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- Editorial
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PubDate: 2022-05-09
- Good and Evil in Recent Discussion
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Abstract: Abstract This paper addresses the question of whether the concept of evil is philosophically adequate. It sets out a secular conception of evil that is sufficiently clear to be used in philosophical theorising. Evil, so conceived, is not merely a fiction or an illusion, but is a moral property possessed by some actions and some persons in the real world. While several philosophers have claimed that it is inescapably dangerous to use the concept of evil, the reality is that the concept of evil, when used carefully, is not prohibitively dangerous. Evil actions are not merely the opposite of good actions. Rather evil actions are are a small subset of extreme moral wrongs. PubDate: 2022-05-05
- Good and Evil in Recent Discussions - Good and Evil in Virtue Ethics
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Abstract: Abstract Talk about evil resonates in ways that are culturally inherited. Historical and religious dimensions of “evil” often seem to be front and center. Nevertheless, we argue that it would be too quick to dismiss the study of evil within secular ethics. We defend an outlook that is inspired by ancient ethics—also called virtue ethics—which accepts the so-called Guise of the Good account of motivation. For an agent to be motivated to perform an action, something about the action must look good to her. We argue that evil actions do not constitute exceptions to the Guise of the Good. To preserve this framework, we entertain a privative account of evil, according to which evil is the absence of the good, and yet (falsely) appears in a positive light to the agent who performs an evil action. We reject the view that evil is quantitatively extreme badness. An account of evil should permit that some instances of evil are from a third person perspective not extremely bad. On this picture, evil is agent-relative; something can be evil relative to one person without being evil relative to another person. Accordingly, several qualities—rather than only one distinctive quality—can make an action evil. PubDate: 2022-05-02
- Good and Evil in Recent Discussion – Introductory Comments
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PubDate: 2022-05-02
- Good and Evil in Recent Discussion
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Abstract: Abstract This paper develops a critical account of evil. By referring to Kant’s moral philosophy, I argue that evil actions have reasons and cannot be explained in terms of a lack of reason. However, these reasons of evil are not obvious but rather forms of rational self-deception. I therefore argue that the phenomenon of evil is complex and involves three dimensions: (i) activity, (ii) reasons, and (iii) (self-)deception. PubDate: 2022-05-02
- Biography and betrayal
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Abstract: Abstract John Bayley was married to Iris Murdoch for 45 years. In the last few years of her life, Murdoch developed Alzheimer’s, and John Bayley wrote a memoir about their life together, including the difficulties of looking after her with the disease. Although the Memoir was generally well-received, some critics called the publication an act of betrayal, because of the intimacy of some of the revelations, because of the public reduction of a great mind to a sick old woman, and especially because of Murdoch’s inability to consent or respond to it. I agree, but I think it was even worse than that. I want to distinguish the ‘shallow’ betrayal of a ‘three-dimensional’ person in the narrow timeframe of the present (where the lack of consent is perhaps the main issue) from a ‘deep’ betrayal – and I will argue that Bayley is guilty of both. Deep betrayal essentially involves a close intimate of the victim betraying the ‘four-dimensional’ person across her whole life, as well as betraying the relationship between them. Such a betrayal inevitably casts a shadow back on our understanding of the earlier relationship between Bayley and Murdoch. PubDate: 2022-04-21
- Aesthetic and ethical Attitudes
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Abstract: Abstract The essay suggests that (despite some hostile twentieth-century criticism) there is such a thing as a characteristically ‘aesthetic attitude’, and that this idea can indeed shed light on the production and reception of works of art, as well as on the appreciation of nature. It argues, further, that the response to individual ‘particularity’ implicit in the aesthetic attitude renders this attitude continuous with that of ethical attention to – and appreciation of – individual persons: we are concerned here with distinct, but related, aspects of the valuable ‘in itself’ or ‘for its own sake’. PubDate: 2022-04-20
- David S. Oderberg: The Metaphysics of Good and Evil
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PubDate: 2022-04-14
