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Abstract: Abstract Haṭhayoga texts, influential in the development of modern posture-based yoga, offer a conceptual framework intertwining physical cultivation, health, and soteriological aims. This article explores two interconnected inquiries regarding early Haṭhayoga texts: How do they conceptualize health, and how do they perceive the relationship between health and soteriology' These investigations illuminate the place of health in early yoga texts within Hindu traditions prior to its global recognition. This article reveals that early haṭha texts present a holistic approach to health, highlighting the interconnectedness of curing the mind and healing the body. This process entails not only eradicating physical diseases but also the transcendence of all forms of suffering. The transformative process of eliminating the misleading self-identity (ahaṁkāra) is pivotal, leading directly to health. This relationship extends beyond metaphorical comparisons of healing ignorance and suffering. This ontological framework proposes a harmonious integration between the material and soteriological realms, viewing the healthy body as a physical manifestation of the divine essence. Thus, the emergence of the biomedical discourse surrounding yoga in modern times did not occur autonomously. Haṭhayoga, with its roots dating back to the beginning of the second millennium CE, played a crucial role in shaping this historical transformation. PubDate: 2024-07-31
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Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between the theory of many-sidedness (anekāntavāda), the theory of viewpoints (nayavāda), and the theory of sevenfold conditional predication (syādvāda) in the philosophical monographs of the Jaina philosopher Akalaṅka (c. 720-780 CE). Despite being celebrated as novel Jaina contributions to Indian philosophy, the mutual relationship between these three theories is poorly understood. Do these three theories represent three distinct frameworks with distinct purposes' Or do these three theories ultimately synthesise to form a single unified framework' Through a careful study of the Laghīyastraya and the Nyāyaviniścaya, this paper shows how Akalaṅka understands syādvāda as the central organising framework for integrating the theory of many-sidedness and the theory of viewpoints. On the one hand, syādvāda is analysed as the synthesis of multiple viewpoints because each of the seven conditional predications, when taken individually, represents a genuine viewpoint. On the other hand, the seven conditional predications of syādvāda, when taken collectively and iterated with respect to different characteristics, represent the linguistic formalisation of many-sided (anekānta) Jaina ontology. This paper shows how syādvāda as the grand synthesis of the theory of many-sidedness and the theory of viewpoints creates new possibilities as well as new problems within Akalaṅka’s philosophical system. PubDate: 2024-07-31
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Abstract: Abstract The thesis I will present is that, whatever its exact origins, the anekāntavāda was primarily (though not exclusively) used for two purposes: (1) to solve the “paradox of causality”, and (2) to classify non-Jaina systems of thought. The earliest texts in which the doctrine occurs present it as a solution to the paradox of causality. Only later do we find its use to classify non-Jaina philosophies. PubDate: 2024-07-27
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Abstract: Abstract The current study aims to clarify the meaning, the epistemic construction, and the pragmatics of the term āgama occurring in Pātañjalayogaśāstra I.7 and its commentaries. Since āgama is a linguistic construction, this paper is also a contribution to the inquiry into the philosophy of language of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. The inclusion of linguistic-philosophical arguments corroborates the Pātañjalayoga system of philosophy as a śāstra text and its logical and epistemological paradigm. The structure of the present work is as follows: a first part strictly dealing with textual sources, and a second where the content of textual sources is discussed. Relying on the early literature ranging from the Pātañjalayogaśāstra (c. 400 CE) to the Pātañjalayogasūtravṛtti of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (PYV, half of 17th—half of 18th cent. CE), to āgama can be accorded two principal meanings: as a generic verbal testimony, and as authoritative verbal teachings. Grounded on the evaluated textual material, the second part of this essay presents a hypothesis aiming at the understanding of verbal testimony: in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, āgama exhibits an epistemological, linguistic and psychological construction. In fact, as an epistemic theory of verbal testimony āgama functions following three main vectors being: (a) epistemological source and instance of valid cognition, namely a pramāṇa, (b) linguistically structured, āgama exhibits a propositional structure (vākya); and (c) a mental episode, placing āgama as one among the different mental events (cittavṛtti) described in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra. PubDate: 2024-07-25
