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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.857
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 1  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 2053-4477 - ISSN (Online) 2053-4485
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [353 journals]
  • APA volume 8 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Pages: 1 - 3
      PubDate: 2022-05-12
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.20
       
  • APA volume 8 issue 2 Cover and Back matter

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Pages: 1 - 2
      PubDate: 2022-05-12
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.21
       
  • Consciousness and Attention in the Bhagavad Gita

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      Authors: MAITRA; KEYA
      Pages: 191 - 207
      Abstract: Consciousness is a central topic in Hindu philosophy. This is because this philosophy understands reality in terms of brahman or atman (typically translated as the self), and consciousness is conceived as the essential marker of self. The prominent Hindu text Bhagavad Gita offers an exception. Self is conceived in the Gita not in terms of its essential identity with pure or transcendental consciousness. But the question remains, does the Gita still offer us a theory of consciousness' The goal of my paper is to show that the Gita can be taken as offering an interesting empirical theory of consciousness. My paper focuses on determining the nature of attention in the Gita's understanding of yoga, and to articulate the role of such attention in the Gita's theory of consciousness. My working conclusion is that what differentiates an ordinary person's consciousness from a yogi's consciousness is the nature of their attention both in terms of its manner and its object. I argue, further, that exploring the Gita's theory of consciousness, especially in conjunction with the nature of attention, is immensely fruitful because it allows us to see the Gita's potential contribution to our contemporary philosophical discussion of consciousness and attention. This is because bringing the Gita into discussion allows us to appreciate a dimension of the metaphysics of attention–namely, the dimension of manner of attending and its cultivation, and the moral and social implications in the proposed redirection of one's attention--not often recognized in the contemporary Western discussion.
      PubDate: 2022-03-29
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2020.23
       
  • Desire's Own Reasons

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      Authors: TOOMING; UKU
      Pages: 259 - 277
      Abstract: In this essay I ask if there are reasons that count in favor of having a desire in virtue of its attitudinal nature. I call those considerations desire's own reasons. I argue that desire's own reasons are considerations that explain why a desire meets its constitutive standard of correctness and that it meets this standard when its satisfaction would also be satisfactory to the subject who has it. Reasons that bear on subjective satisfaction are fit to regulate desires through experience and imagination because desires are naturally sensitive to them. I also analyze the limits of application that such reasons have and how desire's own reasons relate to other kinds of reasons.
      PubDate: 2022-01-24
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.20
       
  • Counterfactuals of Ontological Dependence

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      Authors: BARON; SAM
      Pages: 278 - 299
      Abstract: A great deal has been written about ‘would’ counterfactuals of causal dependence. Comparatively little has been said regarding ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence. The standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics is inadequate for handling such counterfactuals. That is because some of these counterfactuals are counterpossibles, and the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics trivializes for counterpossibles. Fortunately, there is a straightforward extension of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics available that handles counterpossibles: simply take Lewis's closeness relation that orders possible worlds and unleash it across impossible worlds. To apply the extended semantics, an account of the closeness relation for counterpossibles is needed. In this article, I offer a strategy for evaluating ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence that understands closeness between worlds in terms of the metaphysical concept of grounding.
      PubDate: 2022-03-14
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2019.39
       
  • The Unity of Dependence

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      Authors: CASEY; JACK
      Pages: 300 - 317
      Abstract: Most philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations. A number of key differences between the two relations are usually cited in support of this claim: ontological dependence's unique connection to existence, differing respective connections to metaphysical necessitation, and a divergence in their formal features. Alongside reshaping some of the examples used to maintain the distinction between the two, I argue that the additional resources offered by the increased attention the notion of grounding has received in recent years potentially offer us a way to unite the two relations, promising the attendant benefits parsimony offers, as a result.
      PubDate: 2022-01-27
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.5
       
  • Believable Normative Error Theory

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      Authors: HARRISON; GERALD K.
      Pages: 208 - 223
      Abstract: Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable.
      PubDate: 2021-11-22
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.14
       
