Authors:Fabrizio Macagno, Alice Toniolo Pages: 1 - 23 Abstract: Douglas Walton’s work is extremely vast, multifaceted, and interdisciplinary. He developed theoretical proposals that have been used in disciplines that are not traditionally related to philosophy, such as law, education, discourse analysis, artificial intelligence, or medical communication. Through his papers and books, Walton redefined the boundaries not only of argumentation theory, but also logic and philosophy. He was a philosopher in the sense that his interest was developing theoretical models that can help explain reality, and more importantly interact with it. For this reason, he proposed methods that have been used for analyzing different types of dialogical interactions, and modeling procedures for regulating them. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7210 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Jakub Pruś, Andrew Aberdein Pages: 25 - 47 Abstract: “Is every definition persuasive'” If essentialist views on definition are rejected and a pragmatic account adopted, where defining is a speech act which fixes the meaning of a term, then a problem arises: if meanings are not fixed by the essence of being itself, is not every definition persuasive' To address the problem, we refer to Douglas Walton’s impressive intellectual heritage—specifically on the argumentative potential of definition. In finding some non-persuasive definitions, we show not every definition is persuasive. The persuasiveness lies not in syntactic or semantic properties, but the context. We present this pragmatic account and provide rules for analysing and evaluating persuasive definition—a promising direction for further research. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7211 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Marcin Koszowy, Steve Oswald, Katarzyna Budzynska, Barbara Konat, Pascal Gygax Pages: 49 - 82 Abstract: In the spirit of the pragmatic account of quotation and reporting offered by Macagno and Walton (2017), we outline a systematic pragmatic account of rephrasing. For this purpose, we combine two interrelated methods of inquiry into the variety of uses of rephrase as a persuasive device: (i) the annotation of rephrase types to identify locutionary and illocutionary aspects of rephrase, (ii) the crowd–sourced examination of rephrase types to investigate their perlocutionary effects. As it draws on Waltonian insights and on empirical and experimental research on the (mis)use of rephrase, our approach allows us to ground a novel theoretically–informed and data–driven pragmatic account of rephrase. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7212 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Fabrizio Macagno Pages: 83 - 138 Abstract: An argumentation profile is defined as a methodological instrument for analyzing argumentative discourse considering distinct and interrelated dimensions: the types of argument used, their quality, and the emotions triggered. Walton’s theoretical contributions are developed as a coherent analytical and multifaceted toolbox for capturing these aspects. Argumentation schemes are used to detect and quantify the types of argument. Fallacy analysis and the assessment of the implicit premises retrieved through the schemes allow evaluating arguments. Finally, the frequency of emotive words signals the most common emotions aroused. This method is illustrated through a corpus of argumentative tweets of three politicians. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7215 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Chrysi Rapanta Pages: 139 - 170 Abstract: Douglas Walton, perhaps the most prolific author in Argumentation theory, has been of a great influence in the fields of Informal logic, Artificial intelligence, and Law. His contributions in the field of educational research, in particular in the field of argumentation and education, are less known. This review paper aims at shedding light on those aspects of Walton’s theory that have received educational researchers’ attention thus far, as well identifying existing lacks of consideration and open paths for future research. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7222 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Mark Felton, Amanda Crowell Pages: 171 - 202 Abstract: Studies of adolescents and young-adults suggest that deliberative dialogue, a form of consensus-seeking argumentation, leads to stronger learning outcomes than persuasive dialogue. However, this research has not been informed by an analysis of dialogue among more experienced arguers. In the present study, we compare the deliberative and persuasive dialogues of novice and experienced arguers to better understand the difference between these two forms of discourse at differing levels of argumentative expertise. Our results confirm theoretical distinctions between deliberation and persuasion. Results also suggest that greater experience in argumentation is associated with a richer array of argumentative purposes, producing more cohesive, intersubjective and dialectically relevant dialogue. The implications of these findings for learning are discussed. PubDate: 2022-03-16 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Christoph Lumer Pages: 203 - 290 Abstract: The article critically discusses Walton’s (and co-authors’) argument scheme approach to good argumentation. Four characteristics of Walton’s approach are presented: 1. Argument schemes provide normative requirements. 2. These schemata are enthymematic. 3. There are associated critical questions. 4. The method is inductive, abstracting schemata from groups of similar arguments. Four adequacy conditions are applied to these characteristics: AC1: effectiveness in achieving the epistemic goal of obtaining and communicating justified acceptable opinions; AC2: completeness in capturing the good argument types; AC3: efficiency in achieving the goals; AC4: justification of the argument schemes. The discussion reveals weaknesses in Walton’s account, including they are neither effective nor truly justified. A better alternative is an epistemological approach based on epistemological principles. