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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.354
Number of Followers: 51  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-8684 - ISSN (Online) 0020-7047
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2469 journals]
  • ‘Everybody would agree’ – a novel Wittgensteinian approach to
           philosophy of religion

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      Abstract: Abstract In this article, a novel Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy of religion is presented which uses autobiographical exposition as a way of clarifying religious concepts. After analyzing what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in his philosophical approach, Wittgenstein’s type of grammatical inquiry into concept formation is applied to religion in this very straightforward manner. How a child learns to use religious concepts and how people check whether the child is using these concepts correctly, reminds us of the actual role these concepts play in our discourses. In the third and fourth sections, the Wittgensteinian investigation of concept formation into religion conducted in this article is used to establish that the two common criticisms, namely that a Wittgensteinian approach fails to acknowledge that for believers God is real and that religious conflicts exist, are misplaced. It is shown that a Wittgensteinian approach in philosophy of religion merits renewed attention.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Revealing the counterfactuals: molinism, stubbornness, and deception

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper argues that the possibility of revealing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to agents in possible worlds forming part of God’s natural knowledge poses a new problem for Molinism. This problem best comes to light when considering the phenomenon of stubbornness, i.e., the conscious refusal of fulfilling the providential plan revealed to and intended for us by another agent. The reason why this problem has gone unnoticed is that the usual instances of prophecy dealt with by Molinists (especially the story of Peter’s denial) are highly specific cases. These cases are special for three reasons: (1) because the content of the revelations does not include the relevant counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, (2) because the specific revelation plays no causal role in the immediate circumstances of the action that the agent is performing, and (3) because the agent is not intent on consciously refusing the providential plan intended by the relevant counterfactual. I explore possible worlds where one or more of these three conditions do not obtain and demonstrate the consequences these possible worlds have for Molinists.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • The problem of the unknown attributes

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      Abstract: Abstract For the theist, human knowledge of God’s nature is, at best, partial, and this implies that there are characteristics of God beyond our ken which I call ‘the unknown attributes’. However, this confessed ignorance, I argue, has largely unappreciated skeptical consequences for determining the scope of God’s power. Consider some mundane future state of affairs normally considered to be within the scope of God’s power. If it lies within the scope of God’s power, then it is consistent with God’s nature, and hence the unknown attributes. However, what grounds does the theist have for making this claim' More generally, we can ask: how do we know what God can do, if we don’t know what God is' I call this question The Problem of the Unknown Attributes, and take up and evaluate four plausible answers. I argue that the each of these answers fails, but close the paper by gesturing toward a partial reply. The overall aim of the paper is to draw out some of the skeptical consequences of human ignorance of God’s nature, and to thereby highlight an unrecognized tension in theistic thought.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Fission theories of Original Guilt

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      Abstract: Abstract One reading of the Doctrine of Original Sin has it that we are guilty of a sin committed by Adam, thousands of years ago. Fission theorists account for this by saying that Adam fissioned after he sinned and that each of us is one of his ‘fission successors’. This paper recaps the current discussion in the literature about this theory, arguing that the proposed version does not work for reasons already raised by Rea and Hudson. I then introduce a new version of fission theory that avoids the Rea-Hudson objection.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Moral Normativity: Naturalism vs. Theism

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      Abstract: Abstract It is widely assumed that theism is superior to metaphysical naturalism in explaining moral phenomena, especially with regard to the practical aspect of morality. In this article, I will firstly clarify what this practical aspect amounts to and present two challenges against metaphysical naturalism, by John Mackie and Richard Joyce. Then, I will critically engage with two main attempts to argue for the superiority of theism over metaphysical naturalism: One of them is the appeal to the existence of afterlife, and the other is Robert Merrihew Adams' divine command metaethics. I will argue that both are problematic for different reasons. Relying on the main aspects of Adams' metaethical framework, I will advance my proposal to maintain the practical aspect of morality which lends theism superiority over metaphysical naturalism, and then follow with certain implications of the proposal for theistic metaethics.
      PubDate: 2022-07-28
       
  • Editorial Preface

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      PubDate: 2022-07-22
       
  • Analytic Theology and the academic study of Religion, by William Wood.
           Oxford University Press, 2021. 299 pages, $100.00 (hb)

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      PubDate: 2022-07-22
       
  • Grounding, infinite regress, and the thomistic cosmological argument

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      Abstract: Abstract A prominent Thomistic cosmological argument maintains that an infinite regress of causes, which exhibits a certain pattern of ontological dependence among its members, would be vicious and so must terminate in a first member. Interestingly, Jonathan Schaffer offers a similar argument in the contemporary grounding literature for the view called metaphysical foundationalism. I consider the striking similarities between both arguments and conclude that both are unsuccessful for the same reason. I argue this negative result gives us indirect reason to consider metaphysical infinitism as a genuine possibility, the view that chains of ontological dependence or ground can descend indefinitely.
      PubDate: 2022-07-13
       
