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Abstract: Abstract In The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism (1949), Nishitani Keiji provides a thoroughgoing questioning of the theme of nihilism in Japan. Yet, while the text contains a sharp and penetrating interpretation of Heidegger, it focuses on the early Heidegger, whose thinking had not yet ventured into the theme of nihilism. The relationship between Heidegger and Nishitani thus contains a certain “gap” that needs to be investigated. This study takes a cue from the appendix to the The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, “Nihilism and Existence in Nietzsche,” in order to clarify the differences between Heidegger and Nishitani vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s nihilism. Through this process, we will come to know the difference in their positions on who is the “subject (主体)” of nihilism in terms of their interpretations of a constellation of Nietzsche’s key terms, such as “will to power,” “the eternal return of the same,” the “overman,” “amor fati,” and so forth. From there, we will further identify some of the issues involved in their particular understandings of nihilism, and present a perspective on “contemporary nihilism.” I argue that central to their differences is the status of “morals” in nihilism. PubDate: 2023-11-18
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Abstract: Abstract The following presents an excerpt from Nishitani Keiji’s “Prajña and Reason” (1979), which can be considered Nishitani’s last attempt to make his case for the importance of the “standpoint of śūnyatā (‘emptiness’)” in confrontation with the history of Western philosophy. The translator’s preface situates “Prajña and Reason” (1) in Nishitani’s oeuvre and (2) in the context of his broader reception of Western thought, before (3) outlining the place of the excerpt within the full study. The translation here excerpts section six and a portion of the final section seven. Where the prior sections develop and motivate his unified interpretation of G. W. F. Hegel (from the Differenzschrift to the Encyclopedia), in this excerpt, Nishitani diagnoses a problem in the relationships between the domains of Absolute Spirit, specifically, philosophy and religion. As argued in the translator’s preface, the arch of this study points to the contributions that religion (and art) make in evincing “living activity,” a “Knowing” that, while perhaps “un-Scientific” and, in that way, a “not-Knowing,” is for all that “Truthful.” PubDate: 2023-10-27
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Abstract: Abstract This paper provides a reading of Nishitani’s philosophy of culture. It argues that the advent of nihilism is the logical conclusion of what will be called the “fracturing of culture” in which philosophy and religion lose their creative force to revitalize a cultural tradition as the sense of being-in-time that forms the historical life of a historical world. Section two sets out the paradoxical nature of Nishitani’s philosophy of culture as both a transcendental and existential project. Section three draws attention to the fact that a concept of culture always belongs to a concrete culture as part of its own understanding of itself. Section four interprets the advent of nihilism in terms of a crisis of culture that ensues from the loss of the existential understanding of history that grounds a cultural world, that forms the standpoint of a historical event of worlding, the historical life that we are. Section five examines Nishitani’s project in terms of the reappropriation of a lost tradition through an existential receptive reinterpretation of Buddhism. Section six argues that for Nishitani the advent of nihilism comes about as a result of the negation of myth by science and thus the overcoming of nihilism comes about through the recollection of myth. Section seven determines the nature of myth for Nishitani through a comparison with Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s understanding of myth. Three elements of myth are focused on: 1) myth as an existential confrontation with being-in-the-world; 2) this existential being-in-the-world forms an existential being-in-time; and 3) myth is the position of the imagination, a thinking by means of form-images [keizō 形像] (Bild, image). Section seven considers the difference between Cassirer’s and Nishitani’s respective accounts of myth. Section nine examines the nature and function of philosophy, science, and religion in terms of their relation to myth and in terms of how they understand interdependent origination. Section, ten ends the paper by considering what is called the “fracturing” of culture and the advent of nihilism. PubDate: 2023-10-24
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Abstract: Abstract This article introduces the little-studied figure of Saigusa Hiroto, a twentieth century Marxist philosopher who reconstructed the history of technical thought in Japan. The article focuses on Saigusa’s thought between 1939 and 1942, contextualizes his thinking in relation to the technology controversy of the 1930s and presents his critique of the dualism between spiritual and technological culture. Saigusa defines technology as a “means as a process” and not a skill or system of things. The author argues that Saigusa’s notion of “means as a process” dislocates the idea of Western technology as superior to Eastern technology, paving the way for current debates in the field of post-European philosophies of technology. PubDate: 2023-08-26 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00022-7
