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Abstract: Abstract This article surveys recent work on Vedānta, focusing on English-language secondary scholarship since the year 2000. The article consists of two parts. The first part (published here) identifies trends within recent scholarship, highlighting several promising areas of new research: the social history of Vedānta, Vedānta in the early modern period, vernacular Vedānta, Persian Vedānta, colonial and post-colonial Vedānta, and pedagogy and practice. It also covers edited volumes, special journal issues, and ongoing collaborative research projects. The second part (published separately) provides an overview of scholarship on specific schools of Vedānta (Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, etc.), as well as a survey of philosophical, theological, and comparative studies. The article concludes with suggestions for further research. PubDate: 2023-10-12
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Abstract: Abstract Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments' An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. Extending their use to other contexts requires that these specificities are taken into account. Building on an historical survey, I suggest that some essential features of Yogācāra correspond to features of an ancient Greek tradition of metaphysics that has been characterized as idealist: Neoplatonism. On this basis, I come back to the initial question and argue in favor of the idealist interpretation. PubDate: 2023-09-27
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Abstract: Abstract This paper aims to recover the ideas about semantics that are contained in Yāska’s Nirukta (c. 6–3 century BCE), the seminal work of the Indian tradition of nirvacana or etymology. It argues that, within the framework of his etymological project, Yāska developed consistent and sophisticated ideas relating to semantics—what I call his theory of meaning. It shows that this theory assumes the form of explicit and implicit reflections pertaining to the relation between three categories: denoting names (nāman/nāmadheya), denoted objects (sattva/artha), and name-giving action expressed by verbal roots (ākhyāta). A typology of Yāska’s etymologies for what they reveal about semantics will be proposed and investigated. In doing so, attention will be paid to how Yāska’s ideas resemble and anticipate ideas concerning the difference between polysemy and homonymity, metaphoric transfer, and synecdoche. It is hoped that attending to Yāska’s thus-far largely overlooked ideas will help us better appreciate the Nirukta’s role in the history of early Indian engagements with semantics. PubDate: 2023-09-25
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Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I discuss some philosophical problems connected with the notion of regarding the aggregates (khandha) as self in the Nikāyas. In particular, I focus on the attitude represented by the formula “I am this” (esohamasmi) which may be labeled as that of identifying with the aggregates. In the first part of the paper, I point out and analyze certain similes contained in the Nikāyas which may be read as implying the existence of a distinction between the aggregates and the individual who regards them as self. Then, I consider a hypothesis that the aggregates are not objective constituents of a human being but subjectively experienced representational phenomena. I argue that several Nikāya texts imply the existence of important aspects of a human being, in particular cognitive ones, which are not conceptualized in the terms of the five aggregates. I also discuss the possibility of interpreting khandhas as not active in character but as resultant of other cognitive processes. In the last part of the paper I offer a hypothesis that one of the key aspects of regarding the aggregates as self lies in the identification of a human individual with one’s own phenomenal self-representation which results in a mistaken projection of the notions of agency, identity and subjectivity onto something that is inherently devoid of it. I also consider certain parallels between the ideas present in the Nikāyas and the concepts of the modern philosophy of mind. PubDate: 2023-09-09
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Abstract: Abstract Kundakunda’s handling of several basic ideas cannot be omitted when one deals with the following concepts in Jaina philosophy: 1. Syāt/siya, syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī. 2. Nayas, vyavahāra and niścaya nayas and nayavāda. 3. Sapta and Nava tattvas/padārtha and 4. Anekāntavāda. No doubt his dates are a major conundrum; recent research regards him to have lived around the fourth or fifth centuries (Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism, BEJ: Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia), edited by Knut Jacobsen, John A. Cort, Paul Dundas and Kristi L. Wiley. Leiden Boston: Brill, 2020., p. 853). Moreover, it has been said that Kundakunda “thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller”, evident by the fact that hardly, if any, Digambara or even Śvetāmbara scholar elaborates on his ideas, let alone crediting him for significant basic insights into Jaina philosophy. Moreover, it seems to be evident, as will be attempted to show, that some ideas appear to be taken over from Kundakunda. Together with Kundakunda’s ‘legacy’, this article will highlight several conundrums regarding the philosophical impact of several concepts in his works that fortunately have not been relegated to oblivion. PubDate: 2023-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09549-1
