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RUDN Journal of Philosophy
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  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Print) 2313-2302 - ISSN (Online) 2408-8900
Published by Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia Homepage  [22 journals]
  • The Charm of F. Rosenzweig’s Philosophy

    • Authors: Hanoch Ben Pazi
      Pages: 485 - 492
      Abstract: The philosophical works of F. Rosenzweig have particular meaning for both academic and existential inquiries and interests, as he deeply re-observes the religious life of Judaism and Christianity through the reflection of human existence. Fear of death, observation of Plato’s understanding of Eros, overcoming of atheism of Goethe in the experience of faith - these key motives form a challenging discourse of Rosenzweig’s theological and philosophical thought, which invites reader into a truly charming spiritual journey. The article provides an intriguing introduction to the issue of RUDN Journal of Philosophy , which is dedicated to F. Rosenzweig and provides a scope to various aspects of the philosophy of one of the most prominent German-Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century, including topics such as criticism and reception of German idealism and existentialism, «new thinking» as a philosophical system, philosophical interpretation of biblical texts, Kabbalah and mysticism.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-485-492
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Rosenzweig and Luther. The Concept of Faith in the Perspective of «New
           Thinking» and Bible Translation

    • Authors: Hans Martin Dober
      Pages: 493 - 508
      Abstract: In his “The Star of Redemption”, Rosenzweig engages not only in an argument with philosophy, but also with theology. Next to Augustine and Friedrich Schleiermacher Martin Luther was a counterpart in whose face he developed his dialogical “new thinking”. The essay takes up the traces of this dispute in the letters to focus here on Rosenzweig's reading of Ricarda Huch's “Luther’s Faith”. This literary picture is then related in a sketch to Luther's Reformation theology as it emerges from contemporary research. In a next step, the “Star” is interpreted as a book that, on the one hand, owes much to a previous reception of Luther, but on the other hand, also shows the Reformator's thinking in a new light. Finally, the late writings on the problem of translation come into view in order to justify Rosenzweig’s “Verdeutschung” of the Hebrew Bible, undertaken together with Buber, to Luther’s “German Bible”.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-493-508
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • The Ban on Idolatry and the Concept of Difference in Franz
           Rosenzweig’s Philosophy

    • Authors: Alexander I. Pigalev
      Pages: 509 - 522
      Abstract: The purpose of the research is to analyze the context, the essence, and the philosophical implications of Franz Rosenzweig's reconsideration of the ban on idolatry as an implication of pure monotheism. As often as not idolatry is defined generally as the adoration of some images that, representing deity, are considered to be autonomous and hereupon become the objects of worship. The study confines itself to the analysis of the significance of the ban on idolatry in Rosenzweig's interpretation of the concept of difference that underlies his theoretical model of the Other. The consideration proceeds on the general assumption that the encounter of tradition with modernity is the factor that determines the radical change in the philosophies of societies under modernization. In this context, the ancient ban on idolatry means the rejection and prohibition of whatever representation as intricate mediation that is, in turn, the hallmark of modernity. However, according to Rosenzweig, idolatry is not the usage of images as the representations of the reputedly unrepresentable God, but the fixation on one image which would mean the arbitrary limitation of God's infinite freedom to reveal himself visually. This implies that the reconsidered ban on idolatry does not require the absolute prohibition of representation, but the latter should be construed as temporal. Such an approach prevents the identification of the representation of entity with this entity itself, the sign with the thing, and therefore prohibits self-referentiality. Rosenzweig's stance determines also his understanding of familiarity, unfamiliarity, and difference in art and translation. Rosenzweig's emphasis on the shocking influence of the defamiliarizing difference as the feature of the work of art correlates with his interpretation of the translation that should make stable shared senses unfamiliar. Thus, the reconsidered ban on idolatry underlies Rosenzweig's conception of the reconciliation between Jewish tradition and modernity.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-509-522
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Hermann Cohen, Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig on Torah: Jewish Teaching
           versus Law

