A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Husserl Studies
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.194
Number of Followers: 1  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-8501 - ISSN (Online) 0167-9848
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2469 journals]
  • Empirical-Anthropological Types and Absolute Ideas: Tracking
           Husserl’s Eurocentrism

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Husserl has often stood accused of Eurocentrism given his disquieting coupling of philosophy as universal science with Europe. And yet, however much this accusation has clouded the appeal of transcendental phenomenology, the nature of this charge remains obscure: whether Husserl’s chauvinism is merely a personal opinion punctuating his writing or is instead closely connected to the methods of phenomenology has been left unexplored. This paper offers itself as a corrective, looking to get a clearer picture of how precisely Eurocentrism afflicts transcendental phenomenology. The overarching aim of doing so is to chart the possibilities for the development of a non-Eurocentric, decolonial phenomenological thinking which exploits the enduring appeal of Husserl’s commitment to presuppositionlessness. The first part of the paper considers the relationship between the phenomenological reduction and eidetic variation, showing that, by Husserl’s own lights, phenomenological science seeks to expel all forms of prejudice. Part two, however, shows that the entrance of Eurocentrism into phenomenology is not simply accidental, in two distinct senses. The first, which takes off from Merleau-Ponty’s (implicit) critique of Husserl, argues that Husserl in his late work is insufficiently attentive to the empirical dimension: Eurocentrism thus stems from the overly transcendental emphases of this project and its inability to engage with concrete human diversity. The second draws on Derrida’s (explicit) critique of Husserl, arguing that it is precisely the admission of concrete historico-cultural facts into phenomenology that compromises the universal by identifying it with the particularities of Europe. I thus show that Eurocentrism does indeed insinuate itself in Husserl’s methods—not, however, in a manner that renders transcendental phenomenology irredeemable. Given the opposition between these two insightful criticisms, however, I argue that the challenge for a decolonial vision of phenomenology is formidable.
      PubDate: 2022-08-08
       
  • Review of Jagna Brudzinska’s Bi-Valenz der Erfahrung: Assoziation,
           Imaginäres und Trieb in der Genesis der Subjektivität bei Husserl und
           Freud

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2022-08-08
       
  • Demystifying mind-independence

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, I will argue that objects can be experienced as MI in the sense of the experience’s not being due to the malfunctioning of a perceptual organ, e.g., when one examines the ways in which the object displays itself, and gains confidence that there is, indeed, nothing the matter with one’s eyes. I will address the issue of MI from the perspective of Husserlian evidentialism, according to which perceptual content is conceived in terms of ways of perceptually exploring the object, thereby gaining evidence pertinent to the object and its properties, e.g., as when one takes a look at the object’s shape from a different angle, or scrutinizes its color in better lighting.
      PubDate: 2022-08-08
       
  • Values, Purposeful Ideas, and Human Culture in Husserl’s Kaizō
           Articles

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract In his 1922/1923 articles for the Japanese magazine Kaizō, Edmund Husserl identifies a particular “humanity” or human culture by the purposeful idea [Zweckidee] consciously embraced by the community. This purposeful idea is attained through rational self-formation on the part of the community in a manner analogous to the rational self-formation of the individual human being. Thereafter, it can be referenced to distinguish different cultures (or stages of cultural development) from one another through its objective manifestation in communal groups and cultural products, as Husserl retraces in a historical account of the development of Western history. This paper explores the essential character of this conception of the purposeful idea from both an exegetical and a systematic perspective, examining in particular the relationship between such an idea and the values experienced by individual subjects within a culture (which are, according to Husserl, also available at the level of objective culture in relation to a communal subject). The paper argues that Husserl’s basic conception of the purposeful idea is a good model for understanding certain essential characteristics of cultural constitution in general, although some of his fundamental assumptions—especially the strict identity he attempts to establish between a purposeful idea as such and the specific goal of universal, rational self-understanding—turn out to be somewhat more questionable in light of the connection between the purposeful idea and the genuinely felt values underlying it.
      PubDate: 2022-07-22
       
  • The Hyle of Imagination and Reproductive Consciousness: Husserl’s
           Phenomenology of Phantasy Reconsidered

