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Husserl Studies
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.194
Number of Followers: 2  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-8501 - ISSN (Online) 0167-9848
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2468 journals]
  • Review of Larry Davidson’s Overcoming Psychologism: Husserl and the
           Transcendental Reform of Psychology

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      PubDate: 2023-05-24
       
  • Reconsidering Husserl’s Method of Eidetic Variation: The Possibility
           of Productive Phantasy

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      Abstract: The present study reconsiders Husserl’s method of eidetic variation and Schütz’s critique. The method of eidetic variation describes a complex process through which the eidos of empirical objects is obtained. This process has different steps, one of which is the free variation that is conducted by the act of free phantasy. According to Husserl, it is through this act that the transcendental consciousness can surpass the boundary established by empirical generalities and uncover the full extension of eidos as pure generality. However, in Schütz’s analysis, he leaves a series of questions regarding the limitations of the free variation, which potentially leads to a serious consequence: eidos and type (empirical generality) are merely different in degrees. After examining Husserl’s account of the method and Schütz’s analysis, it appears that, although Husserl has noticed the potential questions posed by Schütz and provided an answer to them, the method still fails to provide a way to reveal the eidetic basis of variants. To solve this issue, I argue that an additional step is required for the method to succeed, which involves the act of productive phantasy that enables one to exclude the empirical influences of types.
      PubDate: 2023-04-03
       
  • Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism: Do the Prolegomena Indicate a
           Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations'

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      PubDate: 2023-04-01
       
  • Demystifying mind-independence

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      Abstract: Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, I will argue that objects can be experienced as MI in the sense of the experience’s not being due to the malfunctioning of a perceptual organ, e.g., when one examines the ways in which the object displays itself, and gains confidence that there is, indeed, nothing the matter with one’s eyes. I will address the issue of MI from the perspective of Husserlian evidentialism, according to which perceptual content is conceived in terms of ways of perceptually exploring the object, thereby gaining evidence pertinent to the object and its properties, e.g., as when one takes a look at the object’s shape from a different angle, or scrutinizes its color in better lighting.
      PubDate: 2023-04-01
       
  • Husserl’s Phenomenalism: A Rejoinder to the Philipse-Zahavi Debate

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      Abstract: The present paper explores anew the question of Husserl’s metaphysics by contrasting H. Philipse and D. Zahavi’s respective position on the matter. I argue that these positions fall victim to opposing exegetical pitfalls. On the one hand, while I concur with Philipse’s general characterisation of Husserl as an ontological phenomenalist, I disagree that this implies Husserl was a subjective idealist similar to Berkeley. On the other hand, while Zahavi’s correlationist interpretation of Husserl avoids this subjective idealist interpretation, I argue that it inadvertently succumbs to the realist alternative that construes the world as existing independently from subjectivity. The way out of this dilemma is to interpret Husserl as an experiential monist, where the phenomenal stream (Erlebnisstrom) is taken to be ontologically primary, by virtue of its antecedence over the subject-object or mind-world dichotomy.
      PubDate: 2023-03-28
       
  • Review of Marek Pokropski’s Mechanisms and Consciousness: Integrating
           Phenomenology with Cognitive Science

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      PubDate: 2023-03-14
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-023-09327-7
       
  • Book Review: The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion

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      PubDate: 2023-02-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-023-09325-9
       
  • Review of Edmund Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins,
           Teilband I: Verstand und Gegenstand

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      PubDate: 2023-01-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09322-4
       
  • Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience

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      Abstract: Interpretations abound about Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl’s view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, abstaining from use of any epistemic commitments about mind-transcendent reality, whereas conjunctive and disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, on the other hand, are both premised on some form of metaphysical realism. There seems to be a basic incompatibility between the former approach and the latter. I examine this line of thinking and argue that the incompatibility is only apparent.
      PubDate: 2023-01-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-023-09324-w
       
  • Propositions as Intentions

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      Abstract: I argue against the interpretation of propositions as intentions and proof-objects as fulfillments proposed by Heyting and defended by Tieszen and van Atten. The idea is already a frequent target of criticisms regarding the incompatibility of Brouwer’s and Husserl’s positions, mainly by Rosado Haddock and Hill. I raise a stronger objection in this paper. My claim is that even if we grant that the incompatibility can be properly dealt with, as van Atten believes it can, two fundamental issues indicate that the interpretation is unsustainable regardless: (1) it is hard to determine, without appealing to propositional intentions on pain of circularity, what intention a proof-object should be understood as a fulfillment of; (2) due to a difficult fulfillment dilemma, it is unclear, at best, what the object of an intention corresponding to a proposition is.
      PubDate: 2023-01-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09323-3
       