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Abstract: Abstract This paper attempts to examine how the concept of character in Tosaka's philsoophy presents us with the distinctive features of a situated epistemology. To do this, I will make comparative, although by no means exhaustive, use of the work of Heinrich Rickert. I will not attempt to argue that Rickert was Tosaka’s main interlocutor; however, I will show that the concept of character can be understood as a response to one of the challenges posed by the neo-Kantian philosopher: how can history be grasped philosophically without falling into metaphysical reduction or subjective relativism' Tosaka would answer this question through the concepts of character and everydayness. PubDate: 2023-07-28 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00021-8
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Abstract: Abstract This paper delves into the dispute surrounding “overcoming modernity” in Japanese philosophy, which arose before and during Japan’s Pacific War (the “Greater East Asia War”) in the late 1930s and its impact on the postwar period. Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy provided the foundation for “overcoming modernity,” and the “Oriental” logic of “nothing” emerged as a counterpoint to the rationalist spirit of the West. This logic has persisted from the postwar period to the present day via postmodernism. Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hiromatsu Wataru, both discussed in this paper, played a crucial role in the discussions about this issue in the postwar era. Mainly, this paper focuses on the state of philosophy in Japan during the 1970 and 1980 s, highlighting the divergence in thinking about “nothing” by examining Nakamura Yūjirō and Karatani Kōjin. Focusing on these two thinkers shows that “nothing” transformed into a diverging movement in this period. Additionally, this paper explores the intellectual continuity between the 1930 and 1960 s that paved the way for this era. Through these historical reflections, the paper sheds light on the divergence between the ideas of “nothing” relating to capitalism and those relating to life systems, which occurred in the deeper layer of the intellectual culture of this period (1970-1980 s). This divergence is generally overlooked as a resistance of the “postmodernist” or “new academism” in Japan against the modernist intellectual tides. The purpose of this paper is to offer a fresh perspective on the historical evolution of Japanese philosophy in terms of “nothing”. PubDate: 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00020-9
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Abstract: Abstract Due to the controversy surround his political war-time writings, Nishida Kitarō and his entire corpus has been accused of promoting and supporting Japanese imperialism. Despite the valid criticisms of his writings during the war-time period, Nishida’s early work in An Inquiry into the Good is not so easily interpreted as supporting nationalism. In fact, depending on the lens through which one reads Nishida’s early writings, one can even find the germs of emancipatory ideas that can easily be put in dialogue with other liberatory thinkers such as Marx, Kropotkin, and Adorno. In this article, by considering the pluripotentiality of the text rather than a hermetically sealed off nationalist reading of it, I reread the ethical politics in An Inquiry into the Good through an emancipatory lens, considering how Nishida’s thought could have been taken up in a very different post-1911 Japan that did not move toward authoritarian militarism. Furthermore, I argue that the ambiguity surrounding his early political writings is consistent with his resistance to authoritarian ethics and his emphasis on the autonomy of the individual. PubDate: 2023-05-13 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00019-2
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Abstract: Abstract In this translation, Watsuji Tetsurō sets out to clarify that which is entailed by “national character”. In his analysis of this idea, Watsuji critically analyses the Marxist interpretation from the perspective of Martin Heidegger. After articulating Heidegger’s concept of being-there [Dasein], Watsuji then criticizes Heidegger’s approach in three regards. Firstly, Watsuji questions whether the most accessible way of encountering things in the world is through concern with work and use. Watsuji’s counter-claim is that protection from the cold itself is more primordial that wearing clothes. Secondly, Watsuji questions whether within-the-world is only to be found in equipment. Watsuji claims that although the cold can be treated as equipment, it is more primordially encountered directly, such as in the form of a cold breeze. And thirdly, Watsuji asks whether being-in-the-world should only be grasped as concern. For Watsuji, we not only encounter things in the world to be used, such as for protection against the cold, but also in terms of “enjoyment” or “sensation.” The importance of this essay is that it provides a link between Watsuji’s early engagement with Heidegger and the development of Watsuji’s own concept of fudō (風土). In this regard, this translation fills a gap in the primary sources available in English and provides the means to understand Watsuji’s critique of Heidegger and how this critique shapes the development of Watsuji’s mature thought. PubDate: 2023-03-31 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-023-00018-3
