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Abstract: Abstract In his 2013 book Kiku hito (English translation Homo audiens, 2022), composer and musicologist Jo Kondo (近藤譲) outlines his interpretation of music as the interrelationship between notes, each of which ‘has its own entity and life’ and yet is only meaningful in relationship with other notes, an assertion which echoes 15th-century nō (能) composers Zeami’s (世阿弥) and Zenchiku’s (禅竹) writings on the life and death of each note in a nō performance. Though in his own writing Kondo restricts himself to the tradition of western aesthetics, in a 2023 interview he acknowledges that his system of musical interpretation is rooted in the Kegon (華厳) Buddhist concept of Indra’s Net (which illustrates the idea of ultimate reality as the ‘unimpeded interpenetration of phenomena and phenomena’ jiji muge hokkai 事事無礙法界). In this experimental paper, I will explore the aesthetic implications of this idea: is a listener’s interpretation of the relationships between sounds in a musical work (‘work’ defined as broadly as possible, inclusive of all forms of deep, active listening, from contemporary sound art to nō to Dōgen (道元) hearing a sūtra in the voices of monkeys) merely a metaphor for the ‘unimpeded interpenetration of phenomena and phenomena’, or is it an example of it' What are the implications for the interpretation of all types of music and sound art if sounds – like other nonsentient (hijō 非情) phenomena such as water and mountains – have Buddha-nature (busshō 仏性)' And does this interpretative frame have ethical implications for interpreters – listeners, composers, and performers – of music and sound-art in this age of imminent environmental collapse'. PubDate: 2024-08-01
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The paper endeavors to provide a perspective on aesthetics that proceeds from the original Greek meaning of “aesthetics” as “what is perceived by the senses.” It then introduces a potential dialogue between Confucian and Gadamerian hermeneutic philosophical insights on the importance of “making more sense,” i.e., developing a particular human ethico-aesthetic “sense” for the continuous generation of harmonious communities by partly fusing the two schools of thought. Since the focus of the paper is on early Confucian philosophy, the paper also discusses the relational ontology of classical Chinese philosophy, Confucian considerations of learning, cultivation, emotions and humanization, but also touches upon broader East Asian philosophical notions of “everyday aesthetics,” i.e. how aesthetics is integrated into everyday life, for instance in ritual, dance, calligraphy and other fields that are too often set aside as belonging to a separate category of “art”. PubDate: 2024-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-024-00039-6
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Abstract: Abstract In this article, I will present a construction of a Nishitanian ethics of sympathy primarily based on passages from Nishitani Keiji’s principal work of his middle period Religion and Nothingness (Shūkyō to ha nani『宗教とは何か』). To establish the normativity of Nishitani’s concept of sympathy I will present his concept of force (chikara 力) as its basis. I will argue that the role of force has been hereto overlooked in the analysis of Nishitani’s concept of circuminsessional relations which has impaired the task of constructing an ethical theory from his thought. I will primarily engage with Brett Davis’s work on circuminsessional relations to demonstrate this point, as I believe he has provided the most robust account of it thus far. After establishing this construction, I aim to elucidate the relative advantages of Nishitanian ethics of sympathy and address potential critiques. First, I will position Nishitanian ethics of sympathy as responding to Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s morality of compassion. Nietzsche's critique is strong and that responding to him on Nishitanian grounds will be useful in demonstrating the advantages of my construction. Next, I will respond to a critique given in Peter-Hans Liederbach’s ‘Between the Ontological and the Ontic’ that accuses Nishitani’s philosophy of being unable to offer a basis for ethics. Lastly, I wish to position Nishitanian ethics of sympathy as a starting point for expanding the tradition of sympathy-based morality in East Asian philosophy. I will do this by relating Nishitani’s concept of sympathy to Justin Tiwald’s work on sympathy in Confucianism. PubDate: 2024-05-15 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-024-00037-8
