 Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z | | The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice. |
|
|
- Introduction
Authors: Agnieszka Biegalska
PubDate: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +010
- Ordinary Badness in Aristotelian Ethics: A Virtually Forgotten Question
Authors: Carles José Mestre
Abstract: In this paper, we aim to show the way in which a kind of moral badness, what we call ordinary badness, could be understood from Aristotelian ethical writings. First, we document the recognition of this type of badness in the Aristotelian source, which is seen in his presentation of “hoi polloi” (the Many). In particular, it is shown that “hoi polloi” are “phauloi”, one of the (specific) predicates that Aristotle uses to refer to moral badness. Secondly, we highlight the methodological function of “hoi polloi” in the description of incontinence and self-indulgence, and we show how the Many could be considered as a new class within the question of moral effort. Finally, and related to the result of the previous analysis, we document what could be an aporia in the Aristotelian description of the population of the polis, which brings us to join Ian Morris in his global understanding of Aristotelian political philosophy.
PubDate: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +010
- Moral Evil as a “Thick” Ethical Concept
Authors: Agata Łukomska
Abstract: The paper aims to propose a framework for understanding of the concept of moral evil. It argues that “evil” should be considered one of the so-called “thick” ethical concepts, characterized by their ability to be simultaneously descriptive and normative. To that effect, it examines the relationship between the concepts of moral wrongness and the idea of evil, with a view to explaining why moral evil should be understood as a “thick” rather than a “thin” ethical concept. Finally, it offers some reasons for cultivating thick ethical concepts, and suggests the conditions which have to be met if a thick concept of evil is to be helpful rather than harmful.
PubDate: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +010
- The Thin Moral Concept of Evil
Authors: Michael Wilby
Abstract: Evil-scepticism comes in two varieties: one variety is descriptive, where it is claimed that the concept of evil does not successfully denote anything in the world; the other variety is normative, where it is claimed that the concept of evil is not a helpful or useful concept to be employing in either our social or interpersonal lives. This paper argues that evil-scepticism can be responded to by understanding the concept of evil as a thin moral concept. Understood in this thin way, the descriptive challenge fades, because the concept of evil does not even purport to denote anything in the world (it is purely evaluative), and so does the normative argument, since the thinness of the concept means that, first, it is ineliminable anyway, and, second, its malleability allows for it to be used for progressive and constructive means.
PubDate: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +010
- Nature Without the State: An Anarchist Critique of ‘Animalistic
Evil’
Authors: Jason K. Day
Abstract: I here present an anarchist critique of the idea of ‘animalistic evil’ and its common use as a justification for the State’s existence and use of force. On this view, ‘evil’ is a privation of morality, justice, and civilised behaviour. It is then identified with the ‘animalistic’ since animals are often thought to be defined by the aforesaid privation. I first clarify the idea of animalistic evil within the history of philosophy and science. Aristotle (384–322 BCE), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and Thomas H. Huxley (1825–1895) prominently argue that all that prevents humanity from devolving into animalistic evil, a state of violent and individualistic struggle for bare survival, is the power of State government to forcibly control the animalistic drives within its citizens. I subsequently pose two questions. (1) Is it justified to associate animal life with evil when this is (a) understood as a privation of a morality, justice and society and (b) characterised as an individualistic struggle for survival' (2) If this is not justified, what is the political harm of doing so' Building on the work of the anarchist thinker Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), I argue that any conception of animalistic evil is unjustifiable, that it is a false justification for the State’s existence and use of force, and that the State, upon making the empty threat of animalistic evil, both violently harms individuals and impedes the socially beneficial practice of mutual aid.
PubDate: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +010
- Civilization Without Evil in Leszek Kołakowski’s Works
Authors: Agnieszka Biegalska
Abstract: Leszek Kołakowski had a keen interest in the phenomenon of evil, and many of his works address this topic. Kołakowski made attempts to explore the origin of evil, human experiences of evil, changes in beliefs about evil in European consciousness throughout the ages, and he commented on the proposition that the world should be defined as free of evil. In his works, the phenomenon of evil was examined through the lens of two contextual perspectives: episteme and sacrum. This article explores the ways in which contemporary readers of Kołakowski’s works approach the problem of evil from these two perspectives. The paper discusses Kołakowski’s attempts to analyze the process of eliminating the traditional divide between good and evil and the rejection of Reason, Truth and Virtue in the Platonic and Aristotelean sense.
PubDate: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +010
|
Open Access journal
