A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Journal of Philosophy
Journal Prestige (SJR): 2.1
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 29  
  Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 0022-362X - ISSN (Online) 1939-8549
Published by Philosophy Documentation Center Homepage  [89 journals]
  • Rethinking Convergence to the Truth

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Simon M. Huttegger
      Abstract: The Bayesian theorem on convergence to the truth states that a rational inquirer believes with certainty that her degrees of belief capture the truth about a large swath of hypotheses with increasing evidence. This result has been criticized as showcasing a problematic kind of epistemic immodesty when applied to infinite hypotheses that can never be approximated by finite evidence. The central point at issue—that certain hypotheses may forever be beyond the reach of a finite investigation no matter how large one’s reservoir of evidence—cannot be captured adequately within standard probability theory. As an alternative, I propose a nonstandard probabilistic framework that, by using arbitrarily small and large numbers, makes room for the type of fine-grained conceptual distinctions appropriate for a deeper analysis of convergence to the truth. This framework allows for the right kind of modesty about attaining truth in the limit.
      PubDate: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 12:36:15 GMT
  • Generality Explained

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Øystein Linnebo
      Abstract: What explains the truth of a universal generalization' Two types of explanation can be distinguished. While an ‘instance-based explanation’ proceeds via some or all instances of the generalization, a ‘generic explanation’ is independent of the instances, relying instead on completely general facts about the properties or operations involved in the generalization. This intuitive distinction is analyzed by means of a truthmaker semantics, which also sheds light on the correct logic of quantification. On the most natural version of the semantics, this analysis vindicates some claims made—without a proper defense—by Michael Dummett, Solomon Feferman, and others. Where instance-based explanations are freely available, classical logic is shown to be warranted. By contrast, intuitionistic logic (or slightly more) remains warranted regardless of what explanations are available.
      PubDate: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 12:34:36 GMT
  • Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 05:29:29 GMT
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762

Your IP address:
Home (Search)
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-