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Abstract: Abstract Vasiṣṭha claims both that all four āśramas are equal and that the householder is the best of the four āśramas. This apparent contradiction would be resolved if either of these claims could be dismissed. Vasiṣṭha's claim that the four āśramas are equal seems entailed, however, by his endorsement of the original formulation of the āśrama system. His claim that the householder is superior, in turn, seems supported by the surplus of arguments that he offers in favor of the householder. Patrick Olivelle takes Vasiṣṭha to advance this surplus of arguments for the householder only to bolster the more modest claim that the householder is equal—and therefore not inferior—to the celibate āśramas. If this right, then Vasiṣṭha's claim that the householder is superior might be understood in the same way. If the balance of evidence weighs in favor of one claim or the other, however, it seems to weigh in favor of the superiority of the householder, rather than the equality of the āśramas. An alternative interpretation takes Vasiṣṭha to evaluate the householder in relation to two distinct metrics. The four āśramas are equal, he says, in their ability to attain the highest heaven. The householder is superior to the other three āśramas, however, in his unmatched contributions to the general welfare. PubDate: 2024-07-25
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Abstract: Abstract “Wherever there is smoke there must be fire.” In 1957, Aram M. Frenkian noticed that both ancient Greek and Indian philosophy makes use of the smoke-fire analogy as a model for inferential reasoning. He postulated that Greek use of the example reflected Indian influence on Greek philosophy which was mediated through the works of Pyrrho, the founder of Sceptisicm, who had accompanied Alexander the Great on his Indian campaign (327-5 BCE) and learnt from Indian sages (‘gymnosophists’ as the Greeks called them). More recent scholarship mainly shares his views. In the present paper, I argue that the smoke-fire example formed part of a complex theory of sign inference, and that not only the isolated analogy, but the theory as a whole which it illustrates is present in both cultures. Furthermore, the variants of this theory comprise such close and extended similarities that they must be the result of direct contact between Indian and Greek thinkers, although it is impossible to decide whether they stem from a common origin, or are the result of influence from one culture to the other. PubDate: 2024-07-15
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Abstract: Abstract This article provides an annotated English translation and edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Bhāviveka’s (490/500-570) Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 3.129cd-136 and of the Tibetan text of the Tarkajvālā thereon, which focus on the discussion of unconditioned entities (asaṃskṛta). The study is accompanied by an introduction that outlines the general themes of the third chapter, the specific topics within the examined section and various problematic aspects found in the Tarkajvālā exposition of Buddhist (Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra) and non-Buddhist (Vaiśeṣika, Jain) doctrines and philosophies. The multitude of inaccuracies detected within the examined Tarkajvālā section cast doubt on its authenticity as a genuine work of Bhāviveka. It is hypothesized that the author of at least this portion of the Tarkajvālā might have been a young student who struggled to recall the fundamental doctrines of the schools he attempts to elucidate. PubDate: 2024-07-09
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Abstract: Abstract This paper explores how Indic and Indic-derived linguistic analyses of the Buddha’s epithet bhagavat influenced the epithet’s interpretations and translations in the Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions. The paper consists of three parts. The first part examines and classifies the evidence into four types of analyses that ultimately reflect analytical models afforded by the Indic linguistic disciplines of grammar (vyākaraṇa) and etymology (nirvacana). The second part explores how these linguistic analyses coordinate with pronouncements emphasizing the epithet’s extraordinary status as opposed to ordinary language terms. The third part examines how these analyses fostered the adoption of certain translations strategies in China and Tibet, focusing on the second of the ‘Five Guidelines for Non-Translating’ (wǔzhǒng bùfān 五種不翻) attributed to Xuanzang (600/602–664) and on pertinent statements recorded in the early-ninth-century Tibetan Sgra sbyor bam po gñis pa/Madhyavyutpatti. Using bhagavat as an example, this paper aims to demonstrate the important yet little-studied role that Indic and Indic-derived linguistic analyses had in South Asian Buddhism as well as in the Indianized Buddhist cultures of China and Tibet. PubDate: 2024-06-21
