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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
Showing 601 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted by number of followers
Analítica     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Journal of East Asian Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Modern Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of the Sociology and Theory of Religion     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Food Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Whiteness and Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de pensamiento     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Aesthetic Investigations     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Culture and Dialogue     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Zeszyty Naukowe Centrum Badań im. Edyty Stein     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Laisvalaikio Tyrimai     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Ethics Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Universitas : Revista de Filosofía, Derecho y Política     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie : Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Problema Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Islamic Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
ANFUSINA : Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bioethica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
TheoLogica : An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philosophia : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Gnosis : Journal of Gnostic Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Islamic Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Divination and Prognostication     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Clotho     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
The Biblical Annals     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Fikra     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Islamic Education     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Scientonomy : Journal for the Science of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Innovation Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios Nietzsche     Open Access  
Bergsoniana     Open Access  
Histoire Épistémologie Langage     Open Access  
Ancient Philosophy Today     Hybrid Journal  
Endowment Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion     Full-text available via subscription  
Simone de Beauvoir Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Urdu Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Responsible Technology     Open Access  
Journal of Values Education / Değerler Eğitimi Dergisi     Open Access  
Conciencia     Open Access  
Correspondences : Journal for the Study of Esotericism     Open Access  
Resonancias : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Res Humanitariae     Open Access  
Humanidades em diálogo     Open Access  
Discurso     Open Access  
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã : Crítica e Modernidade     Open Access  
Cadernos de Ética e Filosofia Política     Open Access  
Cadernos Espinosanos     Open Access  
Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations     Open Access  
Dianoia     Open Access  
Saberes y Prácticas : Revista de Filosofía y Educación     Open Access  
Ciência & Trópico     Open Access  
Філософія та політологія в контексті сучасної культури (Philosophy and Political Science in the Context of Modern Culture)     Open Access  
Etcétera : Revista del Área de Ciencias Sociales del CIFFyH     Open Access  
Jurnal Konseling Gusjigang     Open Access  
Science et Esprit     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Bioethics     Open Access  
Journal of Educational Thought / Revue de la Pensée Educative     Full-text available via subscription  
Auslegung : A Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
PhaenEx     Open Access  
International Journal of Philosophy & Social Values     Open Access  
Convivium : Revista de Filosophia     Open Access  
Aurora : papeles del Seminario María Zambrano     Open Access  
Astrolabio     Open Access  
IJIBE (International Journal of Islamic Business Ethics)     Open Access  
International Gramsci Journal     Open Access  
Andrews University Seminary Student Journal     Open Access  
SPICE : Student Perspectives on Institutions, Choices & Ethic     Open Access  
Patristica et Mediævalia     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Filosofía     Open Access  
RUDN Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Revista Fragmentos de Cultura : Revista Interdisciplinar de Ciências Humanas     Open Access  
Temporal : Prática e Pensamento Contemporâneos     Open Access  
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião     Open Access  
Revista Brasileira de Bioética     Open Access  
Ítaca     Open Access  
Analytica : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anais de Filosofia Clássica     Open Access  
AL-Qadissiya Magzine for Human Sciences     Open Access  
Oksident     Open Access  
Diferencia(s)     Open Access  
Philosophical Inquiry in Education     Open Access  
Τέλος : Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas     Open Access  
Frónesis     Open Access  
Sapientia     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access  
Universidad de La Habana     Open Access  
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Revista SURES     Open Access  
Revista Eletrônica Ludus Scientiae     Open Access  
Revista Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access  
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Jus Cogens : A Critical Journal of Philosophy of Law and Politics     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Dharma Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Humanistic Management Journal     Hybrid Journal  
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Via Spiritus : Revista de História da Espiritualidade e do Sentimento Religioso     Open Access  
Filosofia. Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Revista Binacional Brasil - Argentina: Diálogo entre as ciências     Open Access  
Revista de Estudios Kantianos     Open Access  
Journal of Graduate Studies Review     Open Access  
HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz. Internationale Zeitschrift für Humboldt-Studien     Open Access  
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Sincronía     Open Access  
Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
Journal of Analytic Divinity     Open Access  
Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen     Open Access  
Heroism Science     Open Access  
FOKUS : Jurnal Kajian Keislaman dan Kemasyarakatan     Open Access  
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
The Islamic Culture     Open Access  
Teologia i Moralność     Open Access  
Studia z Kognitywistyki i Filozofii Umysłu     Open Access  
Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna     Open Access  
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
Ethics in Progress     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift     Open Access  
Kirke og Kultur     Full-text available via subscription  
Problemos     Open Access  
Global Forum on Arts and Christian Faith     Open Access  
Gogoa     Open Access  
Lato Sensu : Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences     Open Access  
Mutatis Mutandis : Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Ruch Filozoficzny     Open Access  
O Que Nos Faz Pensar : Cadernos do Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-Rio     Open Access  
Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg     Open Access  
Philosophie antique : Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages     Full-text available via subscription  
Studi di Estetica     Open Access  
Hic Rhodus : Crisis capitalista, polémica y controversias     Open Access  
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Psocial : Revista de Investigación en Psicología Social     Open Access  
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice / Recueil annuel de Windsor d'accès à la justice     Open Access  
Éthique en éducation et en formation : Les Dossiers du GREE     Open Access  
Mizar : Costellazione di pensieri     Open Access  
Revista Poiesis     Open Access  
HONAI : International Journal for Educational, Social, Political & Cultural Studies     Open Access  
INSANCITA : Journal of Islamic Studies in Indonesia and Southeast Asia     Open Access  
Marwah : Jurnal Perempuan, Agama dan Jender     Open Access  
FALAH : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access  
Mises : Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics     Open Access  
ULUM : Journal of Religious Inquiries     Open Access  
Voluntaristics Review     Open Access  
Scrinium : Journal of Patrology and Critical Hagiography     Open Access  
Idéias     Open Access  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Jurnal Living Hadis     Open Access  
Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia     Open Access  
Kader     Open Access  
Metaphysics     Open Access  
Griot : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Kontemplasi : Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin     Open Access  
Jurnal Dinamika Penelitian : Media Komunikasi Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan     Open Access  

