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Abstract: Abstract Fine (J Philos Logic 46(6):625–674, 2017) develops a unilateral and a bilateral truthmaker semantics for propositional logic. The unilateral approach trades off the primitive exact falsification relation of the bilateral approach for a primitive exclusion relation between states, thereby raising the question if exclusion serves any purpose other than to avoid exact falsification. We argue that exclusion is motivated independently of its use in avoiding exact falsification, namely as a foundation for the reconstruction of modal notions such as possibility and necessity. This reconstruction in turn motivates what we call emergent exclusion: an atomic state can exclude a sum of atomic states collectively without excluding any of these atomic states individually. Emergent exclusion is banned in Fine (2017a) in order to maintain exact equivalence in de Morgan’s law \(\lnot (P \wedge Q) \Leftrightarrow \lnot P \vee \lnot Q\) ; we argue that the two sides of this law are not exactly equivalent and discuss a variety of state spaces that feature emergent exclusion. This paper aims to be accessible to linguists without prior exposure to truthmaker semantics. We highlight points of contact with natural language semantics, such as event semantics and algebraic semantics of plurals and conjunction. PubDate: 2024-08-02
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Abstract: Abstract This paper explores the distribution and semantics of the reversative affix un- and the restitutive affix re-, and overall makes a new proposal about the lexical semantics of verbs. I argue that these affixes tell a story of derivational morphology that is based not on categorization of verbs into neat aspectual and decompositional classes, but on the result of the verb’s action on the object and whether or not such a result state permits reversal and restitution. The argument structure of these affixes shows us that morphology interacts with semantics in a true compositional sense, whereby the affectedness of the object is a crucial factor in determining compatibility and composition. I propose an approach to verb meaning that encodes this important information as outcomes: the lifespan properties of the object after the action occurs on it. I propose, formulating the Verb-Root-Outcomes framework, that all verb roots come equipped with sets of outcomes. A wide array of verbs that have been classified as ‘change-of-state’ are shown to have different sub-classes based on the shape of the outcome set, and this also allows a formal definition of what ‘potential’ change could mean. The affixes un- and re- are modeled as result-state modifiers, which are sensitive to the outcomes of the action of the verb stem they attach to, and only attach when their presuppositions about the state of the object are met. Apart from directly comparing reversal and restitution with the same formal notion of equivalence, this approach also allows a transparent representation of event decomposition, whereby change in the object is able to be tracked at a granular level and its importance in determining the success of morphological derivations highlighted. This theory argues for compositional semantic interpretation at a sub-lexical level, while also showing how sentential and pragmatic factors affect verb meaning and derivational affixation . PubDate: 2024-07-18
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Abstract: Abstract We propose an account of interpretive effects involving same and different, relying on two claims: the first is that same and different are able to take scope, and the second is that they are presuppositional. On this account, same and different are decomposed into two parts: an additive operator TOO and a (non-)identity predicate. We argue that this account provides a more parsimonious account of well-known properties of same and different, such as the distinction between internal and external readings, as well as the parallelism effects discovered by Hardt and Mikkelsen (Linguist Philos 38:289–314, 2015). We also present a solution to a previously unexplained puzzle involving comparatives. PubDate: 2024-06-22
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Abstract: Abstract When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content' We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics. PubDate: 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09408-y
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Abstract: Abstract The literature in semantics and pragmatics provides extensive evidence for the strengthening of linguistic expressions, both in matrix positions and when embedded under various operators. We study the properties of such strengthening using a very simple setting. Specifically, we look at when the expression “crate with a banana” can be understood as a unique crate even though two different crates have a banana in them. By varying the scenarios in which an expression such as “Pick the crate with a banana” is evaluated, we show that the strengthening of “crate with a banana” within the scope of the definite article parallels the entailments of “crate with only a banana” (with an overt exhaustivity operator, ‘only’). We use this observation to argue that strengthening in embedded positions follows the logic of an exhaustivity operator rather than that of rational inference. We then note that a similar pattern obtains in matrix positions. PubDate: 2024-05-21