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Abstract: Abstract In this translation of his 1936 essay, Tosaka Jun critically examines Tanabe Hajime’s “logic of species,” paying particular attention to its basis, i.e. the logic of “absolute mediation” that Tanabe had devised earlier. In 1936, the logic of species had only been developed within a few texts, including “The Logic of Social Being” (1934–5) and “The Logic of Species and the World Schema” (1935). Interestingly enough, Tosaka agrees to a certain extent with Tanabe’s criticism of the “logic of nothingness” lying at the bottom of Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy, according to which criticism the place of nothingness represents a mystical immediacy. Tosaka, however, also criticizes Tanabe’s own position, claiming that his idea of absolute mediation, in which all immediacies are mediated, leads to a logical absolutism neglecting the materiality of nature. Tosaka claims that the temporal relationship between the mediator and the mediated should be addressed in terms of a “chronology” in which nature exists prior to the subject. Not only Tosaka’s immanent criticism of Tanabe contributed to the development of the “Kyoto School” (an expression Tosaka invented himself in 1932), but the question of “chronology,” with regard to mediation, has a modern theoretical significance as a point of contention in the contemporary debate between realism and constructivism. PubDate: 2024-04-13 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-024-00038-7
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Abstract: Abstract The following translation is an extract from the third chapter of Watsuji Tetsurō’s Hidden Japan [埋もれた日本] 1951. The translation is composed of two sections: “Until I met Sōseki” [漱石に逢うまで], and “Sōseki’s Character” [漱石の人物]. The former section discusses Watsuji’s indirect encounters with Natsume, namely, reading Natsume’s work as it was serialized in literary magazines during the Meiji era (1868–1912) and the impression Watsuji formed of Natsume as a teacher at Tokyo First Higher School (Ichikō). The latter section discusses Natsume as Watsuji’s personal acquaintance. Here the focus is on how Watsuji came to know Natsume through participating in the famous Thursday Club [木曜会], which was held at Natsume’s home, Sōseki Sanbō [漱石山房]. The contributions of this translation to the literature are threefold: it i) provides a multidimensional account of Natsume, ii) offers insight into the legendary Thursday Club, and iii) also tells us about Watsuji himself. PubDate: 2024-03-20 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-024-00036-9
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Abstract: Abstract Contemporary proponents of modern Buddhism argue that the Buddha’s teaching, in contrast to later Buddhist-inspired philosophies and folklore, is of a fundamentally therapeutic or experiential character. In response, other scholars have objected that this amounts to an inadequate protestantization that neglects soteriology and the broader religious or cultural context. In this paper, by critically engaging with therapeutic readings (as proposed by Stephen Batchelor) and experiential readings (as proposed by Alan Wallace and D. T. Suzuki) and by drawing from a few significant early Pāli discourses, I reconstruct the Buddha’s teaching in a way that, like many modern interpretations, does not rely on belief in magical powers and spirits but that, unlike many modern interpretations, does not exhaust itself in mere therapeutics or experiential knowledge. My interpretation is grounded in a notion of negative self-knowledge that takes two distinct forms. On the one hand, there is the self-knowledge of not-self as an antecedent recognition of the possibility of awakening that defines the Buddhist seeker. On the other hand, there is the acquired self-knowledge of not-self of the awakened. The latter—that is, the completed insight into what we are not—is not just one experience among others but the transformation of any possible experience. Thus, the Buddha speaks to us of his self-knowledge that exceeds experiential knowledge. This imbalance between the Buddha and his real or potential interlocutors explains why his teaching remains inaccessible to many, in spite of modern attempts to rationalize it. PubDate: 2024-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-024-00034-x
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Abstract: Abstract The concept of anticipation, on the one hand, has received a considerable treatment in classical phenomenology, particularly in Husserl. The Zhuangzi, on the other hand, has not been explored with the help of Husserl’s concept of anticipation. Broadly construed, anticipation, due to its association with robust proclivity to seeing and conjuring up possibilities issuing from a phenomenon, shall have no place in the Zhuangzi. Against such backdrop, I argue that—albeit the Zhuangzi does not develop an explicit discourse on anticipation—a delimited form of anticipation (‘d-anticipation’), that is, one which is inspired by Husserl’s concept of anticipation evident in his genetic phenomenology, can work in concert with the thoughts articulated in the Zhuangzi. I demonstrate this via examining death, desire, and freedom evident in the Zhuangzi. That ‘d-anticipation’ can work in concert with the thoughts articulated in the Zhuangzi can be apprehended in a variety of ways. Firstly, it can be seen in our natural response to death and the way in which we handle desires. Secondly, it points to Zhuangzi’s reductionistic manner of appreciating the richness of reality. Thirdly, it offers a way in which we can live life according to our nature. Fourthly, it points to an exercise of freedom which opens up the possibility of transcending conventional standards. Fifthly, it is inherently constitutive of the process of comportment with the Dao. Finally, it is in essence constitutive of a phenomenon or circumstance. In setting out to demonstrate these contentions, I seek to show that ‘d-anticipation’ can fill in a lacuna brought about by the negative appraisal of anticipation in the Zhuangzi and can assume a pivotal role in one’s comportment with the Dao. PubDate: 2024-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-024-00035-w