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Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.697
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 13  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1878-5158 - ISSN (Online) 1878-5166
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2467 journals]
  • Fully Caused and Flourishing' Incompatibilist Free Will Skepticism and
           Its Implications for Personal Well-Being

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      Abstract: Abstract Previous research associates free will skepticism with adverse well-being effects. However, it is doubtful that skeptical participants in these studies disbelieved in the incompatibilist notion of what it means to have free will. This is one of the first studies to exclusively examine such skeptics. A sample of 167 participants who claimed to believe that there is no free will responded to an online survey. After examining whether participants in fact disbelieved in the incompatibilist concept, they were asked to describe how their skepticism is affecting their personal life and well-being. Reoccurring themes were identified through thematic analysis. Positive consequences were most commonly reported, including increased compassion for others and oneself, being less controlling and more relaxed, as well as having more control through environmental awareness. Other participants felt unaffected by their disbelief and most frequently mentioned the persisting feeling of having free will as a reason. The most common negative implications were to feel less effective as an agent and to miss a sense of purpose. These findings may shed new light on how to handle the issue of free will in the public sphere as well as inform future research investigating incompatibilist free will skepticism.
      PubDate: 2022-12-02
       
  • The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique

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      Abstract: Abstract The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of mineness, has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of self-consciousness. I point out the potential of the transcendental argument, but most importantly its limitations. And I show that, even if successful, the argument cannot vindicate the claim of an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Since the transcendental argument is depicted as the “central argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), I contend that, in view of its failure, the claim that all of my experiences have to be given to me as mine, all of your experiences have to be given to you as yours, etc., appears insufficiently substantiated. The idea that there is an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness must be called into question.
      PubDate: 2022-11-22
       
