Authors:Informal Logic Pages: 485 - 486 Abstract: In the issue, Michael Gilbert first considers the history and development of his theory before Leo Groarke helpfully clarifies the differences and affinities between multi-modal and multimodal argumentation. Then, each of Gilbert’s modes is explored in a separate critical study, with David Godden attending to the logical mode, Linda Carroza to the emotional, Claudio Duran the visceral, and Christopher Tindale the kisceral. A final paper by Marko Novak applies the theory (particularly the kisceral mode) to the field of law. Together, these papers offer readers an opportunity to review the range of ideas associated with Gilbert’s model, and set the grounds for continuing research on this important theory. PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7496 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:Michael A. Gilbert Pages: 487 - 506 Abstract: My essay, “Multi-modal argumentation” was published in the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, in 1994. This information appeared again in my book, Coalescent argumentation in 1997. In the ensuing twenty years, there have been many changes in argumentation theory, and I would like to take this opportunity to examine my now middle-aged theory in light of the developments in our discipline. I will begin by relating how a once keen intended lawyer and then formal logician ended up in argumentation theory. (If you do not care to read this bit of autobiography, skip to Section 2). PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7497 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:Leo Groarke Pages: 507 - 520 Abstract: Michael Gilbert’s multi-modal theory of argument challenges earlier accounts of arguing assumed in formal and informal logic. His account of emotional, visceral, and kisceral modes of arguing rejects the assumption that all arguments must be treated as instances of one “logical mode.” This paper compares his alternative modes to other modes proposed by those who have argued for visual, auditory, and other “multimodal” modes of arguing. I conclude that multi-modal and multimodal (without the hyphen) modes are complementary. Collectively, they represent an important attempt to radically expand the scope of informal logic and the argumentation that it studies. PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7498 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:David Godden Pages: 521 - 562 Abstract: On Gilbert’s multi-modal theory of argumentation, the “logical” is but one among many modes of argument, including the emotional, the visceral (physical), and the kisceral (intuitive). Yet, I argue that, properly understood, the logical is not one mode among many. Rather, it is better understood as the uber-mode of argument. What Gilbert calls the “logical mode” of argument—a linear, orderly, highly verbalizable, way of arguing—is made possible only to the extent that the logic of some space of reasons has been articulated. The “anti-logical” penchant of multi-modal argumentation is not found at the object-level—in its countenancing “non-logical” modes of argument, but at the meta-level—in its resistance, as a mistaken embracing of the “logical” mode, to using the logics governing the different modes to self-regulate the course of our arguings. PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7499 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:Linda Carozza Pages: 563 - 582 Abstract: This paper summarizes various interpretations of emotional arguments, with a focus on the emotional mode of argument introduced in the multi-modal argumentation model (Gilbert, 1994). From there the author shifts from a descriptive account of emotional arguments to a discussion about a normative framework. Pointing out problems with evaluative models of the emotional mode, a paradigmatic shift captured by the Amenable Argumentation Approach is explained as a way forward for the advancement of the emotional mode and multi-modal argumentation. PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7500 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:Claudio Duran Pages: 583 - 601 Abstract: In this paper I question the primacy of argumentation relying solely on logic by showing how the body and mind are deeply connected and as a result how communication and argumentation are a product of this mind/body connection. In particular, I explore the physicality of argumentation through the research and writings on gestures and the embodied mind. Michael Gilbert’s theory of multi-modal argumentation provides the general approach for this elaboration. PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7502 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:Christopher Tindale Pages: 603 - 621 Abstract: Of the different modes that characterize Michael Gilbert’s multi-modal theory of argumentation, the kisceral is in many ways the most challenging to understand and employ. It appears to bypass the processes of reason that have dominated accounts in the Western tradition, diverting us toward the private worlds of hunches and gut reactions. This paper explores the nature of kisceral arguments, comparing them to the way intuition operates in William James’ examination of mystical experience. Having provided an account of kisceral arguments and their operation, the discussion turns to the even more challenging issue of how such arguments should be evaluated. PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7501 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:Marko Novak Pages: 623 - 652 Abstract: Gilbert's kisceral argumentation is, roughly speaking, about arguing based on intuitions. In the forefront of such a (rhetorical) model are arguers and audiences, who resolve disagreements using kisceral arguments. Intuitions as reasons were more important in pre-modern law, when the law was not as explicit, precise, and determinate as today. Law influenced by religion or religious law was a typical example. In our much more secular modern era, intuitions are more or less subordinated to the (legal) logical mode of arguing. However, in tough legal cases, when logic "runs out," it is values that decide them. Not surprisingly, neuroscience and cognitive psychology have shown a strong connection between values and intuition. PubDate: 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i3.7503 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022)