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Abstract: Abstract The eleventh-century Indian Buddhist master Ratnākaraśānti presents a unique Yogācāra interpretation of tantric maṇḍala visualisation in the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā. In this text, he employs the neither-one-nor-many argument to assert that the qualities of the mind represented by the deities in the maṇḍala are neither the same nor different from the mind itself. He also provides five scenarios of meditation to explain the necessity of practising both the perfection method (pāramitānaya) and the mantra method (mantranaya) together in Mahāyāna. Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation exerts a significant influence on the works of later Buddhist masters in India and Tibet, with parts of it being reused in the *Śrīherukopadeśanāmasvādhiṣṭhānakrama by Śūnyasamādhivajra (c. the eleventh century), the eighteenth chapter of the Āmnāyamañjarī by Abhayākaragupta (from the late eleventh to the twelfth century) and the tantric compendium sNgags rim chen mo by the Tibetan master Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419). This paper explores how Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation has been reused and modified in these subsequent works. While Śūnyasamādhivajra faithfully reproduced Ratnākaraśānti’s Yogācāra explanation, Abhayākaragupta modified it to align with his Madhyamaka view. Abhayākaragupta in turn influenced Tsong kha pa, who accepted Abhayākaragupta’s Madhyamaka modification in his works. This paper also engages with current scholarly discussions on textual reuse and the underlying reasons behind it. While Śūnyasamādhivajra and Abhayākaragupta assimilated Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation without acknowledgement, Tsong kha pa quoted the text by name and acknowledged Abhayākaragupta’s reuse of Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation. This paper concludes by discussing the factors that determine whether the reused text is acknowledged or not, and the possible reasons behind textual reuse. PubDate: 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09548-2
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Abstract: Abstract Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction (svavacanavirodha). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we take to be Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian (someone who is like Dharmakīrti) perspective and to demonstrate the unique features of Dharmakīrti’s view of inference. By so doing, we show that the epistemology in relation to the formal conception of logic that underlies Tillemans’ challenge is problematic from Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian perspective. The paper, thus, presents Dharmakīrti’s view of inference and logical reasoning as well as a Dharmakīrtian challenge to the formal conception of logic that is the dominant contemporary conception. PubDate: 2023-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09546-4
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Abstract: Abstract The word meṇḍaka, a derivative of meṇḍa (“ram”), is generally translated as “made of the ram” or “about the ram” or “horned.” However, in the Pāli Milindapañha (Questions of Milinda), the word meṇḍakapañha, literally, a question about the ram, is also rendered as a logical conclusion that refutes an imaginary dilemma. Hence, in this treatise, the word meṇḍaka is a special logical term which means an imaginary dilemma that can be logically refuted. This raises the question as to why the word meṇḍaka has come to be associated with this logical technique. To answer this question, this paper examines various aspects of the word and its possible connections to a dilemma and its refutation. The discussion ranges from the meaning of this word in a tale in the Jātaka (Birth Stories), within the contextual usage in a meṇḍaka question, to a relatively recent commentarial text (aṭṭhakathā) which gives a different perspective on the etymology of the word. The Milindapañha is explicit in defining a meṇḍaka question as knotty, hard to penetrate, and difficult to resolve, some of which an opponent puts forth to undermine certain aspects of the Buddhist system. However, the way certain meṇḍaka questions are framed, though not directly stated, seem to utilize the principles of logic in a dilemmatic form of argument. With that, a meṇḍaka question, at least in the Milindapañha, could also mean “a dilemmatic expression put forth by a challenger to undermine an opponent, but which can be logically refuted.” PubDate: 2023-07-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09543-7
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Abstract: Abstract As its name implies, Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti (VyY) explains the logic or methodology (yukti) of exegesis or sūtra interpretation (vyākhyā) and only survives in a Tibetan translation. In recent years, research on this treatise has been gradually accumulating. However, due to the difficulty of the Tibetan translation, some of the arguments therein have been misunderstood. In this article, after reviewing the general framework of Vasubandhu’s method of interpreting the sūtras, I will present a newly discovered parallel regarding his discussion of the “purpose, prayojana” of the sūtras and reread it through a close philological examination of various sources in Sanskrit and Tibetan. Thus, this article will first elucidate the details of Vasubandhu’s explanation of the purpose of the Buddha’s preaching using synonyms and will clarify an aspect of his views on the Buddha’s word. In addition, concerning this “purpose,” I will elucidate the characteristics of the final chapter of this text, which provides stories about hearing the Buddha’s words with respect. By doing so, I would like to reveal the characteristics of the VyY as a manual for vivid preaching. PubDate: 2023-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09542-8