  • Intentions in Ecological Psychology: An Anscombean Proposal

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      Abstract: Abstract According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a notion of intention seems to be motivated by the widespread assumption that intentions should be understood as internal states with representational content. This assumption goes against two main tenets of ecological psychology: its anti-representationalist stance and its claim that perception is direct (in the sense of not being mediated by inferential processes). Ecological psychology thus needs a different answer to the question what intentions are. In this paper, we aim to show that Elizabeth Anscombe’s theory of intention can be fruitfully brought to bear on an ecological theory of agency. We will argue that Anscombe’s account can meet the two challenges of bringing intentions into the framework of ecological psychology: firstly it can explain what intentions are, if not representational states; and, secondly, it can show how our perception of affordances is guided by intention without undermining the idea of direct perception.
      PubDate: 2022-11-09
       
  • Is Lucid Dreamless Sleep Really Lucid'

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      Abstract: Abstract Recently, the construct ‘lucid dreamless sleep’ has been proposed to explain the state of ‘clear light’ described by Tibetan Buddhist traditions, a special state of consciousness during deep sleep in which we’re told to be able to recognise the nature or essence of our mind (Padmasambhava & Gyatrul 2008; Ponlop 2006; Wangyal 1998). To explain the sort of awareness experienced during this state, some authors have appealed to the sort of lucidity acquired during lucid dreaming and suggested a link between both phenomena (Thompson 2014, 2015; Windt 2015a; Windt et al. 2016). Whilst these authors appeal to a non-conceptually mediated form of lucidity, which doesn’t consist of reflective awareness and propositional thought, the question as to whether the state of clear light should be considered a lucid state similar to lucid dreaming still arises. I argue that the concept ‘lucidity’ used to describe this sort of state is imprecise and that two theoretical notions of lucidity should be distinguished. The first one, which I call the technical notion, requires the recognition of the hallucinatory character of my current experience. The second, the broader notion, involves the seeming recognition of being directly acquainted with the phenomenal character of my experience. I spell out these two notions of lucidity and argue that only the latter could apply to the state of clear light sleep.
      PubDate: 2022-11-04
       
  • Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter

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      Abstract: Abstract To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.
      PubDate: 2022-11-02
       
  • Somatosensation and the First Person

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      Abstract: Abstract Experientialism about the sense of bodily ownership is the view that there is something it is like to feel a body as one’s own. In this paper I argue for a particular experientialist thesis. I first present a puzzle about the relation between bodily awareness and self-consciousness, and introduce a somewhat underappreciated view on the sense of bodily ownership, Implicit Reflexivity, that points us in the right direction as to how to address this puzzle. I argue that Implicit Reflexivity, however, does not provide a full solution to the puzzle. I then introduce a novel view on the sense of bodily ownership that inherits a central tenet, Reflexivity, from the above view, without having its flaws. According to Reflexivity, the sense of bodily ownership consists in the reflexive character of bodily sensations, namely in the fact that bodily sensations have experience-dependent properties as part of their content. Cashed out this way, Reflexivity is an attractive way of explicating the notion that bodily sensations are experiences of the body as subject. Reflexivity also highlights a central, but so far neglected, connection between the sense of bodily ownership and the sense of experience ownership.
      PubDate: 2022-10-15
       
  • Temporal Perspectives and the Phenomenology of Grief

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      Abstract: Abstract In first personal accounts of the experience of grief, it is often described as disrupting the experience of time. This aspect of the experience has gained more attention in recent discussions, but it may nonetheless strike some as puzzling. Grieving subjects do, after all, still perceptually experience motion, change, and succession, and they are typically capable of orienting themselves in time and accurately estimating durations. As such, it is not immediately obvious how we ought understand the claim that grief disrupts the experience of time. In the present discussion I suggest that we can shed light on this aspect of the experience of grief by distinguishing between three temporal perspectives that experiencing (human) subjects typically occupy: the perceptual, the agential, and the narrative. Appeal to these three temporal perspectives helps to clarify the phenomenology of grief; it reveals a way in which grief can disrupt the experience of time; and it can also help us to analyse pre-existing issues in the literature on grief.
      PubDate: 2022-10-06
       