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Abstract: Abstract This paper is concerned with uses of certain morphemes, most notably the past, to represent meanings of distance from reality in modal expressions. This class of morphology has been identified with the names subjunctive, fake tense, fake past, modal past and is referred to here as X-marking, after von Fintel and Iatridou (Linguist Philos, 2020). X-marking has been most studied in the context of English conditionals however, it is well-known that the morphology is observed in many non-English languages and can appear in various other types of constructions, including counterfactual desire expressions. I motivate two desiderata for theories of X-marking in pursuit of an analysis that unifies the phenomenon across expression types and languages. I then develop a novel, formally explicit analysis of X-marking which I show to satisfy these desiderata while providing greater empirical coverage of well-known cases compared to existing accounts. The proposed analysis makes use of modal presupposition projection together with pragmatic inference via Maximize Presupposition to provide a unified treatment of X-marking in English conditionals and counterfactual desires expressions of English featuring wish. I show how previous proposals for X-marking cannot satisfy these desiderata, making them insufficient for a unified account. Lastly, I introduce a hypothesis that all varieties of morphology that can be used as X-marking cross-linguistically-including past, imperfective, plural and habitual-are vacuous in both their X-marked and ordinary uses. PubDate: 2024-05-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09401-5
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Abstract: Abstract Superlative modifiers (SMs) are known to demonstrate an ambiguity between an epistemic reading (EPI) conveying speaker ignorance and a concessive reading (CON) conveying speaker concession. Such EPI-CON ambiguity has often been taken, implicitly or explicitly, to be a lexical coincidence. While there may be some justification for such a position when a single language is considered, we argue for an intrinsic connection between the two readings based on cross-linguistic considerations. This paper focuses on English at least and Mandarin zhi-shao as representative of superlative modifiers across a wide range of languages to propose a unified account of the two readings. The proposal builds on Biezma (2013) in relying on the role of focus and scalarity in developing a unified semantics for the two readings, but differs in capitalizing on the fact that cross-linguistically superlative modifiers use the same morphological formants as quantity superlatives. It also follows Biezma (2013) in taking pragmatic factors as crucial in deriving the variation between EPI and CON readings. Elaborating on her account, it offers a more nuanced picture of the ways in which EPI is sensitive to the question of informativity while CON relates to issues of evaluativity. The paper shows how the proposed semantics and pragmatics account for several well-known properties of superlative modifiers. It ends by noting several open issues in the literature on this topic that the current proposal sheds new light on. PubDate: 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09400-6
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Abstract: Recent work on mood choice considers fine-grained semantic differences among desire predicates (notably, ‘want’ and ‘hope’) and their consequences for the distribution of indicative and subjunctive complement clauses. In that vein, this paper takes a close look at ‘intend’. I show that cross-linguistically, ‘intend’ accepts nonfinite and subjunctive complements and rejects indicative complements. This fact poses difficulties for recent approaches to mood choice. Toward a solution, a broad aim of this paper is to argue that—while ‘intend’ is loosely in the family of desire predicates—it differs from ‘want’ and ‘hope’ in that it has a causative component, and this is relevant to its mood choice behavior, given that causative predicates also systematically reject indicative complements. More concretely, my analysis has three ingredients: (i) following related proposals in philosophy, intention reports have causally self-referential content; (ii) encoding causal self-reference requires abstraction over the complement clause’s eventuality argument; and (iii) nonfinite and subjunctive clauses enable such abstraction but indicative clauses do not. Aside from causative predicates, independent support for the proposal comes from the syntax of belief-/intention-hybrid attitude predicates like ‘decide’ and ‘convince’, anankastic conditional antecedents, aspectual predicates, and memory and perception reports. Synthesizing this result with that of previous literature, the emergent generalization is that subjunctive mood occurs in attitude reports that involve either comparison or eventuality abstraction. Toward a unified theory of mood choice, I suggest that both comparison and eventuality abstraction represent departures from the clausal semantics of unembedded assertions and consequently that subjunctive mood signals such a departure. PubDate: 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09397-y
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Abstract: Abstract Despite its somewhat marginal occurrence, unattainability has been acknowledged as a genuine problematic element for the semantic analysis of modal constructions, particularly for those expressing desires (Heim in J Semant 9(3):183–221, 1992; Portner in Nat Lang Semant 5(2):167–211, 1997). However, considerably less attention has been given to unattainable duties. In this article, I suggest that just as worlds that are deemed desirable are not necessarily linked to worlds considered candidates for actuality, some circumstantial arrangements allow for obligational expressions the semantics of which evoke worlds that are deemed obligatory yet unattainable. As I will show, a careful examination of unattainable duties constructions reveals some unexplored semantic aspects of obligational ascriptions that are particularly relevant for the development of both X-marking and modal-tense interaction theories. This article provides a philosophical and linguistic account of the meaning and use of such constructions. PubDate: 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09386-1
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Abstract: Abstract Una Stojnić urges the radical view that the meaning of context-sensitive language is not “partially determined by non-linguistic features of utterance situation”, as traditionally thought, but rather “is determined entirely by grammar—by rules of language that have largely been missed”. The missed rules are ones of discourse coherence. The paper argues against this radical view as it applies to demonstrations, demonstratives, and the indexical ‘I’. Stojnić’s theories of demon-strations and demonstratives are found to be seriously incomplete, failing to meet the demands on any theory of reference. Furthermore, the paper argues that, so far as Stojnić’s theories of these terms go, they are false. This argument appeals to perception-based theories of demonstratives, a part of the tradition that Stojnić strangely overlooks. The paper ends by arguing briefly that though coherence has a place in a theory of understanding, it has no place in a theory of meaning. PubDate: 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09398-x