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract The validity of Husserl’s early apprehension/content of apprehension schema (Auffassung/Auffassungsinhalt Schema) of intentionality has long been a subject of dispute. In the case of phantasy (Phantasie), commentators often assert that the talk of “non-intentional content,” i.e. the phantasm, is abandoned in Husserl’s mature phenomenology of phantasy, and his subsequent theory of reproductive consciousness aims precisely to replace the previous schema. Against the current dismissive stance in the literature, this paper argues for the centrality of the concept of phantasm in the phenomenology of phantasy. This is achieved in three steps. First, I argue for a functional interpretation of the schema, which maintains that it is not an empirical-genetic account of how non-intentional “sense-data” is transformed into presentations of intentional objects, but a structural exposition of the essential moments of objectifying consciousness. Second, I revisit Husserl’s theory of reproductive consciousness, arguing that in reproduction, what is reproduced is not only the noetic experience but also the hyletic substrate. Hence, the theory of reproductive consciousness, far from calling for an abandonment of the concept of phantasm, instead clarifies this concept and its function in phantasy. To fortify the point that the phantasm is crucial for the phenomenology of phantasy, I examine two features of phantasy, namely the perspectivalness of phantasized objects and the experience of my phantasy Ego being the “zero point of orientation” in phantasy, arguing that these two essential features can only be accounted for by appealing to the concept of phantasm.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09308-2
       
  • Normality as Background Causality

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Normality, for Husserl, is said in many ways. While the most detailed treatments of this technical Husserlian concept are usually found in discussions concerning the constitutive dimension of the lived body and intersubjectivity, little attention has been paid to the notion of normality understood as the tacit regularity of nature. Indeed, the normal can also be understood as the causal background which is presupposed, tentatively, in the anticipation of uniform processes of change, as well as in poieticinstrumental experiences, that is, in experiences involving the production and use of objects. The subject that elaborates, manipulates or uses objects is installed in nature. Hence, in our productive-instrumental confrontation with objects in the world, we operate under the assumption that the potentially mutable causal scene surrounding our acting life will retain its style. This assumption of normality is the world, in one of the many ways in which Husserl characterizes this concept. The world qua background of normality becomes thematic, retrospectively, precisely when it ceases to cooperate with the agent’s initiatives. This, on my view, is what lies behind Husserl’s assertion that the world is a “super-object” or “higher-level theme”.
      PubDate: 2022-05-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09304-6
       
  • Husserl’s Theory of Scientific Explanation: A Bolzanian Inspired
           Unificationist Account

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Husserl’s early picture of explanation in the sciences has never been completely provided. This lack represents an oversight, which we here redress. In contrast to currently accepted interpretations, we demonstrate that Husserl does not adhere to the much maligned deductive-nomological (DN) model of scientific explanation. Instead, via a close reading of early Husserlian texts, we reveal that he presents a unificationist account of scientific explanation. By doing so, we disclose that Husserl’s philosophy of scientific explanation is no mere anachronism. It is, instead, tenable and relevant. We discuss how Husserl and other contemporary thinkers draw theoretical inspiration from the same source—namely, Bernard Bolzano. Husserl’s theory of scientific explanation shares a common language and discusses the same themes as, for example, Phillip Kitcher and Kit Fine. To advance our novel reading, we discuss Husserl’s investigations of grounding, inter-lawful explanation, intra-mathematical explanation, and scientific unification.
      PubDate: 2022-04-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09302-8
       
  • Post-Husserl Husserlian Phenomenological Epistemology: Seebohm on History
           as a Science and the System of Sciences

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2022-04-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09291-0
       
  • Theodor Conrad, Zum Gedächtnis Edmund Husserls (Ein unveröffentlichter
           Aufsatz aus der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek)

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract The present essay, here published for the first time, is part of a group of four texts on the history of the early phenomenological movement that Theodor Conrad wrote right after World War II. One of these texts known as “Conrads Bericht” was edited by Eberhard Avé-Lallemant and Karl Schuhmann and published in Husserl Studies in 1992. The four original typescripts are preserved in the archive of the Munich Circle of phenomenology at the Bavarian State Library. As the reader will immediately realize, at the center of the present text is a peculiar account of the beginning of the phenomenological tradition, namely, of its first schism. Contrary to the usual thesis according to which the first schism revolved mainly, if not exclusively around the so-called “idealism-realism controversy,” Conrad points out that this was only part of it, and that the first controversy between Husserl and some of his early disciples or students bore on the nature of phenomenology itself.
      PubDate: 2022-04-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09289-8
       
  • Two Conceptions of Husserlian Phenomenology: A Review of Walter Hopp’s
           Phenomenology: A Contemporary Introduction

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2022-04-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09290-1
       
