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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Aesthetic Investigations     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Ahkam : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Aisthesis : Pratiche, Linguaggi e Saperi dell’Estetico     Open Access  
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
al-Afkar : Journal For Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Fikra     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
AL-Qadissiya Magzine for Human Sciences     Open Access  
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Alter : Revue de phénoménologie     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais de Filosofia Clássica     Open Access  
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analítica     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Analytica : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ancient Philosophy Today     Hybrid Journal  
Andrews University Seminary Student Journal     Open Access  
ANFUSINA : Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access  
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Astérion     Open Access  
Astrolabio     Open Access  
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Aurora : papeles del Seminario María Zambrano     Open Access  
Auslegung : A Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 56)
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Bergsoniana     Open Access  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bioethica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 19)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos de Ética e Filosofia Política     Open Access  
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã : Crítica e Modernidade     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Espinosanos     Open Access  
Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen     Open Access  
Cahiers Droit, Sciences & Technologies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Bioethics     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Ciência & Trópico     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Clotho     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Conciencia     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 24)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Convivium : Revista de Filosophia     Open Access  
Correspondences : Journal for the Study of Esotericism     Open Access  
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access  
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Cuadernos de pensamiento     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Culture and Dialogue     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dianoia     Open Access  
Diferencia(s)     Open Access  
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Discurso     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access  
Disputatio     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Doxa : Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
En Líneas Generales     Open Access  
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Endowment Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access  
Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia     Open Access  
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudios Nietzsche     Open Access  
Estudos Bíblicos     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  

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Erkenntnis
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.502
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 29  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-8420 - ISSN (Online) 0165-0106
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2469 journals]
  • A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario

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      Abstract: Abstract In Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief, Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga’s reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.
      PubDate: 2022-06-21
       
  • Biological Individuality and the Foetus Problem

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      Abstract: Abstract The Problem of Biological Individuality is the problem of how to count organisms. Whilst counting organisms may seem easy, the biological world is full of difficult cases such as colonial siphonophores and aspen tree groves. One of the main solutions to the Problem of Biological Individuality is the Physiological Approach. Drawing on an argument made by Eric Olson in the personal identity debate, I argue that the Physiological Approach faces a metaphysical problem - the ‘Foetus Problem’. This paper illustrates how metaphysics can contribute to debates about organisms in the philosophy of biology.
      PubDate: 2022-06-21
       
  • Correction to: Intelligent Behaviour

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      PubDate: 2022-06-15
       
  • Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality

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      Abstract: Abstract Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so on. But what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality' And do we fall under an obligation to be structurally rational' These issues have been at the heart of significant debates over the past fifteen years. Some philosophers have recently argued that we can unify the structural requirements of rationality by analyzing what is constitutive of our attitudes (Lee, 2020; Worsnip, 2018a). It has also been suggested that, in the course of good first-personal deliberation, agents should treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits (Worsnip, 2021). In this paper, I raise a worry for these two theses concerning structural rationality. Roughly, I argue that some imperfect epistemic agents (like us) can be disposed to have structurally irrational combinations of attitudes. Also, when these imperfect agents deliberate, they should not treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits. Given our imperfections, being structurally irrational can very well be the best option we have. More generally, these observations reveal that structural rationality should not always be theorized independently from more “substantive” norms, like responsiveness to reasons or expected value optimization.
      PubDate: 2022-06-09
       
  • Updating on Biased Probabilistic Testimony

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I use a framework from computational linguistics, the Rational Speech Act framework, to model deceptive probabilistic communication. This account allows agents to discount for the biases they perceive their interlocutors to have. This way, agents can update their credences with the perceived interests of others in mind.
      PubDate: 2022-06-07
       
  • Preemptive Omissions

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      Abstract: Abstract Philosophers have already recognized the importance of causal preemption involving “positive” events. First, preemption with positive events raises problems for counterfactual theories of causation. Second, theories of moral and legal responsibility rely heavily on the concept of causation, so accurately assessing responsibility in preemption cases requires correctly assessing their causal structure. However, philosophers have not discussed preemption involving “negative” events or omissions. This paper argues that cases of preemptive omissions exist and have important implications for theories of causation and for moral and legal responsibility. Of theoretical importance, the alterations made to counterfactual theories of causation to address preemption with positive events do not seem to work for accommodating preemptive omissions. Of practical importance, there have been actual legal cases involving preemptive omissions, and at least one such case was, this paper contends, decided incorrectly on erroneous causal grounds. This paper identifies what must happen for preemptive omissions to obtain. It then argues for the existence of preemptive omissions by constructing a series of cases and drawing structural parallels between preemption cases with positive events and cases with omissions. It ultimately presents a formula for generating preemptive omissions and examines both why “traditional” methods of generating preemption fail for omissions and why the proposed method avoids such concerns.
      PubDate: 2022-06-05
       