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Abstract: Abstract Candrakīrti deals with epistemological problems in his works, but he has not propounded a systematic theory of knowledge. Candrakīrti thoroughly discusses Madhyamaka’s ontological view in his explication of Nāgārjuna’s view on two truths (dve satye). Most of his Tibetan commentators and contemporary interpreters engage in explaining Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka ontology. However, Jamyang Zhepa reconstructs Candrakīrti’s theory of knowledge in his magnum opus, Tshig gsal stong thun gyi tshad ma’i rnam bshad (A commentary on epistemological exposition in Prasannapadā). Although Jamyang Zhepa’s work is a novel contribution to Candrakīrti’s scholarship, there are some issues in his interpretation in terms of philosophical portrayal of Candrakīrti’s thought. In the present paper, the author reexamines Jamyang Zhepa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s epistemology and submits that his interpretation faces some textual inconsistencies and philosophical problems in depicting Candrakīrti’s epistemological views. The paper is divided into five sections, and the first section or the introductory section discusses whether Candrakīrti holds his own philosophical position or not. The second section deals with the origin of Tibetan doxographical debates on Candrakīrti’s epistemology. The third section discusses the problem of pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s philosophy. The fourth section revisits Candrakīrti’s theory of perception. The last section or the concluding section shows the textual inconsistencies and philosophical tensions between Candrakīrti’s philosophical corpus and Jamyang Zhepa’s interpretation through at least five arguments. PubDate: 2023-06-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09547-3
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Abstract: Abstract The Jaina saptabhaṅgī (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and avaktavya (‘unutterable’). In its most basic structure, the saptabhaṅgī appears as: (i) in a certain sense, P; (ii) in a certain sense, not P; (iii) in a certain sense, P and not P; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of P; (v) in a certain sense, P and inexpressibility of P; (vi) in a certain sense, not P and inexpressibility of P; (vii) in a certain sense, P, not P, and inexpressibility of P. This appearance has led many (e.g., Ganeri and Priest) to claim that the saptabhaṅgī supports non-classical systems of logic, but such a reading is contested by Balcerowicz. Focusing on Vādidevasūri’s (12th c. CE) and Yaśovijaya’s (17th c. CE) accounts of the saptabhaṅgī, this paper puts forward a formalization of the saptabhaṅgī that brings together the non-classical views and Balcerowicz’s view through relating the saptabhaṅgī to the Buddhist unanswerable questions. PubDate: 2023-06-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09545-5
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Abstract: Abstract The publication in 2015 (ed. Li) of Chap. 6 of the rediscovered Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) allows us to witness more directly Candrakīrti’s careful and deliberate critique of the ‘chariot argument’ for the merely conventional existence of the self in Indian Abhidharmic thought. I argue that in MA 6.140–141, Candrakīrti alludes to the use of the chariot argument in the Milindapañha as negating only the view of a permanent self (compared to an elephant), rather than negating ego-identification (compared to a snake in its hole). In contrast to this misuse of the chariot argument, in MA 6.150–165 Candrakīrti uses the chariot argument as an allegory to enable the meditator to refute the basis of ego-identification in seven ways. Candrakīrti’s use of the chariot argument does not establish any theory about the self or not-self, but acts as a guide to meditation as part of philosophy as a spiritual practice with the goal of liberation. PubDate: 2023-06-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09544-6
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Abstract: Abstract In a triad of practice manuals collectively titled The Process of Meditation (Bhāvanākrama I, II, III), the eight century Indian Buddhist philosopher Kamalaśīla singles out vipaśyanā (insight meditation) to be of particular importance on the early stages of the Buddhist path. This paper provides a reconstruction of vipaśyanā based on how it is depicted in that work. I make two primary claims. First, vipaśyanā is a technique for facilitating the direct perceptual ascertainment of a select set of properties, and second, it accomplishes this by reconditioning the practitioner’s conceptual habitation. I further enrich this reconstruction by suggesting a series of stages that a practitioner progresses through, based on a list of intrinsically and extrinsically epistemic cognitions that Kamalaśīla gives in his Commentary on the Compendium on Reality (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā). I end the paper with a potential method to use during meditation for altering one’s conceptual habitation. Kamalaśīla does not explicitly state these claims, but they can be inferred based on the theories on cognition found in both Kamalaśīla’s other works as well as the works of the Pramāṇavāda philosophers who influenced him. This reconstruction of vipaśyanā thus remains consistent with Kamalaśīla’s own philosophical commitments, and is, I argue, the best way to explain the cognitive function of vipaśyanā given those commitments. PubDate: 2023-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09541-9
