Authors:Tempest Henning Pages: 17 - 39 Abstract: This paper seeks to complicate two primary norms within argumentation theory: 1) engaging with one’s interlocutors in a ‘pleasant’ tone and 2) speaking directly to one’s target audience/interlocutor. Moreover, I urge argumentation theorists to explore various cultures’ argumentative norms and practices when attempting to formulate more universal theories regarding argumentation. Ultimately, I aim to show that the two previously mentioned norms within argumentation obscure and misrepresent many argumentative practices within African American Vernacular English—or Ebonics, specifically the art of signifying. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6687 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Michael Baumtrog Pages: 41 - 55 Abstract: In 1970 the voting age in Canada changed from 21 to 18. Since then, there have been calls to lower it further, most commonly to age 16. Against the motion, however, it has been argued that youth may lack the ability to exercise a mature and informed vote. This paper argues against that worry and shows how restricting youth from voting on the basis of a misbelief about their abilities amounts to an epistemic injustice. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6691 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Harmony Peach Pages: 57 - 79 Abstract: I explore how empathetic visual argument may be the mode best suited for eliciting appropriate force to the reasons given by arguers who face systematic identity prejudices. In the verbal mode, this force is often skewed through epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007), argumentative injustice (Bondy 2010), and discursive injustice (Kukla 2010). Highlighting their reliance on the Aristotelian sense of enthymeme, I show how visual arguments are highly context specific. Using Ian Dove’s Visual Scheming (2016) and the theory of the Retort collective (2004) via case study, I demonstrate how the visual mode can leave the appropriate force in the arguer’s control. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6688 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Tracy Bowell Pages: 81 - 106 Abstract: In this paper, I consider whether there are limits to virtuous argumentation in certain situations. I consider three types of cases: 1) arguing against denier discourses, 2) arguing with people who make bigoted claims, and 3) cases in which marginalised people are expected to exercise virtues of argument from a position of limited agency. For each type of case, I look at where limits to arguing responsibly might be drawn. I argue that there are situations in which we might withdraw from engagement for practical reasons and others in which withdrawing or refraining from engagement is a responsible way to deal with a particular position. Finally, I argue that in the third type of case, expecting the marginalised to argue as though on even terms with the positions of the dominant risks perpetrating argumentative harm. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6690 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Kathryn Phillips Pages: 107 - 130 Abstract: During a year when there is much tumult around the world and in the United States in particular, it might be surprising to encounter a paper about patience and argumentation. In this paper, I explore the notion of deep disagreement, with an eye to moral and political contexts in particular, in order to motivate the idea that patience is an argumentative virtue that we ought to cultivate. This is particularly so because of the extended nature of argumentation and the slow rate at which we change our minds. I raise a concern about how calls for patience have been misused in the past and argue that if we accept patience as an argumentative virtue, we should hold people in positions of power, in particular, to account. PubDate: 2021-03-02 DOI: 10.22329/il.v41i1.6689 Issue No:Vol. 41, No. 1 (2021)
Authors:Louise Cummings Pages: 521 - 544 Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic presents argumentation theorists with an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which people, agencies and governments respond to the emergence of a new virus. Reponses have revealed a range of judgements and decisions, not all of which are rationally warranted. This article will examine errors in reasoning, several of which have reduced the public’s compliance with important health measures. This article will also analyse rationally warranted reasoning about Covid-19 employed by public health agencies. In examining instances of good and bad reasoning during the Covid-19 pandemic, we can begin to construct a taxonomy of arguments that facilitated and hindered individual and collective responses during this public health emergency. PubDate: 2020-12-18 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i4.6310 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020)
Authors:Anand Jayprakash Vaidya Pages: 545 - 586 Abstract: : In this essay I set out the case for why mindfulness meditation should be included in critical thinking education, especially with respect to educating people about how to argue with one another. In 1, I introduce to distinct mind sets, the critical mind and the meditative mind, and show that they are in apparent tension with one another. Then by examining the Delphi Report on Critical Thinking I show how they are not in tension. I close 1 by examining some recent work by Mark Battersby and Jeffery Maynes on expanding out critical thinking education to be inclusive of cognitive science and decision making. I argue that their arguments for expanding critical thinking education ultimately lead to considering the relevance of meditation in critical thinking. In 2, I examine work on critical thinking by Harvey Siegel and Sharon Bailin in order to draw out different conceptions of critical thinking both from a theoretical point of view as well as a pedagogical point of view. In 3, I present criteria for selecting a form of meditation that should be taught in critical thinking courses; I argue that mindfulness meditation deriving from the Buddhist tradition satisfies the relevant criteria. I then present research from contemporary cognitive neuroscience and psychology about the benefits of mindfulness meditation as it relates to the prospects of including it in critical thinking. In 4, I consider a recent study by Noone and Hogan (2018) that suggests that mindfulness meditation does not improve a person’s ability to think critically. I argue that while the study is important, there are substantial reasons for thinking that further studies should be done, as the authors themselves conclude. In 5, I move on to the issue of how meditation can be useful for improving performance in one important area of critical thinking: mitigating stereotype threat. My focus here is on examining the hypothesis that stereotype threat effects performance in critical thinking, and that negative impacts from stereotype threat can be mitigated by meditation. In 6, I summarize my argument for including meditation into critical thinking education, and close by discussing three important objections. PubDate: 2020-12-18 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i4.6311 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020)