  • Hegel and the Problem of Affluence

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      Authors: HEISENBERG; THIMO
      Pages: 224 - 237
      Abstract: It is widely known that Hegel's Philosophy of Right recognizes poverty as one of the central problems of modern civil society. What is much less well known, however, is that Hegel sees yet another structural problem at the opposite side of the economic spectrum: a problem of affluence. Indeed, as I show in this essay, Hegel's text contains a detailed—yet sometimes overlooked—discussion of the detrimental psychological and sociological effects of great wealth and how to counter them. By bringing this discussion to the fore, we get a more complete picture of Hegel's theory of civil society (and of some of its central concepts, such as ‘the rabble') and shed light on an aspect of Hegel's social philosophy that speaks to problems we face today.
      PubDate: 2021-11-18
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.7
       
  • Panprotopsychism Instantiated

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      Authors: GIBERMAN; DANIEL
      Pages: 238 - 258
      Abstract: The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be that many properties are ever instantiated by one object. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In this essay, the author argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is argued here to be the best version of the relata-specific bundle theory—the thesis that each instance of compresence has a special intrinsic nature in virtue of which it necessarily bundles its specific bundle-ees—is also a species of Russellian monism, labeled by David Chalmers as ‘constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism’. The upshot of this connection is significant for the metaphysics of the mind-body problem: a credible theory of property instantiation turns out to have a built-in account of how consciousness is grounded in certain (broadly) physical systems.
      PubDate: 2021-10-21
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.4
       
  • The Problems of Access: A Crip Rejoinder via the Phenomenology of Spatial
           Belonging

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      Authors: LAJOIE; CORINNE
      Pages: 318 - 337
      Abstract: This essay denaturalizes the taken-for-granted meaning of ‘access’ and interrogates its role and lived meaning in ableist social worlds, with a focus on spaces of higher education. I suggest that legalistic approaches to access need ‘cripping’ by a disability framework. Currently, these approaches (1) miss the intersubjective sociality of being-in-the-world; (2) they prioritize a narrow conception of access focused on ‘physical’ access and ‘physical’ space (a typology I contest); (3) they approach access as frozen in time, rather than as a relational and temporally dynamic process (4); and, finally, they contribute to bureaucratizing and privatizing disability knowledge. I examine ‘access’ through the lens of belonging by asking how we orient ourselves in spaces shaped by oppressive social norms. I argue that ableist lifeworlds generate serious disorientations for disabled people that are lasting, structurally enforced, and harmful or debilitating.
      PubDate: 2021-11-22
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.6
       
  • Externalists Should Be Sense-Datum Theorists

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      Authors: DUNCAN; MATT
      Pages: 338 - 355
      Abstract: One increasingly popular view in the philosophy of perception is externalism about sensible qualities, according to which sensible qualities such as colors, smells, tastes, and textures are features, not of our minds, but of mind-independent, external objects in the world. The primary motivation for this view is that perceptual experience seems to be transparent—that is, when we attend to sensible qualities, it seems like what we are attending to are features of external objects, not our own minds. Most (if not all) externalists are either naïve realists or externalist representationalists. However, in this article, I argue that those who are moved by the primary motivation for externalism should instead be sense-datum theorists, for externalists’ primary motivation supports the sense-datum theory, not their actually favored views. I argue that externalists should focus on different motivations, get new ones, or become sense-datum theorists.
      PubDate: 2021-10-21
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.3
       
  • Permanent Value

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      Authors: FRUGÉ; CHRISTOPHER
      Pages: 356 - 372
      Abstract: Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives will not matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives will not make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this essay, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this more powerful conception of nihilism, we do not have personal value after death, so our past life no longer has well-being after we die. The standard objections to the standard interpretation do not apply to this more nihilistic nihilism. I offer a new response according to which personal value persists after death because the person continues to exist.
      PubDate: 2021-11-05
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.16
       
  • Shame, Vulnerability, and Change

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      Authors: HU; JING IRIS
      Pages: 373 - 390
      Abstract: Shame is frequently viewed as a destructive emotion; but it can also be understood in terms of change and growth. This essay highlights the problematic values that cause pervasive and frequent shame and the importance of resisting and changing these values. Using Confucian insights, I situate shame in an interactive process between the individual's values and that of their society, thus, being vulnerable to shame represents both one's connection to a community and an openness to others’ negative feedback. This process provides an important arena where personal values interact with communal ones. The Confucian tradition, I argue, affords individuals a degree of autonomy in internalization through urging them to cultivate and maintain a keen sense of shame. My discussion also offers resources for understanding the various aspects of this interactive process—how individuals with similar experiences of shame may, through channeling their experiences, influence social values and propel moral progress.
      PubDate: 2021-08-27
      DOI: 10.1017/apa.2021.21
       
 
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