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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.402
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 24  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1386-2820 - ISSN (Online) 1572-8447
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2469 journals]
  • Linguistic Interventions and the Ethics of Conceptual Disruption

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      Abstract: Abstract Several authors in psychology and philosophy have recently raised the following question: when is it permissible to intentionally change the meaning and use of our words and concepts' I argue that an arguably prior question has received much less attention: Even if there were good moral or epistemic reasons for conceptual or semantic changes, this does not yet justify pushing or lobbying for such changes if they are socially and conceptually disruptive. In this paper, I develop the beginnings of an ethics of conceptual disruption as well as a set of norms of linguistic interventions based on it.
      PubDate: 2022-09-24
       
  • Aptness Isn’t Enough: Why We Ought to Abandon Anger

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      Abstract: Abstract According to the Fittingness Defense, even if the consequences of anger are overall bad, it does not follow that we should aim to avoid it. This is because fitting anger involves an accurate appraisal of wrongdoing and is essential for appreciating injustice and signaling our disapproval (Srinivasan 2018; Shoemaker 2018). My aim in this paper is to show that the Fittingness Defense fails. While accurate appraisals are prima facie rational and justified on epistemic grounds, I argue that this type of fittingness does not vindicate anger because there are alternative modes of recognizing and appreciating wrongdoing that can generate the benefits of anger without the harmful effects. Moreover, anger involves more than its appraisal of wrongdoing—it also consists of attitudes and motivations that are arguably of intrinsic disvalue.
      PubDate: 2022-09-14
       
  • Beyond (Non)-Instrumentalization: Migration and Dignity within a Kantian
           Framework

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      Abstract: Abstract This article offers a Kantian account of dignity violations in the context of contemporary migration to western states. It considers three major issues: “modern slavery,” statutory detention, and lack of rights to engage in economic activity. While most Kantian accounts emphasize the dignity violations of treating people as “mere means,” we point out that this does not capture the central issue: the “hostile environment” that so many migrants face. The first part of the article briefly sets out a Kantian account of dignity violations. The second part highlights two key differences between modern slavery and its historical forebears. It emphasizes the interpersonal rather than institutional character of modern slavery, and distinguishes trafficking from smuggling. The third part argues that migrants who lack formal rights to remain and work face institutional exclusions that violate human dignity. Policies that aim to discourage and restrict immigration demean people’s status as ends in themselves. Moreover, they do so by actively denying opportunities to act as means for others. As such, the article draws a link between Kant’s well-known cosmopolitan right not to be treated with hostility and his less well-known ethical duty, “to be a useful member of the world.” Dignity can be found in acting as a means for others; hostility and exclusion can violate dignity just as much as instrumentalization.
      PubDate: 2022-08-31
       
  • Editorial ‘Political Normativity. Critical Essays on the Autonomy of
           the Political’

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      PubDate: 2022-08-20
       
  • Limitarianism, Institutionalism, and Justice

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      Abstract: Abstract In recent years, Ingrid Robeyns and several others have argued that, whatever the correct complete account of distributive justice looks like, it should include a Limitarian requirement. The core Limitarian claim is that there is a ceiling – a limit – to the amount of resources that it is permissible for any individual to possess. While this core claim is plausible, there are a number of important questions about precisely how the requirement should be understood, and what its implications are regarding the obligations of various agents, that have not been adequately addressed in the discussions thus far. In this paper, I focus on questions about the relationship between the grounds for the Limitarian requirement and its role in generating obligations of justice for different agents. I argue that the plausible grounds for the requirement are incompatible with the widely accepted view, deriving from John Rawls, that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society,” but do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals and other possible agents (e.g. corporations) acting within that structure. If my argument succeeds, then Limitarians must accept that if the grounds that they have offered in defense of Limitarian policy interventions are compelling, then individuals are obligated to voluntarily direct any resources that they possess above the threshold in ways that will promote the same goals that justify Limitarian policies.
      PubDate: 2022-08-12
       
