Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Ouzilou; Olivier Pages: 199 - 235 Abstract: La thèse affirmant la dépendance mentale des entités institutionnelles est particulièrement débattue en ontologie sociale. L'une de ses implications est la position infaillibiliste selon laquelle l'existence des entités institutionnelles nécessite que certaines de leurs propriétés soient connues. Quelles sont ces propriétés ' Après avoir présenté la conception searlienne des entités institutionnelles et le type de dépendance mentale qu'elles manifestent, je circonscris le contenu de la position infaillibiliste. Je montre ensuite que ces propriétés sont les pouvoirs déontiques associés à ces entités et que l'attitude mentale vis-à-vis des pouvoirs déontiques doit prendre la forme d'un savoir pratique. Je montre enfin que cette interprétation est compatible avec l'existence d'au moins certaines entités institutionnelles naturalisées. PubDate: 2021-09-02 DOI: 10.1017/S001221732100024X
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Authors:Giladi; Paul Pages: 257 - 275 Abstract: In this paper, I argue that John Dupré and Daniel Nicholson's ‘process manifesto’ is ironically more sympathetic to descriptive metaphysics than to revisionary metaphysics. Focusing on their argument that any process philosophy automatically slides into Whiteheadian obscurantism if it does not just rest content with revealing the problematic features of ordinary language, I argue that their position occludes a logical space, one in which revisionary metaphysics is articulated without any Whiteheadian obscurantism and involves no dereliction of critical/revisionary orientation. I argue that key features of the respective critical social ontologies of Judith Butler and Talia Mae Bettcher occupy such a logical space. PubDate: 2021-03-19 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000068
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Authors:Soucy; Guillaume Pages: 277 - 295 Abstract: Dans Fellow creatures, Christine Korsgaard soutient que les êtres humains auraient l'obligation morale de traiter les animaux sensibles comme des fins en soi. Cependant, cet article tente de démontrer que la méthode korsgaardienne dépasse ce que permet une théorie constructiviste conséquente et soutient que nous devrions opter pour une version humienne plutôt que kantienne du constructivisme. Selon moi, une telle conception permet tout à fait de soutenir des positions éthiques substantielles sur la question animale sans avoir à compromettre ses engagements ontologiques. PubDate: 2021-08-06 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000172
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Authors:Li; Jingjing Pages: 297 - 317 Abstract: In this article, I explore how we can expand the project of Buddhist feminism by drawing on Chinese Yogācāra philosophy. With a focus on the writings of Xuanzang (c. 602–664) and his disciple Kuiji (632–682), I investigate how the Yogācāra theory of consciousness can be read as a gendered account of non-duality. The term ‘Yogācāra dialectics’ is thus coined to describe this theory of non-duality that highlights fluidity and transformability. As I will argue, Chinese Yogācārins developed the dialectics of gender by means of which they were able to subtly erode sexism in premodern times. PubDate: 2021-01-29 DOI: 10.1017/S001221732000044X
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Authors:Ronen; Ruth Pages: 319 - 336 Abstract: Taste, as a faculty of aesthetic appreciation, involves an individual, and yet assumes a community. In this article, a distinctly singular mode of being attuned to objects of taste is shown to be conditioned by the consent of others and by being-with others, thereby constituting what is named here an ‘aesthetic community.’ This idea of an aesthetic community is traced back to Kant's sensus communis and to Heidegger's notion of preservation: for both, it is the presence of a community that conditions aesthetic experience. PubDate: 2021-03-11 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000093
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Authors:Chamois; Camille Pages: 337 - 358 Abstract: Cet article souligne l'originalité et la pertinence des premiers travaux de Mikel Dufrenne (notamment publiés entre 1946 et 1953) pour les sciences humaines contemporaines. Sous l'influence de Georges Gurvitch, Dufrenne s'est en effet intéressé de près à l'anthropologie culturelle américaine et notamment au concept de « personnalité de base » d'Abram Kardiner, auquel il tente de donner une consistance philosophique à partir, d'une part, de la tradition transcendantale kantienne et, d'autre part, de la théorie du Mitsein heideggérienne. Nous montrons que ce projet se heurte à la question proprement psychologique de l'historicité des catégories de l'expérience. PubDate: 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000275
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Authors:Ramsoomair; Nicole Pages: 359 - 377 Abstract: Whether seen after a vehement denunciation of one's former values or a subtle change of heart, it is often thought that significant change to one's evaluative character could undermine responsibility for past wrongdoing. In this article, I explore this intuition by analyzing Angela Smith's concept of “responsibility as answerability.” I introduce an alteration/replacement distinction to define the limits of answerability over time. These limits are then further qualified by drawing on Delia Graff's work on Sorites type cases to argue that persons are answerable for past wrongdoing if they remain “saliently similar” in some relevant respects PubDate: 2021-03-19 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217321000081
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Authors:Goldstick D. Pages: 379 - 394 Abstract: There are no qualia. The phenomenological difference between seeing and visualizing something is that the propositions which the experient begins to believe in the first case are only entertained in the second. We can know what it's like to be a bat by knowing that their echolocation informs them non-inferentially of the shapes, sizes, and directional distances away of nearby surfaces. The terms for secondary qualities like colours, though, are names of the type-properties they designate, tracing back causally to a verbal ‘baptism,’ and so experients don't know the character of colour experiences until they study brain physiology. PubDate: 2021-01-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217320000438
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Authors:Besch; Thomas M. Pages: 237 - 255 Abstract: This paper engages Rainer Forst's doctrine of noumenal power. At the centre of this doctrine is its signature claim that power is noumenal in nature. I reconstruct Forst's definition of power and distinguish three conceptions of noumenal power in his writings. I argue that, on each conception, we should reject that claim. It emerges that the professed noumenality of power is either a trivial feature of power, or else a feature only of some forms of power. Consequently, Forst's definition of power cannot be adequate and the claim that power is noumenal in nature is either trivial or false. PubDate: 2020-12-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217320000426
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