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Informal Logic
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.277
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 9  

  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Print) 0824-2577
Published by U of Windsor Homepage  [4 journals]
  • Identifying Linked and Convergent Argument Structures

    • Authors: Shiyang Yu, Frank Zenker
      Pages: 363 - 387
      Abstract: To analyze the argument structure, the linked vs convergent distinction is crucial. In applying this distinction, argumentation scholars test for variations of argument strength under premise revision. A relevance-based test assesses whether an argument’s premises are individually relevant to its conclusion, while a support-based test assesses whether premises support the conclusion independently. Both criteria presuppose that evaluating an argument’s strength is methodologically prior to identifying its structure. Yet, if ‘argument structure’ is a concept of analysis, then a structural analysis would precede evaluating an argument’s strength. We problematize that state-of-the-art methods to identify structures fail, because they rely on evaluative judgments, and so “put the cart before the horse.”
      PubDate: 2022-06-10
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7133
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
  • A Modal Criterion for Epistemic Argumentation

    • Authors: Job de Grefte
      Pages: 389 - 415
      Abstract: In this paper, I spell out and argue for a new epistemic theory of argumentation. Contrary to extant views, this theory is compatible with a pluralistic framework on argumentation, where the norms governing argumentation depend on the aim with which we engage in the practice. A domain of specifically epistemic argumentation is singled out, and I argue based on recent findings in modal epistemology that this domain is governed by the modal norm of safety; where a belief is safe just in case it is produced by a method that would not easily produce a false belief. While this criterion is well-known and uncontroversial in epistemology, it has hitherto not been applied to epistemic theories of argumentation. I show that the norm allows for a novel and superior perspective of the relevance of the persistent interlocutor in argumentation theory, and on the relation between dialectical and epistemic norms more generally.
      PubDate: 2022-06-10
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i2.7020
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
  • Argumentative Hyperbole as Fallacy

    • Authors: A.J. Kreider
      Pages: 417 - 437
      Abstract: In typical critical thinking texts, hyperbole is presented as being largely “argumentationally innocent” - it’s primary role being to express emotion of to bring desired emphases to a particular point. This discounts its prevalent use in argumentation, as it is also used as a device to persuade, and in particular, to persuade an interlocutor that they should take or support a course of action. When it is so used, the exaggerated claims would, if true, provide greater support for the conclusion. But since the claims are not fully accurate, this “greater support” is only illusory. Its use is thus deceptive and counts as fallacious reasoning.
      PubDate: 2022-06-10
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i2.6351
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
  • Deeper into Argumentative Bullshit

    • Authors: Nikil Mukerji, Adriano Mannino
      Pages: 439 - 470
      Abstract: In a recent paper, José Ángel Gascón extends the Frankfurtian notion of bullshit to the sphere of argumentation. On Frankfurt’s view, the hallmark of bullshit is a lack of concern for the truth of an utterance on the part of the bullshitter. Similarly, Gascón argues, the hallmark of argumentative bullshit should be viewed as a lack of concern for whether the reasons that are adduced for a claim genuinely support that claim. Gascón deserves credit for drawing attention to the idea of argumentative bullshit. Nevertheless, we argue, his treatment leaves room for further refinement as he fails to clarify important points and misidentifies several features of argumentative bullshit. In particular, Gascón’s account fails to accommodate non-Frankfurtian forms of argumentative bullshit. This paper aims to amend and extend his proposal and proposes a general account that can encompass both Frankfurtian and non-Frankfurtian forms of argumentative bullshit.
      PubDate: 2022-06-10
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i2.7005
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
  • Notice of Books Received

    • Authors: Informal Logic
      Pages: 471 - 484
      PubDate: 2022-06-10
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i2.7384
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
  • Notice of Books Received

    • Authors: Informal Logic
      PubDate: 2022-05-05
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i4.6571
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • Introduction to the Special Issue

    • Authors: Fabrizio Macagno, Alice Toniolo
      Pages: 1 - 23
      Abstract: Douglas Walton’s work is extremely vast, multifaceted, and interdisciplinary. He developed theoretical proposals that have been used in disciplines that are not traditionally related to philosophy, such as law, education, discourse analysis, artificial intelligence, or medical communication. Through his papers and books, Walton redefined the boundaries not only of argumentation theory, but also logic and philosophy. He was a philosopher in the sense that his interest was developing theoretical models that can help explain reality, and more importantly interact with it. For this reason, he proposed methods that have been used for analyzing different types of dialogical interactions, and modeling procedures for regulating them.
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7210
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • Is Every Definition Persuasive'

    • Authors: Jakub Pruś, Andrew Aberdein
      Pages: 25 - 47
      Abstract: “Is every definition persuasive'” If essentialist views on definition are rejected and a pragmatic account adopted, where defining is a speech act which fixes the meaning of a term, then a problem arises: if meanings are not fixed by the essence of being itself, is not every definition persuasive' To address the problem, we refer to Douglas Walton’s impressive intellectual heritage—specifically on the argumentative potential of definition. In finding some non-persuasive definitions, we show not every definition is persuasive. The persuasiveness lies not in syntactic or semantic properties, but the context. We present this pragmatic account and provide rules for analysing and evaluating persuasive definition—a promising direction for further research.
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7211
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • A Pragmatic Account of Rephrase in Argumentation