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Abstract: Abstract Comparing the kāraka theory as presented in Pāṇiniʼs (ca. fifth-fourth century BC) and Candragominʼs (ca. fifth century AD) systems of grammar, Joshi and Roodbergen observed that in the Cāndrasūtra, the heading rule Pāṇ 2.3.1 (anabhihite), which plays an important role for all the kāraka rules, is missing. Deshpande, however, criticized their understanding. According to him, Patañjali (ca. second century BC), in his Mahābhāṣya, already dealt with the question of whether the general principle uktārthānām aprayogaḥ can justify the omission of this heading rule; under the influence of Patañjali, Candragomin took the position that it is not necessary to explicitly provide Pāṇ 2.3.1. The present paper revisits this issue on the basis of some newly edited Cāndra materials, the Cāndrapañjikā and the Śabdārthacintā, which were both written by the eminent Sinhalese grammarian Ratnamati or Ratnaśrījñāna (ca. tenth century AD). Ratna’s detailed explanation not only confirms that Deshpande’s assumption is correct, but it also clarifies that the problem pointed out by Pāṇinians in the case of the omission of Pāṇ 2.3.1 can be solved by resorting to the theory of the fivefold meaning of a nominal stem. PubDate: 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09564-w
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Abstract: Abstract One debate that occupied Pratyabhijñā philosophers and their Buddhist interlocutors was the question of the reality of sambandha, or relation. A central treaty on the topic is Utpaladeva’s (∼10th c.) Sambandhasiddhi [SS] (‘Proof of Relation’), a response to Dharmakīrti’s (∼7th c.) Sambandhaparīkṣā [SP] (‘Analysis of Relation’). As the contrasting titles suggest, Dharmakīrti held that relations are merely conceptual constructions (kalpanā), inferred post hoc from discrete perceptual cognitions (pratyakṣa)—and thus ultimately unreal. Utpaladeva, on the other hand, attempted to ‘prove’ (siddhi) the truth (satya) of relation as a genuine ‘division-non-division,’ or ‘unity-in-diversity’ (bhedābheda). In this article, I reconstruct Utpala’s ‘proof’ as a pragmatic argument to the effect that Dharmakīrti, in virtue of his nominalist metaphysics, mistakenly treats the general form of relation as an inferential concept, rather than the mode of ‘intentional’ action (śakti) manifest in reflexive judgment (vimarśa). In doing so, Utpala suggests that Dharmakīrti inadvertently renders the relational conditions for the recognition of determinate intentional content unintelligible. PubDate: 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09566-8
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Abstract: Abstract This article will critically examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of substance (dravya). The Buddhists are reductionists, who believe that there is no substance over and above its attributes (guṇa) or parts (avayava). Thus, a pot is a set of a certain shape, size, color, texture, etc. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher thinks that a pot is a substance that houses all of its attributes and actions (karman). It holds all these together. Also, it binds its parts. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school defines a substance, it does not seem to offer any theory of the diachronic identity of a substance; it does not discuss a Theseus’-ship-like case. In this article we shall offer a theory of diachronic identity of a substance based on a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of substance. PubDate: 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09569-5
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Abstract: Abstract The traditional Buddhist Sanskrit term vijñāna cannot be given the meaning “consciousness” in accordance with the grammatical rules of Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī. In Vedic texts the traditional Sanskrit terms citta and manas refer to the eternal cognitive entities, which were also popular in some Indian Prakrit languages at the time of Buddha. It seems possible that Buddha himself created the new Prakrit term to denote the impermanent cognitive apparatus, which is produced by object and sensory organ. The sound of the Prakrit term is recorded and written as vijñāna with Sanskrit letters. In the case of a hypothetical debate between a Buddhist and a Brahmanist, the Brahmanist would insist on strictly following Sanskrit Grammar in order to interpret the Sanskrit word vijñāna. Discrepancies arising from the non-native usage of this term would lead to a great many mistakes and cause debates to become impossible. Vasubandhu, therefore, introduced a new Sanskrit term vijñapti to refer to consciousness and remedy this confusion. Through the analysis presented in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, we find that the root of vijñapti is not jñā as some scholars have said, but jñap. Although vijñapti looks like a substantive thing, it is just a momentary aggregation of cognitive efficacies (vyāpṛti) without any ontic base. Therefore, the new term vijñapti can not only be translated as consciousness, but it is also in conformity with the Mahāyāna doctrines of anityatā, niḥsvabhāvatā and śūnyatā well. PubDate: 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09558-8
