Authors:Ignacio Quepons Pages: 1 - 10 Abstract: The paper outlines an attempt at phenomenological description of two intermingled dimensions of human vulnerability. First, vulnerability understood as an essential dimension in the constitution of embodiment and second, vulnerability in regard to trust, as a form of emotive interpersonal disposition. In either case, vulnerability does not only refer to mere physical fragility but to the situational horizon where from emerge progressive anticipations of “possible harm”. According to this account, vulnerability appears as a practical horizon of emotional awareness of risk involving not only bodily fragility but a dimension of concrete existence of individual persons, namely, the intimate affectation of being harmed, injured or deprived or a practical aim. In this context the paper claims for a second and more radical sense of vulnerability that problematize the classical account of emotive protentionality, following Anthony Steinbock´s description of moral emotions. In this regard, vulnerability of trust involves an emotional risk and fragility that opens to consideration a dimension of human existence revealing human persons in their absolute and individual concreteness. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6220 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Jason W. Alvis Pages: 11 - 37 Abstract: At least for Schleiermacher, religion is life in immediate feeling. Whether or not we agree with him, immediacy can be understood as one essential aspect of feeling that makes feeling congenial as the means by which we tend to express the source of religious experience. Yet in general, immediacy is difficult to define and qualify. Is there a hope for immediacy in seeking “to be delivered from contingency” (Merleau-Ponty)' Is immediacy expressed in the instantaneity of how qualities of things are given in a “total interpenetration” (Sartre)' Or are “immediacy and mediation” always inseparable, thus leaving any “opposition between them to be a nullity”' (Hegel)'[i] Might immediacy entail a threat to faith through the absolutizing of the relative (Kierkegaard)' And finally, would not the absolute insistence upon mediation morph it into a new form of immediacy' It is against the backdrop of these questions that this paper investigates the constellation of roles immediacy might play in religious experience, and it does so through building upon the (seemingly diametrically opposed) claims of Jean-Yves Lacoste and Anthony Steinbock in regards to religion. For Lacoste, “feeling” is not an adequate means by which we should give expression to religion, in part because it leaves religion responsive to an all too volitional and intentional account. Lacoste also prefers to conceive relation with the Absolute/God (a relation he calls "liturgy") not as an experience, but as a non-experience. Whereas for Steinbock, even though emotions all to often are conceptualized according to sentimentality and solipsism, he undertakes to reveal that (especially regarding Religious Experience or "epiphanic" givenness) they in fact have an inherent inter-personal/Personal or Moral intelligibility. The paper builds up to the final claims that immediacy is a temporal expression of the unconditioned, yet that it is precisely this temporal element in relation to the Absolute that complicates the mediation/immediacy interaction. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6207 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Iris Hennigfeld Pages: 38 - 51 Abstract: In my paper, I want to focus not only on the notions of givenness and evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also on phenomenological work “after” Husserl. I will elaborate on how these phenomenological key ideas can methodologically be made fruitful, especially for an investigation into religious phenomena. After giving an outline of Husserl’s notions of (self-)givenness, evidence, and original intuition (I), I want to portray key elements of Steinbock’s discovery of a generative dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology and show how this approach correlates to the field of religious experiences (II). Subsequently, I want to focus on Steinbock’s book Phenomenology of Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (2007), and elucidate how for Steinbock different historical examples of mystical experiences can serve as leading clues for the revelation of the essential, eidetic structures of “vertical experiences”—or, phenomenologically speaking, the eidos of religious experience, which turns out to be “epiphany” (III). The expression “verticality,” as opposed to “horizontality,” denotes the existential and dynamic dimension of experiences which are oriented toward a new height (religiously or morally) “beyond” ourselves. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6217 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Esteban Marín-Ávila Pages: 52 - 61 Abstract: The work of Anthony J. Steinbock on emotions―particularly moral emotions―and on religious experience is closely related to a methodological claim. This claim is that the concepts of “experience” and “manifestation” should be understood in a broader manner than that of classical phenomenology, particularly Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In this paper, I examine the way in which Steinbock understands and conceptualizes the kind of givenness to which he refers with the notion of “vertical experience”. I focus on his claim that vertical experiences are irreducible to the kind of experiences that can be described in terms of what he calls “provocation”, “presentation” and the “noesis-noema structure”. Even though I make a criticism of his assertion that the latter implies that they should not be understood as forms of givenness founded on the above-mentioned structure, I agree with some major implications that he draws from them. In the last part of the paper, I discuss his suggestion that the Husserlian conceptualization of emotional givenness should be revised to set forward their structure in terms of what he calls “evocation” and try to give additional reasons, drawn from Husserl himself, to support this claim. The paper comes concludes by stressing the relevance of Steinbock’s analyses concerning what he calls “idolatry”. I argue that his analyses of attitudes that negate the vertical dimension of experience have far reaching implications that go beyond the field of philosophy of religion and open new, promising paths for phenomenological research on social and moral problems. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6219 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Michael Staudigl Pages: 62 - 85 Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between religion and violence from a phenomenological point of view. In the context of the so-called "return of the religious" and the crisis of contemporary social imaginaries, it deals with the supposedly disruptive and liberating potentials of religion in general, and religious violence in particular. The discussion revolves around the concept of "verticality" as developed by A. Steinbock and offers a generative interpretation of verticality's liberating and transformative potentials. The paper proceeds to demonstrate how religion and violence are interrelated on a variety of levels. In conclusion the author argues that we need to understand the relationship between religion and violence in terms of its contingent actualization and display but must avoid pitting it down as an essential feqture of religious systems of knowledge and practice. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6213 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Michael R. Kelly Pages: 86 - 102 Abstract: Abstract This paper presents Anthony Steinbock's broad theory of moral emotions and specifically the distinction he draws between the temporal orientation and the temporal meaning of emotions. The latter distinction is used in order to provide phenomenological descriptions of, and distinctions between, patience and impatience. The paper takes leading clues from Steinbock’s work in an effort to “do” phenomenology in a way that clarifies these specific natural attitude intentionalities. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6208 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Šimon Grimmich Pages: 103 - 116 Abstract: The author investigates whether Anthony J. Steinbock, in his book Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience, succeeds in overcoming the difficulties and objections which the phenomenology of religion traditionally comes up against. Among these are, most importantly, the problem of going beyond immanence and the question of whether the investigation of religion from a phenomenological point of view is in fact possible. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6215 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Thomas Kenton Hubschmid Pages: 117 - 121 Abstract: This is a book review of The Michel Henry Reader, pubished in 2019, and edited by Scott Davidson and Frederic Seyler. It summarizes the basic outlook of Henry's radical phenomenology of life and notes some of its implications. PubDate: 2020-04-02 DOI: 10.22329/p.v13i2.6209 Issue No:Vol. 13, No. 2 (2020)
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