Authors:José Ángel Gascón Pages: 587 - 604 Abstract: Hilary Kornblith has criticised reasons-based approaches to epistemic justification on the basis of psychological research that shows that reflection is unreliable. Human beings, it seems, are not very good at identifying our own cognitive processes and the causes of our beliefs. In this article I defend a conception of reasons that takes those empirical findings into account and can avoid Kornblith’s objections. Reasons, according to this account, are not to be identified with the causes of our beliefs and are useful first and foremost in argumentation instead of reflection. PubDate: 2020-12-18 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i4.6070 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020)
Authors:Yi Song, Szu-Fu Chao, Yigal Attali Pages: 605 - 628 Abstract: We designed scaffolded tasks that targeted the skill of identifying reasoning errors and conducted a study with 472 middle school students. The study results showed a small positive impact of the scaffolding on student performance on one topic, but not the other, indicating that student skills of writing critiques could be affected by the topic and argument content. Additionally, students from low-SES families did not perform as well as their peers. Student performance on the critique tasks had moderate or strong correlations with students’ state reading and writing test scores. Implications of the scaffolding and critique task design are discussed. PubDate: 2020-12-18 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i4.6034 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 4 (2020)
Authors:Lilian Bermejo-Luque Pages: 295 - 316 Abstract: In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong.
Authors:Felipe Oliveira de Sousa Pages: 317 - 357 Abstract: In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned both with his own development as an arguer and with helping other arguers in that regard. PubDate: 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6205 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 3 (2020)
Authors:Leah Henderson Pages: 359 - 382 Abstract: Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour. PubDate: 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6172 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 3 (2020)
Authors:Marko Novak Pages: 383 - 421 Abstract: This paper discusses how an understanding of Jung's psychological types is important for the relevance of Gilbert's multi-modal argumentation theory. Moreover, it highlights how the types have been confirmed by contemporary neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Based on Gilbert's approach, I extend multi-modal argumentation to the area of legal argumentation. It seems that when we leave behind the traditional fortress of “logical” legal argumentation, we "discover" alternate modes (such as the intuitive, emotional, and sensory) that have always been present, concealed in the theoretically underestimated rhetorical skills of arguers. PubDate: 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6002 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 3 (2020)
Authors:Jingjing Wu Pages: 423 - 441 Abstract: Particular reasoning is arguably the most common type of legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick proposed that, in a legal context, justifiable particular reasoning has to be universalizable. This paper aims to: (1) investigate MacCormick’s thesis; (2) explain how a particular can ever be universal by drawing inspiration from Scott Brewer’s formula on reasoning by analogy; (3) further comprehend MacCormick’s thesis by considering some of the arguments advanced by its opponents; (4) use the ‘pilot-judgement procedure’ developed by the European Court of Human Rights as an example to illustrate the relevance of the universalizable particular thesis in today’s legal practices. PubDate: 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.5994 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 3 (2020)
Authors:Ralph Barnes, Zoë Neumann, Samuel Draznin-Nagy Pages: 443 - 473 Abstract: In this paper, we consider the way that web documents seeking to persuade readers of certain science claims provide information about the sources of the arguments. Our quantitative analysis reveals that web documents in our sample include hundreds of examples in which the reader is provided information regarding the trustworthiness (or lack thereof) of sources. The web documents also contain a large number of examples in which the reader is provided with information about how many individuals hold a particular belief. We discuss ad hominem, ad verecundiam, and ad populum arguments, and the way that the examples found in our sample of documents are related to these argumentation schemes. PubDate: 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.5984 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 3 (2020)
Authors:Kamil Lemanek Pages: 475 - 487 Abstract: This short work presents a popular fringe theory as a source of case studies for use in teaching informal logic in an introductory course. It puts forward ancient astronaut theory as the candidate source, together with a characterization of why it fits the bill. The televised material associated with that theory is well suited to being used as case studies given that they are easy to follow, contain a surprising number of arguments and fallacies, and keep students reliably engaged. The paper includes an overview of the forms of argumentation and fallacies that these cases may be used to teach, along with a sketch of how to best implement them in the classroom. PubDate: 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6294 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 3 (2020)
Authors:Kevin Possin Pages: 489 - 508 Abstract: The CAT is entirely dedicated to assessing the critical-thinking skills involved in scientific reasoning and practical problem solving. While the test is found to have reasonable content validity, various issues with its prompts are discussed, along with significant issues with its scoring. The CAT’s recommended use as a “model” for curricular changes, called CAT Apps, is criticized as “teaching to the test.” PubDate: 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6243 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 3 (2020)
