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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 766 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Aesthetic Investigations     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Ahkam : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Aisthesis : Pratiche, Linguaggi e Saperi dell’Estetico     Open Access  
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
al-Afkar : Journal For Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Fikra     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
AL-Qadissiya Magzine for Human Sciences     Open Access  
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Alter : Revue de phénoménologie     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais de Filosofia Clássica     Open Access  
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analítica     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Analytica : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ancient Philosophy Today     Hybrid Journal  
Andrews University Seminary Student Journal     Open Access  
ANFUSINA : Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access  
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Astérion     Open Access  
Astrolabio     Open Access  
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Aurora : papeles del Seminario María Zambrano     Open Access  
Auslegung : A Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 56)
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Bergsoniana     Open Access  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bioethica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 19)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos de Ética e Filosofia Política     Open Access  
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã : Crítica e Modernidade     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Espinosanos     Open Access  
Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen     Open Access  
Cahiers Droit, Sciences & Technologies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Bioethics     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Ciência & Trópico     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Clotho     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Conciencia     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 24)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Convivium : Revista de Filosophia     Open Access  
Correspondences : Journal for the Study of Esotericism     Open Access  
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access  
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Cuadernos de pensamiento     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Culture and Dialogue     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dianoia     Open Access  
Diferencia(s)     Open Access  
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Discurso     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access  
Disputatio     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Doxa : Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
En Líneas Generales     Open Access  
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Endowment Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access  
Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia     Open Access  
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudios Nietzsche     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Etcétera : Revista del Área de Ciencias Sociales del CIFFyH     Open Access  

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Disputatio
Number of Followers: 0  

  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Print) 2182-2875 - ISSN (Online) 0873-626X
Published by Sciendo Homepage  [370 journals]
  • The Aim of Inquiry

    • Abstract: I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.
      PubDate: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Editorial: ’s 25 Anniversary

    • PubDate: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

    • Abstract: My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.
      PubDate: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Metaphysical Nature of Social Groups

    • Abstract: In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features (structural organization of the group) with respect to the significance of concrete features (the group’s members) can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group.
      PubDate: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science'

    • Abstract: The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.
      PubDate: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • The Proportionality Argument and the Problem of Widespread Causal
           Overdetermination

    • Abstract: The consensus is that repeatable artworks cannot be identified with particular material individuals. A perennial temptation is to identify them with types, broadly construed. Such identification, however, faces the so-called “Creation Problem.” This problem stems from the fact that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims are mutually inconsistent. A possible solution to the Creation Problem is to argue that claim (2) can be rejected because (a) the only motivation for it is that a type, being abstract, cannot stand in causal relations, but (b) this motivation is ungrounded, since types can, in fact, stand in such relations. Clearly, in order for this solution to be successful, it is necessary to substantiate the possibility of types to be causally efficacious. In this essay, I examine an attempt to do this with the help of Yablo’s principle of proportionality, which has been undertaken by Walters (2013) and, more recently, Juvshik (2018). Although the argument they advance may seem to provide strong support for the causal efficacy of types, I think it actually fails to do this. To explain why this is so, I first show that this argument commits us to the existence of widespread causal overdetermination involving types and then argue that this commitment is both epistemically and ontologically problematic.
      PubDate: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame

    • Abstract: This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the fault of the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that she deserves. In Section 2, I discuss objections to judgment-based accounts of blame (that they cannot tell the difference between blaming and judging to be blameworthy, that they cannot explain why blame is often accompanied by emotion, and that they cannot make sense of irrational blame), and I argue that my proposal can handle all of them.
      PubDate: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • The Early Modern Origins of Pragmatism

    • Abstract: This paper considers the alleged pragmatism of Berkeley’s philosophy using the two Sellarsian categories of ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images of the world and human beings. The ‘manifest’ image is regarded as a refinement of the ordinary way of conceiving things, and the scientific image is seen as a theoretical picture of the world provided by science. The paper argues that the so-called Berkeleian pragmatism was an effect of Berkeley’s work towards a synthesis of ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images through the creation of one unified synoptic vision of the world and was a part of a new conceptual framework within which these two images could be combined.
      PubDate: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Two Informational Theories of Memory: a case from Memory-Conjunction
           Errors

    • Abstract: The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience (the causal condition). In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process (no causal condition). I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors (DRM, “lost in the mall”, and memory-conjunction errors) as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid attention to memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one (and only one) target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position.
      PubDate: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Minding Strangers’ Business

    • Abstract: When should we interfere in the course of a stranger’s life' While philosophers have discussed at length extreme cases of assisting poor people in famine stricken countries, much less attention has been given to casual, everyday episodes. If I overhear two people discussing a place they are about to visit, and know that it is closed for renovation, should I interfere and tell them so' If I stand next to a customer who has not been given enough change in the supermarket, should I point that out or mind my own business' Using the Kantian notions of love and respect, I answer such questions. I claim that Kant’s terminology is ill-suited for instructing us how to deal with others with whom we are personally involved, but is important for our encounters with strangers. I suggest that we take seriously Kant’s claim that we are “united in one dwelling place”. When around others, keep an open eye to the possibility that they might need help. If there is good reason to suppose that you may help, knock on their door. Let them decide whether they want to open it. They are totally entitled to decline the offer, but should keep in mind that it was given as part of the joint venture of living together with others. The interference should therefore not be regarded as an infringement of privacy.
      PubDate: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Replies

    • Abstract: In this paper I provide five separate responses, one for each of the contributed papers, in order to clarify some crucial aspects of the view defended in my book.
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Logic in Natural Language: Commitments and Constraints