  • Representing Probability in Perception and Experience

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      Abstract: Abstract It is increasingly common in cognitive science and philosophy of perception to regard perceptual processing as a probabilistic engine, taking into account uncertainty in computing representations of the distal environment. Models of this kind often postulate probabilistic representations, or what we will call probabilistic states,. These are states that in some sense mark or represent information about the probabilities of distal conditions. It has also been argued that perceptual experience itself in some sense represents uncertainty (Morrison Analytic Philosophy 57 (1): 15 48, 2016). In this article, we will first consider three models of sensory activity from perceptual neuroscience, namely signal detection theory (SDT), probabilistic population codes (PPC), and sampling. We will then reflect on the sense in which the probabilistic states introduced in these models are probabilistic representations. To sharpen this discussion, we will compare and contrast these probabilistic states to credences as they are understood in epistemology. We will suggest that probabilistic representation, in an appropriately robust sense, can be understood as a form of analog representation. In the last part of the paper, we apply this to the issue of whether conscious experience represents uncertainty—we will interpret this as the claim that there are phenomenal features of experience that serve as analog probabilistic representations.
      PubDate: 2022-09-29
       
  • Knowing Other Minds: A Scorekeeping Model

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      Abstract: Abstract The prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns, e.g., ‘my’ and ‘mine,’ in the context of attributions of mental states, such as “in my mind” or “in your mind,” threaten to confuse attempts to account for knowledge of other minds. This paper distinguishes proper from improper uses of such expressions. I will argue that proper use of the prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns in the context of mental state attributions presupposes capacities to properly track and attribute what are really, in a sense to be specified, intersubjectively articulated and inferentially interrelated normative statuses. What we call “mental states” or “minds,” in as far as primarily cognitive states such as beliefs are concerned, are intersubjectively constituted. As opposed to being inner and private, something we must learn to intersubjectively discover, minds and mental states are intersubjectively articulated and we learn to attribute them as inner and private. A scorekeeping-model is used to illustrate how the privacy of mind presupposes intersubjectivity. Using that model, I argue that the traditional problem of knowing other minds can be re-framed as a problem of learning how to pursue intersubjective practices of acknowledging, attributing and undertaking mental states.
      PubDate: 2022-09-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00642-0
       
  • Are Mentalizing Systems Necessary' An Alternative Through
           Self–other Distinction

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      Abstract: Abstract Recent studies have identified two important findings on infants’ capability of taking others’ perspectives and the difficulty of ignoring perspectives irrelevant to the acquired perspective. Unfortunately, there is insufficient consensus on the interpretation of these phenomena. Two important features of perspective-taking, embodiment and aging, should be considered to reach a more appropriate hypothesis. In this paper, the mechanism of perspective-taking can be redefined through the well-known process of self–other distinction, which is inherent to humans, without resorting to either the assumption of controversial systems or an excessive reduction to executive functions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the implicit mentalizing observed in infancy comes from the loosening phenomenon and lasts lifelong and that the self-representation separated from one’s own body by the detachment function is sent to other perspectives for explicit perspective-taking. This hypothesis can not only explain both the robustness of perspective-taking in the older adults and the appearance of egocentric/altercentric bias in adults but also is consistent with the findings in brain science and neuropathology. Finally, some issues to be considered are presented to improve the validity of this hypothesis.
      PubDate: 2022-09-07
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00656-8
       
  • Fearful Object Seeing

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      Abstract: Abstract What is it like to perceive a feared object' According to a popular neo-Gibsonian theory in psychology, fear biases our perceptions of objects so as to encourage particular kinds of actions: when we are afraid, spiders may be perceived as physically closer than they are in order to promote fleeing. Firestone mounted severe criticisms against this view, arguing that these cases are better explained by non-perceptual biases that operate on accurate perceptions of the external environment. In this paper I will argue that fear might indeed distort our perceptions of the world, but not in the way neo-Gibsonians suppose. In the view I favor, perceptual distortions occur as by-products of fearful attention, a special mode of attention that is part of an orchestrated defensive response that prepares the organism to deal effectively with a threat. To argue for this view I will rely on empirical evidence that fearful attention narrows down the focus of attention and favors processing of local rather than global features of stimuli, which may jointly explain why perceptual distortions might occur in fearful object seeing. This view has consequences not only for empirical investigations in fearful perceptual distortions, but also for an explanation of the intentionality of fear and the phenomenal integration of bodily and intentional elements in fear episodes.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00549-2
       