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7224 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:David Godden, Simon Wells Pages: 291 - 342 Abstract: This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation dialogues. Do proposers bear a burden of proof' Building on pioneering work by Douglas Walton (2010), and following on a growing literature within computer science, the prevailing answer seems to be “No.” Instead, only recommenders—agents who put forward an option as the one to be taken—bear a burden of proof. Against this view, we contend that proposers have burdens of proof with respect to their proposals. Specifically, we argue that, while recommenders that Φ bear a burden of proof to show that □Φ (We should / ought to / must Φ), proposers that Φ have a burden of proof to show that ◇Φ (We may / can Φ). A burden of proposing may be defined as <P, Φi, ◇Φ>, which reads: Those who propose that we might Φ are obliged, if called upon, to show that Φ is possible in any of four ways which we call worldly, deontic, instrumental, and practical. So understood, burdens of proposing satisfy the standard formal definition of burden of proof. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7225 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Trudy Govier Pages: 523 - 537 Abstract: Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions. PubDate: 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6876 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 4 (2021)
Authors:Geoff Goddu Pages: 539 - 578 Abstract: While there has been in depth discussion of many particular argumentation schemes, some lament that there is little to no theory underpinning the notion of an argumentation scheme. Here I shall argue against the utility of argument schemes, at least as a fundamental part of a complete theory of arguments. I shall also present and defend a minimalist theory of their nature—a scheme is just a set of proposition expressions and propositional functions. While simple, the theory contravenes several typical desiderata of argumentation schemes such as (i) aiding in the identification of enthymemes and (ii) keeping arguments constrained to a manageable taxonomy. So much the worse for the desiderata. Instead, I shall recommend focusing less on schemes and more on the component propositional functions. PubDate: 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6671 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 4 (2021)
Authors:Martin Hinton Pages: 579 - 606 Abstract: Herein, I consider arguments resting on an appeal to a non-existent authority as a species of argument from authority, and ultimately show them to be reliant on arguments from analogy in their inferential force. Three sub-types of argument are discussed: from authorities as yet unborn, no longer living, or incapable of ever doing so. In each case it is shown that an element of arguing from analogy is required since there can be no direct evidence of any assertions of the source. In conclusion, it is suggested that such steps of analogy are employed frequently in traditional arguments from authority. PubDate: 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6662 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 4 (2021)
Authors:Taeda Tomic Pages: 607 - 639 Abstract: Since a clear account of the fallacy of false disjunctive syllogism is missing in the literature, the fallacy is defined and its three types are differentiated after some preliminaries. Section 4 further elaborates the differentia specifica for each of the three types by analyzing relevant argument criticism of each, as well as the related profiles of dialogue. After defining false disjunctive syllogisms, it becomes possible to distinguish between a false dilemma and a false disjunctive syllogism: section 5 analyzes their similarities (which explains why the fallacies are often confused with one another) and section 6 explains their differences. PubDate: 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6233 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 4 (2021)
Authors:Irmtraud Gallhofer, Willem Saris Pages: 641 - 676 Abstract: Philosophers deny a proposal for actions can be deduced from arguments for or against the proposal because they may be incompatible. Nevertheless, people in general, and politicians especially, make decisions and present arguments they believe are convincing. We studied politicians who made decisions in complex situations. They spoke about possible actions, their consequences, the probabilities of these consequences and their evaluations, but rarely indicated why their arguments led to their choice. We hypothesized implicit argumentation rules involved and checked whether they predicted those choices. We found seven implicit informal logic rules involved. We also found a random sample of people made the same choices based on the same arguments, suggesting basic warrants by which people argue about decisions. PubDate: 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.6765 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 4 (2021)
Authors:Sally Jackson Pages: 691 - 693 Abstract: Our beloved colleague, Charles Arthur Willard, has died at the age of 76. He will be remembered within the argumentation community not only as an influential theorist but also as one of the chief architects of an international and interdisciplinary field devoted to the study of argumentation. PubDate: 2021-12-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i4.7062 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 4 (2021)