- Nary an Obligatory Maxim from Kant’s Universalizability Tests
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Abstract: Abstract In this paper I argue that there would be no obligatory maxims if the only standards for assessing maxims were Kant’s universalizability tests. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I clarify my thesis: I define my terms and disambiguate my thesis from other related theses for which one might argue. In the second, I confront the view that says that if a maxim passes the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt that maxim; I also confront a close relative of this view. In the third, I confront the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt the contradictory of that maxim. In the fourth, I confront two variations of the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests and an agent is deliberating about the action in the maxim, then the agent has a positive duty to adopt the contrary of that maxim. In the fifth, I confront the view that says that if an agent has adopted a maxim of ends, then the agent has a positive duty to universalize that end. I then wrap up the paper with some concluding remarks. PubDate: 2022-04-04
- Die innere Dynamik von selbst- und umweltbezogenen Tugenden im
tugendhaften Akteur.-
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Die eudaimonistische Tugendethik sieht sich, was ihre innere Struktur anbelangt, standardmäßig mit den Vorwürfen des Egoismus und Anthropozentrismus konfrontiert, was auch das Projekt einer ökologischen Tugendethik zu gefährden scheint. Der vorliegende Artikel versucht, ausgehend von der Tugendethik Erich Fromms, eine neue Perspektive auf diese Standardvorwürfe zu entwickeln, indem er den theoretischen Implikationen nachgeht, die die Anerkennung der Biophilie – der Liebe zum Leben – als eine der Tugenden des Menschen für den Frommschen Ansatz hat. Die zunächst noch exegetisch ausgerichtete Diskussion der werkinternen Relation von humanistischer und biophiler Ethik bei Erich Fromm leitet schließlich zu einer stärker systematisch ausgerichteten Diskussion der inneren Dynamik von selbst- und umweltbezogenen Tugenden im tugendhaften Akteur über. In diesem Zuge wird deutlich gemacht, dass das selbstbezogene Streben nach eigener Eudaimonie und das umweltbezogene Streben nach der Förderung des Objekts der eigenen Liebe zwar durchaus miteinander in einen Konflikt geraten können, dass dieser Konflikt aber nicht zur Selbstauslöschung der Tugendethik führt, sondern stattdessen im tugendhaften Akteur eine produktive Dynamik entfaltet. Die klassische Gegenüberstellung von Anthropozentrismus und Biozentrismus innerhalb der Ethik lässt sich auf diese Weise unterlaufen. PubDate: 2022-02-07 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00114-7
- Dankbarkeit in dichten und losen Gemeinschaften
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Dankbarkeit erfreut sich uneingeschränkter Hochschätzung. Es soll hier zur Probe dem Gedanken nachgegangen werden, Dankbarkeit sei allenfalls eingeschränkt als gut zu beurteilen. Die positive Bewertung der Dankbarkeit steht, so die Vermutung, unter der sozialontologischen Voraussetzung einer fortgeschrittenen Vereinzelung der Menschen. PubDate: 2021-10-04 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00109-4
- Editorial
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PubDate: 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00112-9
- Thomas Fuchs: Verteidigung des Menschen. Grundfragen einer
verkörperten Anthropologie-
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PubDate: 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00113-8
- Darf der Staat von Migrant*innen fordern, sich zu integrieren'
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung In diesem Aufsatz gehe ich der Frage nach, ob der Staat von Migrant*innen fordern darf, sich zu integrieren. Nach einer Erläuterung des Begriffs „Integration“ und der verschiedenen Dimensionen der Integration werde ich ein Argument vorstellen, das zeigt, dass sich auf Grundlage des politischen Liberalismus eine staatliche Forderung nach politischer Partizipation von Migrant*innen begründen lässt. Diese Forderung beruht auf Gerechtigkeits- sowie demokratietheoretischen Überlegungen. Weil die politische Partizipation zugleich eine gewisse strukturelle, soziale und identifikative Integration der Migrant*innen voraussetzt, erstreckt sich die Forderung auch auf diese Voraussetzungen. Da sich die entsprechende Forderung gleichermaßen an Migrant*innen als auch an Einheimische richtet, entgeht die hier vorgestellte Argumentation dem Vorwurf, auf einem bloß partikularen Interesse der einheimischen Bevölkerung zu beruhen, dass sich die Migrant*innen der bzw. einer nationalen Kultur anpassen mögen. Zuletzt diskutiere ich einen Einwand, der sich gegen eine der Prämissen meiner Argumentation richtet. Dieser lautet, dass ein liberaler Staat keinen Einfluss auf die Haltungen und Überzeugungen seiner Bürger*innen nehmen darf. Ich verteidige die Behauptung, dass es auch im liberalen Staat legitim ist, die Bürger*innen zur Demokratie zu erziehen. PubDate: 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00111-w
