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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy
Number of Followers: 27  

  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Online) 1559-3061
Published by U of Southern California Homepage  [3 journals]
  • The Inherent Tolerance of the Democratic Process

    • Authors: Emanuela Ceva, Rossella De Bernardi
      Abstract: Recent attempts at making sense of toleration as an ideal of political morality have focused on how liberal democratic institutions generate political arrangements that protect people’s freedom to “live their life as they see fit.” We show how these views rely on a one-dimensional interpretation of the liberal democratic political project. In so doing, they underestimate an important “interactive” dimension. This dimension concerns what it means for liberal democracies to realize toleration as a property inherent to their constitutive political processes. We illustrate this claim with reference to the liberal democratic decision-making process. Such a process realizes toleration as forbearance in itself. It does so because it establishes the participants in the process as political agents who recognize their mutual standing to share the political authority to make collectively binding decisions, despite their grounds for reciprocal objection.
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.1541
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
  • Slack Taking and Burden Dumping

    • Authors: Aaron Finley
      Abstract: Peter Singer argues that when some fail to do their part in alleviating suffering, the rest of us must take up their slack. In response, L. J. Cohen, Liam Murphy, and David Miller argue that such a requirement would be unfair. No one, they contend, should be required to contribute more than she would be required to under full compliance. I argue against Cohen, Murphy, and Miller that we are obligated to take up slack left by noncontributors, but agree that we are thereby treated unfairly. Drawing on the literatures on group causation and moral responsibility, I argue that noncontributors wrong those they fail to help and those who take up their slack. I refer to the latter kind of wrong as “burden dumping.” Furthermore, I argue that my account applies whether we conceive of rescue duties as discretionary or nondiscretionary. One might think that if my duties to rescue do not require me to contribute to any particular rescue effort, I do not dump burdens on anyone when I do nothing. In reply, I argue that when I have a nondiscretionary duty to contribute to a particular rescue effort, I unfairly dump burdens on those contributing to that effort when I fail to do my part. Similarly, when my duty to rescue is discretionary and I do nothing, I unfairly dump burdens on everyone whose rescue efforts I might have contributed to. Using this apparatus, we can account for the force of arguments such as Singer’s as well as the idea that those who dump burdens are blameworthy for treating other rescuers unfairly.
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.1611
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
  • Is Morality Open to the Free Will Skeptic'

    • Authors: Stephen Morris
      Abstract: The primary aim of this essay is to consider whether free will skeptics’ assertions of moral claims pertaining to human agents and their actions are consistent with the rejection of the kind of moral responsibility—namely, that which requires free will—that is espoused by virtually all of them. In order to address this issue, I will examine one of the most well-known and detailed defenses of morality by a free will skeptic; namely, that provided by Derk Pereboom in his book Living without Free Will. I conclude that free will skeptics should dispense with making any moral assertions with regard to human agents or their actions since doing so does little more than muddy up the conceptual waters by recasting moral terms in ways that are at odds with their traditional or folk usage.​
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.1817
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
  • When to Start Saving the Planet'

    • Authors: Frank Hindriks
      Abstract: People should take immediate action to prevent climate harms. Although intuitive, this claim faces two important problems. First, no individual can avert a climate harm on their own. Second, too few people are typically willing to contribute. In response, I point out that individuals can sometimes help prevent harm to the climate, and I argue that they should take preventive action when the prospect of success is good enough. Furthermore, when too few are willing to contribute, an individual may be required to activate others to increase their number. This serves to increase the prospect of success. Crucially, this prospect may be good enough well before enough people have become willing to engage. It follows that people should start saving the planet soon, if not immediately.
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.1564
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
  • No Disrespect—But That Account Does Not Explain What Is Morally Bad
           About Discrimination

    • Authors: Frej Klem Thomsen
      Abstract: The article explores one prominent account of what makes discrimination morally bad (when it is) – the disrespect-based account. The article first reviews and clarifies the account, arguing that it is most charitably understood as the claim that discrimination is morally bad when the discriminator gives lower weight to reasons grounded in the moral status of the discriminatee(s) in her decision-making. It then presents three challenges to the account, and reviews a recent argument in defense of it. The first challenge is the fact that intuitions that might support the disrespect-based account can also be explained by reference to the fact that disrespect reflects poorly on the moral character of the discriminator. The second challenge is that there are cases where disrespectful discrimination is not intuitively worse than non-disrespectful discrimination. The third challenge is that the disrespect-based account has difficulties explaining our intuitions about cases of “doing right for the wrong reasons”. Finally, pace a recent argument in its defense, cases of harmless and apparently morally bad discrimination are plausibly best explained by other factors than disrespect. In the light of this analysis, the article concludes that the disrespect-based account should be abandoned.
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.1900
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
  • Agency, Stability, and Permeability in "Games"

    • Authors: Elisabeth Camp
      Abstract: In “Games and the Art of Agency,” Thi Nguyen argues that games both highlight and foster a profound complexity in human motivation, in the form of “purposeful and managed agential disunity.”  I agree that human agency is “fluid and fleeting” rather than stable and unified; but I argue that Nguyen’s analysis itself relies on a traditional conception of selves as enduring goal-driven agents which his discussion calls into question. Without this conception, games look more like life, and both look riskier, than we might otherwise hope.
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.2707
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
  • Coverage Shortfalls at the Library of Agency

    • Authors: Elijah Millgram
      Abstract: In his “Games and the Art of Agency,” C. Thi Nguyen makes an intriguing and very plausible suggestion: games, or at any rate a great many of them, are artworks whose medium is, roughly, how one goes about doing what one does. In assigning an objective, laying down the constraints under which it has to be achieved, and specifying the terrain on which it will be played out, a game sculpts the decision-making processes of its players, the ways they see their environment and option space, their motivations, and much else. Thus our by now quite extensive repertoire of games constitutes a library of agency. This library allows us to try on different modes of agency before deciding which is best for us—for a given type of occasion, or generally. It can help educate us into unfamiliar forms of agency, by providing the sort of controlled exercises that allow beginners the practice they need, which is to say that games are exercise and preparation for autonomous agency. And it promises to broaden and enrich our philosophical treatments of the topic, in part by serving as a testbed for competing theories of practical rationality; if we want to get a realistic sense of what it would be like to decide what to do, in the way that one or another theory of practical deliberation says, we can experiment with it in an appropriately designed game.
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.2708
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
  • Games Unlike Life

    • Authors: C. Thi Nguyen
      Abstract: This is an answer to Elisabeth Camp's and Elijah Millgram's probing articles about Games and the Art of Agency, published in this symposium.
      PubDate: 2023-01-26
      DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v23i3.2709
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 3 (2023)
       
 
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