Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The essay deals with problems encountered by Western researchers working in the field of Chinese philosophy. It begins with a discussion of intercultural and transcultural methodologies and illuminates some of the most common issues inherent in traditional intercultural comparisons in the field of philosophy. Taking into account the current state of the so-called postcomparative discourses in the field of transcultural philosophy and starting from the notion of culturally divergent frames of reference, it focuses upon semantic aspects of the Chinese philosophical tradition and exposes the need for discursive translations. On this basis, a new postcomparative approach in transcultural philosophical studies of Chinese philosophy is suggested. In this context, the author proposes the application of an innovative principle, based upon what can preliminary be denoted as the method of sublation. PubDate: 2022-04-14
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In his Laozi Commentary (Laozi Zhu 老子注) and Structure of the Laozi’s Subtle Pointers (Laozi Weizhi Lilüe 老子微指例略), Wang Bi 王弼 seems to identify the Dao 道 with “absence” or “nothingness” (wu 無). Despite this identification, some modern commentators regard Wang Bi’s Dao as a being. Other commentators deny that the Dao is a being but, nonetheless, seem to regard it as a reality of some kind. In contrast, I propose that Wang Bi’s Dao is literal absence and that we need not reify this absence in any way. Wang Bi’s descriptions of the Dao can be understood as metaphorical descriptions of mere absence. To support this proposal, I present an interpretation of Wang Bi’s Dao and then apply this interpretation to the first section of Wang Bi’s Laozi Commentary and to the first section of the Structure of the Laozi’s Subtle Pointers. PubDate: 2022-04-13
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In this essay, I investigate how Chinese Yogācāra scholars of the Tang 唐 dynasty explicated and supplemented the theory of apoha (exclusion) propounded by the Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga 陳那, according to which a nominal word functions by excluding everything other than its own referent. I first present a brief exposition of the theory. Then, I show that although they had very limited access to Dignāga’s theory, Kuiji 窺基 and Shentai 神泰 provide constructive and significant explanations that supplement the theory. I also show that the term zhequan 遮詮 (excluding expression) has been construed in Chinese Buddhism in at least three different senses to mean: (1) an expression that both excludes and signifies, (2) an expression that merely excludes and does not signify, and (3) a negative expression that merely excludes. The notion of apoha is related to the first two senses but not the third. PubDate: 2022-04-13
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This article explores contrasting interpretations of early Confucian philosophy as they apply to education, focusing primarily on the Analects of Confucius (Lunyu 論語), the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), and the Xunzi 荀子. I first describe a common interpretation of the Confucian worldview, according to which an already perfected way is thought to have been established. This view tends to encourage thinking of education as a process of conveying the True Way and ensuring conformity to the norms that constitute it. I then describe and defend a contrasting Confucian worldview, in which the learner’s initiative, critical engagement, creativity, and personal qualities play a significant role. According to this interpretation, the way is, to some degree, indeterminate and evolving, and thus more open to participatory inquiry as well as influence. Illustrious virtue, which Confucian learning aims at developing, is likewise to some degree indeterminate and legitimately personalized. Although some degree of conformity to established norms is involved, especially in early stages, Confucian education culminates in the cultivation of personal distinction, developing one’s own uniqueness. PubDate: 2022-04-12
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Mencius 孟子 is famous for arguing that human nature is good (xingshan 性善). In this article, I offer a reading of Mencius’ argument which can be evaluated in terms of empirical psychology. In this reading, Mencius’ argument begins with three claims: (1) humans naturally have prosocial inclinations, (2) prosocial inclinations can be cultivated into mature forms of virtue, and (3) the growth of prosocial inclinations is more natural than the growth of their alternatives. I also argue that each of these claims is well supported by empirical psychology. The relevant studies demonstrate, for example, that humans’ prosocial inclinations are not merely products of social conditioning or egoistic concerns; that prosocial inclinations can be cultivated by environmental factors and personal effort; that humans—even preverbal infants—have a natural inclination to prefer prosociality over its alternatives; and that growth in prosociality is positively associated with human health. Finally, I suggest we interpret Mencius’ expression “human nature is good” as a rhetorical tool to capture the totality of such empirically minded claims. PubDate: 2022-04-12
