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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo)
Number of Followers: 1  

  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Online) 2345-7937
Published by Global Science Journals Homepage  [10 journals]
  • Conceptuality of Unreflective Actions in Flow: McDowell-Dryfus Debate

    • Abstract: Abstract The objective of this paper is to supplement Gottlieb’s challenge to Dryfus who claims that concepts are not operative in expert’s unreflective actions. First, concepts that an agent develops over time with practice, starting from the stage of novelty, become deeply rooted and persist through his expertise stage, according to common sense. It is unlikely that such rooted concepts become inoperative just when it is time for the agent to put them to use during the time that he is in the zone (i.e., in flow). Second, an expert's inability to remember reasons behind his actions while he is in the zone is insufficient to prove that concepts are inoperative when he is acting in the zone. For an agent to not remember reasons as such could more likely be a consequence of the adequacy of his minimized reflections on his maximized (i.e. expert level) concepts, while he is in such a state. Moreover, not recalling every reason behind every step of an agent’s actions in the zone could be a consequence of his maximum concentration on successful processing and coordination of the task at hand, as opposed to committing his finite mental capacities to memorizing the reasons behind his step-by-step actions when he is performing an expert level action in the zone. Third, I point out to the prevalence of examples when experts or observers provide testimony about use of concepts to strategize or review actions before, during, and after their ‘in the zone’ actions (e.g., review of video replays of a game or a tournament on sports channels), which supports the operations and conceptuality of unreflective actions in flow.
      PubDate: 2015-11-25
       
  • Explicating Curiosity via Uncertainty and Interest, Augmented with
           Open-Mindedness

    • Abstract: Abstract The objective of this paper is to raise a challenge to Ilhan Inan’s claim (2013) that an agent’s curiosity ceases when the agent is firmly certain about the object of curiosity that is of interest to him, and to supplement his account by appealing to an aspect of curiosity that Inan overlooks substantively: open-mindedness. To achieve this objective, I first provide a brief summary of Inan’s claim that an agent’s curiosity is directly proportional to his interest and uncertainty, and inversely proportional to evidence and belief. Second, I discuss my objection to an aspect of Inan’s claim that firm certainty and (high) interest yields no curiosity. In ordinary enquiries or cases of propositional curiosity (e.g., whether questions), Inan’s claim that firm certainty extinguishes curiosity is convincing. However, there can be objectual curiosity cases (e.g., what questions) where Inan’s claim may not be sufficient. Moreover, in many academic enquiries, a scientist may remain motivated to expend extra epistemic and cognitive capital, despite his firm certainty about his once imaginable aspects of the object of curiosity, for the sake of unimaginable possibilities. Fueled by his continued curiosity, it is not uncommon for a scientist to take self-initiatives and reconsider propositions he was once certain about. Based on his past experiences, he might have learned that certainty is generally impermanent and does not always last forever, which could keep his curiosity and hence the possibility of discovering more truths alive. Third, I present a number of rebuttals to my objection and show how they fall short of supporting Inan’s account including the role of other feelings such as fear and anxiety about losing face, and knowing but being subjectively uncertain, which may motivate continued curiosity even when the agent is firmly certain. Fourth, I suggest an alternative view by adding open-mindedness to Inan’s curiosity formulation that could help exculpate my objection. Instead of Inan’s proposition, I suggest that one can remain curious about an objective he is interested in, despite being certain about it, when he is open-minded. (Baehr, 2012) Open-mindedness is a facilitating virtue and an activity that is a cognitive moving beyond or transcending of the person’s doxastic commitments, thus facilitating curiosity. Open-mindedness assists in keeping the agent’s interest and uncertainty alive, and helps freeing the mind beyond default beliefs and binds of certainty.
      PubDate: 2015-09-10
       
