Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 1572-3429 This journal is no longer being updated because: RSS feed has been removed by publisher
Authors:Cheongho Lee First page: 1 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 1 - 14In his theory of interpretation, Peirce’s attention is drawn to the work of “mind,” especially its appropriation of signs. Mind interprets nature by using signs in every form of inquiry. Based on his three categories, Peirce defines interpretation as a determinate process of interpretations of interpretations. Communicative process thus means, instead of just being determined as an interpretant by an object, that the interpreter is determined by a “communicative effort.” In the communicative effort, for Peirce, temporal unit is the necessary condition of meaning. In other words, in order to mean something, the communicative effort has to be performed in a continuum from a past to a future. Concealed possibilities can be actualized when the continuum is “broken,” genuinely divided. Peirce truly acknowledges that the possibility can be actualized when it is broken into parts.Secondary The main purpose of this paper is to investigate Charles S. Peirce’s theory of interpretation, with special regard to the theory of determination. Peirce fleshes out his theory of interpretation out of the three categories that perpetually turn up in Peirce’s intellectual career. Based on the three categories, Peirce defines interpretation as a determinate process of interpretations. Communicative process thus means, instead of just being determined as an interpretant by an object, the determinative process by which the interpreter is determined. In order to mean something, for Peirce, the communicative effort has to be performed in a continuum from a past to a future. For instance, the possibility of communication between computers and human beings can be explained by aid of Whitehead’s concept of “flat loci” as well as Peirce’s theory of interpretation. A flat locus is essentially a spatial region that represents the finite arrangement of ones and zeroes. A computer turns what it “sees” (the visual information to which it is exposed) into ones and zeroes according to mereo-topological schemata. Peirce truly acknowledged that possibilities can be actualized when the continuum is “broken,” genuinely divided. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Authors:Justin Remhof First page: 15 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 15 - 22The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C.S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. It will emerge that although this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Authors:Marco Antonio Joven-Romero First page: 23 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 23 - 45I apply recent research on the links between belief, truth and pragmatism based on Williams (1970) statement that “beliefs aim at truth,” to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, in which agents act contrary to their private beliefs because they believe that other agents believe the contrary. I consider three positions; an epistemic position, a pragmatic position, and a third position coordinating the first two. I apply them to pluralistic ignorance while considering the recent study of Bjerring, Hansend and Pedersen (2014). I conclude that a purely epistemic approach is better for understanding pluralistic ignorance. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Authors:Gustavo Javier Arroyo First page: 46 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 46 - 65Philosophers have traditionally described themselves as “intuitive scientists”: people seeking the most justified theories about distinctive aspects of the world. Relying on insights from philosophers as Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Williams James, I argue that philosophers should be described instead as “intuitive lawyers” who defend a point of view largely by appealing to non-cognitive reasons. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Authors:Michael P. Wolf; Jeremy Randel Koons First page: 66 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 66 - 94Many contextualist accounts in epistemology appeal to ordinary language and everyday practice as grounds for positing a low-standards knowledge (knowledgeL) that contrasts with high-standards prevalent in epistemology (knowledgeH). We compare these arguments to arguments from the height of “ordinary language” philosophy in the mid 20th century and find that all such arguments face great difficulties. We find a powerful argument for the legitimacy and necessity of knowledgeL (but not of knowledgeH). These appeals to practice leave us with reasons to accept knowledgeL in the face of radical doubts raised by skeptics. We conclude by arguing that by relegating knowledgeH to isolated contexts, the contextualist fails to deal with the skeptical challenge head-on. KnowledgeH and knowledgeL represent competing, incompatible intuitions about knowledge, and we must choose between them. A fallibilist conception of knowledge, formed with proper attention to radical doubts, can address the skeptical challenge without illicit appeal to everyday usage. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Authors:D.S. Clarke First page: 95 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 95 - 151This Tractatus-style sequence of propositions describes logical features of natural language discourse, pre-linguistic levels of signs interpreted in associative learning and animal communication, and the specialized discourses of the institutions of science, religion, law, politics, and the arts. Its comprehensive scope is designed to help overcome the compartmentalization of philosophy into its branches of epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics. The general perspective is that of pragmatic naturalism as developed by the classical pragmatists Peirce, James, Schiller, and Dewey. Central to pragmatism is its emphasis on the use of practical inferences combining descriptive and expressive premisses with prescriptive “ought” conclusions guiding conduct. I argue that by making such inferences its focus, pragmatism enables contemporary philosophy to offset the effects of social specialization. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Authors:Mark Tschaepe First page: 152 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 152 - 164When we assume that we have cultural competence rather than thoroughly engaging in what Dewey calls the pattern of inquiry, we fail to achieve cultural humility. By analyzing how habits undermine inquiry and underlie failure in situations that call for cultural humility, we may be better equipped to address unintentional offenses. In this essay, I define cultural humility and contrast it with cultural competence, explaining why aiming for cultural competence alone is problematic. Next, I consider the attributes necessary for cultural humility and the attitudes that Dewey considers beneficial for inquiry. This is followed by an outline of Dewey’s pattern of inquiry and explanation of how unquestioned habits of thought short-circuit our ability to become culturally humble. I suggest that we forgo attempting to achieve cultural competence and instead use Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with the attitudes he recommends as tools to work toward cultural humility. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Authors:Jerome A. Popp First page: 165 Abstract: Source: Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 165 - 178John Dewey’s analysis of the role of emotion in moral reasoning, presented in the later Ethics, led him to conclude that our development of moral reasoning should be less focused on the secondary interest of attention to ourselves or others, and attend to the more complete interests of the welfare and integrity of the social groups in which we participate. In that analysis, Dewey identified the essential role of empathic understanding in moral decisions, referred to by neuroscientists as social intelligence. Dewey’s discussion of the essential role of emotion in these decisions is further supported by research in neuroscience which has established that general intelligence is located in an area of the brain distinct from the area that supports social intelligence, our capacity for empathic experience. These findings suggest that the presence of individuals with developed social intelligence in the groups in which we participate provide increased opportunities for growth. PubDate: 2018-02-22T00:00:00Z
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
