalists to a better understanding of what it takes for a decision between some collection of options to count as a subdecision of a decision between a larger collection of options. And with this better understanding of subdecisions in hand, causalists will not violate IIA or NEE. This decision will also teach causalists that, in sequential decisions, a rational agent may be led to make a series of choices which are causally dominated by some other sequence of choices they could have made instead. I will encourage causalists to recognize this as an intrapersonal tragedy of the commons. PubDate: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab047 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2021)
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Fujimoto K. Pages: 129 - 157 Abstract: AbstractTruth is often considered to be a logico-linguistic tool for expressing indirect endorsements and infinite conjunctions. In this article, I will point out another logico-linguistic function of truth: to enable and validate what I call a blind argument, namely, an argument that involves indirectly endorsed statements. Admitting this function among the logico-linguistic functions of truth has some interesting consequences. In particular, it yields a new type of so-called conservativeness argument, which poses a new type of threat to deflationism about truth. PubDate: Sat, 30 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa083 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2021)
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Loets A. Pages: 159 - 191 Abstract: AbstractA variety of recent work in epistemology employs a notion of normality to provide novel theories of knowledge or justification. While such theories are commonly advertised as affording particularly strong epistemic logics, they often make substantive assumptions about the background notion of normality and its logic. This article takes recent normality-based defences of the KK principle as a case study to submit such assumptions to scrutiny. After clarifying issues regarding the natural language use of normality claims, the article isolates a number of choice points regarding the role of contingency, context-sensitivity and similarity in our theorizing with normality. It turns out that both weaker and stronger logics of normality can be motivated depending on how such choices are resolved. And yet securing logics of normality strong enough for normality to play its envisaged role in epistemology may have unwelcome downstream consequences for the resultant theories of knowledge or justification. PubDate: Fri, 08 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab021 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2021)
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Dover D. Pages: 193 - 230 Abstract: AbstractThis paper explores a distinctive form of social interaction—interpersonal inquiry—in which two or more people attempt to understand one another by engaging in conversation. Like many modes of inquiry into human beings, interpersonal inquiry partly shapes its own objects. How we conduct it thus affects who we become. I present an ethical ideal of conversation to which, I argue, at least some of our interpersonal inquiry ought to aspire. I then consider how this ideal might influence philosophical conceptions of the self. PubDate: Fri, 24 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab069 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2021)
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Hewson M; Kirkpatrick J. Pages: 231 - 258 Abstract: AbstractKevin Dorst has recently pointed out an apparently puzzling consequence of denying epistemic luminosity: given some natural-sounding bridging principles between knowledge, credence, and indicative conditionals, the denial of epistemic luminosity licenses the knowledge and assertability of abominable-sounding conditionals of the form ⌜If I don’t know that ϕ, then ϕ⌝. We provide a general and systematic examination of this datum by testing Dorst’s claim against various semantics for the indicative conditional in the setting of epistemic logic. Our conclusion is that, regardless of whether knowledge is luminous, the knowability of these conditionals is highly sensitive to the correct semantic analysis of the indicative conditional. Moreover, standard pragmatic resources can explain away the infelicity of such assertions. As it stands, the datum does not tell against epistemic non-luminosity. PubDate: Mon, 13 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab064 Issue No:Vol. 131, No. 521 (2021)
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
