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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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The Monist
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.282
Number of Followers: 9  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0026-9662 - ISSN (Online) 2153-3601
Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [419 journals]
  • Genealogy, Evaluation, and Engineering

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      Pages: 435 - 451
      Abstract: AbstractAgainst those who identify genealogy with reductive genealogical debunking or deny it evaluative significance, I argue, first, that while genealogies tend to trace the higher to the lower, they need not reduce the higher to the lower, but can elucidate their relation and help us think more realistically about both relata; second, that if we conceive of genealogy in terms of a triadic model including the addressee, it becomes intelligible how tracing the higher to the lower can facilitate an evaluation of the higher, and how, where the lower is some important practical need rather than some sinister motive, the genealogy can even be vindicatory; and third, that vindicatory genealogies can offer positive guidance on how to engineer better concepts.
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac010
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
  • Genealogy as Meditation and Adaptation with the Han Feizi

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      Pages: 452 - 469
      Abstract: AbstractThis paper focuses on an early Chinese conception of genealogical argumentation in the late Warring States text Han Feizi and a possible response it has to the problem of genealogical self-defeat as identified by Amia Srinivasan (2015)—i.e., the genealogist cannot seem to support their argument with premises their interlocutor or they themselves can accept, given their own argument. The paper offers a reading of Han Fei’s genealogical method that traces back to the meditative practice of an earlier Daoist text the Zhuangzi and its communicative strategy, providing a conception of genealogy aimed at undoing fixations on political systems in order to bring about a more adaptive state—specifically, genealogy that does not require epistemological commitment to its premises.
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac011
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
  • Dripping with Blood and Dirt from Head to Toe: Marx’s Genealogy of
           Capitalism in Capital, Volume 1

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      Pages: 470 - 486
      Abstract: AbstractI argue that Marx’s critique of political economy in volume 1 of Capital relies on a kind of genealogical argument that takes capitalism as its object. In the first section of the article, I sketch out an interpretation of the argumentative structure of Capital 1, highlighting what I take to be the two crucial turning points in Marx’s critique of political economy. Marx’s specifically genealogical argument comes to the foreground with the second of these turning points, which can be found at the start of his account of primitive accumulation in Part 8 of Capital 1. The first part of the paper defends the thought that the genealogy of capitalism’s prehistory is no mere digression from or complement to the main theoretical argument, but rather the crucial completion of Marx’s critique of political economy in Capital 1. In the second part of the paper, I turn to the somewhat thornier question of what sort of genealogy Marx offers. Drawing on and extending Bernard Williams’s distinction between vindicatory and subversive genealogies, I contend that Marx’s genealogy of capitalism, despite containing both subversive and vindicatory strands, is embedded in a longer vindicatory historical arc that, while avoiding crude teleologies and strong claims to unilinearity, nonetheless maintains a kind of necessity claim for its genealogical object.
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac012
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
  • Psychology, Physiology, Medicine: The Perspectivist Interpretation of
           Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality

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      Pages: 487 - 506
      Abstract: AbstractThis article introduces the perspectivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (GM), characterized by two core theses. According to the results thesis, the three treatises of GM introduce three types of critical results, respectively: psychological claims about the value of morality for the interests of various character types; physiological claims about its value for the ‘progress of the species’; and medical claims about its value for health. According to the distinction thesis, the critical results of GM are descriptive, while their reader-specific implications (and therapeutic effects) are normative. This interpretation illuminates the genealogical method of GM by answering four fundamental questions about (Q1) its historical method, (Q2) the history of morality that it reveals, (Q3) the critical results of GM, and (Q4) their intended therapeutic effects. Challenging the widespread assumption that the critical results of GM are evaluative claims, the perspectivist interpretation reveals the novelty of Nietzsche’s “new demand” for a critique of values not only relative to his predecessors’ approach to critique, but also to his own previous works. GM offers a critique that is grounded on factual claims, at once extramoral and external to (Christian) morality, and internal to its readers’ evaluative perspectives, even those who remain beholden to (Christian) moral values. Consequently, its authority and therapeutic efficacy are not threatened by discrepancies between it and its readers’ affective-evaluative preferences.
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac013
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
  • Is Heidegger’s History of Being a Genealogy'