  • Review of Anthony J. Steinbock´s Knowing by Heart. Loving as
           Participation and Critique

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      PubDate: 2023-01-06
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09320-6
       
  • Husserl on the Normativity of Intentionality and Its Neutralization

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      Abstract: In this paper, I explore Husserl’s view on the normativity of intentionality and its neutralization. Husserl reaches his mature, normative-transcendental conception of intentionality by way of critical engagement with Brentano’s position. As opposed to Brentano, Husserl does not conceive of the normativity of intentionality as deriving from the more basic character of polar opposition. Normativity comes first and it is an original, though not universal determination of intentionality which is expressed in the identificatory achievement of constitution. Even where it is absent, this absence makes itself felt since neutrality is never the simple omission of normativity but essentially its neutralizing modification. The discussion of neutrality-modification in Ideas I is, however, problematic, as I will argue by drawing upon Husserl’s research manuscripts. I aim to show that neutralization is not a single but a group of closely related intentional modifications and that ways of neutralization are best conceptualized as changes of attitude. I will then examine phantasy and aesthetic consciousness as involving two such neutralizing attitudes. What they have in common is a spirit of playfulness in contrast to the serious commitment to truth that characterizes original intentionality. The neutralization of normativity takes place in play.
      PubDate: 2022-12-21
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09321-5
       
  • Plato’s Ideas in Lotze’s Light—On Husserl’s
           Reading of Lotze’s Logik

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      Abstract: Recent scholarship has shed more light on the relationship between Husserl and Lotze. And Husserl indeed claims of Lotze that “his inspired interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of Forms […] put up a bright first light and determined all further studies” (2002a, 297). In this paper I will try to answer the question what exactly Husserl saw in this “bright light”—the answer being much more complicated than “Platonism.” As I will show, Lotze misreads Plato, but in interesting ways, and Husserl in turn misreads Lotze. In other words, this paper is about a misreading of a misreading—yet one fundamental for the development of phenomenology in that Husserl’s engagement with Lotze enabled him (a) to expand and differentiate his own anti-reductionism in regard to ideal entities, leading him to two forms of what he calls “Platonism,” one of which even runs contrary to Lotze’s own account, and (b) to conceive of a method to gain truths about the material apriori. After a brief introduction, I will discuss (1) Lotze’s interpretation of Plato, (2) what Husserl took from it, and finally (3) Plato’s Platonism, to substantiate my claims1.
      PubDate: 2022-12-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09319-z
       
  • Saulius Geniusas: Phenomenology of Productive Imagination. Embodiment,
           Language, Subjectivity

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      PubDate: 2022-12-06
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09318-0
       
  • Husserl on Significance at the Core of Meaning

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      Abstract: I reconstruct the notion of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] in the later Husserl, with attention to his conceptions of judgment and transcendental logic. My analysis is motivated by the idea that an account of significance can help to connect analytic, Anglo-American conceptions of meaning as a precise, law-governed phenomenon investigated via linguistic analysis and Continental European conceptions of meaning in a broader “existential” sense. I argue that Husserl’s later work points to a transcendental-logical conception of a founding level of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] prior to language, and that this conception meets characteristically analytic demands for precision and governance by logical constraints. At the same time, since it is based in descriptions of perceptual intentionality at the level of essential possibility, it leaves room for an account of meaning as a partially undetermined phenomenon of lived experience, and not just of our language and concepts, and thereby meets the characteristically Continental demand to take at face value meaning’s vagueness and indeterminacy in everyday human life.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09305-5
       