  • Francesco Guala: Understanding Institutions—The Science and
           Philosophy of Living Together

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      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Backing Without Realism

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      Abstract: Abstract Facts about explanation are often taken as a guide to facts about metaphysics. Such inferences from explanation to metaphysics typically rely on two elements: explanatory realism, the view that it is a characteristic and necessary aspect of explanation to give information about metaphysical structure, and a backing model of explanation, according to which explanations are backed by supporting relations, such as causation. Combining explanatory realism with a backing model permits conclusions about metaphysics to follow straightforwardly from facts about explanation, and those who endorse backing models of explanation have typically endorsed explanatory realism. In light of recent critiques of explanatory realism, in this paper I explore the prospects for a backing model without explanatory realism. I articulate a non-realist backing model and argue that this model can satisfy most of the motivations for a realist backing model, and that it can also play a central and illuminating role in the practice of metaphysics.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Group Inquiry

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      Abstract: Abstract Group agents can act, and they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge' In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account faces two challenges: to make sense of how large-scale distributed activities might be a kind of group action, and to make sense of the kind of division of labour involved in collective inquiry. In the first part of the paper, I argue that existing accounts of group action face problems dealing with large-scale group actions, and propose a minimal alternative account. In the second part of the paper, I draw on an analogy between inquiry and conversation, arguing that work by Robert Stalnaker and Craige Roberts helps us to think about the division of labour. In the final part of the paper I put the accounts of group action and inquiry together, and consider how to think about group knowledge, deep ignorance, and the different kinds of division of labour.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Irresolvable Disagreement, Objectivist Antirealism and Logical Revision

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      Abstract: Abstract Meta-ethical realism faces the serious epistemological problem of how to explain our epistemic access to moral reality. In the face of this challenge many are sceptical about non-naturalist realism. Nonetheless, there is good reason to acknowledge moral objectivity: morality shows all the signs of a truth-apt discourse but doesn’t exhibit the typical relativity inducing features. This suggests a middle-ground position, a theory that embraces the virtues of realism but does avoid its vices: objectivist antirealism. In this paper, I’ll discuss, mainly following Crispin Wright’s account of moral truth as superassertibility, a promising version of objectivist antirealism and show how to cope with notorious problems, notably those arising from the thought that moral disagreement might be possible in which nobody is guilty of a cognitive shortcoming, which contradicts the antirealist claim that moral truth is not beyond our epistemic reach. The solution is to deny the possibility of cognitively faultless moral disagreement by arguing that cognitively blameless thinkers either agree or stay agnostic and, therefore, never disagree about any moral proposition. Since assuming an agnostic stance on the part of such thinkers contradicts the antirealist’s conception of truth—even within the limits of intuitionistic logic—I’ll propose an alternative logical revision for the moral discourse: a three-valued logic with epistemically construed truth-values.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization

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      Abstract: Abstract Lewis proved a Dutch book theorem for Conditionalization. The theorem shows that an agent who follows any credal update rule other than Conditionalization is vulnerable to bets that inflict a sure loss. Lewis’s theorem is tailored to factive formulations of Conditionalization, i.e. formulations on which the conditioning proposition is true. Yet many scientific and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory require a non-factive formulation, i.e. a formulation on which the conditioning proposition may be false. I prove a Dutch book theorem tailored to non-factive Conditionalization. I also discuss the theorem’s significance.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Panqualityism, Awareness and the Explanatory Gap

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      Abstract: Abstract According to panqualityism, a form of Russellian monism defended by Sam Coleman and others, consciousness is grounded in fundamental qualities, i.e. unexperienced qualia. Despite panqualityism’s significant promise, according to David Chalmers panqualityism fails as a theory of consciousness since the reductive approach to awareness of qualities it proposes fails to account for the specific phenomenology associated with awareness. I investigate Coleman’s reasoning against this kind of phenomenology and conclude that he successfully shows that its existence is controversial, and so Chalmers’s critique is inconclusive. I then present a critique of panqualityism that avoids this controversial posit, arguing that the panqualityist treatment of awareness faces an explanatory gap, failing to account for the intimate cognitive access to qualities which we are afforded, i.e. for our ‘strong awareness’ of qualities. The real worry for panqualityists is thus not the contested phenomenology of awareness, which Chalmers relies on, but rather the special way in which we are aware of qualities.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Towards Collective Self-knowledge