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Abstract: Abstract It is conventionally accepted that while Western philosophy has “being” as a central topic, Eastern thoughts focused only on “nothing”. I will challenge this perception by retrieving the original meaning of the Chinese existential word 存 cun, which can provide a hitherto neglected affective aspect of being, which in the West is also mentioned by only a handful of philosophers, including Heidegger’s famous discussion of Sorge. I will utilize Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology on cun by looking into the present state of cun’s usage, comparing to its original meaning, and proposing a new way forward. Cun and its compound form cunzai is used to translate “being” in modern East Asian languages. However, recently Chinese philosophers began to question the appropriateness of using cunzai for this role. I will go back to the original meaning of cun as care with both lexicographical and orthographical evidence, comparing its antonym pairing to that of the other East Asian existential words such as 是 shi and 有 you, and trace its changes in meaning. In the last section I will propose possible changes to our dealing with our own existence when we retrieve the original affective aspect of cun, with its coherence of care and existence, through the philosophical use of cun in Mencius. PubDate: 2022-08-20 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-022-00017-w
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Abstract: Abstract The Derridean standpoint has made it challenging for philosophy to affirm a non-dualistic view of the world. If signification is a process where linguistic signs are always postponed or in deferment, then it is impossible to cultivate experiences without recurring to metaphysical thought. However, third generation Kyoto School thinker, Ueda Shizuteru, complicates this viewpoint. What Ueda describes as “exiting of language and exiting into language” is the dynamic movement of Zen experience that instantiates how language can be torn through and resurrected. As a reversal of Derrida who prizes linguistic signs over experience, Ueda’s view of Zen seeks to set limits to language without denying its inherent existence by clarifying how humans live in a two-fold world of the metaphysical and non-metaphysical. In order to make the latter visible, however, Ueda speaks of how absolute silence operates as a negation of Being, that which brings forth the world of infinite nothing, accompanied by an infinite stillness and openness that is undisturbed by the utterance of words. And yet the implications of Derrida’s method of critique are something Zen must also confront. Since human experience cannot avoid the world of metaphysics by virtue of existing as signs inscribed in the historical context, Zen must ethically examine the repressiveness of its inherited linguistic structure in the return to the world of signs. In the attempt to dispel this particular tension between Derrida and Ueda, this article, as a concluding point, will close the gap between their view of language and freedom by demonstrating how the compassionate vow of the bodhisattva can interrupt the problems of exclusion and marginalization brought on by linguistic production. PubDate: 2022-07-26 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-022-00016-x
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Abstract: Abstract The Japanese philosopher and literary critic, Karatani Kōjin, offered a new approach to understanding world history with his 2010 book Sekaishi no Kōzō (The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange). In this text he outlines how economic activity can historically be thought of through three forms of exchange: the nation, the state and capital. Within this fundamental shift in reorganizing the past is an invitation to also think about the relation of politics and space. Arguably each mode of exchange also produces particular types of spaces within a capitalist landscape and points to the problem of producing a politics that neglects the relation between capitalism and space. Thus, the aim of this paper is to situate Karatani’s philosophy of history into a concrete historical space to explore how the social form of Capital-Nation-State operates on an everyday level. To this end, I suggest that Yasukuni Jinja, the Tokyo shrine dedicated to commemorating Japan’s war dead, be thought of as a space that facilitates these three forms of exchange through the nexus of Empire-Ritual-Emperor. By examining everyday life on the shrine grounds, it is possible to observe acts of reciprocity (Nation), plunder and redistribution (State), as well as commodity exchange (Capital) and thus it can help illuminate how these three forms of exchange became fused together. PubDate: 2022-07-08 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-022-00015-y