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Abstract: Abstract Beatrice Erskine Lane Suzuki (1878–1939) is mainly known for being the wife of D.T. Suzuki鈴木大拙 (1870–1966), the Japanese religious studies scholar and intellectual who promoted the popularization of Buddhism in the Western world. However, she was also an active researcher and prolific writer in the same field, boasting deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the subject and an original, brilliant interpretative style. Her research led her to appreciate and assimilate cultural values quite different from those of her Scottish and American background influenced by Catholicism. The fact that she left her homeland to research an entirely different culture was what she had in common with Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965), her contemporary and eclectic intellectual and philosopher who left Alsace to engage in religious and anthropological studies in Africa. Although she dedicated numerous enthusiastic reflections to Schweitzer in her writings, those refuting Schweitzer's theories assume great relevance. In his comparison between Western and Eastern spirituality, Schweitzer fiercely attacked the latter, expressing the absolute superiority of the Christian doctrine, which he fervently supported. Lane, on the contrary, was strongly fascinated by Buddhism, and found in it a source of faith and a creed to live by. This article aims to retrace the analysis made by both authors to outline their different perspectives, despite their shared cultural background. PubDate: 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-024-00031-0
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Abstract: Abstract This study presents and discusses the essential “nearness” and “farness” between Nishitani philosophy and Nishida philosophy, where such “nearness” and “farness” are not meant to be words that simply express the relative positions in which Nishida and Nishitani philosophy stand with respect to each other, but present the internal structure of the very problems at the core of both. Taking as a clue, Nishitani’s words, “nearer to me than I am to myself,” we examine these philosophies by situating their interpretations of Eckhart as an axis for our considerations and then introducing their understandings of an expression from Daitō Kokushi 大燈国師. In conclusion, we consider the problems remaining for both. While it was Nishida philosophy that made it possible to take on the foundation of the history of philosophy as a problem, it would be left to Nishitani to actually carry this out. In turn, while Nishitani presents a criticism of the “intellect,” we must speak of the elucidation of logic as an undeveloped problem left within Nishitani philosophy. PubDate: 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00028-1
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Abstract: Abstract In Prajñā and Reason Nishitani presents a powerful vision of philosophy as Absolute knowing. Nishitani’s conclusions are striking: Absolute knowing can only fulill its potential by beginning without any presuppositions and affirming the truth of contradiction. Because Hegel’s philosophy also purports to be a science of Absolute knowing, in Prajñā and Reason Nishitani develops his own account of the Absolute in conversation with Hegel’s philosophy. We reconstruct Nishitani’s reading and various critiques of Hegel, and thereafter evaluate its merits. Our inquiry shows that Hegel too begins without presuppositions and affirms the truth of contradiction. As a result, we argue that Nishitani’s profound reflections on Absolute knowing draw him into close proximity with Hegel’s thinking and call us to re-think the very being of philosophy and philosophical practice today. PubDate: 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00026-3
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Abstract: Abstract Nishitani Keiji elaborated the celebrated concept of nihility (虚無) in his seminal work Religion and Nothingness. In this paper, I discuss this concept of nihility in relation to the Christian cross and the theological concept of kenosis. After briefly recapitulating the context and function of the theological concept of kenosis, I show how the notion of nihility is particularly apt to problematize the Christian cross from Nishitani’s Mahayana Buddhist standpoint of emptiness (空). Furthermore, I make use of the concept of nihility to shed some light on one of the earliest texts of Nishitani, in which he expressly engages with Christianity and the Christian cross. Read along this line of continuous development in Nishitani’s thinking, his early and critical reflections on the Christian cross can serve to illustrate what is at stake when Nishitani later attempts to show nihility as a preliminary experience; an experience which must be overcome for the subject to reach the experience of true emptiness. I thereby suggest that Nishitani’s early critique of the worship or adoration of the crucified God anticipates and exemplifies the later generalized move beyond the “field of nihility” (虚無の場) unto the field of emptiness (空の場). Thus, I demonstrate how, from his Buddhist standpoint, Nishitani articulates a profound challenge to any Christian theology of the cross. PubDate: 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00029-0
