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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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THEORIA : An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.137
Number of Followers: 1  
 
  Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 0495-4548 - ISSN (Online) 2171-679X
Published by Philosophy Documentation Center Homepage  [89 journals]
  • Duchenne smiles are actions not mere happenings - lessons from the debate
           on expressive action

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      Authors: Marta Cabrera
      Abstract: In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to what is generally assumed in the debate on expressive action, we do not have good reasons to exclude facial and bodily expressions of emotion such as smiling or frowning from the category of actions. For this purpose, I will compare facial and bodily expressions of emotion with simple expressive actions, such as jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame. I will try to show that simple expressive actions cannot be presented as actions while excluding facial and bodily expressions of emotion from this condition. My contention will then be that either both sorts of behaviour are to be identified as actions or neither is. The latter sounds rather implausible, though, as we would have to assimilate jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame to spasms, which conflicts with the way we relate to such behaviours. My conclusion will then be that both simple expressive actions and facial and bodily expressions of emotion should be included within the category of actions, at least on the basis of the main assumptions in the current debate on expressive action.
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:24 GMT
       
  • Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom'

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      Authors: Markus Dressel
      Abstract: The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science.
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:24 GMT
       
  • Towards a Pricean foundation for cultural evolutionary theory

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      Authors: Lorenzo Baravalle;Victor J. Luque
      Abstract: The Price equation is currently considered one of the fundamental equations —or even the fundamental equation— of evolution. In this article, we explore the role of this equation within cultural evolutionary theory. More specifically, we use it to account for the explanatory power and the theoretical structure of a certain generalised version of dual-inheritance theory. First, we argue that, in spite of not having a definite empirical content, the Price equation offers a suitable formalisation of the processes of cultural evolution, and provides a powerful heuristic device for discovering the actual causes of cultural change and accumulation. Second, we argue that, as a consequence of this, a certain version of the Price equation is the fundamental law of cultural evolutionary theory. In order to support this claim, we sketch the ideal structure of dual-inheritance theory and we stress the unificatory role that the Price equation plays in it.
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:24 GMT
       
  • Darwinian functional biology

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      Authors: Santiago Ginnobili
      Abstract: One of the most important things that the Darwinian revolution affected is the previous teleological thinking. In particular, the attribution of functions to various entities of the natural world with explanatory pretensions. In this change, his theory of natural selection played an important role. We all agree on that, but the diversity and heterogeneity of the answers that try to explain what Darwin did exactly with functional biology are overwhelming. In this paper I will try to show how Darwin modified previous functional biology. Pre-Darwinian naturalists did not hesitate to attribute functions in which, for example, the traits of one species were in the service of other species. I will try to show that this has consequences on the discussion regarding the nature of functional language, since the main approaches, the systemic and the etiological, do not adequately account for these changes and therefore do not account for the way functional biology regulates the kind of legitimate functions. I will outline a possible new solution to this problem: appropriate functional attributions in Darwinian functional biology could be regulated by a theory or a set of laws that provide the criteria for determining its fundamental concepts.
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:24 GMT
       
  • Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic
           negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and
           Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295)

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      Authors: Mirco Sambrotta
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:24 GMT
       
  • Mario Gómez-Torrente (2020). Roads to Reference

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      Authors: Scott Soames
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:24 GMT
       
  • Summary

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      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:24 GMT
       
  • Explanation, persistence, and location

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      Authors: Valerio Buonomo;Giuliano Torrengo
      Abstract: According to the “received view” the disagreement between endurantism and perdurantism is ontological and concerns the existence of temporal parts of continuants. In a recent paper, Wasserman (2016) argues that the ontological conception of these theories does not address the crucial point: explaining the way things persist. According to Wasserman, perdurantism is not just the view that things have temporal parts; it is the view that things persist by (or in virtue of) having temporal parts. Moreover, in the last decade an alternative understanding of the dispute between endurantism and perdurantism, the so called “locative turn”, has led to an understanding of these two theories as concerning crucially locational rather than mereological notions. Our main aim in this paper is to bring together those two revisionary approaches to the received view, and show how they can enrich each other and open up further dimensions of the debate. Finally in the last section we focus on some of the non-standard accounts of persistence and location that arise from this approach, such as “autonomism of persistence and location” and “reverse locational endurantism/perdurantism”.
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:23 GMT
       
  • Perceptual science and the nature of perception

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      Authors: Alessandra Buccella
      Abstract: Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception' Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception' Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers when interpreting such science. On the other hand, I will show how perceptual science often relies on another assumption, which I call the ‘Measuring instrument conception’ of sensory systems, which philosophers of perception should clearly reject. Given these two symmetric lines of argument, I will finally suggest that we ought to think differently about the relationship between perceptual science and the philosophy of perception.
      PubDate: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 05:09:23 GMT
       
 
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