Authors:José Ángel Gascón Pages: 289 - 308 Abstract: Harry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. Here, I propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. Argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim. PubDate: 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6838 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:Guillermo Sierra-Catalán Pages: 309 - 334 Abstract: Argumentation and fiction are quite different types of communicative phenomena. However, overlaps between them happen to be very frequent. We can both fictionalize by means of argumentation and argue by means of fiction. The main goal of this paper is to analyse the different types of overlap that may arise between argumentation and fiction. In this paper, the defended hypothesis is that by considering who the “character” that is arguing is, we can get an exhaustive account of any possible overlap, as well as an explanation of the different functions that such overlaps can play PubDate: 2021-09-09 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:John Butterworth Pages: 335 - 358 Abstract: Many standard definitions of ‘argument’ that recognise an ambiguity between its active and objective senses seek to subsume these in various ways into a single, composite whole. This, it is argued, glosses over the distinction instead of exploiting its elucidatory potential. Whilst optimistic about the prospects of theory integration, the paper recommends a methodology of differentiation as a first necessary step towards any such goal. It starts by assuming that ‘argument’ refers —simultaneously and independently— to two different things, making space between them for a theory of argument based on the then necessary externality of the relation between them. PubDate: 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6851 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:Matthew William Mckeon Pages: 359 - 390 Abstract: When a speaker states an argument in arguing—in its core sense—for the conclusion, the speaker asserts, as opposed to merely implies or implicates, the associated inference claim to the effect that the conclusion follows from the premises. In defense of this, I argue that how an inference claim is conveyed when stating an argument is constrained by constitutive and normative conditions for core cases of the speech of arguing for a conclusion. The speech act of assertion better reflects such conditions than does implication, conversational implicature, or conventional implicature. PubDate: 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6844 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:Esther Romero, Belén Soria Pages: 391 - 419 Abstract: It is a fact that novel metaphorical utterances appear in natural language argumentation. It seems, moreover, that these put forward metaphorical propositions that can have different roles (data, warrants or claims) in argument structure. There can even be good argumentation which is indispensably metaphorical. However, not all metaphor theories provide an explanation of metaphorical meaning compatible with these claims. In this article, we explain the three main views on metaphorical meaning and show, analysing some examples, their consequences for metaphorical argumentation. Our analysis shows that only the cognitive view can explain that there are arguments which can only be generated using novel metaphors. PubDate: 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6836 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:Marcin Lewinski Pages: 421 - 451 Abstract: I challenge two key assumptions of speech act theory, as applied to argumentation: illocutionary monism, grounded in the idea each utterance has only one (primary) illocutionary force, and the dyadic reduction, which models interaction as a dyadic affair between only two agents (speaker-hearer, proponentopponent). I show how major contributions to speech act inspired study of argumentation adhere to these assumptions even as illocutionary pluralism in argumentative polylogues is a significant empirical fact in need of theoretical attention. I demonstrate this with two examples where arguers interacting with multiple persons convey plural, argumentatively relevant illocutionary forces. Understanding illocutionary pluralism in argumentative polylogues also affords a better account of fallacious and manipulative discourse. PubDate: 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6855 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:Cristina Corredor Pages: 453 - 483 Abstract: This paper endorses a view of argumentation and arguments that relates both to a special type of speech action, namely, the performance of speech acts of arguing. Its aim is to advance an analysis of those acts that takes into account two kinds of norms related to their correct performance, namely, felicity conditions and objective requirements related to the “correspondence with the facts.” It assumes that the requirement that certain objective conditions be satisfied is among the set of felicity conditions of speech acts of arguing. Taking this into account helps clarify the position and role of warrants in the performance and assessment of these acts. PubDate: 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6854 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:Nathan Dickman Pages: 485 - 508 Abstract: An axiom of philosophical hermeneutics is that questioning has hermeneutic priority. Yet there are many different kinds of questions. Which sort has priority in understanding complete thoughts and for bringing about a fusion of horizons' Speech act theory is one resource for specifying which kind. I first develop the broad notion of questioning in philosophical hermeneutics. Second, I examine aspects of question taxonomies in pedagogy as well as their shortcomings. Third, I turn to the Speech Act approach to questioning and provide a challenge to this theory for adequately addressing what kind takes hermeneutic priority. I propose the category of “suspensives” as the kind of interlocutionary act definitive for questions that have hermeneutic priority. PubDate: 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i3.6840 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021)