  • Husserl’s Taxonomy of Action

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume ‘Wille und Handlung’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins. In so doing, I first present Husserl’s universal characterization of action (Handlung) as a volitional process (willentlicher Vorgang). Then, after clarifying what it means for a process to have a character of volitionality (Willentlichkeit), I illustrate the various types of actions, which Husserl distinguishes as ‘straightforward’ (schlicht) or ‘deciding’ (entscheidend), ‘primary’ (primär) or ‘secondary’ (sekundär), ‘inner’ (innere) or ‘outer’ (äußere), ‘immediate’ (unmittelbar) or mediate (mittelbar), ‘simple’ (einfach) or ‘compound’ (zusammengesetzt). Finally, I consider Husserl’s discussion of the direction and foundation of action.
      PubDate: 2022-03-29
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09306-4
       
  • Husserl on Significance at the Core of Meaning

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract I reconstruct the notion of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] in the later Husserl, with attention to his conceptions of judgment and transcendental logic. My analysis is motivated by the idea that an account of significance can help to connect analytic, Anglo-American conceptions of meaning as a precise, law-governed phenomenon investigated via linguistic analysis and Continental European conceptions of meaning in a broader “existential” sense. I argue that Husserl’s later work points to a transcendental-logical conception of a founding level of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] prior to language, and that this conception meets characteristically analytic demands for precision and governance by logical constraints. At the same time, since it is based in descriptions of perceptual intentionality at the level of essential possibility, it leaves room for an account of meaning as a partially undetermined phenomenon of lived experience, and not just of our language and concepts, and thereby meets the characteristically Continental demand to take at face value meaning’s vagueness and indeterminacy in everyday human life.
      PubDate: 2022-03-24
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09305-5
       
  • Book Review: The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2022-02-22
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09303-7
       
  • Is Husserl’s Antinaturalism up to Date' A Critical Review of the
           Contemporary Attempts to Mathematize Phenomenology

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Since the end of the last century, there has been several ambitious attempts to naturalize Husserlian phenomenology by way of mathematization. To justify themselves in view of Husserl’s adamant antinaturalism, many of these attempts appeal to the new physico-mathematical tools that were unknown in Husserl’s time and thus allegedly make his position outdated. This paper critically addresses these mathematization proposals and aims to show that Husserl had, in fact, sufficiently good arguments that make his antinaturalistic position sound even today. The starting point of the discussion presented in this paper is the mathematization project introduced by Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud, and Francisco Varela in their introduction to the book Naturalizing Phenomenology (Stanford University Press, 1999). This proposal was followed by a number of critiques but also by several alternative naturalization attempts clearly inspired by Roy et al.’s ambitious project. The review of some of Husserl’s important arguments often overlooked or misinterpreted by both the naturalization advocates and their critics leads the author of the paper to the twofold conclusion which, on the one hand, explores the deeper reasons for the impossibility of a physical and mathematical treatment of phenomenology, on the other hand, clarifies the sense in which such treatments are possible, namely by way of restriction of the variety of experiential aspects that undergo naturalization and substitution of the aspects amenable to the direct mathematization for the directly unmathematizable ones. In the fourth section of this paper, the author attempts to demonstrate that, contrary to widespread belief, Husserl’s arguments are not obsolete by the standards of the contemporary physico-mathematical approaches employed in the mathematization of phenomenology and indeed stand the test of time.
      PubDate: 2022-01-17
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09300-2
       
  • Modes of Self-Awareness: Perception, Dreams, Memory

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract I contend that the well-established phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness needs to be further supplemented with more refined distinctions between different modes of pre-reflective self-awareness. Here I distinguish between five modes, which we come across in perception, lucid dreams, non-lucid dreams, daydreams, and episodic memory. Building on the basis of a phenomenological description, I argue that perception entails the pre-reflective self-awareness of the perceiving ego; non-lucid dreams implicate the pre-reflective self-awareness of the dreamed (and not the dreaming) ego; in the case of lucid dreams and daydreams, we are faced with a split pre-reflective self-awareness, which entails the self-awareness of the (day)dreaming and the (day)dreamed ego. Lastly, in the case of episodic recollection, we are confronted with a threefold pre-reflective self-awareness: the self-awareness of the remembered ego, the remembering ego, and of the temporal unity of experience. The phenomenological analysis here offered leads to the conclusion that pre-reflective self-awareness need not be spoken of in the singular, but in the plural, and that while some modes of pre-reflective self-awareness constitute the foundations of selfhood, others enable the subject of experience to flee its facticity and become someone other than it is.
      PubDate: 2022-01-16
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-022-09301-9
       