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Abstract: Abstract Kennedy (Linguist Philos 30:1–45, 2007) forcefully proposes what is now a widely assumed semantics for absolute gradable adjectives. On this semantics, maximum standard adjectives like “straight” and “dry” ascribe a maximal degree of the underlying quantity. Meanwhile, minimum standard adjectives like “bent” and “wet” merely ascribe a non-zero, non-minimal degree of the underlying quantity. This theory clashes with the ordinary intuition that sentences like “The stick is straight” are frequently true while sentences like “The stick is bent” are frequently informative, and fans of the indicated theory of absolute gradable adjectives appeal to loose talk in response. One goal of this paper is to show that all extant theories of loose talk are inconsistent with this response strategy. Another goal is to offer a revised version of Hoek’s (Philos Rev 127:151–196, 2018, in: Proceedings of the 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium, 2019) recent theory of loose talk that accommodates absolute gradable adjectives after all, while being defensible against a range of important concerns. PubDate: 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09399-w
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Abstract: Abstract I review Ninan’s Hundred Tickets case pertaining to quantification into epistemic modal contexts, and his counterpart theoretic way to address it (Ninan, Philos Rev, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-6973010). Ninan’s solution employs a ‘counterpart relation’ parameter intended to reflect how the domain of quantification is thought of in a context. This approach theoretically rules out the possibility of contexts where different ways of thinking about the domain can be deployed through different quantificational noun phrases. I bring out the case of the multiply de re modal statement Any ticket in photo #2 might be any ticket in photo #1 to challenge Ninan’s approach. I propose a different approach adapting a more complex ‘counterpart relation’ parameter due to Rabern (Inquiry, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1470568). I attempt to flesh it out by relating it to a finer grained notion of epistemic possibility involving assignments to discourse referents. My approach can account for the aforementioned multiply de re statement, as well as address the Hundred Tickets case. PubDate: 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09394-1
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Abstract: Abstract In a recent paper, Ippolito and Farkas (Linguist Philos, 45(4):943–984, 2022b) (I &F) question the premise that Italian future is epistemic necessity; in this brief response we want to show that there is no empirical motivation for abandoning it once we employ a more flexible framework of modality such as the one advanced in Giannakidou and Mari (Linguist Philos 41(6): 623–664, 2018) (G &M) which posits a ranking meta-evaluation in the modal structure that explains the empirical objections raised by I &F. We show that the core of the account in I &F shares the main ingredients with G &M and that, unlike what I &F propose, Italian future is not pure credence. PubDate: 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09383-4
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Abstract: Abstract I argue that predicativism, the view that proper names are predicates, is a viable theory of the semantics of proper names given a certain hypothesis about the grammar of definiteness. Extant versions of predicativism hold that a singular name in argument position constitutes the predicative component of a covert definite description. I show that these versions cannot accommodate semantic and typological data, specifically: syntactic and semantic disparities between bare and non-bare occurrences of such names in English, the distinctive modal rigidity displayed by names, as opposed to common noun definite descriptions, and cross-linguistic data that feature seemingly distinct determiners for names in argument position. I propose that predicativism needs to embrace a view of definite marking as complex, consisting of a definite article and a bindable, familiarity-tracking constituent, which I call index. I show that this view is empirically motivated and typologically attested. The resulting version of predicativism can accommodate elegantly the observed semantic data when coupled with language-specific morpho-phonological generalizations. I finally address criticisms of and alternatives to my version of predicativism. PubDate: 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09389-y
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Abstract: Abstract Semanticists and philosophers of fiction that formulate analyses of reports on the content of media—or ‘contensive statements’—of the form ‘In/According to s, \(\phi \) ’, usually treat the ‘In s’-operator (In) and the ‘According to s’-operator (Acc) on a par. I argue that In and Acc require separate semantic analyses based on three clusters of linguistic observations: (1) preferences for In or Acc in contensive statements about fictional or non-fictional media, (2) preferences for In or Acc in contensive statements about implicit or explicit content and (3) tense preferences in contensive statements with In and Acc. To account for these three observations I propose to adopt Lewis’s possible world analysis for contensive statements with In and to analyse contensive statements with Acc as indirect speech reports. PubDate: 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09395-0