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Abstract: Abstract If an object changes its spatial position over time, or moves from one place to another, we say that the object is in motion. But in Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy reality of motion has been questioned. Nāgārjuna, the renowned philosopher in Mādhyamika school, has argued that motion is an absurd concept—it is empty. In the second chapter of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Gatāgata-parikṣā) Nāgārjuna examined the notion of motion and showed that motion exists neither in past, nor in present, and nor in future—the notion of motion is paradoxical. This paper intends to critically examine those arguments from a realist point of view, and tries to demystify the paradox analyzing its nature and origin. Nāgārjuna’s arguments on motion have two different interpretations, and the paper shows that it is possible to counter both of the interpretations from the Nyāya point of view. The paradox does not arise in the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika ontology. The paper also tries to find out why the paradox arises in Nāgārjuna’s theoretical framework. This paper also examines Nāgārjuna’s refutation of the commencement and cessation of motion and shows how these arguments could be answered from a realist point of view. In this context the paper also examines a modern interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s arguments offered by Westerhoff (J Indian Philos 36(4):455–479, 2008). Nāgārjuna argues that motion and mover are mutually interdependent, hence have no intrinsic nature—they are empty and absurd. He uses this argument as an argument template to refute other notions like pramāṇa and prameya. This paper analyzes that argument template and shows that the argument from mutual interdependence can also be countered. Time is an important presupposition for an account of motion. Nāgārjuna refutes the reality of Time which implies that there cannot be any motion. But the Naiyāyikas have refuted this position and presented arguments in favour of the reality of time. It supports the claim that motion exists—it is not an absurd concept. PubDate: 2023-05-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09535-7
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Abstract: Abstract Sāṃkhya, in its commentary Yuktidīpikā, responds to the Buddhist claim that a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and a valid cognition (pramā), its result (phala), are identical. The response of Sāṃkhya was pioneering: it is one of the two earliest responses to the Buddhists in the lively polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result. (The other of these two earliest responses is in the Ślokavārttika by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.) Sāṃkhya’s voice in this polemic is earlier than that of Nyāya, which is, as well as Mīmāṃsā, the main rival of the Buddhists in addressing this issue. This study provides a translation and detailed reconstruction of the Yuktidīpikā’s polemic with the Buddhist opponent, which has not been researched before, as well as a critical assessment of the Sāṃkhya position. The Yuktidīpikā polemicizes against Dignāga. It aptly questions the standpoint of the Buddhist opponent and presents an alternative standpoint, contrasting its own view with that of the opponent. Though the Sāṃkhya position formulated in the Yuktidīpikā evokes several critical remarks, the Yuktidīpikā’s response is an important contribution to Indian thought. PubDate: 2023-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09538-4
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Abstract: Abstract The Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (2nd c. CE) is best known for his works on emptiness in which he advances a program for the relinquishing of all philosophical views (dṛṣṭi) in light of the impossibility of establishing the true existence of any kind of entity. At the same time, he is famous also for his theory of two truths, according to which conventional or transactional language is both a legitimate and a necessary factor on the path to the ultimate abandonment of views. Although more than 100 works are ascribed to Nāgārjuna in the Tibetan canon, none is specifically dedicated to an exploration of conventional or transactional truth. So it is of great interest to find that two eighth-century Madhyamaka thinkers, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, have in their writings preserved and commented on six verses from a treatise they ascribe to Nāgārjuna entitled Establishing the Transactional (Tha snyad grub pa = *Vyavahārasiddhi). The present article provides a translation of the six verses from the Tibetan (the Sanskrit of all these writings is lost) along with a translation for the first time in English of Śāntarakṣita’s commentary and Kamalaśīla’s subcommentary upon the verses. The multi-part translation is framed by a consideration of the nature and role of philosophical views in relation to Nāgārjuna’s other writings, based on a reading of these few tantalizing verses from an apparently lost text, the commentaries of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and the theories of contemporary Madhyamaka scholars. PubDate: 2023-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09536-6