  • The Origin of the Phenomenology of Instincts

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      Abstract: This essay accomplishes two goals. First, I explore Husserl’s study of “tension” from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest,” to reveal that it comprises his de facto first analysis of instinct. Husserl there describes tension as the innate pull to execute ever new objectifications. He clarifies this pull of objectification by contrasting it to affective and volitional experiences. This analysis surprisingly prefigures a theory of drive-feelings and anticipates the idea that consciousness is both teleological and autotelic. Second, I show how Husserl’s de facto account of instincts from 1893 inspires his robust philosophy of instincts from Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness and other late manuscripts. While Husserl maintains many 1893 insights, he now claims that the instinct towards objectification comprises affective and volitional moments. Finally, I demonstrate that Husserl’s analyses of instincts throughout his life are united by the idea that consciousness possesses an essential structural lack.
      PubDate: 2022-11-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09316-2
       
  • Rare Encounters: A Review of Wiltsche and Berghofer’s
           Phenomenological Approaches to Physics

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      PubDate: 2022-11-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09307-3
       
  • What is Modern in the Crisis of European Sciences'

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      Abstract: Although the notion of the crisis of European sciences has a general meaning, Husserl mainly focuses on this phenomenon in relation to the modern establishment of a mathematical natural science. However, he does not provide a definitive clarification of how its new method is specifically involved in bringing about such a crisis. Without trying to offer a faithful exegetical contribution, this paper further elaborates on Husserl’s analyses in the Krisis to give a possible answer to this question. After defining the concept of crisis in general, I single out why algebraic thinking is the core of the method that essentially characterizes mathematical physics. Then, I compare this method to a case of pre-modern discipline (namely, Euclidean geometry) to show that the sedimentation of meaning at work in the progressive technization of algebra is exceptional and sufficient to explain the specificity of the modern character of the crisis of the exact sciences. The exclusively technical development of formal mathematics, in fact, elicits those shifts of meaning (such as objectivism) that phenomenology is required to amend to overcome the crisis and to establish an authentic form of knowledge. On the basis of these results, I conclude by suggesting a few consequences that are useful for the understanding of the project of phenomenology of the later Husserl.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09317-1
       
  • Husserl’s Dual Aspect Framework of Mind and the Rejection of Common
           Ground Mentality

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      Abstract: As two defining properties of mental phenomena, consciousness and intentionality have some deep connections. These connections may be either grounded by a more fundamental mental property, or governed by some bridge laws, or accepted as a brute unexplainable fact. This paper argues, on the one hand, that we do not have justifications for believing in the existence of a new fundamental mental property, although we have motivations for making an inference to such a new mental property. On the other hand, this paper demonstrates that Husserl took these connections to be governed by some bridge laws and to be realized by the mapping function of what he called apprehension.
      PubDate: 2022-09-23
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09311-7
       
  • Empirical-Anthropological Types and Absolute Ideas: Tracking
           Husserl’s Eurocentrism

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      Abstract: Husserl has often stood accused of Eurocentrism given his disquieting coupling of philosophy as universal science with Europe. And yet, however much this accusation has clouded the appeal of transcendental phenomenology, the nature of this charge remains obscure: whether Husserl’s chauvinism is merely a personal opinion punctuating his writing or is instead closely connected to the methods of phenomenology has been left unexplored. This paper offers itself as a corrective, looking to get a clearer picture of how precisely Eurocentrism afflicts transcendental phenomenology. The overarching aim of doing so is to chart the possibilities for the development of a non-Eurocentric, decolonial phenomenological thinking which exploits the enduring appeal of Husserl’s commitment to presuppositionlessness. The first part of the paper considers the relationship between the phenomenological reduction and eidetic variation, showing that, by Husserl’s own lights, phenomenological science seeks to expel all forms of prejudice. Part two, however, shows that the entrance of Eurocentrism into phenomenology is not simply accidental, in two distinct senses. The first, which takes off from Merleau-Ponty’s (implicit) critique of Husserl, argues that Husserl in his late work is insufficiently attentive to the empirical dimension: Eurocentrism thus stems from the overly transcendental emphases of this project and its inability to engage with concrete human diversity. The second draws on Derrida’s (explicit) critique of Husserl, arguing that it is precisely the admission of concrete historico-cultural facts into phenomenology that compromises the universal by identifying it with the particularities of Europe. I thus show that Eurocentrism does indeed insinuate itself in Husserl’s methods—not, however, in a manner that renders transcendental phenomenology irredeemable. Given the opposition between these two insightful criticisms, however, I argue that the challenge for a decolonial vision of phenomenology is formidable.
      PubDate: 2022-08-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09312-6
       
 
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