    • Abstract: In his new book, Logical Form, Andrea Iacona distinguishes between two different roles that have been ascribed to the notion of logical form: the logical role and the semantic role. These two roles entail a bifurcation of the notion of logical form. Both notions of logical form, according to Iacona, are descriptive, having to do with different features of natural language sentences. I agree that the notion of logical form bifurcates, but not that the logical role is merely descriptive. In this paper, I focus on formalization, a process by which logical form, on its logical role, is attributed to natural language sentences. According to some, formalization is a form of explication, and it involves normative, pragmatic, as well as creative aspects. I present a view by which formalization involves explicit commitments on behalf of a reasoner or an interpreter, which serve the normative grounds for the evaluation of a given text. In previous work, I proposed the framework of semantic constraints for the explication of logical consequence. Here, I extend the framework to include formalization constraints. The various constraints then serve the role of commitments. I discuss specific issues raised by Iacona concerning univocality, co-reference and equivocation, and I show how our views on these matters diverge as a result of our different starting assumptions.
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Anaphoric Dependence and Logical Form

    • Abstract: In the core chapters 4–6, Iacona (2018) argues against the “Uniqueness Thesis” (UT), stating that “there is a unique notion of logical form that fulfils both the logical role and the semantic role” (39), where the former “concerns the formal explanation of logical properties and logical relations, such as validity or contradiction” (37), and the latter “concerns the formulation of a compositional theory of meaning” (ibid.). He argues for this on the basis of relations of coreference among referential expressions, names and indexicals. From what I take to be a fundamental agreement on most relevant issues, here I will nonetheless press him to clarify the notions of intrinsicness and the logical and semantic role of logical form on which he relies.
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Logical Form through Abstraction

    • Abstract: In a recent book, Logical Form: between Logic and Natural Language, Andrea Iacona argues that semantic form and logical form are distinct. The semantic form of a sentence is something that (together with the meanings of its parts) determines what it means; the logical from of a sentence is something that (all by itself) determines whether it is a logical truth. Semantic form does not depend on context but logical form does: for example, whether ‘This is this’ is a logical truth depends on whether the two occurrences of ‘this’ are used to demonstrate the same individual. I respond by claiming that logical form is indifferent to reference and is sensitive only to obligatory co-reference. When the speaker intends both occurrences of ‘this’ to be interpreted the same way the logical from of ‘This is this’ is a=a, while in a context where the speaker has no such intention it is a=b. This proposal allows a much more conservative revision of the traditional picture than the one suggested by Iacona. Instead of identifying the logical form of a natural language sentence by seeking a formalization in an artificial language, we obtain it through abstraction from its syntactic analysis: replacing the non-logical expressions by schematic letters, making sure that we use identical ones if and only if the speaker intended co-reference.
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Varieties of Logical Form

    • Abstract: The paper reviews some conceptions of logical form in the light of Andrea Iacona’s book Logical Form. I distinguish the following: logical form as schematization of natural language, provided by, for example, Aristotle’s syllogistic; the relevance to logical form of formal languages like those used by Frege and Russell to express and prove mathematical theorems; Russell’s mid-period conception of logical form as the structural cement binding propositions; the conceptions of logical form discussed by Iacona; and logical form regarded as an empirical hypothesis about the psychology of language processing, as in the Discourse Representation Theory tradition. Whereas neither schematization, nor the use of special languages for mathematics, raise general methodological or empirical difficulties, other conceptions of logical form raise at least apparent problems.
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization

    • Abstract: I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Introduction

    • Abstract: This introduction is a short critical presentation of the topic and main arguments of Andrea Iacona’s book Logical Form. Furthermore, it summarizes the commentators’ views on two central issues: Iacona’s rejection of the uniqueness thesis, i.e. his claim that no single notion of logical form can be adequate to the tasks that logical form has been supposed to perform, and the relation between a sentence’s logical form and its truth conditions.
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Simply Finding Answers, or the Entirety of Inquiry While Standing on One
           Foot

    • Abstract: I argue that inquiry can be defined without reference to the attitudes inquirers have during inquiry. Inquiry can instead be defined by its aim: it is the activity that has the aim of answering a question. I call this approach to defining inquiry a “naive” account. I present the naive account of inquiry in contrast to a prominent contemporary account of inquiry most notably defended by Jane Friedman. According to this view of inquiry, which I call an attitude-centric view, inquiry is appropriately defined not by the aim of the activity but by the attitudes that inquirers have during inquiry. After developing the naive view, I defend it against the objection that it collapses into the attitude-centric view.
      PubDate: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • Descriptive Rules and Normativity

    • Abstract: This work offers a challenge to the orthodox view that descriptive rules are non-normative and passive in their role and usage. It does so by arguing that, although lacking in normativity themselves, descriptive rules can be sources of normativity by way of the normative attitudes that can develop around them. That is, although descriptive rules typically depict how things are, they can also play a role in how things ought to be. In this way, the limited role that this type of rule can play as either a basis for the development of normative reasons, or as explanatory reasons for action is identified and clarified. One desirable outcome of the analysis is a more complete view of what descriptive rules are and how they are utilized by agents.
      PubDate: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 00:00:00 GMT
       
  • The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past

    • Abstract: I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain metaphysical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I argue that, even if I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The Dynamic Theory entails that you should not want to travel back to the past. Finally, I conclude by considering a puzzle that arises for those who believe that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible: What exactly are we thinking about when we seem to be thinking about traveling back in time' For it certainly does not feel like we are thinking about something that is metaphysically impossible.
      PubDate: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 00:00:00 GMT
       
 
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