    • Authors: Marcin Koszowy, Steve Oswald, Katarzyna Budzynska, Barbara Konat, Pascal Gygax
      Pages: 49 - 82
      Abstract: In the spirit of the pragmatic account of quotation and reporting offered by Macagno and Walton (2017), we outline a systematic pragmatic account of rephrasing. For this purpose, we combine two interrelated methods of inquiry into the variety of uses of rephrase as a persuasive device: (i) the annotation of rephrase types to identify locutionary and illocutionary aspects of rephrase, (ii) the crowd–sourced examination of rephrase types to investigate their perlocutionary effects. As it draws on Waltonian insights and on empirical and experimental research on the (mis)use of rephrase, our approach allows us to ground a novel theoretically–informed and data–driven pragmatic account of rephrase.
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7212
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • Argumentation Profiles

    • Authors: Fabrizio Macagno
      Pages: 83 - 138
      Abstract: An argumentation profile is defined as a methodological instrument for analyzing argumentative discourse considering distinct and interrelated dimensions: the types of argument used, their quality, and the emotions triggered. Walton’s theoretical contributions are developed as a coherent analytical and multifaceted toolbox for capturing these aspects. Argumentation schemes are used to detect and quantify the types of argument. Fallacy analysis and the assessment of the implicit premises retrieved through the schemes allow evaluating arguments. Finally, the frequency of emotive words signals the most common emotions aroused. This method is illustrated through a corpus of argumentative tweets of three politicians.      
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7215
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • Douglas Walton’s Contributions in Education

    • Authors: Chrysi Rapanta
      Pages: 139 - 170
      Abstract: Douglas Walton, perhaps the most prolific author in Argumentation theory, has been of a great influence in the fields of Informal logic, Artificial intelligence, and Law. His contributions in the field of educational research, in particular in the field of argumentation and education, are less known. This review paper aims at shedding light on those aspects of Walton’s theory that have received educational researchers’ attention thus far, as well identifying existing lacks of consideration and open paths for future research.
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7222
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise

    • Authors: Mark Felton, Amanda Crowell
      Pages: 171 - 202
      Abstract: Studies of adolescents and young-adults suggest that deliberative dialogue, a form of consensus-seeking argumentation, leads to stronger learning outcomes than persuasive dialogue. However, this research has not been informed by an analysis of dialogue among more experienced arguers. In the present study, we compare the deliberative and persuasive dialogues of novice and experienced arguers to better understand the difference between these two forms of discourse at differing levels of argumentative expertise. Our results confirm theoretical distinctions between deliberation and persuasion. Results also suggest that greater experience in argumentation is associated with a richer array of argumentative purposes, producing more cohesive, intersubjective and dialectically relevant dialogue. The implications of these findings for learning are discussed.
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • An Epistemological Appraisal of Walton’s Argument Schemes

    • Authors: Christoph Lumer
      Pages: 203 - 290
      Abstract: The article critically discusses Walton’s (and co-authors’) argument scheme approach to good argumentation. Four characteristics of Walton’s approach are presented: 1. Argument schemes provide normative requirements. 2. These schemata are enthymematic. 3. There are associated critical questions. 4. The method is inductive, abstracting schemata from groups of similar arguments. Four adequacy conditions are applied to these characteristics: AC1: effectiveness in achieving the epistemic goal of obtaining and communicating justified acceptable opinions; AC2: completeness in capturing the good argument types; AC3: efficiency in achieving the goals; AC4: justification of the argument schemes. The discussion reveals weaknesses in Walton’s account, including they are neither effective nor truly justified. A better alternative is an epistemological approach based on epistemological principles.
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7224
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • Burdens of Proposing

    • Authors: David Godden, Simon Wells
      Pages: 291 - 342
      Abstract: This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation dialogues. Do proposers bear a burden of proof' Building on pioneering work by Douglas Walton (2010), and following on a growing literature within computer science, the prevailing answer seems to be “No.” Instead, only recommenders—agents who put forward an option as the one to be taken—bear a burden of proof. Against this view, we contend that proposers have burdens of proof with respect to their proposals. Specifically, we argue that, while recommenders that Φ bear a burden of proof to show that □Φ (We should / ought to / must Φ), proposers that Φ have a burden of proof to show that ◇Φ (We may / can Φ). A burden of proposing may be defined as <P, Φi, ◇Φ>, which reads: Those who propose that we might Φ are obliged, if called upon, to show that Φ is possible in any of four ways which we call worldly, deontic, instrumental, and practical. So understood, burdens of proposing satisfy the standard formal definition of burden of proof.
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7225
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • Notice of Books Received

    • Authors: Informal Logic
      Pages: 343 - 357
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7226
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
  • In Memoriam

    • Authors: Dale Hample
      Pages: 359 - 361
      PubDate: 2022-03-16
      DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7227
      Issue No: Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
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