- Heidegger’s Forgetfulness of Difference
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Abstract: Abstract Martin Heidegger’s National Socialist political sympathies are plainer and more troubling to contemporary readers than ever before. This paper examines the relation of leader to society he uses to ground his account of the state in the 1930s. But breakthroughs in the previous decade, in Being and Time in particular, make the political ontology he endorses less compelling. Heidegger’s political positions are incompatible with his account of the ontological difference. The power of the leader of the society he or she leads cannot repeat the relation of Being over entities. Ontologically speaking, totalitarianism is a category mistake. Confusing the transcendental domain for its ontical contents, Heidegger refuses to learn his own lessons in ways Eric Voegelin helps us detect. PubDate: 2021-09-20 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00108-5
- The Order of Charity
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Abstract: Abstract This paper defends partiality as an inherent, essential part of ethical decision-making. First, the concept of charity as a kind of universal benevolence is spelled out, drawing on key ideas from classical religious thinking. I then argue that any justification of partiality must appeal to the good first, rather than rights. There follows a justification of partiality via an argument from the idea of control over the good. The next section seeks to harmonize partialistic preference with universal charity, explaining the concept of love of neighbour. There follows an outline of the key principles required for setting out an order of charity based on different kinds of special relationship. While not all of this theistically driven approach to the order of charity translates easily into secular moral thought, enough does to suggest that the view defended is at the least worthy of consideration and not to be dismissed lightly. At best, it has much in it that is commendable to secular common sense. PubDate: 2021-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00107-6
- Der Knobe-Effekt als Doppeleffekt
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Dem sogenannten Knobe-Effekt zufolge bestimmt die moralische Valenz von Nebeneffekten menschlichen Verhaltens die Zuschreibung ihrer absichtlichen Verursachung. Wir argumentieren, dass erstens die empirisch ermittelten sozialpsychologischen Daten den Knobe-Effekt in der üblichen Lesart nicht belegen, vor allem wegen der unvollständigen Untersuchung der entscheidenden moralischen Varianzfaktoren. Zweitens zeigen wir, dass - und wie - eine spezifische Version des traditionellen Prinzips des Doppeleffekts den empirisch bestätigten Teil des Knobe-Effekts philosophisch erklärt. Die Erklärungskraft des Prinzips des Doppeleffekts kann auch als eine Rechtfertigung eben dieses Prinzips gesehen werden. PubDate: 2021-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00105-8
- Von der Geschichtsphilosophie zur Formalpragmatik
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung Die gegenwärtige Debatte über die normativen Grundlagen Kritischer Theorie lässt sich nur vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Geschichte verstehen: Die Defizite in den Konzeptionen der 1. und 2. Generation strukturieren das Feld der Optionen, die heute noch als aussichtsreich gelten können. Der Blick zurück schärft den Blick nach vorn. Im ersten Teil des Beitrags werde ich deshalb die Hauptthesen, ethischen Implikationen und Einseitigkeiten von Horkheimers Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft darstellen. Im zweiten Teil werde ich die (von Horkheimer beiläufig angedachte und) von Habermas ausgearbeitete These diskutieren, dass der Sprache das nicht-instrumentelle Telos der Verständigung innewohnt. Zudem werde ich zeigen, dass es Habermas nicht gelingt, den für seine Diskursethik zentralen Universalisierungsgrundsatz abzuleiten. Wie sich die Begründungsprobleme bei Horkheimer und Habermas auf die gegenwärtige Debatte auswirken, werde ich im dritten Teil besprechen. PubDate: 2021-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00106-7
- Moralischer Konstitutivismus und die Ethik grundlegender Güter
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Abstract: Zusammenfassung In this article, I defend a version of moral constitutivism that is based on a theory of goods. It is inspired by ancient philosophy both in claiming that action theory should be formulated in teleological terms (not as a causalism) and in the idea that a sound theory of goods should be a eudaemonist one. Additionally I argue that morality can be understood on the basis of such an approach. PubDate: 2021-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00090-y
- Editorial
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PubDate: 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s42048-021-00099-3
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