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      Abstract: Abstract We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends' How do groups get to know their own mental states' This is the question of collective self-knowledge. I argue that collective self-knowledge is a distinct phenomenon that deserves our attention. In particular I suggest: (1) that we should be interested in collective self-knowledge, because our behaviour indicates that we already engage with collective self-knowledge in practice; (2) that groups can collectively avow, which indicates that they have privileged and peculiar access to their own intentional states; and (3) that collective self-knowledge is not reducible to intentional states of individuals and therefore is an independent explanandum.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”

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      Abstract: Abstract The aim of this paper is to argue against the claim that the term “belief”, as it functions in philosophical psychology, has natural-kind term semantics; this thesis is central to the famous Lycan–Stich argument against eliminative materialism. I will argue that the current debate concerning the discrepancy between the professed opinions and actions, especially the debate concerning the idea of aliefs, shows that the concept of belief is plastic and amenable to conceptual engineering. The plasticity and amenability to conceptual engineering of the concept of belief give us, in turn, a reason to doubt that “belief” functions in a way that is presupposed in the Lycan–Stich argument. Finally, I point to an alternative to both eliminativism and the natural kind view, namely the idea that we should treat belief as a human kind.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • The Multi-location Trilemma

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      Abstract: Abstract The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (1) the location of immanent universals, (2) the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, (3) the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it (4) makes extended simples impossible.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism

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      Abstract: Abstract Evolutionary scepticism holds that the evolutionary account of the origins of the human cognitive apparatus has sceptical implications for at least some of our beliefs. A common target of evolutionary scepticism is moral realism. Scientific realism, on the other hand, is much less frequently targeted, though the idea that evolutionary theory should make us distrustful of science is by no means absent from the literature. This line of thought has received unduly little attention. I propose to remedy this by advancing what I will call an evolutionary sceptical challenge to scientific realism. I argue that, given standard evolutionary theory, our possession of sound innate metaphysical intuitions would have taken an epistemically problematic ‘lucky accident’. This, as I will show, entails that scientific realism is a self-undermining position. I discuss objections to my argument’s two premises, including ones that appeal to the success of the sciences and to the possibility that sound innate metaphysical intuitions evolved as an evolutionary ‘by-product’. I then draw out an advantage of my argument over a similar one recently put forward by Graber and Golemon (Sophia, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0695-0). I finish by submitting that scientific realism, given the soundness of my argument, is faced with a new ‘Darwinian Dilemma’, and briefly address the significance of this for the debate between realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Materiality, parthood, and possibility

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper offers an argument in favour of a Lewisian version of concretism that maintains both the principle of material inheritance (according to which, if all the parts of an object x are material, then x is material) and the materiality-modality link (that is, the principle that, for every x, if x is material, then x is possible).
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias'

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      Abstract: Abstract Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action

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      Abstract: Abstract If there is pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, whether a person knows that p can vary with normative facts about her actions—including facts that do not bear on the truth or likelihood of p. This paper raises an underappreciated question for defenders of pragmatic encroachment: which of the many norms on action are distinctively connected to knowledge' To the extent that contemporary defenders of pragmatic encroachment address this question, they do so by citing norms of ‘practical rationality.’ I show that this approach can only be made to work on the assumption that all immorality involves some form of incoherence. I then suggest a pluralist strategy for pragmatic encroachers who seek to answer my question without making this heavyweight metaethical assumption: they should agree that multiple distinct norms on action play a difference-making role in epistemology. I close the paper by sketching three ways in which pragmatic encroachers might pursue this strategy.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Towards a Bayesian Account of Perceptual Competence

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      Abstract: Abstract I offer an account of perceptual warrant according to which one’s basic perceptual beliefs are immediately and defeasibly warranted if they are formed on the basis of experiences produced by a competent perceptual system. I claim that sub-personal features of one’s perceptual systems can render one competent to perceptually represent a particular environment. When these conditions are met, one is warranted in forming beliefs on the basis of one’s perceptual experiences. I develop my account of perceptual warrant in the context of a Bayesian theory of perceptual processing.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
 
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