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This essay aims to show that the fourfold division theory of consciousness in the Cheng Weishi Lun 成唯識論 (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra) is the third way between phenomenology and the higher-order theories of consciousness. Regarding the problem of infinite regress, in particular, this theory represents an alternative between the reflexive model and the reflective model of self-consciousness. The main purpose of this essay is not to prove or to argue for the theory, but to clearly present its structure and the systematic or Abhidharmic way of thinking that leads to the notion of awareness of self-awareness and provides a way out of the problem of infinite regress. It also points out some pertinent issues that need to be further addressed or explored, such as simultaneous causation, begging the question, reconciling the antireflexivity principle with the lamp simile for self-awareness, and aboutness. PubDate: 2022-04-12
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The notion of dao 道 in the Daodejing 道德經 typically receives either a metaphysical interpretation or a practical one. In this essay, I survey a series of recent interpretations and show that given the gap between the two dimensions, the extant interpretations typically have the problem of attributing ambiguity to the central notion of dao, whether explicitly or implicitly. In light of this, I venture a novel reading according to which the text is interpreted also in practical terms, more specifically in methodological terms, but thoroughly. This requires me to offer a new account for the creative or generative role of dao, now construed as a method. I argue that this reading is at least equally plausible as the ones in circulation by spelling out its central constituents and pointing out its theoretical virtues. In conclusion, I point out certain implications for research, both exegetical and comparative, if we come to accept this novel reading. PubDate: 2022-04-12
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is well known for his Kantian interpretation of Confucianism, while his understanding of Kant’s ethics is itself colored very much by Confucianism. Mou not only coined the idea “heteronomous morality” (tālǜ dàodé 他律道德) (the term is actually an oxymoron in the context of Kant’s ethics); he also maintained that Kant’s ethics actually espouses heteronomous morality. In this essay, I will first analyze Mou’s idea of heteronomy and his criticism of heteronomous morality and point out that, characterizing Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 philosophy as ethics of heteronomy, Mou gives up a fundamental element in Kant’s idea of heteronomy, according to which heteronomous principles are all principles of self-love. I will then expound Mou’s ideas of moral feelings and moral acts presupposed in his idea of heteronomy and criticism of heteronomous morality and contrast my interpretation with two important interpretations, those of Lee Ming-huei 李明輝 and Sébastien Billioud. PubDate: 2022-04-12
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Zhang Zai’s 張載 “Western Inscription (Ximing 西銘)” and Kant’s “Conclusion” of the Critique of Practical Reason are two profound pieces. As of yet, no comparative study has been made of the two. I argue that a comparative and contrasting study provides us a window into the central and powerful ideas within these two pieces. Section 2 of this article contrasts Zhang Zai’s “Heaven-Earth” with Kant’s starry heavens, his external “wonderland.” Section 3 contrasts Zhang Zai’s teaching of morality by personal commitment and exemplars with Kant’s teaching of morality by a theory based on the moral law within, his inner “wonderland.” Section 4 compares and contrasts Zhang Zai’s human self-realization in the one world of Heaven-Earth with Kant’s human (generic) realization in the coming-together of the two “wonderlands.” By stressing some significant differences between Zhang Zai and Kant, I conclude that the view that takes Kant’s coming-together of the two “wonderlands” as a version of the union or interpenetration between the cosmos and the human (tian ren he yi 天人合一, as Zhang Zai used it) will need important qualifications. PubDate: 2022-03-01
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Many comparative philosophers discuss ceyinzhixin 惻隱之心 (the Confucian heart-mind of pity and compassion) and its moral psychological nature to understand the Confucian heart-mind and the unique Confucian approach to other-concerning love. This essay examines and analyzes different interpretations of ceyinzhixin. First, it surveys and compares the four interpretations (ceyinzhixin as empathic concern, as concern-based construal, as modular moral emotion, and as Humean moral sentiment) in recent publications of comparative Chinese philosophy, and analyzes their moral psychological viewpoints. Second, three major approaches (the essentialist, the foundationalist, and the integrative approaches) to ceyinzhixin and their differences are analyzed. Third, the moral psychological complexity of ceyinzhixin and the advantage of the integrative approach are discussed. The integrative approach, in comparison to other approaches, explains both the complexity and the unity of ceyinzhixin better and develops an inclusive and comprehensive interpretation of ceyinzhixin and the unique moral psychological nature of the Confucian heart-mind in its empathic other-concerning love. PubDate: 2022-03-01
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
