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Abstract: Abstract The discussion about the open-border postulate, initiated by Joseph H. Carens in 1983, is developing an ever-increasing dynamism in both Anglo-American and German-speaking philosophy. There are two positions in this discussion: (1) the view that states have the sovereign right to decide whether and under what conditions they grant entry and residence to aliens (the right to exclusion); (2) the view that all people have a moral right to global free movement (the right to migration). The essay defends the thesis that there is neither a moral right to migration nor a moral right to exclusion. In the relationship between states and aliens, the state of nature prevails. In the state of nature there are no moral rights and duties other than human rights. Neither the alleged right to migration, i.e. global free movement nor the alleged right to exclusion can be considered a human right. The study is focused solely on ethics. Positive law, which depends on many coincidences anyway, is not considered. PubDate: 2023-11-17
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, den normativen Status der elterlichen Fürsorgearbeit zu klären: Fällt sie unter die Kategorie des Supererogatorischen, des Obligatorischen oder bewegt sie sich im Zwischenbereich der Quasi-Supererogation oder der erzwungenen Supererogation' Obwohl supererogatorische Akte eine große Affinität zu der selbstlosen Fürsorge haben, die nach weit verbreiteter Auffassung die Haltung von Eltern auszeichnet, wurde der Status der Elternschaft innerhalb der Supererogationstheorie kaum diskutiert oder sogar explizit ausgeklammert. Durch die Verbindung der Supererogationstheorie mit aktuellen Diskursen innerhalb der Familienethik wird die Frage diskutiert, inwieweit Elternschaft, elterliche Fürsorge oder einzelne im Rahmen der Elternschaft auftretenden Handlungen oder Haltungen als obligatorisch, supererogatorisch oder erzwungen supererogatorisch verstanden werden können. Dabei argumentiert der Beitrag für folgende vier Thesen: (1) Überhaupt Kinder zu bekommen, ist supererogatorisch; (2) Mit der Übernahme der Elternrolle entstehen weitreichende spezifische Verpflichtungen zur Wohltätigkeit, die außerhalb der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung als supererogatorisch gelten würden; (3) Bestimmte elterliche Handlungen und Haltungen können quasi-supererogatorisch oder supererogatorisch sein. (4) Paradoxerweise sind Eltern oft zu supererogatorischen Handlungen verpflichtet bzw. gezwungen. Das primäre Ziel des Beitrages liegt in der analytischen Klärung des ethischen Status’ parentaler Handlungen und Haltungen. Angesichts der besonderen moralischen Anforderungen an Eltern werden im letzten Abschnitt kurz erläutert, dass die Gesellschaft als ganze Hilfspflichten hat, Eltern darin zu unterstützen, ihre außergewöhnlichen Pflichten erfüllen zu können. PubDate: 2023-10-25
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Our everyday lifeworlds, the environments in which we spend our daily lives, in which we exercise agency and control and to which we are bound through practical knowledge and routines, receive little attention in contemporary climate ethics. This is unfortunate, as climate ethics can benefit from an in-depth analysis of the lifeworld-perspective—especially when it comes to evaluating the individual’s role in the face of climate change. This paper focuses on two key problems, the problem of individual climate responsibility and the problem of the individual’s motivation to support climate protection policies. Currently discussed strategies to solve both problems face serious objections. A lifeworld-oriented perspective, so I argue, helps us to better understand both problems as well as the reasons why they are practically resistant to solutions proposed in the philosophical literature. My main claim is that climate change’s serious consequences cannot be experienced in the current everyday lifeworlds of most people who live in the Western hemisphere. In consequence, appeals to conscience lack adequate grounding in everyday contexts. These contexts, however, have a decisive impact on the individual’s motivation and moral behavior. Based on this critique, I give some suggestions how the problems of individual responsibility and motivation could be handled from a lifeworld-oriented perspective. PubDate: 2023-09-22
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Abstract: Abstract Following a seminal definition by Gerald Dworkin, paternalism comprises interventions which interfere with the liberty or autonomy of a person, lack the concerned person’s consent and are conducted with benevolent intention. In a paper titled “The Concept of Paternalism” Dominik Düber advises abstaining from applying the notions of liberty and autonomy in a conceptual analysis of paternalism in order to avoid conceptual confusion and moral preconception regarding paternalism. In the present paper, I will argue to the contrary that both the concept and justification of paternalism depend dialectically on the notions of liberty and autonomy, respectively. The concept of paternalism alters its structure and meaning according to these notions. Likewise, the legal and ethical evaluation of particular instances of paternalism depend on the related concepts of liberty and autonomy. PubDate: 2023-09-20