  • The Impacts of Jean Paul Sartre on Simone De Beauvoir

    • Abstract: Abstract It has been commonly argued that there are traces of Jean Paul Sartre on the philosophical system of his partner, Simone de Beauvoir. Some claim that Beauvoir was not original enough when constructing her system and developing her thoughts; according to some others, she even was not a philosopher. From the perspective of Beauvoir, she didn’t even consider herself as a philosopher but as an author. For her, to call somebody a philosopher, they should be like Spinoza, Hegel, or Sartre who constructs a comprehensive philosophical system, loves philosophy, teaches philosophy, understands philosophy, and uses philosophy in their works. Given these criteria, Sartre was a philosopher for her and she admits that Sartre’s philosophy influenced her a lot. Furthermore, she clearly expresses that there was a mutual influence indeed, which means she also influenced Sartre, but her impacts on him were in terms of literature, not philosophy. To give an example, after writing his biography books, Sartre wrote The Words where the traces of Beauvoir can be seen quite easily. This point can also be derived from Sartre’s admittance that he got the clarity and truth in his works--especially when describing a gesture, analyzing a situation, or observing an incident--by means of Beauvoir’s meticulous style and rich experiences. Sartre also indicates that Beauvoir was a perfect complement and privileged reader for him. In this work, our primary focus will be on the details of the influence of Sartre on Beauvoir. Here, I have to point out that even though the title of this paper is determined as “The Impacts of Sartre on Beauvoir” indeed the word “benefit,” instead of “impact,” would do better for our purpose. It is because though Beauvoir was influenced from Sartre’s philosophical identity, when building her thoughts we must say she mostly “benefited” from Sartre’s philosophy. We can easily see the examples of this point in several contexts: first, in the notion of ambiguity, and second, in her analysis of the position of woman. Also, in her notion of “the other” which is a threat for the independence of an individual, she shares the same ideas with Sartre in her early writings, but later, she changed her direction and adopted a different view. If we examine the notion of Beauvoir’s “ambiguity,” though it has various meanings, what she means is that a person is a free and unique subject on the one hand; and on the other hand that person is an object for others. Here, Beauvoir benefits from Sartre’s existential types. She agrees with Sartre on the idea that human existence contains both being-in-itself and being-for-itself; however, she thinks that having these two types of being together in their existence leads to an ambiguity for human beings. Sartre sees humans as beings that are always in a relationship with the other. And in this relationship, when being-for-itselfsubmit to the other, it becomes an object for the other’s freedom. While being-for-itself perceives the other as subject, she, herself, becomes an object. This fact expresses an ambiguity for Beauvoir. Another issue we can associate with the notion of “ambiguity” is related to the relationship between self and the other, the relationship that relies on the confrontation of the consciousness of the self with the consciousness of the other. At this point, the “I” who identifies himself as an absolute being sees the other’s consciousness as a threat and acts like an enemy towards it. It is because the subject that was exposed to the perspective of the other becomes an object now and she loses her freedom due to the intervention of the other. The other makes her an unguarded being. Now, the subject is not an active being but the object of the other. Thus, due to these restraints of the other on the subject’s freedom, the subject must deny the hegemony of the other and get over the problem by making the other an object. Similar to Sartre, Beauvoir, too, sees the existence of the other or others as a danger for her own freedom at the beginning. She considers freedom in individualistic way and sees the others as barriers for her freedom. But later, she changes her stance, and begins to consider the other as a necessary condition for her own freedom. The last point I am going to focus on is the philosophical source of The Second Sex. One of her masterpieces, The Second Sex, in which she gives the explanation of the oppressions women face and established the principles of modern feminism, is about the women who represent “the other gender” due to fact that women are always identified in terms of the differences of their oppressors, men. In The Second Sex, she examines the essential features that make a woman a woman and at the end she comes up with the notion of “the other.” When reaching this notion, in order to show how she applied existentialist ideas of ontology and ethics, she says that men perceive themselves as “I” or “the subject” and women perceive themselves as “the other.” Beauvoir improves the claims of Sartre in The Second Sex in a unique way, and further put forwards that women are regarded as “the other” and men are called as “the subject.” At this point, if the other becomes a threat for the subject or “I,” then, it can be said that women, too, become a similar threat for men. Surely, there are other points that can be said ...
      PubDate: 2015-09-10
       
  • Smith’s Incoherence Argument for Moral Rationalism

    • Abstract: Abstract Defenders of Motivational judgment internalism (MJI) argue that in one sense or another, our moral judgments necessarily motivate us to some extent. One of the most prominent defenders is Michael Smith, who in his highly influential book The Moral Problem defends a form of moral rationalism, which is the view that moral reasoning is based on practical reasoning, and thus that moral facts can and are determined a priori. This form of rationalism Smith claims to entail his account about internalism. One of the main merits of Smith’s account of moral motivation is that it allows for individual difference in levels of moral motivation, by making the claim that moral judgments necessarily motivate defeasible. Before elaborating on how Smith does so, I shall first discuss Smith's approach in The Moral Problem, which will also help to set out the basic assumptions that will be taken for granted within this essay. I will then look at the account that he provides, and assess it with respect to one of Russ Shafer-Landau's criticisms thereof. Shafer-Landau rather helpfully puts Smith’s case for his moral rationalism in the form of what he calls ‘the incoherence argument’. The strongest problem that Shafer-Landau has with this argument seems to be with the following claim: ‘it is irrational for an individual to not desire what his fully rational self would desire’. What I hope to conclude is as follows: Although Smith’s account of internalism can for the most part withstand this objection that Shafer-Landau makes to it, even though Smith himself does not demonstrate any incoherence in failing to desire what one’s fully rational self would desire, in that a different kind of incoherence can be defended through other means. This would however result in a requirement for Smith to make significant concessions to his project in The Moral Problem.
      PubDate: 2015-08-21
       
  • In Support of Theory of Appearing: Defending Langsam against
           Djukic’s Critique

    • Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to defend Langsam’s Theory of Appearing (TA) against Djukic et al’s critique. In strengthening Langsam’s defense of TA, I adopt some of Le Morvan's arguments in defending Direct Realism. TA states that experiences are relations between material object and mind, and that phenomenal features are appearances of relations held between material objects and mind. Djukic objects to TA on three grounds of Hallucination, Causal Principle (CP), and Time-Gap: First, Djukic objects to TA on the ground that perception and hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable, thus phenomenal features (or properties) instantiated in perception may not be relations either, and thus TA could fail. In defending TA, Langsam argues that indistinguishability does not entail that perception and hallucination instantiate the same appearance. Moreover, disjunctivist conception of experience supports TA in that phenomenal features are either a relation between a material object and mind, or it is something else (as in cases of hallucination). I aim to show that sense-data (or like) theories of perception, that Djukic favors as being superior, would fail Djukic's own scrutiny in cases of hallucination in addition to being against common-sense. Second objection is that perception and hallucination must have the same-cause because they are indistinguishable, and also CP requires that same-causes to produce the same-effects. But hallucination and perception are different experiences, and hence TA fails CP. Responding to CP objection, “same-cause same-effect” only applies to intrinsic changes and intrinsic changes are changes in intrinsic properties and relations between intrinsic properties. Third, TA is opposed because for a given Time-Gap we cannot experience objects as they are (were) at the time of our perception. TA defeats this objection because it does not claim that “we can now (experience) the no-longer existent object as it is now, but only that we can now (experience) the once-existent object as it used to be. Fourth, to further strengthen TA, I will raise objections to TA including from the vantage point of Durability, Perceptual Relativity, Illusion, and Partial Perception arguments, and respond to such objections accordingly. To explicate TA, I argue from the vantage points of common sense, realistic physical biological considerations, and non-miraculous expectations from any theory of perception, including from TA.
      PubDate: 2015-08-21
       
  • The Metaphysics of the Tragic

    • Abstract: Abstract The author analyzes the concept of “the tragic” in socio-philosophical aspect. The tragic is conceived not only as a property of the individual, but also as a property of social consciousness. The methodology of study rests on the necessity of studying the problem at the level of society as a whole, at the level of an ordinary person and at the level of a leader. The state of society during conditions of system crisis is analyzed with the use of the concepts of the “personification of power,” and the “depersonalization of the common man.” In a “Bonaparte” situation, the leader personalizes public self- consciousness. The special attention is given thin distinctions of concepts personification and personalization. The author emphasizes the paradoxical salutary nature of the Bonaparte dictatorship for society against the background of the unsatisfactory performance of failed politicians.
      PubDate: 2015-08-21
       
  • The Incipient Mind Argument

    • Abstract: Abstract The incipient mind argument is the central argument of Evan Thompson’s solution to the so-called mind-body problem. This paper challenges Evan Thompson’s (and Francisco Varela’s) assumption of a pristine form of subjectivity, as well as of interiority in unicellular life forms. I claim that this assumption makes sense only as a useful strategy for an absolutist account of mind. In this paper, I argue that Thompson’s thesis is erroneous at the object-level, as well as at the meta-level of his argumentation. By paying greater attention to the meta-level of his exposition, I show that Thompson’s assumption of an “incipient mind” obeys an absolutist, two- sided pattern of thinking and, therefore, that his argumentation fails to give an accurate account of the systemic generation and development of mind. After demonstrating this, I suggest an innovative action-based approach to mind in order to accurately give an account of its real-constructive development.
      PubDate: 2015-08-21
       
  • Sartre and Fanon : On Men and Women, and Gender and Race Intersection as
           They Relate to French Colonial Resistance

    • Abstract: Abstract In this paper, the author presents Fanon’s analysis of decolonization in order to present an explicit conception of resistance based upon Fanon’s concept of decolonization, which is aligned with the lived experience of the colonized: their racial, sociopolitical, and economic condition as well as their existential condition. The author contrasts Fanon’s analysis with Sartre’s critique of colonialism as it appears in The Critique. Ultimately, through the presentation of Sartre’s and Fanon’s theories, the author attempts to show a feminist analysis of French colonial resistance as a criticism of Sartre’s and Fanon’s theories and of the analysis their male contemporaries within the field of Post/Colonial Theories.
      PubDate: 2015-08-21
       
  • The Ontology and Developmental Root Of the First-Person Perspective

    • Abstract: Abstract Many philosophers take for granted the distinction between the first-person and third-person perspectives. They employ this distinction in a variety of philosophical debates including those concerning self-consciousness, phenomenal properties, subjectivity of phenomenal consciousness, and conceivability issues. This paper aims to explore the developmental root of the distinction in question. Through several analyses, the paper attempts to show that infants in the early childhood are exposed to cognitive, behavioral and experiential processes that are constitutive of the first-person perspective. The striking conclusion that can be derived from the analyses is that the first-person perspective is not possessed inborn. Rather, it gradually develops through certain experiential processes and interaction with other human infants in the early childhood. This potentially implies that if conditions had been properly designed, infants would have possessed an “inter-subjective self” that lacks the first-person perspective as we traditionally know. The paper additionally hints that serious philosophical consequences occur if the above conclusion is true.
      PubDate: 2015-05-17
       
 
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