  • Street Photography Ethics

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I examine the ethics of street photography. I firstly discuss the close-up ‘in-your-face’ style street photography made famous by American photographer, Bruce Gilden. In close-up street photography, the proximity of the camera to the subject and the element of surprise work in tandem to produce a striking and evocative picture. Close-up street photography is shown to be ethically contentious on wellbeing-related and autonomy-related grounds. I next examine the more orthodox ‘respectable distance’ kind of street photography. In orthodox street photography, the photographer positions the camera some distance away from a nonconsenting subject that may or may not be aware a picture is to be taken. The main ethical problem with this form of street photography relates to the subject’s vanity and sense of self. When street photographers produce and publish images without the consent of subjects, they express their own creative freedom at the expense of the subject’s right to editorial control. I discuss the scope and potentially demanding practical implications of a right to editorial control. To conclude, I offer a workable solution to the ethical dilemma facing street photographers and discuss the implications of smart phones and photo-sharing social media platforms.
      PubDate: 2022-08-12
       
  • Contractualism and the Moral Point of View

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that accounts of the normative basis of morality face the following puzzle, drawing on a case found in Susan Wolf’s influential discussion of conflicts between the moral and personal points of view. On the one hand, morality appears to constitute an independent point of view that can intelligibly conflict with, and can conceivably be overruled by, the verdicts of other points of view. On the other hand, moral demands appear to carry a distinctive sort of authority; moral reasons normally seem to take priority over other kinds of considerations, and the verdicts of morality seem to possess a distinctive place in our deliberations, in that they appear to represent standards that we are open to legitimate complaint for failing to honor. After clarifying the nature of the problem, I argue that a contractualist theory of morality can resolve the puzzle by offering a compelling vindication of the independence of the moral perspective, the normal priority of moral reasons, and the deliberative significance of moral verdicts, within a unified theoretical framework. Furthermore, I claim that this contractualist analysis can help account for the sense of deep conflict that is characteristic of the sort of troubling moral choices that Wolf calls to our attention.
      PubDate: 2022-08-02
       
  • Irreplaceability and the Desire-Account of Love

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      Abstract: Abstract Lovers do not relate to their beloveds as seats of valuable qualities that would be replaceable for anyone with relevantly similar or more valuable qualities. Instead, lovers take their beloveds to be irreplaceable. This has been noted frequently in the current debate on love and different theories of love have offered different explanations for the phenomenon. In this paper, I develop a more complex picture of what is involved in lovers taking their beloveds to be irreplaceable. I argue that in order to account for the beloved’s irreplaceability, a theory of love must meet two conditions: it must explain the subjective aspect as well as the moral aspect of the beloved’s irreplaceability. I show that current theories of love fail to meet these conditions, either one or both of them, and I offer an alternative account that does - an account according to which love is understood as a special kind of desire for the beloved as a person. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to give a more nuanced picture of the beloved’s irreplaceability, acknowledging in particular that there is a moral aspect to the phenomenon that has not been attended to thus far; second, to introduce and motivate a new desire-based account of love.
      PubDate: 2022-08-02
       
  • The relational wrong of Poverty

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I explore elements from Kant’s philosophy of right to develop a relational account of the wrong of poverty. Poverty is a relational wrong because it involves relations of problematic dependence, inequality, and humiliation. Such relations infringe the rights to freedom and equality of the poor. And the called-for response is one of public recognition and protection of the rights of the poor. This position means we must radically reconceptualize our individual duties to the poor: not private beneficence, but private remedies for public failures.
      PubDate: 2022-08-01
       
  • Can we Bridge AI’s responsibility gap at Will'

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      Abstract: Abstract Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly executes tasks that previously only humans could do, such as drive a car, fight in war, or perform a medical operation. However, as the very best AI systems tend to be the least controllable and the least transparent, some scholars argued that humans can no longer be morally responsible for some of the AI-caused outcomes, which would then result in a responsibility gap. In this paper, I assume, for the sake of argument, that at least some of the most sophisticated AI systems do indeed create responsibility gaps, and I ask whether we can bridge these gaps at will, viz. whether certain people could take responsibility for AI-caused harm simply by performing a certain speech act, just as people can give permission for something simply by performing the act of consent. So understood, taking responsibility would be a genuine normative power. I first discuss and reject the view of Champagne and Tonkens, who advocate a view of taking liability. According to this view, a military commander can and must, ahead of time, accept liability to blame and punishment for any harm caused by autonomous weapon systems under her command. I then defend my own proposal of taking answerability, viz. the view that people can makes themselves morally answerable for the harm caused by AI systems, not only ahead of time but also when harm has already been caused.
      PubDate: 2022-07-29
       
