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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Logic and Logical Philosophy
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.387
Number of Followers: 5  

  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Print) 1425-3305 - ISSN (Online) 2300-9802
Published by UMK Homepage  [22 journals]
  • Introduction to the Special Issue: Logics and Their Interpretations I

    • Authors: Henrique Antunes; Damian Szmuc
      PubDate: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • A Logic for a Critical Attitude'

    • Authors: Federico Boem; Stefano Bonzio
      Abstract: Individuating the logic of scientific discovery appears a hopeless enterprise. Less hopeless is trying to figure out a logical way to model the epistemic attitude distinguishing the practice of scientists. In this paper, we claim that classical logic cannot play such a descriptive role. We propose, instead, one of the three-valued logics in the Kleene family that is often classified as the less attractive one, namely Hallden’s logic. By providing it with an appropriate epistemic interpretation, we can informally model the scientific attitude.
      PubDate: Sat, 19 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • On Barrio, Lo Guercio, and Szmuc on Logics of Evidence and Truth

    • Authors: Abilio Rodrigues; Walter Carnielli
      Abstract: The aim of this text is to reply to criticisms of the logics of evidence and truth and the epistemic approach to paraconsistency advanced by Barrio [2018], and Lo Guercio and Szmuc [2018]. We also clarify the notion of evidence that underlies the intended interpretation of these logics and is a central point of Barrio’s and Lo Guercio & Szmuc’s criticisms.
      PubDate: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems

    • Authors: Diego Tajer; Camillo Fiore
      Abstract: Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic – and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising – albeit not unproblematic – route to logical pluralism.
      PubDate: Mon, 07 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Metainferential Paraconsistency

    • Authors: Bruno Da Ré; Mariela Rubin, Paula Teijeiro
      Abstract: In this article, our aim is to take a step towards a full understanding of the notion of paraconsistency in the context of metainferential logics. Following the work initiated by Barrio et al. [2018], we will consider a metainferential logic to be paraconsistent whenever the metainferential version of Explosion (or meta-Explosion) is invalid. However, our contribution consists in modifying the definition of meta-Explosion by extending the standard framework and introducing a negation for inferences and metainferences. From this new perspective, Tarskian paraconsistent logics such as LP will not turn out to be metainferentially paraconsistent, in contrast to, for instance, non-transitive logics like ST. Finally, we will end up by defining a logic which is metainferentially paraconsistent at every level, and discussing whether this logic is uniform through translations.
      PubDate: Mon, 07 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Intensional Semantics for Syllogistics: what Leibniz and Vasiliev Have in
           Common

    • Authors: Antonina Konkova; Maria Legeydo
      Abstract: This article deals with an alternative interpretation of syllogistics, different from the classical (extensional) one: an intensional one, in which subject and predicate are not associated with a set of individuals (the extension of the concept) but a set of attributes (the content of the concept). The authors of the paper draw attention to the fact that this approach was first proposed by Leibniz in works on logical calculus, which for a long time remained in the shadow of his other philosophical works. Currently, the intensional approach is gaining more and more popularity due to the development of non-classical logics, and the article will present several existing intensional formal syllogistic semantics. The paper will also consider another historical approach to syllogistics, associated with the name of the Russian logician Nikolai Vasiliev, who is not only one of the founders of non-classical (non-Aristotelian logic) but also of a different intensional interpretation of such logic. The authors, along with the already known formalizations of Vasiliev’s ideas, present two new systems. One of them is a reconstruction of one type of imaginary logic with statements of three qualities: affirmative and two types of negative statements (with absolute and ordinary negation). The second system is the one that is adequate to semantics, in which instead of the four classical ones, only three types of statements are presented (two particular statements are replaced by one - accidental), and their significance is determined through the relation of the classical logical entailment. Both of them are interpreted intensionally. The intensional approach in logic and, in particular, in syllogistics allows us to expand the class of accepted principles (which occurs due to the expansion of the class of correct moods of syllogisms).
      PubDate: Sun, 06 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • The Liar Paradox: Between Evidence and Truth

    • Authors: Jonas Becker Arenhart; Ederson S. Melo
      Abstract: Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is dealt with by classical logic. In this paper we discuss the fate of the Liar paradox in this picture. While this is a paradox about truth, it cannot be accommodated by the classical part of the approach, due to trivialization problems. On the other hand, the paraconsistent part does not seem fit as well, due to the fact that its intended reading is in terms of non-conclusive evidence, not truth. We discuss the difficulties involved in each case and argue that none of the options seems to accommodate the paradox in a satisfactory manner.
      PubDate: Sat, 05 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Logica Dominans vs. Logica Serviens

    • Authors: Jaroslav Peregrin; Vladimír Svoboda
      Abstract: Logic is usually presented as a tool of rational inquiry; however, many logicians in fact treat logic so that it does not serve us, but rather governs us – as rational beings we are subordinated to the logical laws we aspire to disclose. We denote the view that logic primarily serves us as logica serviens, while denoting the thesis that it primarily governs our reasoning as logica dominans. We argue that treating logic as logica dominans is misguided, for it leads to the idea of a “genuine” logic within a “genuine” language. Instead of this, we offer a naturalistic picture, according to which the only languages that exist are the natural languages and the artificial languages logicians have built. There is, we argue, no language beyond these, especially none that would be a wholesome vehicle of reasoning like the natural languages and yet be transparently rigorous like the artificial ones. Logic is a matter of using the artificial languages as idealized models of the natural ones, whereby we pinpoint the laws of logic by means of zooming in on a reflective equilibrium.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
 
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