Authors:Shiyang Yu, Frank Zenker Pages: 363 - 387 Abstract: To analyze the argument structure, the linked vs convergent distinction is crucial. In applying this distinction, argumentation scholars test for variations of argument strength under premise revision. A relevance-based test assesses whether an argument’s premises are individually relevant to its conclusion, while a support-based test assesses whether premises support the conclusion independently. Both criteria presuppose that evaluating an argument’s strength is methodologically prior to identifying its structure. Yet, if ‘argument structure’ is a concept of analysis, then a structural analysis would precede evaluating an argument’s strength. We problematize that state-of-the-art methods to identify structures fail, because they rely on evaluative judgments, and so “put the cart before the horse.” PubDate: 2022-06-10 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7133 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
Authors:Job de Grefte Pages: 389 - 415 Abstract: In this paper, I spell out and argue for a new epistemic theory of argumentation. Contrary to extant views, this theory is compatible with a pluralistic framework on argumentation, where the norms governing argumentation depend on the aim with which we engage in the practice. A domain of specifically epistemic argumentation is singled out, and I argue based on recent findings in modal epistemology that this domain is governed by the modal norm of safety; where a belief is safe just in case it is produced by a method that would not easily produce a false belief. While this criterion is well-known and uncontroversial in epistemology, it has hitherto not been applied to epistemic theories of argumentation. I show that the norm allows for a novel and superior perspective of the relevance of the persistent interlocutor in argumentation theory, and on the relation between dialectical and epistemic norms more generally. PubDate: 2022-06-10 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i2.7020 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
Authors:Nikil Mukerji, Adriano Mannino Pages: 439 - 470 Abstract: In a recent paper, José Ángel Gascón extends the Frankfurtian notion of bullshit to the sphere of argumentation. On Frankfurt’s view, the hallmark of bullshit is a lack of concern for the truth of an utterance on the part of the bullshitter. Similarly, Gascón argues, the hallmark of argumentative bullshit should be viewed as a lack of concern for whether the reasons that are adduced for a claim genuinely support that claim. Gascón deserves credit for drawing attention to the idea of argumentative bullshit. Nevertheless, we argue, his treatment leaves room for further refinement as he fails to clarify important points and misidentifies several features of argumentative bullshit. In particular, Gascón’s account fails to accommodate non-Frankfurtian forms of argumentative bullshit. This paper aims to amend and extend his proposal and proposes a general account that can encompass both Frankfurtian and non-Frankfurtian forms of argumentative bullshit. PubDate: 2022-06-10 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i2.7005 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 2 (2022)
Authors:Fabrizio Macagno, Alice Toniolo Pages: 1 - 23 Abstract: Douglas Walton’s work is extremely vast, multifaceted, and interdisciplinary. He developed theoretical proposals that have been used in disciplines that are not traditionally related to philosophy, such as law, education, discourse analysis, artificial intelligence, or medical communication. Through his papers and books, Walton redefined the boundaries not only of argumentation theory, but also logic and philosophy. He was a philosopher in the sense that his interest was developing theoretical models that can help explain reality, and more importantly interact with it. For this reason, he proposed methods that have been used for analyzing different types of dialogical interactions, and modeling procedures for regulating them. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7210 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Jakub Pruś, Andrew Aberdein Pages: 25 - 47 Abstract: “Is every definition persuasive'” If essentialist views on definition are rejected and a pragmatic account adopted, where defining is a speech act which fixes the meaning of a term, then a problem arises: if meanings are not fixed by the essence of being itself, is not every definition persuasive' To address the problem, we refer to Douglas Walton’s impressive intellectual heritage—specifically on the argumentative potential of definition. In finding some non-persuasive definitions, we show not every definition is persuasive. The persuasiveness lies not in syntactic or semantic properties, but the context. We present this pragmatic account and provide rules for analysing and evaluating persuasive definition—a promising direction for further research. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7211 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Marcin Koszowy, Steve Oswald, Katarzyna Budzynska, Barbara Konat, Pascal Gygax Pages: 49 - 82 Abstract: In the spirit of the pragmatic account of quotation and reporting offered by Macagno and Walton (2017), we outline a systematic pragmatic account of rephrasing. For this purpose, we combine two interrelated methods of inquiry into the variety of uses of rephrase as a persuasive device: (i) the annotation of rephrase types to identify locutionary and illocutionary aspects of rephrase, (ii) the crowd–sourced examination of rephrase types to investigate their perlocutionary effects. As it draws on Waltonian insights and on empirical and experimental research on the (mis)use of rephrase, our approach allows us to ground a novel theoretically–informed and data–driven pragmatic account of rephrase. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7212 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Fabrizio Macagno Pages: 83 - 138 Abstract: An argumentation profile is defined as a methodological instrument for analyzing argumentative discourse considering distinct and interrelated dimensions: the types of argument used, their quality, and the emotions triggered. Walton’s theoretical contributions are developed as a coherent analytical and multifaceted toolbox for capturing these aspects. Argumentation schemes are used to detect and quantify the types of argument. Fallacy analysis and the assessment of the implicit premises retrieved through the schemes allow evaluating arguments. Finally, the frequency of emotive words signals the most common emotions aroused. This method is illustrated through a corpus of argumentative tweets of three politicians. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7215 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Chrysi Rapanta Pages: 139 - 170 Abstract: Douglas Walton, perhaps the most prolific author in Argumentation theory, has been of a great influence in the fields of Informal logic, Artificial intelligence, and Law. His contributions in the field of educational research, in particular in the field of argumentation and education, are less known. This review paper aims at shedding light on those aspects of Walton’s theory that have received educational researchers’ attention thus far, as well identifying existing lacks of consideration and open paths for future research. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7222 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Mark Felton, Amanda Crowell Pages: 171 - 202 Abstract: Studies of adolescents and young-adults suggest that deliberative dialogue, a form of consensus-seeking argumentation, leads to stronger learning outcomes than persuasive dialogue. However, this research has not been informed by an analysis of dialogue among more experienced arguers. In the present study, we compare the deliberative and persuasive dialogues of novice and experienced arguers to better understand the difference between these two forms of discourse at differing levels of argumentative expertise. Our results confirm theoretical distinctions between deliberation and persuasion. Results also suggest that greater experience in argumentation is associated with a richer array of argumentative purposes, producing more cohesive, intersubjective and dialectically relevant dialogue. The implications of these findings for learning are discussed. PubDate: 2022-03-16 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:Christoph Lumer Pages: 203 - 290 Abstract: The article critically discusses Walton’s (and co-authors’) argument scheme approach to good argumentation. Four characteristics of Walton’s approach are presented: 1. Argument schemes provide normative requirements. 2. These schemata are enthymematic. 3. There are associated critical questions. 4. The method is inductive, abstracting schemata from groups of similar arguments. Four adequacy conditions are applied to these characteristics: AC1: effectiveness in achieving the epistemic goal of obtaining and communicating justified acceptable opinions; AC2: completeness in capturing the good argument types; AC3: efficiency in achieving the goals; AC4: justification of the argument schemes. The discussion reveals weaknesses in Walton’s account, including they are neither effective nor truly justified. A better alternative is an epistemological approach based on epistemological principles. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7224 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
Authors:David Godden, Simon Wells Pages: 291 - 342 Abstract: This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation dialogues. Do proposers bear a burden of proof' Building on pioneering work by Douglas Walton (2010), and following on a growing literature within computer science, the prevailing answer seems to be “No.” Instead, only recommenders—agents who put forward an option as the one to be taken—bear a burden of proof. Against this view, we contend that proposers have burdens of proof with respect to their proposals. Specifically, we argue that, while recommenders that Φ bear a burden of proof to show that □Φ (We should / ought to / must Φ), proposers that Φ have a burden of proof to show that ◇Φ (We may / can Φ). A burden of proposing may be defined as <P, Φi, ◇Φ>, which reads: Those who propose that we might Φ are obliged, if called upon, to show that Φ is possible in any of four ways which we call worldly, deontic, instrumental, and practical. So understood, burdens of proposing satisfy the standard formal definition of burden of proof. PubDate: 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.22329/il.v42i1.7225 Issue No:Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022)
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