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Der Artikel geht im Ausgang von der Leibphänomenologie auf deren Schlüsselbegriffe „Erfahrung“ und „Artikulation“ ein. Unter dieser Perspektive werden vier Paradigmata naturphänomenologisch näher betrachtet: a) die Einstellung der Biophilie, die sich eine naturgeschichtliche Mitgift, eine phänomenologische Aufgabe und eine Naturschutzperspektive unterscheidet, b) die Phänomene der gesundheitsförderlichen Wirkungen von Naturkontakten, c) Musterbeispiele deontischer Erfahrungen mit Naturwesen, deren Deutung für die Lösung des Inklusionsproblems relevant ist, und schließlich d) Versuche, Klimawandel in phänomenologische Erfahrung zu bringen. Im Fazit werden Überlegungen zu offenen Fragen und möglichen Konsequenzen angestellt, die sich für ein vertieftes Verständnis der Paradigmata ergeben könnten. PubDate: 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00150-5
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Abstract: Abstract The paper advocates the idea of grief as a key emotion for transformation. Following Judith Butler’s concept of grievability, it agues that a critical reflection on who (or what) is mourned reveals the normative orders of a society as well as its possible blind spots. As a particularly telling case, the mass culling of Danish minks that took place in 2020 as a preventive public health measure in the Covid-19 pandemic is examined. The response to the case sheds light on the various barriers of broadening the moral community. The paper explores some of the reasons for the practical disability to mourn for animals bred for use and argues that it is part misleading to focus on the species-line. Rather, it is a question of selective moral responsiveness which is dependent on the specific cultural context and way of life. In the last part of the paper, it is suggested that ecological grief work is a means to move from grief to empathy and solidarity and finally resistance. When others are discovered as grievable, they are acknowledged as vulnerable fellow beings which have to be morally considered. Grief, then, can be understood as a disruptive emotion which questions the current understanding of normality. PubDate: 2023-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00151-4
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Abstract: Abstract This paper explores the relevance of intergenerational ethics in the context of climate change and argues that virtue ethics provides a suitable framework for addressing these ethical concerns. We suggest the inclusion of a new virtue, called prospection, which involves cultivating the ability to think and care deeply about the future, navigate its inherent uncertainties constructively, and ensure the availability of sustainable options for future generations. We suggest that thinking and imagining sustainable futures trigger good dispositions towards future humans, non-humans and nature and that ought to be part of the definition of a good life. We posit that fostering this disposition can inspire and motivate present actions that effectively mitigate climate change. Virtue ethics implies an element of timelessness in morality because the future tends to be there by default; with prospection, the future will be there by design, reinforcing its importance in intergenerational ethics. PubDate: 2023-08-16 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00152-3
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Abstract: Abstract Anger plays an important yet under researched role in climate activism. Anger can stimulate the fight for a more climate just and sustainable world, but it can also provide the motivation for eco-fascist attacks. In this paper, I differentiate between different kinds of anger motivating climate activism. Focusing attention to ‘Lordean Rage’, a specific form of anti-racist anger conceptualized by Myisha Cherry as a crucial tool in the fight against racial injustice, I argue that it would be both apt and productive for climate activist groups in the Global North to cultivate a form of ‘Lordean anger’ in response to climate breakdown. More fundamentally, my contribution to scholarship on emotions about the ecological crisis is to show the potential of anger, while emphasizing the importance of evaluating racism and applying anti-racism in the context of climate justice activism. PubDate: 2023-08-08 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00149-y