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Abstract: Abstract In The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism (1949), Nishitani Keiji provides a thoroughgoing questioning of the theme of nihilism in Japan. Yet, while the text contains a sharp and penetrating interpretation of Heidegger, it focuses on the early Heidegger, whose thinking had not yet ventured into the theme of nihilism. The relationship between Heidegger and Nishitani thus contains a certain “gap” that needs to be investigated. This study takes a cue from the appendix to the The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, “Nihilism and Existence in Nietzsche,” in order to clarify the differences between Heidegger and Nishitani vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s nihilism. Through this process, we will come to know the difference in their positions on who is the “subject (主体)” of nihilism in terms of their interpretations of a constellation of Nietzsche’s key terms, such as “will to power,” “the eternal return of the same,” the “overman,” “amor fati,” and so forth. From there, we will further identify some of the issues involved in their particular understandings of nihilism, and present a perspective on “contemporary nihilism.” I argue that central to their differences is the status of “morals” in nihilism. PubDate: 2023-11-18 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00027-2
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Abstract: Abstract The following presents an excerpt from Nishitani Keiji’s “Prajña and Reason” (1979), which can be considered Nishitani’s last attempt to make his case for the importance of the “standpoint of śūnyatā (‘emptiness’)” in confrontation with the history of Western philosophy. The translator’s preface situates “Prajña and Reason” (1) in Nishitani’s oeuvre and (2) in the context of his broader reception of Western thought, before (3) outlining the place of the excerpt within the full study. The translation here excerpts section six and a portion of the final section seven. Where the prior sections develop and motivate his unified interpretation of G. W. F. Hegel (from the Differenzschrift to the Encyclopedia), in this excerpt, Nishitani diagnoses a problem in the relationships between the domains of Absolute Spirit, specifically, philosophy and religion. As argued in the translator’s preface, the arch of this study points to the contributions that religion (and art) make in evincing “living activity,” a “Knowing” that, while perhaps “un-Scientific” and, in that way, a “not-Knowing,” is for all that “Truthful.” PubDate: 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00024-5
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Abstract: Abstract This paper provides a reading of Nishitani’s philosophy of culture. It argues that the advent of nihilism is the logical conclusion of what will be called the “fracturing of culture” in which philosophy and religion lose their creative force to revitalize a cultural tradition as the sense of being-in-time that forms the historical life of a historical world. Section two sets out the paradoxical nature of Nishitani’s philosophy of culture as both a transcendental and existential project. Section three draws attention to the fact that a concept of culture always belongs to a concrete culture as part of its own understanding of itself. Section four interprets the advent of nihilism in terms of a crisis of culture that ensues from the loss of the existential understanding of history that grounds a cultural world, that forms the standpoint of a historical event of worlding, the historical life that we are. Section five examines Nishitani’s project in terms of the reappropriation of a lost tradition through an existential receptive reinterpretation of Buddhism. Section six argues that for Nishitani the advent of nihilism comes about as a result of the negation of myth by science and thus the overcoming of nihilism comes about through the recollection of myth. Section seven determines the nature of myth for Nishitani through a comparison with Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s understanding of myth. Three elements of myth are focused on: 1) myth as an existential confrontation with being-in-the-world; 2) this existential being-in-the-world forms an existential being-in-time; and 3) myth is the position of the imagination, a thinking by means of form-images [keizō 形像] (Bild, image). Section seven considers the difference between Cassirer’s and Nishitani’s respective accounts of myth. Section nine examines the nature and function of philosophy, science, and religion in terms of their relation to myth and in terms of how they understand interdependent origination. Section, ten ends the paper by considering what is called the “fracturing” of culture and the advent of nihilism. PubDate: 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00023-6
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