  • Democratic citizenship and polarization: Robert Talisse’s theory of
           democracy

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      Abstract: Abstract This review essay critically discusses Robert Talisse’s account of democracy and polarization. I argue that Talisse overstates the degree to which polarization arises from the good-faith practice of democratic citizenship and downplays the extent to which polarization is caused by elites and exacerbated by social structures; this leads Talisse to overlook structural approaches to managing polarization and leaves his account of how citizens should respond to polarization incomplete. I conclude that Talisse’s insights should nevertheless be integrated into a broader agenda for thinking about the causes and solutions to polarization.
      PubDate: 2022-07-27
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10314-8
       
  • Wellbeing and Changing Attitudes Across Time

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      Abstract: Abstract The fact that our attitudes change poses well-known challenges for attitude-sensitive wellbeing theories. Suppose that in the past you favoured your adventurous youthful life more than the quiet and unassuming life you expected to live as an old person; now when you look back you favour your current life more than your youthful past life. Which period of your life is better for you' More generally, how can we find a stable attitude-sensitive standard of wellbeing, if the standard is in part defined in terms of unstable attitudes' In this paper, I introduce an ‘attitudinal matrix’ framework that will help us clear up the problems posed by changing attitudes across time. In particular, it will help us see what is at stake, which principles that can or cannot be combined, and what might be the best solution. I defend a very plausible candidate constraint on a solution to the challenge of changing attitudes, which I call ‘diagonalism’. It is argued that among the three main forms of substantive attitude-sensitive wellbeing theories – the attitude-version, the object-version, and the satisfaction-version – it is the satisfaction-version that can both satisfy diagonalism and provide the best account of temporal and lifetime wellbeing.
      PubDate: 2022-07-26
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10311-x
       
  • Billy Christmas: property and justice. A liberal theory of Natural Rights.
           New York: Routledge, 2021. E-Book (ISBN: 978-0-429-29725-0), € 29.70.
           184 pp.

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      Abstract: Abstract In this book Billy Christmas advances an interpretation of justice grounded in a distinctive theory of property. Christmas’ account of property is at the same time pluralistic – it justifies various forms of property of external objects – and grounded in one original natural right: the right to freedom. Indeed, one main take-away of the book is that freedom as (a claim to) non-interference does not only justify private property: it can also justify common property.
      PubDate: 2022-07-05
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10309-5
       
  • The View from everywhere: temporal self-experience and the Good Life

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      Abstract: Abstract It is a common thought that our experience of self in time plays a crucial role in living a good human life. This idea is seen both in views that say we must think of our lives as temporally extended wholes to live well and those that say living well requires living in the moment. These opposing views share the assumption that a person’s interests must be identified with either a temporally extended or temporally local perspective. David Velleman has argued that both perspectives are necessary parts of human experience, and each has its own independent interests. I agree with Velleman that our experience is inherently multi-perspectival but argue that there are more than two relevant perspectives and reject the claim that these perspectives have independent interests. Expanding his metaphor of narrative, I describe the way in which these perspectives continuously influence and affect one another, and suggest that living well can be understood in terms of skillful management of the perspectives that make up this complex form of temporal self-experience.
      PubDate: 2022-07-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10308-6
       
  • Correction to: The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for
           Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism

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      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Michael S. Moore: Mechanical Choices. The Responsibility of the Human
           Machine

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      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Malcolm Schofield: Cicero: Political Philosophy

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      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Sara Protasi: The Philosophy of Envy Cambridge: Cambridge University
           Press, 2021. Hardback (ISBN 978-1-316-51917-2), £75. 260 pp

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      Abstract: Abstract Envy is a complex and intriguing emotion that has received too little philosophical attention in recent years. Sara Protasi has come to remedy that gap with an original, thorough and carefully researched monograph that defends the view that envy is not all vicious, that one of its varieties can be fully virtuous, and that it plays an important role in our moral psychology.
      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Andrew I. Cohen: Apologies and Moral Repair: Rights, Duties, and
           Corrective Justice. Routledge, 2020. Hardback (978-0-367-90103-5), $160.
           216 Pages

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      PubDate: 2022-07-01
       
  • Tommaso Greco: La legge della fiducia. Alle radici del diritto

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      PubDate: 2022-06-30
      DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10306-8
       
 
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