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Ausgehend von einem Blick auf die Rahmenbedingungen wissenschaftlicher und ethischer Diskussionen in pluralistischen Demokratien werden im vorliegenden Text verschiedene Ansätze der zeitgenössischen Ethik diskutiert, die Konzepte des guten Lebens entwickeln und die dazu gehörenden Naturerfahrungen erörtern. In Weiterführung wird zugunsten einer Position argumentiert, die von der Idee einer „guten Welt“ ausgeht. Deren Güte ist im Ausgang von multizentrischen Wertrelationen zu bestimmen, die nicht nur das urteilende Subjekt begünstigen. Auf dieser Grundlage werden alltägliche Erfahrungen in den Blick genommen: Sie dienen dazu, den Rahmen der entworfenen Ethik zu konkretisieren, müssen aber ihrerseits einer ethischen Prüfung unterzogen werden. PubDate: 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00146-1
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Am Beispiel wildlebender Vögel wird in diesem Beitrag eine oft praktizierte, aber bislang wenig reflektierte Tugend, die ökologische Gastfreundschaft, dargestellt. Gastfreundschaft (hospitalitas) ist aus der Menschenwelt wohlbekannt und besonders in der jüdisch-christlichen Tradition, wenn auch keineswegs nur dort, eine lebendige Institution. Man kann sie, wie hier gezeigt werden soll, auch nichtmenschlichen Wesen gegenüber üben. Der Text versucht, die Konturen der ökologischen Gastfreundschaft herauszuarbeiten und vergleicht sie abschließend mit anderen umweltethischen Tugenden. PubDate: 2023-07-06 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00147-0
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Abstract: Abstract Both paternalism and relational autonomy are two concepts that are much discussed in medical ethics. Strangely enough, they have hardly been considered together. How does the understanding and justification of medical paternalism change if we take a (constitutively) relational understanding of autonomy as a basis' From an individualistic understanding of autonomy, medical paternalism interferes in the individual sphere of a patient. It can be justified if the benefit to the patient clearly outweighs the extent of the violation of their autonomy. I argue that according to a relational understanding of autonomy other justification criteria come to the fore than those we know from the ‘classic paternalism debate’. Building on the concept of maternalism introduced by Laura Specker-Sullivan and Fay Niker, I propose that the nature and quality of the physician-patient relationship, the epistemic access to the patient’s pro-attitudes, the physician’s motivation to intervene, and intersubjective recognition constitute relevant justification criteria. In addition, I argue that these criteria provide helpful indications of how physician-patient relationships should be structured in order to enable relational autonomy in patient care and avoid medical paternalism in general. PubDate: 2023-07-05 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00148-z
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Abstract: Abstract This essay concerns what it means to historicize evil in an ethically responsible way: that is, what it means to think and narrate perpetrators and victims of evil through what is testified to and told about them. I show that a responsible gaze can only be recognized by allowing ourselves to be addressed by the dead victims. The argument consists in an existential critique of a set of common ideas in the human sciences, which suggest that we must attempt to empathize with the perpetrators in order to understand their deeds in human terms. This empathetic thought, I suggest, easily leads us either to aestheticize the victims or to think that the evils in our history should be addressed as a metaphysical susceptibility to evil internal to being human. By critically discussing these ideas, I show that empathy for the perpetrators in several respects does injustice to the dead victims, which marks that we as their afterlife continue to have an irresponsible relationship with the dead. PubDate: 2023-06-07 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00144-3
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Abstract: Abstract It is a widespread notion that certain rights duties put categorical constraints on the actions of any rational agent, whereas other rights or duties that can be weighed against each other, based on the value of the goods affected. Both assumptions, however, seem to exclude each other in a theoretical perspective. In this article, I will nevertheless propose an approach, how to reconcile them. The starting point for this proposal is the idea that any action must be justifiable to the persons concerned. Against this backdrop, I try to show that submitting another person to a strategic calculus of weighing goods cannot be justified to her if the goods in question cannot be separated from that person, i.e. are in a certain perspective “identical” with her, as with the good of life. This also opens a perspective to reconcile deontological and consequentialist ethics. PubDate: 2023-06-07 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-023-00145-2
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