    • Authors: Hartwig Wiedebach
      Pages: 523 - 536
      Abstract: Cohen, Buber, and Rosenzweig were eminent figures in what Buber called a “Jewish renaissance.” I will limit myself to their relation to two basic Jewish concepts: teaching , i.e., the theoretical, theological part of the tradition, and law , i.e., the practical part. Historically, my focus is on those approximately 20 years between Cohen’s 1904 essay on Ethics and Philosophy of Religion in their Interrelation , and Rosenzweig’s 1923 essay The Builders , i.e., his response to Buber’s newly published Speeches on Judaism . Almost all of the main philosophical works of our three authors fall into this period: Cohen’s System of Philosophy (1902-1912), his Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism (1919), Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption (1921), and Buber’s I and Thou (1923). To think, to feel and to do one’s own authentically without excluding oneself from the general culture, or more strongly: to accomplish the general, even the most general at all, precisely in the realization of one’s own, is for all three philosophers the high demand of their Jewish self-interpretation. None of them has devoted his life’s work exclusively to “Jewish” issues, least of all Hermann Cohen. But each of them is under the question of how it is possible to write in German about the general human and just in this to be unambiguously Jewish.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-523-536
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Rosenzweig and Bakhtin. Hermeneutics of Language and Verbal Art in the
           System of the Philosophy of Dialogue

    • Authors: Ilya Dvorkin
      Pages: 537 - 556
      Abstract: For all the differences in the teachings and fate of Franz Rosenzweig and Mikhail Bakhtin, comparing them with one another is extremely instructive and reveals important and often lost meanings of 20th-century philosophy. Bakhtin made his debut in 1929 as the author of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Creative Art, but then went into exile for sufficient years and emerged from oblivion only in the 1960s. Rosenzweig died in 1929 and was almost forgotten for many years. Now, almost a century later, we see in Bakhtin’s philosophy, especially in his early works, and in Rosenzweig’s philosophy very much in common. Both sought to create a new philosophical system that radically rethinks the subject of philosophy. Both went beyond the traditional New European ontology, both recognized the fundamentality of language and language arts in the philosophy of the future, and, finally, both became the creators of the philosophy of dialogue as an important trend in 20th-century thought. For all that, there were many cultural, religious, and intellectual differences between Bakhtin and Rosenzweig. However, consideration of both the commonalities and differences in their philosophical systems is extremely fruitful not only for the cultural history of the 20th century but also for philosophical studies of the future.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-537-556
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Interpretation of the Origin by F. Rosenzweig and M. Heidegger

    • Authors: Maksim F. Litvinov
      Pages: 557 - 571
      Abstract: The research focuses on the problem of interpretation of such a concept as the origin, which is ultimate for philosophical thought and bases existentially oriented constructions of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger. It is argues in this paper the fundamental difference between the interpretations of the origin in “The Star of Redemption» and in «Being and Time”, despite all points of intersection and coincidences that bring closer together dialogical and existential-historical thinking. Such differentiation of positions is determined by the necessity both to neutralize romantic connotations, which expose the origin ( Ursprung ) as abyss ( Abgrund ), and to methodologically clarify the possibility not so much to think as to practically assert a limited and unclosed within itself integral being, including ontological and ethical dimensions. The origin of oblivion and renewal, imposed by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, is contrasted with Rosenzweig's origin of the “eternal overworld”, reconstructed on the basis of Herman Cohen's religio-philosophical intuitions and his analysis of the infinitesimal as a principle of reality. Rosenzweig’s position, which aims at a correlative consideration of the purely logical content of the infinitesimal quantity (almost-Nothing) and the existential experience of the finiteness of everything, is favorably distinguished by the absence of a one-sided focus on recalling, where fore-running although is declared, but it is immediately restrained by being-towards-death. As a result, Rosenzweig’s dialogism turns out to be free from overestimating what Heidegger’s interpretation calls resoluteness, which in fact is not much different from paralysis in the clearance of being. Cohen’s problem of an infinite task's realization, being actualized in Rosenzweig’s conception, allows to go beyond being-towards-death in juxtaposing the trajectories of initial elements into a true gestalt.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-557-571
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • B. Epstein’s Social Ontology