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Abstract: Abstract As one of the most pivotal thinkers in the history Mahāyāna Buddhism, the writings of Nāgārjuna have long attracted the attention of scholars aiming to interpret in declarative terms the meaning of the arguments contained therein. However, the very aim of such an endeavor that seeks to ascribe to Nāgārjuna a philosophical position is fundamentally at odds with the unwaveringly critical nature of his project. In order to illustrate the singular character of Nāgārjuna’s methodology, this article seeks to clarify three crucial points concerning his thought: (1) the central concept in his philosophical works, dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), ironically denotes the non-origination (anutpāda) of any entity (bhāva) whatsoever and is universal in scope; (2) emptiness (śūnyatā) is not a meaningful predicate of any entity, meaning that no entity exists that can be identified as being empty; and (3) the Two Truths (satyadvaya) are not a philosophically significant device for Nāgārjuna and subsequently do not provide a means by which to mitigate the radical consequences of his arguments. As a result, we can understand Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no postulative thesis (pratijñā) as a statement that he predicates no quality (dharma) of any subject (dharmin), and that his methodology is strictly critical, offering us no constructive theory by which to make sense of reality. PubDate: 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09563-x
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Abstract: Abstract The Old Nyāya believes that a cause has a causal power of some kind, and it is possible to have valid cognition of a causal event. But Nāgārjuna (2nd century) challenged the very idea of causality. Also, he attacked the concept of epistemic instruments (pramāṇa). Śrīharṣa (12th century) too found counterexamples to the Nyāya definition of valid cognition. These attacks raised fundamental questions about the Naiyāyika’s take on the validity of causal statements. In 14th century, Gaṅgeśa defended the Nyāya theories of causality by shifting the starting point, and redefined causality. He completely bypassed the ontological issues raised by Nāgārjuna, and sought to answer an epistemic question: Is the knowledge about a causal event possible' In this essay, I shall critically examine his answer. He adopted the Old Nyāya view that a valid cognition leads one to pragmatic success, and stated that all pragmatically successful cognitions about causal events were valid. But he was aware of the fact that success could also be accidental. His ‘inferential defeater’ has the potential to rule out cases of accidental success or epistemic luck in the inferential context, although his definition of valid cognition seems to apply to those. In this essay, I shall formulate a definition of ‘epistemic defeater’ by modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of ‘inferential defeater’, and shall use the new concept for modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of valid cognition. This modified definition of valid cognition—I shall argue—will be able to rule out most of the problematic cases cited by Śrīharṣa. PubDate: 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09568-6
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Abstract: Abstract This article discusses the unique practice of many philosophers in classical India to write on several philosophical and religious systems, each time adopting a sympathetic point of view for a different tradition. The article describes the development of this phenomenon in the context of interreligious debates between Buddhists, Jains, and Brahmins in the course of three distinct historical periods, transitioning from pluralism about views to pluralism about philosophical systems and culminating in the ideal of sarva-tantra-sva-tantra, a polyvocal philosopher and a polymath. Contrary to such approaches as nihilism, agnosticism, skepticism, and dogmatism, pluralism about views and systems was an attempt to justify the acceptance of several competing schools of thought. The article demonstrates that varieties of pluralism about views and systems played a role in forming and broadening philosophical alliances to defeat religious rivals, but also enhanced the scholarly reputation of erudite thinkers capable of “proving and refuting any system by will.” PubDate: 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09570-y
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Abstract: Abstract The critical analysis of desire is a staple of classical Buddhist thought; however, modern scholarship has focused primarily on doctrinal and scholastic texts that explain the Buddhist understanding of desire. As a result, the contribution of kāvya (poetry) to the classical Buddhist philosophy of desire has not received much scholarly attention. To address this dearth, I explore in this article the notion of kāma (desire or love) in Aśvaghoṣa’s epic poem, the Saundarananda (Beautiful Nanda). I begin by framing the poem’s Buddhist interpretation of desire and highlighting the didactic and transcendental role of kāma in transforming Nanda, the poem’s protagonist. Then, I examine Aśvaghoṣa’s poetic depictions of Nanda, Sundarī, and the apsarases, outlining the Saundarananda’s phenomenology of desire. Overall, this article illustrates how Aśvaghoṣa employs the genre of kāvya to express a Buddhist critique of desire that focuses on the nature of the desirable object and the state of mind of the desirous subject. PubDate: 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09560-0