Authors:Jean Goodwin Pages: 157 - 203 Abstract: I inquire into argument at the system level, exploring the controversy over whether climate scientists should fly. I document participants’ knowledge of a skeptical argument that because scientists fly, they cannot testify credibly about the climate emergency. I show how this argument has been managed by pro-climate action arguers, and how some climate scientists have developed parallel reasoning, articulating a sophisticated case why they will be more effective in the controversy if they fly less. Finally, I review some strategies arguers deploy to use the arguments of others against them. I argue that only by attending to argument-making at the system level can we understand how arguers come to know the resources for argument available in a controversy and to think strategically about how to use them. I call for more work on argument at the system level PubDate: 2020-07-06 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i2.6327 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Catarina Dutilh Novaes Pages: 205 - 236 Abstract: Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument with two real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information by authoritarian politicians. PubDate: 2020-07-06 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i2.6328 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Derek Allen Pages: 237 - 254 Abstract: My topic is the theme of the E-OSSA 12 conference, namely Evidence, Persuasion and Diversity. I will present relevant material from a selection of Canadian legal cases, along with background information as needed and commentary. My primary focus will be on two landmark Supreme Court of Canada cases—an Aboriginal law case and a case that was both a constitutional law case and a criminal law case. PubDate: 2020-07-06 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i2.6329 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Petar Bodlović Pages: 255 - 294 Abstract: On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to' Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents' In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous (because two types of presumptions entail distinct conceptions of the “burden of proof”), and likely implausible. As a result, they require qualifications. PubDate: 2020-07-06 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i2.6312 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 2 (2020)
Authors:Christopher Tindale Pages: 1 - 2 Abstract: We deeply mourn the sudden and completely unexpected death of our friend and colleague on 3 January 2020, a gentle and unassuming giant in the fields of informal logic and argument theory. PubDate: 2020-02-29 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Douglas Walton Pages: 3 - 45 Abstract: Amphiboly has been widely recognized, starting from the time of Aristotle, as an informal fallacy arising from grammatical ambiguity. This paper applies the profiles of dialogue tool to the fallacy of amphiboly, providing a five-step evidence-based procedure whereby a syntactically ambiguous sentence uttered in a natural language text can be evaluated as committing a fallacy of amphiboly (or not). A user applies the tool to a natural language text by comparing a descriptive graph, representing how the argumentation actually went, to a normative graph, representing how the argumentation should ideally have proceeded. PubDate: 2020-02-28 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i1.5997 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:Austin Dacey Pages: 47 - 76 Abstract: In defending a new framework for incorporating metacognitive debiasing strategies into critical thinking education, Jeffrey Maynes (2015; 2017) draws on ecological rationality theory to argue that in felicitous environments, agents will achieve greater epistemic success by relying on heuristics rather than more ideally rational procedures. He considers a challenge presented by Mercier and Sperber’s (2011; 2017) “interactionist” thesis that individual biases contribute to successful group reasoning. I argue that the challenge can be met without assuming an individualist ideal of the critical thinker as a solitary reasoner. Focusing on cognitive laziness and myside bias, I then argue that a more complete reckoning with the implications of interactionism about reasoning will require us to transcend individualism more fully to embrace the selection, design, regulation, and navigation of dialogic environments as central pedagogical aims of critical thinking education. PubDate: 2020-02-28 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i1.6024 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:John Casey Pages: 77 - 108 Abstract: The concept of adversariality, like that of argument, admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I argue, the question of adversarial argument has not been well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two considerations show that adversariality is an essential part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the psychological states they provoke and for the fact that they are causally related to our actions. As a result, argument involving agreement can also be understood to be adversarial. PubDate: 2020-02-28 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i1.5969 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2020)
Authors:David Alvargonzález Pages: 109 - 137 Abstract: In this paper, I will propose a classification of analogies based on their internal structure. Selecting the criteria used in that classification first requires discussing the minimal constitutive parts of any analogy. Accordingly, I will discuss the differences between analogy and similarity and between analogy and “synalogy,” and I will stress the importance of the analogy of operations and procedures. Finally, I will set forth a classification of the different types of analogies, which lends itself to a further understanding of the differences between certain modulations of the general idea of analogy, such as archetypes, prototypes, models, simulations, parables, paradigms, canons, maps, thought experiments, myths, utopias, dystopias and fables. PubDate: 2020-02-28 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i1.5082 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2020)
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