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- The Typology of Representations in Computer Games
Authors: Pawel Grabarczyk
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore how Peirce’s trichotomy of symbolic, indexical and iconic representations can be applied to computer games. I argue that if we use this classification, we gain the ability to make distinctions that game studies often ignore, or do not adequately grasp. To increase the descriptive power of Peirce’s trichotomy, I suggest two additional distinctions: the difference between external and internal representations, and the difference between diegetic and non-diegetic representations. I combine all of these distinctions to construct a typology of representations in computer games. I argue that the application of this typology to particular elements of games (instead of games understood as a whole) enables us to solve some of the problems caused by the relationship of games to the external world. A case study I use to illustrate how my typology helps to improve game studies discourse, is LocoRoco—an abstract game accused of containing racist imagery. I argue that the game publisher’s response to the controversy was inadequate, since the game content, due to the application of representational mechanisms, can be seen as racist even if its developers had no intention of creating such a racist content.
PubDate: 2021-12-21
DOI: 10.5617/jpg.2926
- Ludic Unreliability and Deceptive Game Design
Authors: Stefano Gualeni, Nele Van de Mosselaer
Abstract: Drawing from narratology and design studies, this article makes use of the notions of the ‘implied designer’ and ‘ludic unreliability’ to understand deceptive game design as a specific subset of transgressive game design. More specifically, in this text we present deceptive game design as the deliberate attempt to misguide players’ inferences about the designers’ intentions. Furthermore, we argue that deceptive design should not merely be taken as a set of design choices aimed at misleading players in their efforts to understand the game, but also as decisions devised to give rise to experiential and emotional effects that are in the interest of players. Finally, we propose to introduce a distinction between two varieties of deceptive design approaches based on whether they operate in an overt or a covert fashion in relation to player experience. Our analysis casts light on expressive possibilities that are not customarily part of the dominant paradigm of user-centered design, and can inform game designers in their pursuit of wider and more nuanced creative aspirations.
PubDate: 2021-09-28
DOI: 10.5617/jpg.8722
- The Value of Value Capture
Authors: Michael Ridge
Abstract: Gamification, roughly the use of game-like elements to motivate us to achieve practical ends “in the real world,” makes large promises. According to Jane McGonigal, gamification can save the world by channelling the amazing motivational power of gaming into pro-social causes ranging from alienation from our work to global resource scarcity and feeding the hungry (McGonigal 2011). Even much more modest aims like improving personal fitness or promoting a more equitable division of household labour provide some license for optimism about the ability of gamification to improve our lives in more humble but still worthwhile ways. On the other hand, Thi Nguyen has argued that there is a dark side to gamification: what he calls “value capture.” Roughly, gamification works in large part because it offers a simplified value structure – this is an essential part of its appeal and motivational power. However, especially in the context of gamification which exports these value schemes into our real-world lives, there is a risk that these overly simplistic models will displace our more rich, subtle values and that this will make our lives worse: this is value capture. The point is well-taken. The way in which number of steps taken per day can, for an avid user of “FitBit,” displace more accurate measurements of how one’s activities contribute to one’s fitness is a compelling example. If I become so obsessed with “getting my 10,000 steps” that I stop making time to go to the gym, jog or do my yoga/pilates then that is not a net gain. However, there is an important range of cases that Nguyen’s discussion ignores but which provide an important exception to his critique: value capture relative to behaviours that are addictive and destructive. Here I have in mind things like alcoholism, drug addiction, and gambling addiction. With these kinds of activities, value capture can not only be good but essential to a person’s well-being because (and not in spite of) of its displacement of the person’s more rich, subtle values. Interestingly, the point is not limited to cases of addictive behaviour, though they put the point in its most sharp relief. Any situation in which making rational decisions one by one can leave one worse off than “blindly” following a policy which is itself rational to adopt also turns out to illustrate the point, thus further expanding the role for value capture as itself a force for good. The more general point is that certain kinds of sequential choice problems carve out an important and theoretically interesting exception to Nguyen’s worries about value capture. In these kinds of choice contexts, value capture not only does not make our lives go worse, it may be essential to making our lives go better.
PubDate: 2021-08-06
DOI: 10.5617/jpg.8760
- Videogame Cognitivism
Authors: Alexandre Declos
Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine and defend videogame cognitivism (VC). According to VC, videogames can be a source of cognitive successes (such as true beliefs, knowledge or understanding) for their players. While the possibility of videogame-based learning has been an extensive topic of discussion in the last decades, the epistemological underpinnings of these debates often remain unclear. I propose that VC is a domain-specific brand of aesthetic cognitivism, which should be carefully distinguished from other views that also insist on the cognitive or educational potential of videogames. After these clarifications, I discuss and assess different broad strategies to motivate VC: propositionalism, experientialism, and neocognitivism. These map the different ways in which videogames can prove epistemically valuable, showing them to be, respectively, sources of propositional knowledge, experiential knowledge, and understanding. I eventually argue that neocognitivism is a particularly promising and yet underexplored way to defend VC.
PubDate: 2021-06-25
DOI: 10.5617/jpg.8104
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