  • Husserl on Minimal Mind and the Origins of Consciousness in the Natural
           World

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract The main aim of this article is to offer a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of minimal mind and his ideas pertaining to the lowest level of consciousness in living beings. In this context, the term ‘minimal mind’ refers to the mental sphere and capacities of the simplest conceivable subject. This topic is of significant contemporary interest for philosophy of mind and empirical research into the origins of consciousness. I contend that Husserl’s reflections on minimal mind offer a fruitful contribution to this ongoing debate. For Husserl, the embodied character of subjectivity, or consciousness, is essential for understanding minimal mind. In his view, there is an a priori necessary constitutive connection between the subjective and objective aspects of the body, between Leib and Körper, and this connection is especially important for exploring minimal mind from a phenomenological perspective. Thematically, the essay has three main parts. In Sect. 2, I present an overview of how minimal mind is framed in contemporary philosophy of mind and empirical research. I then analyse Husserl’s conception of embodiment with regard to the problem of minimal mind in Sect. 3. Finally, I present a more detailed investigation into Husserl’s account of minimal mind, highlighting features from his descriptions of animal mind and consciousness in early infancy (Sects. 4 and 5).
      PubDate: 2021-12-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09299-6
       
  • Edmund Husserl on the Historicity of the Gospels. A Different Look at
           Husserl’s Philosophy of Religion and his Philosophy of the History of
           Philosophy

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract There is an obscure but recurring strain of Edmund Husserl’s theological ideas, simultaneously bearing on the question of the historicity of philosophy, which spans the entirety of Husserl’s oeuvre and has yet evaded closer scholarly attention. My paper combines the textual study of the passages in question with a survey of Husserl’s biography and a meticulous reconstruction of the relevant cultural-historical backgrounds—ranging from professional exegesis to general cultural-historical phenomena and to historical speculations by one of Husserl’s family friends and colleagues at the University of Halle—in order to obtain a useful concrete cross-section of the interconnected debates on Husserl’s views—and their possible phenomenological ramifications—on the history of religion, respectively the history of philosophy.
      PubDate: 2021-11-18
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09298-7
       
  • Normativity and Teleology in Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Normative notions are central to Husserl’s account of intentionality: intending an object is a normative achievement, essentially admitting of fulfillment or disappointment. So is teleology: intentional conscious life is inseparable from a horizontal orientation toward “ideas in the Kantian sense.” How are they related' Is teleology essential for intentionality as a normative achievement' Or, in Husserl’s way of putting it, do relative truths “demand” ideal truths' This article explores some reasons for agreeing with Husserl that this is indeed the case. In Sec. 2, I will identify a “normative turn” in Husserl’s account of the basic structure of perceptual intentionality and spell out the teleological character of this normative account. This sense of teleology is a minimal one. A more robust teleology, in the sense of an orientation toward infinite ideality, is then justified in Sec. 3 by virtue of its function in the constitution of genuine objectivity. In Sec. 4, I will turn to the noetic, especially the ego-oriented side of Husserl’s analysis, in order to clarify the normative force of infinite telos. All in all, I will argue that the normative and the teleological sides of the story are inextricably intertwined in Husserl’s account of intentional conscious life.
      PubDate: 2021-10-29
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09297-8
       
  • Review of Michael Madary’s Visual Phenomenology

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2021-09-15
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09296-9
       
  • Gesten als Okkasionelle Bedeutungserfüllungen

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract This paper addresses the question of occasional expressions, as discussed by Husserl in his First and Sixth Logical Investigation in relation to the problem of gestures. It aims to show that gestures are intimately related to the use of occasional expressions and have an indispensible contribution to their understanding. In doing so, the paper points out an important lack in Husserl’s early theory of signification, which has to do with its exclusion of all aspects related to intersubjective communication. The paper begins with a short presentation of Husserl’s interpretation of occasional expressions in the Logical Investigations. Further on it identifies the main source of Husserl’s difficulties in coming to terms with this issue in his problematic treatment of communication, and shows how the consideration of gestures can help overcome these difficulties. Finally, the paper considers some consequences which derive from such a treatment of the issue for Husserl’s theory of fulfillment (Bedeutungserfüllung).
      PubDate: 2021-09-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s10743-021-09295-w
       
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 3.229.124.74
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-