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Abstract: Abstract This research attempts to evaluate the hermeneutic characteristics of catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) in the ‘Nirvāṇa’ Chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Ch. 25), focusing on the identity thesis between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. Regarding the structure of the tetralemma posited by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-ca. 250), this study criticizes the dialectical interpretation of Robinson and Kajiyama from the perspective of Siderits and Katsura’s semantic approach to the extent that it does not deny ultimate truth. This sets it apart from the semantic view presented by Siderits and Garfield (J Indian Philos 41:655–664, 2013). To support this position, the commentaries of Piṅgala (ca. 4C) and Candrakīrti (ca. 600–ca. 650) are also used, along with Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī. From this standpoint, the meaning of non-duality of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is evaluated, in the sense that both are negated in the ultimate sense, as opposed to the metaphysical view, which interprets the tetralemma in a dialectical way. Siderits and Katsura suggests that, as in the case of nirvāṇa, “just as the four lemmas applying to saṃsāra is rejected, ultimately there is no such state as saṃsāra,” because it is empty of its intrinsic nature. Following this line of reasoning, the thesis of Tathāgata in 25.17 and 25.18 can also be interpreted semantically as “there is no real distinction between before and after death, due to the absence of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) in Tathāgata.” Likewise, the semantic approach here negates the four propositions of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra only, as operated when clinging to identity. PubDate: 2023-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09539-3
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Abstract: Abstract Pramāṇavādins are antirealists on the problem of universals by virtue of the fact that they deny the existence of real universals. Dignāga, therefore, offered apoha theory to explain how the denotation of objects is possible without postulating real universals. According to Apohavāda, a word, for instance “cow”, denotes a cow not by referring to a real universal “cowness,” but by excluding it from those which are non-cows, such as horses. In recent years, there is a discussion about what the genuine cause of exclusion in Dignāga’s apoha theory is. One line of interpretation suggests that, in the case of the word “cow,” the cause of exclusion is sāsnādidarśana (perception of dewlap, etc.). On the other hand, some scholars maintain that it should be adṛṣṭi (non-observation) or adarśanamātra (mere non-observation) instead of sāsnādidarśana. The present paper consists of two parts. The first part will be an elaboration on the philosophical implications of the abovementioned philological inquiry. I will show that if the cause of exclusion is sāsnādidarśana, then Dignāga should be considered as a conceptualist about universals and a foundationalist about human cognitions. On the contrary, if it is adṛṣṭi, then Dignāga should be characterized as a nominalist as well as an antifoundationalist. In the second part, l will explore what the cause of exclusion is through a Mādhyamika critic of Dignāga, namely Bhāviveka. I will demonstrate that the critique of apoha theory launched by Bhāviveka indicates that Dignāga does not regard sāsnādidarśana as the cause of excluding non-cows. PubDate: 2023-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09540-w
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Abstract: Abstract The lay follower Citta’s debate with Mahāvīra in the Nigaṇṭha Sutta reflects not just simple polemic, but a fundamental epistemological division between Early Jains and Buddhists. A close reading of the Ācārāṅga Sūtra shows that the Jains see the truth as a property of the self-knowing purified soul that knows all things. For the Buddhists, consciousness is conditioned and dependent. If truth is a property or relation of consciousness, then it too is conditioned and dependent. In order to maintain that truth is the end of the Buddha’s path, Buddhists sever the connection between consciousness and truth by formulating a negative definition of truth. Truth is that which lacks a deceptive nature and accordingly, Nirvāṇa is the ultimate truth. The Buddha’s path culminates in the discovery of truth through the elimination of deception by the annihilation of consciousness, which the Jains hold is impossible because knowledge is essential to the soul. PubDate: 2023-04-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09534-8
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Abstract: Abstract Assigning a date to Kumārila is notoriously difficult. Kumārila’s dates are usually assigned through a relative chronology of Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers with whom Kumārila engages or is engaged. This is a precarious method because the dates of these interlocutors are equally unstable. But what if in considering systematic dialogues (śāstra) to be the primary medium for interreligious philosophical debate we have missed a source that does engage with Kumārila, and that can be reliably dated' In this article, I turn to a religious group whom, it has been previously thought, did not respond to Kumārila until the eighth century—Jainas—as well as to a genre that is not typically viewed as a site of systematic philosophical dialogue—narrative. I argue that the Padmacarita, a Jaina Rāmāyaṇa composed by a Digambara writer called Raviṣeṇa, contains a narrative refutation of Kumārila’s commentary to Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2. By bringing to light this refutation, and explaining how Raviṣeṇa’s Padmacarita can be reliably dated, I assign Kumārila’s terminus ante quem to the date of the Padmacarita’s composition, 676 CE. Finally, I suggest that Raviṣeṇa’s Padmacarita is the earliest extant Jaina text to discuss Kumārila’s claims, and that Jainas used narrative to reflect on Mīmāṃsā before they turned to śāstra as another medium for this dialogue. PubDate: 2023-03-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09533-9
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