A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.156
Number of Followers: 6  
 
  Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 0012-2173 - ISSN (Online) 1759-0949
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [352 journals]
  • DIA volume 61 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Pages: 1 - 4
      PubDate: 2022-09-27
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217322000385
       
  • Projet Babel Fish : Introduction

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Bandini; Aude, Salay, Nancy
      Pages: 197 - 201
      PubDate: 2022-09-27
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217322000336
       
  • Le raisonnement par analogie considéré comme un schéma
           d'inférence

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Walliser; Bernard, Zwirn, Denis, Zwirn, Hervé
      Pages: 225 - 248
      Abstract: Malgré son importance dans divers domaines, le raisonnement par analogie n'a pas encore reçu de représentation formelle unifiée. Notre contribution suggère un schéma d'inférence général compatible avec différentes logiques. Premièrement, une assertion analogique définit la similarité entre deux objets en fonction de leurs propriétés, de façon seulement relative. Deuxièmement, une inférence analogique transfère une propriété nouvelle d'un objet à un objet similaire, grâce à une méta-hypothèse d'arrière-plan qui relie deux ensembles de propriétés. Le degré de croyance dans la conclusion est directement relié au degré de croyance dans cette méta-hypothèse.
      PubDate: 2022-09-27
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217322000294
       
  • Les termes transplantés : une approche réflexive de la
           philosophie en chinois moderne

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Zhou; Xiyin
      Pages: 249 - 260
      Abstract: Après la dispute soutenue à partir des années 1990 sur la question de savoir s'il y a une philosophie chinoise, plusieurs intellectuels chinois, y compris et surtout des philosophes, ont commencé, depuis une dizaine d'années, à se réunir autour d'une problématique plus concrète : « une philosophie en langue chinoise est-elle possible ' » ou « comment raisonner en chinois moderne ' » Parmi de nombreux sujets, celui des « termes transplantés » initié par Chen Jiaying (1952-) a attiré l'attention générale. Cet article compte, en s'appuyant sur son travail, introduire et approfondir ce problème en tant que défi particulier pour la pratique philosophique en chinois.
      PubDate: 2022-08-12
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217322000300
       
  • Gadamer's Historically Effected and Effective Consciousness

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Larrauri Pertierra; Iñaki Xavier
      Pages: 261 - 284
      Abstract: Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that consciousness not only historically constrains experience but also allows strangeness to intelligibly speak to it. This historically effected and effective consciousness features in Gadamer's idea that a common language is unearthed for the interpretive horizons of those involved in dialogue with each other through a logic of question and answer. I argue, however, that this reveals a conceptual uncertainty about evaluating progress in interpretive understanding. Gadamer's failure to escape from this uncertainty risks the possibility of a problematic relativism. Effectively, even if sufficient interpretation occurs when horizons are infinitely structured, this does not preclude incoherence between a horizon's elements.
      PubDate: 2022-05-16
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217322000178
       
  • Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Walker; Mark
      Pages: 285 - 309
      Abstract: Epistemic uniqueness is the view that there is at most one rational doxastic response to a given batch of evidence E, while epistemic permissiveness is the denial of epistemic uniqueness. As several authors have noted, one of the attractions of epistemic permissiveness is that it allows us to believe that more than one doxastic response may be rationally faultless, and so permits us to respect the epistemic credentials of all parties to a dispute. I argue that permissiveness is unable to deliver on this claimed benefit in many philosophical disputes.
      PubDate: 2022-03-10
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217322000117
       
  • God, Tragic Dilemmas, and the Problem of Gratuitous Evil

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Naraghi; Arash
      Pages: 311 - 324
      Abstract: Many philosophers have argued that the existence of gratuitous evil is the most serious objection against the existence of an all-perfect God. I argue that the idea of a moral dilemma (or, more accurately, a tragic dilemma) may either (1) provide a moral justification for God to permit the existence of gratuitous evil, or (2) offer a theodicy of divine tragedy to explain why evils in the world are not necessarily gratuitous, or if they are, why they cannot provide a piece of decisive evidence to reject the existence of an all-perfect God.
      PubDate: 2022-01-24
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000354
       
  • Une défense de l'hédonisme axiologique

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Broi; Antonin
      Pages: 325 - 346
      Abstract: L'hédonisme axiologique a une longue histoire en philosophie. Pourtant, il garde une mauvaise réputation qui lui vaut d’être parfois écarté sans ménagement de la discussion philosophique. Cet article se propose de défendre l'hédonisme axiologique en exposant les principaux arguments en sa faveur et en répondant aux principales critiques et confusions dont il fait l'objet. Une attention particulière sera portée aux arguments établissant la spécificité du plaisir et du déplaisir par rapport à toutes les autres choses — amitié, savoir, justice, etc. — dont on pourrait argumenter la valeur finale.
      PubDate: 2022-09-27
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217322000373
       
  • Analogical Reasoning as an Inference Scheme

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Walliser; Bernard, Zwirn, Denis, Zwirn, Hervé
      Pages: 203 - 223
      Abstract: Despite its importance in various fields, analogical reasoning has not yet received a unified formal representation. Our contribution proposes a general scheme of inference that is compatible with different types of logic (deductive, probabilistic, non-monotonic). Firstly, analogical assessment precisely defines the similarity of two objects according to their properties, in a relative rather than absolute way. Secondly, analogical inference transfers a new property from one object to a similar one, thanks to an over-hypothesis linking two sets of properties. The belief strength in the conclusion is then directly related to the belief strength in this meta-hypothesis.
      PubDate: 2021-08-09
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000226
       
  • On Being a Fan and on Fanhood and Its Implications for Defeating the Moral
           Sceptic

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Superson; Anita M.
      Pages: 347 - 368
      Abstract: I employ the notion of fanhood to object to David Gauthier's Dependency Thesis, according to which, if a disposition is rationally required to adopt, so too are the acts expressing it. I first establish that fanhood is a commitment relevantly similar to a moral commitment. I then argue that, because genuine fanhood characteristically issues in inherently irrational behaviours in the form of ‘luck charms,’ or, superstitious practices fans believe will help their team win, it poses a decisive objection to the Dependency Thesis, thereby eliminating a promising attempt to defeat the moral sceptic.
      PubDate: 2021-12-02
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000330
       
  • Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Hossein Khani; Ali
      Pages: 369 - 391
      Abstract: I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content.
      PubDate: 2021-08-09
      DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000214
       
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 35.173.35.14
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-