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      Pages: 507 - 520
      Abstract: AbstractThis paper argues that Heidegger’s ‘history of being’ is a debunking narrative, characterised by both analogies and disanalogies to genealogy, at least in its Nietzschean form. I begin by defining such narratives in terms of non-truth-tropic explanation. In §2, I argue, contra Foucault, that the debate is not best approached via the idea of an “origin” or “Ursprung.” Instead, having flagged some classic features of at least Nietzschean genealogy (§3), I examine two case studies from Heidegger’s ‘history of being’. The first, I argue, is not a debunking history (§4). The second is and its target is ironically Nietzsche himself (§5). I highlight Heidegger’s psychological and epistemic claims, and I draw a comparison with MacIntyre’s discussion of ‘dead-end’ problems. I conclude that Heidegger’s history of being is a debunking history, but not a genealogy, at least in the Nietzschean sense: amongst other things, Heidegger’s method differs in its stance on truth and on the role of polemical writing (§6).
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac014
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
  • On Moral Unintelligibility: Beauvoir’s Genealogy of Morality in the
           Second Sex

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      Pages: 521 - 540
      Abstract: AbstractThis paper offers a reading of Beauvoir’s Second Sex as a genealogy of ‘morality’: the patriarchal system of values that maintains a moral distinction between men and women. This value system construes many of women’s experiences under oppression as evidence of women’s immorality, obscuring the agential role of those who provoke such experiences. Beauvoir’s examination of the origin for this value system provides an important counterexample to the prevailing debate over whether genealogical method functions to debunk or to vindicate: while the currently dominant moral system may have been historically necessary at certain stages in human development, Beauvoir nevertheless debunks it; only the value system itself now remains, without its precipitating needs. Thus, Beauvoir’s critique reveals what I call the moral unintelligibility of women’s experiences of oppression: women encounter difficulty in making sense of the harms wrought against them because the operative value system obscures them as harms in the first place, instead construing women themselves as immoral. Against the prevailing construction of moral blame and responsibility, Beauvoir’s solution is the political virtue of moral invention, a virtue epistemic as well as moral, collective as well as individual.
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac015
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
  • Reason Versus Power: Genealogy, Critique, and Epistemic Injustice

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      Pages: 541 - 557
      Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, I take issue with the idea that Michel Foucault might be considered a theorist of epistemic injustice, and argue that his philosophical premises are incompatible with Miranda Fricker’s. Their main disagreement rests upon their divergent ways of conceiving the relationship between reason and power, giving rise to the contrasting forms of normativity that characterize their critical projects. This disagreement can be helpfully clarified by addressing the different use they make of the genealogical method. While Fricker’s genealogy of Testimonial Justice aims to ground her claim that reason and power can be neatly pulled apart, thus avoiding the reductionist and relativist conclusions entailed (in her view) by Foucault’s genealogies, I argue that Foucault’s mature, overlooked definition of genealogy is based on a sophisticated distinction between games and regimes of truth, and is thus not vulnerable to these criticisms. Consequently, Foucault’s genealogical inquiries prove helpful for understanding issues that normally fall under the umbrella of epistemic injustice in a new light, while also allowing us to avoid some of the main objections that threaten Fricker’s project.
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac016
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
  • Vindicating Reasons

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      Pages: 558 - 573
      Abstract: AbstractWhat is the philosophical role of an historical account of how someone, or some people, came to believe or value as they do' I consider some proposals, due to Bernard Williams and David Wiggins, according to which such an account might either vindicate or subvert our believing or valuing as we do. I suggest some reasons for scepticism about those proposals, at least when construed as providing a fundamental means of assessing cases of believing or valuing. The main problem raised for the proposals, when so construed, is that they conflate reasons that now support believing or valuing with reasons for coming in the first place to believe or value.
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac017
      Issue No: Vol. 105, No. 4 (2022)
       
 
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