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Abstract: Abstract Arguments for context-sensitivity are often based on judgments about the truth values of sentences: a sentence seems true in one context and false in another, so it is argued that the truth conditions of the sentence shift between these contexts. Such arguments rely on the assumption that our judgments reflect the actual truth values of sentences in context. Here, I present a non-semantic explanation of these judgments. In short, our judgments about the truth values of sentences are driven by heuristics that are only fallible reflections of actual truth values. These heuristics can lead to different truth-value judgments in different contexts, even when the sentence at issue is not semantically context-sensitive. As a case study, I consider Sterken’s (Philos. Imprint, 15, 2015a) argument for the context-sensitivity of generic generalisations. I provide a non-semantic explanation of Sterken’s truth-value judgments, which builds on Leslie’s (Philos Perspect 21(1):375–403, 2007; Philos Rev 117(1):1–47, 2008) theory of default generalisation. PubDate: 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09396-z
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Abstract: Abstract One of the success stories of formal semantics is explicating responsive moves like answers to questions. There is, however, a significant lacune concerning the characterization of initiating utterances, which are strongly tied to the conversational activity [language game (Wittgenstein), speech genre (Bakhtin)], or—our terminology—conversational type, one is engaged in. To date there has been no systematic proposal trying to account for the range of possible language games/speech genres/conversational types and their global structure. In particular, concerning the range of subject matter that can and needs to be discussed and by whom—ultimately a semantic analogue of Laplace’s demon. We suggest that the subject matter problem for conversational types is a central task for any semantic theory for conversation. This paper develops a theory of conversational types, which embedded in the theory of conversational interaction KoS, enables this problem to be tackled for a wide range of conversational types drawn from the British National Corpus classification of conversational domains. The theory we develop treats conversational types as first class, not metatheoretical entities, in contrast to explications of corresponding notions in game theoretic approaches. We demonstrate that this allows us to explicate the possibilities interlocutors have to refer to and seek clarification about the types of conversations they are engaged in. PubDate: 2023-09-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09393-2
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Abstract: Abstract We argue that the pictorial nature of certain constructions in signs and in gestures explains surprising properties of their syntax. In several sign languages, the standard word order (e.g. SVO) gets turned into SOV (with preverbal arguments) when the predicate is a classifier, a distinguished construction with highly iconic properties (e.g. Pavlič, 2016). In silent gestures, participants also prefer an SOV order in extensional constructions, irrespective of the word order of the language they speak (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008). But in silent gestures and in Brazilian Sign Language (Libras), intensional constructions can override these SOV preferences, yielding SVO instead (Schouwstra & de Swart, 2014; Napoli et al., 2017). This distinction was argued to be due to iconicity: arguments are expressed before the verb if they correspond to entities that are present before the action, otherwise they follow the verb. While agreeing with this intuition, we propose that the extensional/intensional distinction is neither empirically nor theoretically appropriate. In new data from American Sign Language, we replicate the distinction among extensional classifier predicates: for x ate up the ball, the ball is typically seen before the eating and a preposed object is preferred; but for x spit out the ball, the ball is typically seen after the spitting and a postposed object is preferred, although both eat up and spit out are used extensionally. We extend this finding to data involving pro-speech (= speech-replacing) gestures embedded in French sentences. We argue for a Visibility Generalization according to which arguments appear before the verb if their denotations are typically visible before the action, and we develop a new formal account within a pictorial semantics for visual animations (inspired by Greenberg and Abusch). It derives the observed word order preferences, it explains how the semantics of classifier predicates combines iconic and conventional properties, and it makes a more general point: sign language semantics combines logical semantics with pictorial semantics. PubDate: 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09388-z
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Abstract: Abstract This paper discusses a set of observations, many of which are novel, concerning differences between the adjectival modals certain and possible and their adverbial counterparts certainly and possibly. It argues that the observations can be derived from a standard interpretation of certain/certainly as universal and possible/possibly as existential quantifiers over possible worlds, in conjunction with the hypothesis that the adjectives quantify over knowledge and the adverbs quantify over belief. The claims on which the argument relies include the following: (i) knowledge implies belief, (ii) agents have epistemic access to their belief, (iii) relevance is closed under speakers’ belief, and (iv) commitment is pragmatically inconsistent with explicit denial of belief. PubDate: 2023-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09391-4
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Abstract: Abstract The morphological marking that distinguishes conditionals that are called “counterfactual” from those that are not, can also be found in other modal constructions, such as in the expression of wishes and oughts. We propose to call it “X-marking”. In this article, we lay out desiderata for a successful theory of X-marking and make some initial informal observations. Much remains to be done. PubDate: 2023-08-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10988-023-09390-5
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