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Abstract: Abstract This essay is one more attempt of understanding the non-dual philosophical position of Abhinavagupta viz-a-viz the problem of reflection. Since when my first essay on ‘Abhinavagupta on Reflection’ appeared in JIP, I have once again focused on the non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) (3.1-65) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) in the Tantrāloka and his commentator Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE). The present attempt is to understand their philosophical position in the context of Nyāya realism where a reflection is simply caused by an erroneous apprehension of an entity. For Naiyāyikas, according to both Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha, a reflection (pratibimba) does not have a real existence at all. There are only two ways of looking at a reflection: it can either simply be an original image (bimba) or an illusion (bhrānti). There is no scope for any third entity apart from something being an error or a non-error. In contrast to this, establishing a Śaiva theory of reflection, Abhinavagupta is corroborating a valid ontological status for the seemingly illusory objects of perception or imagined objects, such as, to use Abhinavagupta’s own language, ‘an elephant with five trunks and four tusks who is running in the sky’. In other words, he is pleading for the valid cognition of objects which are otherwise deemed to be an error or external to consciousness. While Abhinavagupta’s system has generally been referred to as ‘idealism’, I argue that by establishing the dynamism of reflective awareness that is deemed to be absolutely real, his system should be referred to as ‘dynamic realism’ i.e., the ‘dynamism’ that is common to both ‘real’ and ‘ideal’. This is why he uses the metaphor consciousness-as-mirror (ciddarpaṇa) in establishing a non-erroneous ontological status for otherwise illusive idea of reflection. PubDate: 2024-04-05 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09562-y
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Abstract: Abstract The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, “that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world.” This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts everything that is “common knowledge” or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a “lowest common denominator” version of lokaprasiddhi instead of a model which promotes “in some areas at least, more of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals.” In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a “typical Prāsaṅgika” who advocates “a populist lokaprasiddha and global error theory,” leading to “a dismal slough of relativism” in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of “average worldlings.” I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of lokaprasiddhi that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the hoi polloi. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of āgama Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti’s usage of the terms lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, loka- / laukikavyavahāra, saṃvṛti and saṃvṛtisatya, and laukika paramārtha. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa), the foremost of which is the “mundane ultimate” (laukika paramārtha), the Buddha’s teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following “the Victor’s path of reasoning” (jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (lokaprasiddhi). PubDate: 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9
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Abstract: Abstract The paper attempts to answer a very obstinate fundamental problem—is literary meaning determinable at all' Would it be determinable if it were constructed by the language of the text' Or is this meaning open-ended, constantly deferred or shifted as a result of the very nature of signification' In this paper, I argue that the levels of dhvani-ṣ Avivakṣitavācya dhvani and Vivakṣitavācya dhvani and their sub-levels are far more comprehensive than the concept of ‘differance’, both based on the play of meanings. Ānandvardhana seems to anticipate Derrida in postulating the infinite suggested meaning over and above the expressed literal meaning in the levels of dhvani, though the admission of any definite literal meaning itself goes against the deconstructive approach of ‘differance’. The paper also deals with the analysing a few literary works with the levels of dhvani and also how meaning of a text is revealed to the sahrdaya (reader). PubDate: 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09559-7
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Abstract: Abstract Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the catuṣkoṭi via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and prasajya-pratiṣedha is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using prasajya-pratiṣedha or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative catuṣkoṭi, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the catuṣkoṭi are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the catuṣkoṭi is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions. PubDate: 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4