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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Hegel Bulletin
Number of Followers: 3  
 
  Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 2051-5367 - ISSN (Online) 2051-5375
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [353 journals]
  • HGL volume 43 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

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      Pages: 1 - 4
      PubDate: 2022-03-09
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2022.5
       
  • HGL volume 43 issue 1 Cover and Back matter

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      Pages: 1 - 2
      PubDate: 2022-03-09
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2022.6
       
  • Karen Ng, Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic. New
           York: Oxford University Press, 2020. ISBN: 978-0190947613 (hbk). Pp. 336.
           £55.

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      Authors: Little; Eliza Starbuck
      Pages: 153 - 156
      PubDate: 2022-02-08
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2022.4
       
  • Three Attitudes Towards Nature

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      Authors: Martin; Christian
      Pages: 1 - 25
      Abstract: In his introductions to the encyclopaedic Philosophy of Nature and to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel distinguishes between three ‘attitudes’ (Verhaltensweisen, Einstellungen) towards nature—the theoretical, the practical and the philosophical attitude. According to him there is a certain ‘contradiction’ or tension between our theoretical attitude towards nature, which makes it an object of scientific inquiry, and the practical attitude that we assume as living rational beings who intervene in nature and shape it according to our purposes. This article focuses on how exactly to pinpoint that tension and on how it is resolved in what Hegel calls the ‘philosophical’ or ‘comprehending’ attitude towards nature.
      PubDate: 2021-09-01
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2021.17
       
  • Hegel's Concept of the Familiar: Toward a Philosophical Study

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      Authors: Aldouri; Hammam
      Pages: 26 - 46
      Abstract: One of the most memorable lines of Hegel's oeuvre is from the preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit: ‘Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood.’ Surprisingly, relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to the notion of ‘the familiar’ in Hegel scholarship. This essay aims to rectify this lack by offering a preliminary inquiry in what the notion means across Hegel's work. It does so by focusing on three underexplored moments in Hegel's work: (1) the exposition of the logic of appearance in the description and diagnosis of seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch painting in the lecture notes from the 1823 Berlin lectures on the philosophy of fine art; (2) the function of institutionalized practice in Hegel's Tübingen essay of 1793; and (3) the conjunctural relation of the familiar with philosophical terminology in an entry from the ‘Aphorisms from the Wastebook.’ Through a careful reading of these three moments, I will show that the familiar is a point that constellates multiple processes, mechanisms and apparatuses that, when grasped in their complex totality, functions as the ‘prius’ (priority/prioritization/first moment) of Hegel's speculative philosophy.
      PubDate: 2021-05-19
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2021.7
       
  • Hegel's A Priori and the Critique of Three Aprioristic Readings of the
           Science of Logic

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      Authors: Orsini; Federico
      Pages: 47 - 68
      Abstract: The goal of my essay is to clarify the status of the a priori in Hegel's Science of Logic. My claim is that in order to make possible an appreciation of the originality of Hegel's position we need to map a context of discussion and to dissolve a set of preconceptions about Hegel's idea of philosophy. My argument will be articulated in two parts. In the first part, I will analyse four possible positions regarding the issue of the aprioricity of the Logic, I will defend a fifth position, and I will draw a distinction between apriorism and a priori. In the second part, I will examine three distinct charges of apriorism against Hegel's Logic: the charge of assuming God's point of view of the universe, the charge of vicious circularity between the beginning and the end of the Logic, the charge of self-sufficiency of the Logic. As a result, I hope to show that these charges are unfounded, and to clear the ground for an adequate evaluation of Hegel's own sublation (Aufhebung) of the a priori/a posteriori divide.
      PubDate: 2021-11-04
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2021.23
       
  • Is there a Deduction in Hegel's Science of Logic'

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      Authors: Cooper-Simpson; Charlie
      Pages: 69 - 92
      Abstract: Robert Pippin's recent study of Hegel's Logic, Hegel's Realm of Shadows, argues that we should read Hegel as rejecting the need for a Transcendental Deduction in logic because he takes Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, to have ruled out the scepticism that motivates Kant's Deduction. By contrast, I argue, we cannot understand what Pippin calls the ‘identity’ of logic and metaphysics in the Science of Logic unless we see how Hegel does provide a kind of Deduction argument in the Logic, albeit one stripped of the psychologism present in the Kantian version. Accordingly, I provide a sketch of what such an ‘absolute’ Deduction must look like, and argue that Hegel's presentation of the ‘absolute idea’ functions as the conclusion of such an argument.
      PubDate: 2021-06-11
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2021.8
       
  • Peer Gynt and Oedipus: Ibsen on Hegel's Precursors of Modernity

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      Authors: Levy; Lior
      Pages: 121 - 143
      Abstract: G. W. F. Hegel sees Oedipus as an epitome of the philosophical quest for self-knowledge. In Hegel's readings of Oedipus, the latter becomes a distant reflection of the modern and mature Hegelian self, who consciously takes on this quest. Yet unlike Oedipus, whose search for the truth about his past is characterized by both metaphorical and literal blindness, the modern self knows itself, precisely because it understands its past and can thus appropriate and situate itself in relation to the present. For Hegel, self-understanding entails grasping the proper relationship between past and present, which in turn necessitates acknowledging his own relationship to Oedipus. This essay examines Henrik Ibsen's turn to the Hegelian engagement with the past (Oedipus being one crucial moment in the Hegelian story of the history of self-consciousness), by focusing on one of the most enigmatic scenes in his 1866 drama, Peer Gynt, where the Norwegian protagonist is cast as Oedipus. The scene examines the drama's own past—through an engagement with a dramatic ancestor—and focuses on the influence of the past on fashioning modern European identity. Moreover, it offers a critique of how the past is utilized in the creation and consolidation of that identity. With this, Ibsen offers an implicit critique of Hegel's understanding of Oedipus, and his encounter with the Sphinx in particular. Revisiting Oedipus through its modern reception, Ibsen questions the act by which the past is revealed as such and is put to work in the service of a particular present.
      PubDate: 2021-07-28
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2021.11
       
  • Todd Hedrick. Reconciliation and Reification: Freedom's Semblance and
           Actuality from Hegel to Contemporary Critical Theory. New York: Oxford
           University Press, 2019. ISBN 10- 019063402-2 (pbk). ISBN
           13-978-0-19063402-5 (hbk). Pp. 296. £55.

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      Authors: Hammer; Espen
      Pages: 144 - 148
      PubDate: 2021-08-31
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2021.15
       
  • Kevin Thompson. Hegel's Theory of Normativity: The Systematic Foundations
           of the Philosophical Science of Right. Evanston IL: Northwestern
           University Press, 2019. ISBN 978-0-81013993-0 (hbk). ISBN 978-0-81013992-3
           (pbk). ISBN 978-0-81013994-7 (ebk). Pp. 117. $99.95 (hbk). $34.95 (pbk).
           $34.95 (ebk).

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      Authors: Manchisi; Armando
      Pages: 149 - 152
      PubDate: 2021-08-31
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2021.14
       
  • Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity
           in Hegel's Logic of the Concept

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      Authors: Mácha; Jakub
      Pages: 93 - 120
      Abstract: Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play.
      PubDate: 2020-10-02
      DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2020.24
       
 
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