    • Authors: Andrey M. Orekhov
      Pages: 572 - 581
      Abstract: The article realizes the analysis of B. Epstein’s social ontology. Social ontology is teaching on basic principles of constructing of social reality, founded on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary strategies of investigations of the social world. There are five leading programs in contemporary social ontology: “CIIF-program” of J. Searle, “Cambridge program” of T. Lawson, “Tufts program” of B. Epstein, “critical realism” and “the other institutionalism”. “Tufts program” is one from them. Social ontology tries to make progress on clarifying all of these in the context of specific topics: group intentions, laws, corporations, property, institutions, social groups. To begin an inquiry in social ontology, we need to choose which entities to work out the ontology of, that is, where to focus our attention in analyzing the social world. B. Epstein supposes his own model of re-conceptualization of framework of social ontology: two concepts play here a leading role, - “grounding” and “anchoring”. “Anchoring” and grounding”: these are two fundamental aspects to the building of the social world. Correspondingly, social ontology consists of two distinct projects. The grounding project is the inquiry into the conditions for the social facts to obtain. There are facts in the world are metaphysically sufficient reasons, - that is, grounds, - but it is more exact social facts of some kind. The anchoring project is the inquiry into what puts those conditions in place. Also it should be realized research concerning the grounding conditions for social facts. The last work of B. Epstein “The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of Social Sciences” is devoted to criticism of ontological individualism in philosophical analysis of social knowledge.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-572-581
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • A Framework of Social Ontology

    • Authors: B. Epstein, Andrey M. Orekhov, Sergey V. Moiseev, Alexey Z. Chernyak, Alexey V. Antonov
      Pages: 582 - 598
      Abstract: The research sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology, the study of the of the nature of the social world. Social ontology is also gaining prominence in traditional philosophical discussions. The subject matter of social ontology is clarified, in particular the difference between it and the study of causal relations and the explanation of social phenomena. For any social fact, there are two distinct ontological questions: what is the ground for that fact, why is that fact grounded just the way. Two different inquires are defined and explained: the study of how social categories are “anchored” or “grounded”. The distinction between these inquires is used to clarify prominent programs in social theory, particularly theories of practice and varieties of ontological individualism. Anchoring and grounding are two fundamental aspect to the building of the social world, Correspondingly, social ontology consists of two distinct project - “project of grounding” and “project of anchoring’.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-582-598
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • The Nature of Social Fact in B. Epstein’s Social Ontology

    • Authors: Svetlana I. Platonova
      Pages: 599 - 606
      Abstract: The research analyzes the social ontology of the American philosopher B. Epstein. Social ontology studies the nature of the social world: what are its main elements and how they come together. There are different theories in modern social ontology: the theory of structuration, the theory of communicative action, social constructivism, critical realism. B. Epstein opposes psychological theories of social ontology and ontological individualism in explaining the social world. B. Epstein distinguishes between ontological questions about the social world and causal relationships between events. The initial category of social ontology for American philosopher is a social fact. To establish a social fact, two actions are necessary: to give an ontological explanation of the existing social fact and to find facts that determine the conditions necessary for a social fact. Accordingly, B. Epstein distinguishes between two projects: the project of the foundation of a social fact and the project of fixing a social fact. The project of the foundation of a social fact provides an ontological explanation of a social fact, studies the conditions for the presence of social facts. The fixation project explores what gives rise to the conditions of the basis for social facts. The ground relation and the fixation relation are not causal relationships. A social fact must have diachronic constituent elements, which is, in particular, a test of social theory for truth. The article also discusses the theory of social facts by J. Serle. The theory of J. Serle B. Epstein refers to a psychological concept based on the collective acceptance of certain rules by the community. This position does not seem to be entirely correct, since J. Searle, in understanding the nature of a social fact, relies on social institutions, and the fact itself refers to institutional facts.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-599-606
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • How social ontology is possible from the point of view of epistemology and
           philosophy of language'