Authors:Paula Olmos Pages: 131 - 164 Abstract: This paper is an essay on metaphilosophy that reviews, describes, categorises, and discusses different ways philosophers have approached the justification of abduction as a mode of reasoning and arguing. Advocating an argumentative approach to abduction, I model the philosophical debate over its justification as the critical assessment of a warrant-establishing argument allowing “H explains D” to be used as a reason for “H can be inferred from D.” Philosophers have discussed the conditions under which such kind of generic argument can be accepted, and I identify five kinds of such conditions, namely: a) dialectical/procedural restriction; b) claim restriction; c) restriction over acceptable explanatory principles; d) balancing restriction; and e) epistemic restriction. PubDate: 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i2.6249 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 2 (2021)
Authors:Jarmila Bubikova-Moan Pages: 187 - 217 Abstract: Building on a view of both narration and argumentation as dynamic concepts, this paper considers ways of assessing the credibility of narrative arguments constructed in empirical examples of conversational discourse. I argue that the key in any such exercise is to pay close attention to both structural and pragmatic details, particularly how conversational storytelling gets embedded in the surrounding discourse and how the way this is discursively accomplished vis-à-vis the narrators’ multilayered audience may be reflective of their argumentative goals. PubDate: 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i2.6506 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 2 (2021)
Authors:Fernando Leal Pages: 219 - 243 Abstract: Argumentation that uses the beliefs of one’s opponents to refute them is well known (ad hominem in the classical sense). This paper proposes that there is a hitherto unnoticed counterpart to it, to be called ab homine, in which speakers/writers argue through the manner in which they deliver a message. Since the manner of delivery can never be turned into a premise or premises, this form of argumentation—although somewhat resembling Aristotle’s ethos—is much closer to the peculiar force of Socratic elenchos. PubDate: 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i2.6338 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 2 (2021)
Authors:Tempest Henning Pages: 17 - 39 Abstract: This paper seeks to complicate two primary norms within argumentation theory: 1) engaging with one’s interlocutors in a ‘pleasant’ tone and 2) speaking directly to one’s target audience/interlocutor. Moreover, I urge argumentation theorists to explore various cultures’ argumentative norms and practices when attempting to formulate more universal theories regarding argumentation. Ultimately, I aim to show that the two previously mentioned norms within argumentation obscure and misrepresent many argumentative practices within African American Vernacular English—or Ebonics, specifically the art of signifying. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6687 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Michael Baumtrog Pages: 41 - 55 Abstract: In 1970 the voting age in Canada changed from 21 to 18. Since then, there have been calls to lower it further, most commonly to age 16. Against the motion, however, it has been argued that youth may lack the ability to exercise a mature and informed vote. This paper argues against that worry and shows how restricting youth from voting on the basis of a misbelief about their abilities amounts to an epistemic injustice. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6691 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Harmony Peach Pages: 57 - 79 Abstract: I explore how empathetic visual argument may be the mode best suited for eliciting appropriate force to the reasons given by arguers who face systematic identity prejudices. In the verbal mode, this force is often skewed through epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007), argumentative injustice (Bondy 2010), and discursive injustice (Kukla 2010). Highlighting their reliance on the Aristotelian sense of enthymeme, I show how visual arguments are highly context specific. Using Ian Dove’s Visual Scheming (2016) and the theory of the Retort collective (2004) via case study, I demonstrate how the visual mode can leave the appropriate force in the arguer’s control. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6688 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Tracy Bowell Pages: 81 - 106 Abstract: In this paper, I consider whether there are limits to virtuous argumentation in certain situations. I consider three types of cases: 1) arguing against denier discourses, 2) arguing with people who make bigoted claims, and 3) cases in which marginalised people are expected to exercise virtues of argument from a position of limited agency. For each type of case, I look at where limits to arguing responsibly might be drawn. I argue that there are situations in which we might withdraw from engagement for practical reasons and others in which withdrawing or refraining from engagement is a responsible way to deal with a particular position. Finally, I argue that in the third type of case, expecting the marginalised to argue as though on even terms with the positions of the dominant risks perpetrating argumentative harm. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6690 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Kathryn Phillips Pages: 107 - 130 Abstract: During a year when there is much tumult around the world and in the United States in particular, it might be surprising to encounter a paper about patience and argumentation. In this paper, I explore the notion of deep disagreement, with an eye to moral and political contexts in particular, in order to motivate the idea that patience is an argumentative virtue that we ought to cultivate. This is particularly so because of the extended nature of argumentation and the slow rate at which we change our minds. I raise a concern about how calls for patience have been misused in the past and argue that if we accept patience as an argumentative virtue, we should hold people in positions of power, in particular, to account. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6689 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Open Access journal
