A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Social Philosophy Today
Number of Followers: 3  
 
  Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 1543-4044 - ISSN (Online) 2153-9448
Published by Philosophy Documentation Center Homepage  [89 journals]
  • Introduction

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Zachary Hoskins;Joan Woolfrey
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 13:58:59 GMT
       
  • Notes on Contributors

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 13:58:59 GMT
       
  • Willingly Making Reparations, Loss of Unjust Advantage, and Counterfactual
           Comparative Harm

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Alex R. Gillham
      Abstract: The Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) of harm holds that event e harms subject S when e makes S worse off than S would have been without e occurring. In this paper, I argue that CCA is unattractive because it entails that someone who willingly makes monetary reparations harms himself. I explain why I find this entailment unattractive. I then acknowledge that my intuition about the unattractiveness of this entailment might simply be mistaken, so I offer an argument for the claim that willingly making reparations is not a form of self-harm. I argue that willingly making reparations is not harmful to the person who makes them because losing an unjust advantage does not harm. I then consider some objections against my argument and respond to them. Although I concede that some of these objections do more damage to my argument than others, I conclude that CCA is at least prima facie unattractive for the reasons I give and that, at bare minimum, someone who does not think that willingly making reparations harms the maker and/or that losing an unjust advantage is harmful to the person who loses it could not consistently accept any of the formulations of CCA that I consider in this paper.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:43 GMT
       
  • Slave Narratives and Epistemic Injustice

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Kevin M. Graham;Anaja Arthur;Hannah Frazer;Ali Griswold;Emma Kitteringham;Quinlyn Klade;Jaliya Nagahawatte
      Abstract: Epistemic injustice is defined by Miranda Fricker as injustice done to people specifically in their capacities as knowers. Fricker argues that this injustice can be either testimonial or hermeneutical in character. A hearer commits testimonial injustice against a speaker by assigning unfairly little credibility to the speaker’s testimony. Hermeneutical injustice exists in a society when the society lacks the concepts necessary for members of a group to understand their social experiences. We argue that epistemic injustice is necessary to permit the functioning of race-based chattel slavery and that this necessity is illustrated in slave narratives. The testimonies of slave narratives like those of Frederick Douglass, Olaudah Equiano, Harriet Jacobs, and Mary Prince identify and transform a culture of race-based epistemic hermeneutic and testimonial injustice. Through telling their stories, these agents establish their capacity as knowers and thus resist the epistemic injustice that undergirds the oppressive system of race-based chattel slavery. The authors of slave narratives not only identify race-based epistemic injustice, but actively fight against it.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:43 GMT
       
  • Summary of Serena Parekh’s No Refuge

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Karen Adkins
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:43 GMT
       
  • Commentary on Parekh’s No Refuge

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Shannon Fyfe
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:43 GMT
       
  • Remaining Agnostic about Blame and the Moral Status of Smugglers: Response
           to Commentaries

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Serena Parekh
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:43 GMT
       
  • Revolutionary Repair

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Mark Lance
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:42 GMT
       
  • Commentary: Serena Parekh’s No Refuge

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Velimir Stojkovski
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:42 GMT
       
  • The Inadequacy of Choice Language in Migration Debates

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Karen Adkins
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:21:42 GMT
       
  • The Speed of Crisis: Slow Violence, Accelerationism, and the Politics of
           the Emergency Brake

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Ashley J. Bohrer
      Abstract: This paper traces the history of accelerationism as a political philosophy, from its inception at Warwick University to its deployment by avowed white supremacists. Probing its philosophical commitment to a both a deterministic philosophy of history and a sacrificial logic of politics, I argue that even the initial elaborations of (non-race-based) accelerationism contained the seed of its development into violent white supremacy. The conclusion assesses a politics of deceleration as a strategy for countering accelerationism, ultimately arguing for the superiority of a Benjaminian politics of the emergency brake.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:01:52 GMT
       
  • Hegel, Marx and Huey P. Newton on the Underclass

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Joshua Anderson
      Abstract: This article is a discussion of the rabble in the context of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The article will progress as follows: First, I present how Hegel discusses the formation of a rabble and consider Michael Allen’s and James Bohman’s arguments regarding the domination inherent in Hegel’s theory. Next, I critique Joel Anderson’s “Hegelian” solution to the problem of the rabble. Finally, I show that the rabble are precisely the “class” that Marx needs to bring about change in the organization of society. Interestingly, there is a surprising similarity between Hegel’s discussion of the rabble and justified disobedience and the Marxism of Huey P. Newton.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:01:51 GMT
       
  • Any Woman: Rape, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistance Violence

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Margaret Betz
      Abstract: I argue that resistance violence is physical force carried out by members of politically vulnerable groups. It is not reducible to self-defense because it does not always involve protecting the life of the actor but, instead, is an expression of establishing one’s dignity and humanity. Applied to women as a vulnerable class in the face of sexual violence, this article looks at a case study of an enslaved teenager named Celia who killed her owner in order to end his sexual abuse. Various philosophies of epistemic injustices (including Fricker, Pohlhaus, Medina, Dotson, Mills, and Card) establish that socially/politically dominant groups help create a context in which compartmentalization, active ignorance, and inconsistencies contribute to the conditions in which marginalized groups reside in spaces of little to no protection from the state. As such, resistance violence emerges as a legitimate option. Selective epistemic attention that fails to contextualize resistance violence supports unjust systems.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:01:50 GMT
       
  • Community Repair of Moral Damage from Domestic Violence

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco
      Abstract: I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to repair and prevent moral damage that some survivors of domestic violence may experience. This responsibility is grounded in those communities’ complicity in domestic violence and the moral damage that may result. Drawing on Claudia Card’s work on domestic violence, I first explain two forms of moral damage that some survivors may experience. These are: 1) normative isolation, or abusive environments that are marked by distorted moral standards about the abuse itself, and 2) coerced self-betrayal, the coercive entrapment of the survivor’s agency, emotions, and beliefs to express the will of the abuser. Though the abuser is always the primary cause of abuse, I argue that survivors’ communities can contribute to a climate that facilitates domestic violence by, for instance, sustaining harmful norms about gender roles, shaming survivors, protecting abusers, and not wanting to interrupt “private matters.” When this complicity exists, I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to create structures that repair and prevent moral damage from domestic violence. Finally, I sketch out some practical considerations for building these structures. These involve creating violence-resistant communities that protect survivors, hold abusers accountable, and help survivors reclaim their agencies.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:01:50 GMT
       
  • Countering MacKinnon on Rape and Consent

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Erik A. Anderson
      Abstract: Feminists are divided on whether consent should be employed in legal definitions of rape. Catharine MacKinnon has criticized the usefulness of consent in enabling legal systems to recognize and prosecute instances of rape (MacKinnon 1989, 2005, 2016). In a recent article in this journal, Lisa H. Schwartzman defends the use of affirmative consent in rape law against MacKinnon’s critique (Schwartzman 2019). In contrast to MacKinnon, Schwartzman claims our understanding of rape must include both force and consent components. In this paper, I will argue in agreement with Schwartzman and against MacKinnon that the legal definition of rape should include an affirmative consent component. I will take Schwartzman’s discussion as my point of departure and consider whether she has responded adequately to MacKinnon’s criticisms of consent. I will argue that her responses are not fully adequate. In particular, she has not successfully rebutted the argument that an appeal to consent is unnecessary once we have accepted an expanded definition of coercion. I will then provide a more affirmative defense of affirmative consent in response to MacKinnon’s most challenging criticism.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Nov 2022 05:01:49 GMT
       
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 3.235.195.196
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-