    • Authors: Alexander Yu. Antonovskiy, Raisa Ed. Barash
      Pages: 607 - 622
      Abstract: The article critically examines the project of Brian Epstein's social ontology. The authors propose to interpret a social fact as derived from the appropriate perspective of an observer carrying out a structural reconstruction of a social phenomenon and identify difficulties in the way of analyzing social facts as structurally independent of causally determining factors. The article shows that the determination and foundation of social facts cannot be understood as asymmetric, substantiates the symmetrical nature of the relationship between the determinable complex fact and the ontological foundations that determine them, and suggests that the judgments describing them are equivalent, and also proves the need to involve philosophical and scientific methodology, the resources of the philosophy of language and epistemology to address the issue of the validity of projects “ontological fixation”, which the authors of the article propose to consider as a scientific classification. Understanding the ontology of the social is possible only when going beyond its limits, and any classifications can be idiosyncrasies of individual classifiers or observers, scientifically unequal and requiring epistemological evaluation. The authors note that epistemology allows us to judge the necessity or, on the contrary, artificiality of classification, and the question of the ontological basis of a social fact should be solved by analogy. Accordingly, the search for such ontological foundations is not possible without prior resolution of the epistemological problem: which classifications (fixations) of “natural” or “social species” are structurally necessary (in the sense that their macro-properties properties stem from the internal structure), and which are arbitrarily constructed by the observer, based on his idiosyncrasy or local-historical, cultural or ideological position.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-607-622
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • An Old Annex, Long since Unhabitable: The Critique of Practical Reason as
           an Offspring of Architectonic Classicism

    • Authors: Andrey K. Sudakov
      Pages: 623 - 643
      Abstract: The Critique of Practical Reason is traditionally regarded as one of Kant’s central works on practical philosophy. Its structural and stylistic parallels with the Critique of Pure Reason sustain one’s conviction about its fundamental systematic relevance in Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, the compositional sketch of the system of critical philosophy in the first Critique does not presume any separate critique of reason in its practical use. This inspires to investigate the question of the sense and aim of the critique of practical reason in Kant’s main works of the 1780s. Such an investigation discovers, that the concept of such a critique emerges in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, which intends to find and to establish the supreme principle of pure morals, to supply its full-value deduction and insofar to present a sufficient introduction to the system of moral metaphysics. It is for the purpose of such a deduction, which demonstrates the normative validity and truth of categorical imperatives, that Kant considers a transition to a critique of practical reason necessary. And yet this transition as well as this critique are presumed to take place within the subject field of the Groundwork itself: the main features of the practical critique of reason as described in the Groundwork III are, according to Kant, sufficient for the purpose of justification of critical morality. If, however, the deduction of the moral law given in Groundwork III should fail, no possible future “progress of metaphysics” could compensate this failure, - because this deduction occurs at the «extreme boundary of all practical philosophy”, beyond which lies the realm of moral faith. Kant scholars consider the concepts of the “fact of pure reason” and the doctrine of the highest derivative good as crucial innovations of the second “Critique”. There are however reasons enough to dispute the question as to whether both doctrines really make for an innovation - and for an advance.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-623-643
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Hegel’s Bellicis View of War. Initial State and Early Works