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Abstract: Abstract This article suggests that the writings of the Huang Lao tradition embody an ethic in the sense of a guiding philosophy of life. This ethic is based on the Laozi - the initial text in the tradition that is textually presented in paradoxes. While the paradoxical expression could make readers forgo an ethic, we claim that it is the other way around. The paradoxes, as we explain in this article, are inherent to the tradition, and reflect a unique reasoning described here as riddles lived by or living riddles. We suggest that Laozi 1 suggests riddle reasoning that is based on an understanding Dao as at once kedao可道 (“can be daoed”) and changdao常道 (constant Dao). While changdao is the ineffable unity, kedao is plurality, hence it may be expressed as familiar moral ways when alone. Only when unified with changdao, Dao opens a gate to the mysteries of life. The mystery suggested here is a “model of modeling” as suggested in Laozi 25 that represents the unified Dao riddle reasoning rather than dichotomizing (kedao) reasoning. According to the model we refer to, the Laozi’an De as self-so (ziran自然) that serves as foundation for an ethic that is not dichotomizing and has no dependence whatsoever on morality. We suggest that this ethic can serve as a basis for the analysis of the Huang Lao tradition as a whole. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-022-00014-z
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Abstract: Abstract This paper offers a comparative-philosophical examination of how the early 20th-century Chinese philosopher Xiong Shili (1885–1968) and late 19th-century Japanese philosopher Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) thought about the topic of transformation. Although the two thinkers face similar material and intellectual circumstances – both attempt to develop an idealist philosophy of mind to combat naturalism – my focus is on demonstrating that they occupy inverted philosophical positions on transformation. I begin by discussing their different evaluations of logic. Xiong considers logic nothing more than a tool for combating false views that must be abandoned upon achieving its goal. Kiyozawa has a positive understanding of logic and thinks that it can be used speculatively to conceive of our relation to the unlimited. I then show how their differing evaluations of logic are rooted in their divergent views on transformation. Kiyozawa conceives of transformation as a process of spiritual evolution from matter to mind; that is, for him something transforms into something else. To Xiong, transformation is the sole reality; that is, for him there is only: transformation. In the last part, I supplement idea-historical reasons for their inverted positions vis-à-vis transformation with a philosophical examination aimed at revealing the existential attitudes from which Xiong and Kiyozawa theorize and engage in practice. To that end, I heuristically apply Kiyozawa’s two-gate theory. Within the framework offered by this theory, Xiong can be considered a philosopher of self-power, and Kiyozawa one of other-power. PubDate: 2022-02-24 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-021-00012-7
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Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the metaphysics of interdependence in the work of the Chinese Buddhist Fazang. The dominant approach of this metaphysics interprets it as a species of metaphysical coherentism wherein everything depends upon everything else, no individual is more fundamental than any other, and so reality itself is non-well-founded in the sense that chains of dependence never terminate. I argue, to the contrary, that Fazang's metaphysics is better interpreted as a novel variety of foundationalism. I argue, as well, using set- and graph-theoretic techniques, that there is a consistent way to model this alternative interpretation, and that this model differs in significant ways from a coherentist model. PubDate: 2022-02-24 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-021-00011-8
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Abstract: Abstract In the opening passage of the Mengzi, Mengzi brings up the problem of the relationship between yi (optimal appropriateness) and li (benefit/profit). According to a traditional interpretation, Mengzi believes that although an action from yi can sometimes produce li, li can never be taken as the reason for deciding to act from yi. On the other hand, according to a more recently developed consequentialist interpretation, Mengzi suggests that we should act from yi precisely because this is actually more effective in producing li than acting with the intention of li. This essay aims to argue against the consequentialist interpretation while reinforcing the traditional one. First, it demonstrates that Mengzi not only believes that yi has the intrinsic moral value that makes it irreducible to li but also disapproves of the way of moral reasoning underlying the kind of consequentialism that some scholars have attributed to him. After this, the essay re-examines the traditional interpretation in the context of the characteristic Mengzian moral cultivation by taking yi as a developing virtue that designates the transformative character trait of an agent, through which some previously unattended difficulties faced by the traditional interpretation will be solved. PubDate: 2022-02-03 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-021-00013-6