  • Are cosmological arguments good arguments'

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      Abstract: Abstract Over the course of his work, Graham Oppy developed numerous important criticisms of versions of the cosmological argument. Here I am not concerned with his specific criticisms of cosmological arguments but rather with his claim that cosmological arguments per se are not good arguments, for they provide no persuasive reason for believing the conclusion that God exists and are embedded in theories that already affirm the conclusion. I explore what he believes makes an argument good, contend that cosmological arguments can have functions within worldviews other than persuasion, and consider his recent modifications of the discussion that address competing worldviews.
      PubDate: 2022-07-05
       
  • Correction to: Maximal possessiveness: A serious flaw in the evil God
           challenge

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      PubDate: 2022-06-28
       
  • Editorial Preface

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      PubDate: 2022-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-022-09834-1
       
  • The aloneness argument: an aspectival response

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      Abstract: Abstract This article seeks to provide a response to the Aloneness Argument Against Classical Theism proposed by Joseph C. Schmid and Ryan T. Mullins. This response focuses on showing the unsoundness of the argument once the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity is reformulated within the essentialist aspectival framework provided by the Aspectival Account. Formulating a response to this argument will thus also serve the further purpose of providing an extension of the Aspectival Account and a needed revision of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity, which can aid others in their quest to further clarify the nature of this doctrine.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09819-6
       
  • A crucial distinctive author contact information

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      Abstract: Abstract A mutual relation between God and the world provides a crucial distinction between panentheism and both classical theism and pantheism. Several proposals responding to Analytical Theology's challenge to distinguish panentheism from other forms of theism are considered and found inadequate. After defining mutual relation, conceptual evidence and the frequency of descriptions of panentheism that affirm a mutual relation between God and the world provide evidence that a mutual relation is crucial to distinguishing panentheism. Finally, benefits of recognizing a mutual relation between God and the world as crucial to panentheism are described.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09817-8
       
  • Interpreting the probabilities in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument
           against naturalism

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      Abstract: Abstract While much has been written about the probabilities referenced in Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how these probabilities are to be interpreted. In this paper, I demonstrate that objective interpretations entail the denial of traditional theism, making them unsuitable for Plantinga’s purpose here. With respect to epistemic interpretations, I note that standard Bayesianism is too permissive for Plantinga’s purposes. I then argue that Plantinga’s use of the Principle of Indifference is at odds with his Reformed Epistemology. I conclude with some suggestions for how defenders of the argument might proceed.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09818-7
       
  • The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews, by Kirk Lougheed.
           Palgrave-Macmillan, 2020, 279 pp, $109.99 (hb)

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      PubDate: 2022-05-05
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-022-09833-2
       
  • The evolutionary argument against naturalism: a Wittgensteinian response

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      Abstract: Abstract In this essay, we put forth a novel solution to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, utilizing recent work done by Duncan Pritchard on radical skepticism. Key to the success of Plantinga’s argument is the doubting of the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties. We argue (viz. Pritchard and Wittgenstein) that the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties constitutes a hinge commitment, thus is exempt from rational evaluation. In turn, the naturalist who endorses hinge epistemology can deny the key premise in Plantinga’s argument and avoid the dilemma posed on belief in the conjunction of naturalism and evolution.
      PubDate: 2022-04-29
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3
       
  • Maximal possessiveness: A serious flaw in the evil God challenge

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      Abstract: Abstract The Evil God (EG) challenge alleges that because arguments used to support belief in a Good God (GG) can be mirrored by the EG hypothesis, then belief in the former is no more reasonable than belief in the latter. Thus, there is an epistemic symmetry between both hypotheses. This paper argues that one of the EG’s secondary traits, specifically his maximal possessiveness, would render it very likely, if not certain, that the EG would not create anything at all. By contrast, the GG would very likely create. Consequently, the existence of anything non-divine would generate a significant asymmetry between the hypotheses—one that favors the GG hypothesis. Moreover, strategies to overcome this argument fail, and as such, the EG challenge is severely undermined.
      PubDate: 2022-04-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-022-09831-4
       
  • Editorial preface

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      PubDate: 2022-03-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-022-09830-5
       
  • Faith and resilience

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      Abstract: Abstract In this short essay, we sketch a theory of faith that features resilience in the face of challenges to relying on those in whom you have faith. We argue that it handles a variety of both religious and secular faith-data, e.g., the value of faith in relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness, how the Christian and Hebrew scriptures portray pístis and ʾĕmûnāh, and the character of faith as it is often expressed in popular secular venues.
      PubDate: 2022-01-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09820-z
       
  • Correction to: A crucial distinctive author contact information

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      PubDate: 2021-12-27
      DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09821-y
       
 
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