    • Authors: Alexei N. Krouglov
      Pages: 644 - 657
      Abstract: For over a century, Hegel’s view of war is seen as controversial that results in mutually exclusive interpretations. To reach a proper evaluation of Hegel’s views, it is necessary to consider both Hegel’s initial states of philosophical doctrine about war and peace, and the development of his understanding of war from early works to mature ones. In the first part of the paper, I characterize Kant’s position on war, since it was the starting point for Hegel. Contrary to popular representations about Kant as an exclusive pacifist, the philosopher of Koenigsberg had a philosophical-historical treatment of war, in which the war appeared as something sublime. However, both legal-ethical peace understanding and veto of war from the point of practical reason were not dominant in Kant’s philosophy, subordinating the sublime treatment of war. Kant’s next contemporaries could not already keep this position, emphasizing either one or the other side of war interpretation. Starting from the early writings (the paper “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” or manuscripts “System of Ethical Life” and “The German Constitution”), Hegel stresses an ethical aspect of war and its necessity, so that the shield is arranged on the way of systems isolation and individuals atomization, and the unity in its ethical health is saved. Perpetual peace, on the contrary, leads to diseases. The statement about equality of claims and the same truthfulness of warring parties’ rights is the originality of Hegel’s view. It makes absolutely impossible the war evaluation from the point of its justice and injustice.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-644-657
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Hermann Cohen’s logic of the pure knowledge as a philosophy of
           science

    • Authors: Zinaida A. Sokuler
      Pages: 658 - 671
      Abstract: The connection of Hermann Сohen’s “The Logic of Pure Knowledge” with the revolutionary transformations in physics and mathematics at the end of the 19th century is shown. Сohen criticised Kant’s answer to the question “How is mathematics possible”' If Kant refers to a priori forms of pure intuition, Сohen sees in it a restriction of freedom of mathematical thinking by limits of intuition. It has been shown that Cohen's position is in accordance with the main development of mathematics in the last decades of the 19th century, in particular, with K. Weierstrass’ striving to get rid of geometrical or mechanical images and intuitions in the mathematical analysis. Cohen was also well informed about the latest ideas in physics of his time. They are also discussed in “The Logic of Pure Knowledge.” The revolutionary spirit of physics and mathematics was appealing to Cohen, and he felt a corresponding enthusiasm for it. The ongoing scientific revolution is consonant with Cohen’s assertion that the foundations of science are hypotheses. The purity of pure thinking does not guarantee the correctness of any of its constructions. Each step in the development of science requires a critique of existing notions. The development of knowledge from the naive to the critical one shows a movement from a picture of the world as a set of stable things to a picture of continuous movement and change, where change is more important than what changes. Cohen sees such a development in an evolution of the concept of substance in modern physics and he welcomes the replacement of material substance by energy, seeing this movement as a confirmation of critical idealism. Finally, it is discussed whether we can speak of the actuality of Cohen’s logic of pure knowledge.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-658-671
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Karl Popper and the Problem of Essentialism in Philosophy

    • Authors: Alexey V. Antonov
      Pages: 672 - 686
      Abstract: In modern philosophy, essentialism is in most cases regarded as an outdated and, in fact, incorrect philosophical trend. And one of the scientists who created such a reputation of essentialism was the famous English philosopher of Austrian origin Karl Popper. The success of his book “The Open Society and its Enemies” led to the fact that in the West essentialism began to be considered not only cognitively untenable, but also suspicious as the theoretical basis of fascism, communism and totalitarianism. In the article, K. Popper’s arguments against essentialism are reviewed all over again, and it is shown that K. Popper’s criticism of essentialism as an anti-scientific and outdated doctrine is not the point of view of the philosophy as a whole, but it is just the position of empirical positivism. Essentialism deals with the reality that lies on the other side of phenomena. And this, according to K. Popper, necessarily leads to “ultimate” definitions. However, in accordance with the doctrine of falsification by K. Popper himself, every scientific conclusion within its expiration date is “ultimate”. The article shows that in reality essentialism did not only play an extraordinary role in the classical metaphysical theory of knowledge, but also continues to do so within the framework of modern ontology. Moreover, in the latter case, he does it with the help of abduction which is a specific form of logical inference generating scientific hypotheses. The existence of abduction in science, which generates new knowledge, suggests that essentialism is not something, at best, tolerable and excusable. This is the main way to development of sciences in general. In all cases, the author of the article considers only logical entities, but not legal, theological or any other.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-672-686
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Philosophy of Accelerationism: A New Way of Comprehending the Present
           Social Reality (in Nick Land’s Context)