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Abstract: Abstract In this article from 1928, translated here for the first time, Tanabe Hajime examines the concept of self-evidence, mainly in the light of Husserl and Brentano. The author starts out by establishing, through a preliminary analysis of the Cartesian cogito, two criteria for self-evidence, namely adequate fulfillment of the intention of Sosein, and the coextension of Dasein and Sosein (being-there, or existence, and being-such, or essence/properties). He then proceeds to consider four domains of knowledge through the prism of the question of their claim to self-evidence: knowledge of mathematical objects, categorial intuition, the ontological proof for the existence of God and finally, outer perception. Dedicating the last paragraph to a critical assessment of Husserl’s account of perception, the author concludes that all self-evidence is founded on inner perception. Outlining a creative appropriation of phenomenology while elucidating the conditions for certainty, this text constitutes an important milestone in a period leading up to Tanabe’s break with Nishida as well as to his critique of Heidegger, thus laying the groundwork for his independent philosophical stance. PubDate: 2022-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-021-00003-8
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Abstract: Abstract A pervasive misunderstanding of Confucian philosophy’s concepts considers them to be directives that call for deference and subordination, principally associated with the concept Lǐ 禮 which is understood as rites, rituals, manners, or generally “propriety”. Imposing Lǐ 禮 is considered a path to social and personal harmony. However, an analysis of the conditions and implications of Lǐ 禮 in early Confucian thinking shows that authentic respect, not obedience, is considered the essential condition for good governance and an ordered society. Significantly, authentic respect can only originate from within the self, it cannot be commanded. Based upon self-cultivation, participation in ritual and exemplary conduct establishes a commitment to respect, and the purposeful distinctions expressed through Lǐ 禮 make social order intelligible. Considering the essence of respect in depth, and comparing it to the ethics conceived by Immanuel Kant, neither Confucian nor Kantian ethics are truly deontological in the sense of a “duty that is owed to an external instance”, rather they both rest on the autonomy of the self. A synthesis of both implies that extending authentic respect to an other in an encounter within the context of Lǐ 禮 gives rise to “Existential Reciprocity”: a virtuous cycle which mutually affirms both the self and the other, while rejecting a dichotomous opposition between self-esteem and morality. This is not contingent on external factors, but accessible from a self-determined, autonomous engagement with self-affirming conduct and productive encounters. Benefits are immediate and personal, and this forms the conditions in which harmonious relationships are a natural outcome. PubDate: 2022-01-24 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-021-00004-7
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Abstract: Abstract What is the philosophical significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Japanese notion of kotoba (言葉) for Japanese philosophy' Was his conversation with Tezuka Tomio a real dialogue or not' To answer to these correlated questions, I elucidate Heidegger’s 1954 essay “A Dialogue on Language” by following a topological mode of thinking, and I inquire into the way-making of a “thinking conversation”. First, I problematize whether Heidegger engaged in a genuine dialogue with Tezuka. To that end, I distinguish the hermeneutic horizon of the actual encounter between Tezuka and Heidegger from Heidegger’s essay which places Tezuka (the Japanese) and Heidegger (the Inquirer) in a fictional philosophical conversation. Second, I argue that Heidegger’s topological method of interpretating kotoba can be read as a poetic means of thematizing East-West dialogue. Third and finally, exploring the topological sense of kotoba, I engage with third generation Kyoto School thinker Ueda Shizuteru’s idea of “hollow words” of language, situated in a twofold view of the world. I conclude that the true character of Heidegger’s conversation with Tezuka can be identified neither in Heidegger’s “actual” encounter with Tezuka, nor merely in Heidegger’s “hollow” essay. Departing from Ueda’s account of kotoba, it appears that a genuine conversation with language can be located in the dialogue of actuality and hollowness, which finds it expression in poetic language. PubDate: 2021-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s43493-021-00008-3
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