    • Authors: Denis I. Chistyakov
      Pages: 687 - 696
      Abstract: Modern types of social reality require updated ways of comprehending them. The research is devoted to a new analytical form of understanding modernity that has recently emerged - accelerationism, still rarely discussed in Russian philosophy. The representatives of accelerationism call for a radical and rapid acceleration of socio-economic and technological processes in capitalist societies. The article reflects some ideas of the Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics by Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek, after which the accelerationist trend in philosophy and social sciences intensified and gained clear theoretical guidelines. The Manifesto’s ideas about accelerating technological evolution as a means of resolving social conflicts, about unleashing all the latent forces of capitalist production to achieve a state of post-capitalism, denying a return to the Fordist type of production and calling for the restoration of the future as such, are highlighted. The Manifesto and the works of Nick Land, the founder and the most prominent representative of accelerationism, present the position of creating a new program and the very style of thinking with regard to changing the capitalist system along the vector of acceleration. The article pays attention to the interpretation of Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s concept of “deterritorialization” in Land’s works. It emphasizes the focus of accelerationism on the future as a kind of realization of the paradoxical thesis of “looking back from the future.” The content of Land’s accelerationist theory shows the fundamental concepts of K-space (cyberspace), K-war (cyberwar), time and reality, technocratic future of society as Techno-Capital Singularity, expansion of capital as opposed to its reterritorialization. The meaning of Land’s idea of an acceleration of capitalism and the transition to a more progressive future through the collapse of outmoded structures and phenomena of the existing system of capitalism and its technological basis is deduced.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-687-696
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Fanaticism as a Τype of Μentality in the Works of Gabriel Marcel
           and Karen Armstrong

    • Authors: Farid I. Guseynov
      Pages: 697 - 712
      Abstract: The author examines the fanatical type of mentality in its secular and religious forms based on the analysis of the works of Gabriel Marcel and Karen Armstrong. The origins of the phenomenon of fanaticism are found in the basic foundations of Modern culture as the time of the replacement of myth by logos (Armstrong) and the domination of the abstract spirit (Marcel). The understanding of the foundations of fanaticism as a broad phenomenon undertaken by the French philosopher and the British religious scholar is associated with interpretations of the concept of the transcendent. Although the socio-spiritual situation in which Marcel and Armstrong work is different, their conclusions generally coincide and become especially relevant today, when the world is on the verge of a new world war. The author briefly formulates definitions of some basic categories of G. Marcel's philosophy - "philosophical experience", "first reflection", "second reflection", "fanaticized consciousness", "disparity", "abstraction", "abstract spirit", "collective violence", "property", "being", "ideologue", "intersubjectivity", "identity", etc. Gabriel Marcel's reflection on the fundamental difference between a true believer and a religious fanatic is discussed, despite the fact that both are spoken on behalf of absolute values. The will to refuse to "question" the object of one's faith presupposes immunity to the arguments of critical thinking, which by definition would be intended to act as a kind of antidote to fanaticism as a special type of radical consciousness. The basis of fanaticism turns out to be insensitivity to what is the fanatic's idefix, while modern fanatics, in contrast to the ordinary idea of them, are often well-educated people. This is a decentered consciousness dominated by "carnal thought". Such an idea may be called the idea of equality or justice, but it is not actually a thought born from experience and sympathy for people.
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-697-712
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Homo Hallucinas: Review of the Book «Introduction to Singular
           Philosophy» of F.I. Girenok

    • Authors: Dmitry D. Romanov
      Pages: 713 - 719
      Abstract: -
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-713-719
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy - VII: Transcendentalism
           and Cognitive Science

    • Authors: Sergey L. Katrechko, Anna A. Shiyan, Tatyana V. Salnikova
      Pages: 720 - 728
      Abstract: -
      PubDate: 2022-09-30
      DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2022-26-3-720-728
      Issue No: Vol. 26, No. 3 (2022)
       
 
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