  • Intuitions on Semantic Reference

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      Abstract: Abstract Since Machery et al. Cognition 92, B1-B12 (2004) attacked Kripke’s refutation of classical descriptivism, their experiment has been repeated several times, in its original version or in some revised ones, by theorists with contrasting intents. Some repeated the experiment for confirming its results, others for proving them unreliable. One striking characteristic of those surveys is that they mostly replicated the data collected in Machery et al.’s Cognition 92, B1-B12, 2004 experiment: less than 60% of Westerners showed preference for the causal-historical response. We side with the critics of Machery et al.’s experiment. In this paper, we present the results of a survey that tests some hypotheses for explaining that percentage of Westerners’ preferences without taking it as evidence that more than 40% of Westerners have descriptivist intuitions on semantic reference. The aim of our paper is not merely to question the reliability of Machery et al.’s experiment. In sections 4 and 5 we assess the impact of our survey on the current debate in experimental semantics. We provide a novel account of the nature of the epistemic ambiguity that affects experiments in theory of reference and explain the consequences that our account of the epistemic ambiguity has for subsequent works trying to avoid ambiguities.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00560-7
       
  • Framing Effects and Fuzzy Traces: ‘Some’ Observations

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      Abstract: Abstract Framing effects occur when people respond differently to the same information, just because it is conveyed in different words. For example, in the classic ‘Disease Problem’ introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, people’s choices between alternative interventions depend on whether these are described positively, in terms of the number of people who will be saved, or negatively in terms of the corresponding number who will die. In this paper, I discuss an account of framing effects based on ‘fuzzy-trace theory’. The central claim of this account is that people represent the numbers in framing problems in a ‘gist-like’ way, as ‘some’; and that this creates a categorical contrast between ‘some’ people being saved (or dying) and ‘no’ people being saved (or dying). I argue that fuzzy-trace theory’s gist-like representation, ‘some’, must have the semantics of ‘some and possibly all’, not ‘some but not all’. I show how this commits fuzzy-trace theory to a modest version of a rival ‘lower bounding hypothesis’, according to which lower-bounded interpretations of quantities contribute to framing effects by rendering the alternative descriptions extensionally inequivalent. As a result, fuzzy-trace theory is incoherent as it stands. Making sense of it requires dropping, or refining, the claim that decision-makers perceive alternatively framed options as extensionally equivalent; and the related claim that framing effects are irrational. I end by suggesting that, whereas the modest lower bounding hypothesis is well supported, there is currently less evidence for the core element of the fuzzy trace account.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00556-3
       
  • The Influence of Situational Factors in Sacrificial Dilemmas on
           Utilitarian Moral Judgments

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      Abstract: Abstract The standard way to test alternative descriptive theories of moral judgment is by asking subjects to evaluate (amongst others) sacrificial dilemmas, where acting classifies as a utilitarian moral judgment and not acting classifies as a deontological moral judgment. Previous research uncovered many situational factors that alter subject’s moral judgments without affecting which type of action utilitarianism or deontology would recommend. This literature review provides a systematic analysis of the experimental literature on the influence of situational factors on moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. It analyses 53 articles in detail and reports mean effect sizes, as well as operationalizations, for 36 situational factors that significantly influence moral judgment. Moreover, the review discusses how the impact of situational factors relates to a dual process theory of moral judgment. It supports the view that utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes and shows that the drivers of deontological judgments depend on valence.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00547-4
       
  • What Are Abstract Concepts' On Lexical Ambiguity and Concreteness
           Ratings

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      Abstract: In psycholinguistics, concepts are considered abstract if they do not apply to physical objects that we can touch, see, feel, hear, smell or taste. Psychologists usually distinguish concrete from abstract concepts by means of so-called concreteness ratings. In concreteness rating studies, laypeople are asked to rate the concreteness of words based on the above criterion. The wide use of concreteness ratings motivates an assessment of them. I point out two problems: First, most current concreteness ratings test the intuited concreteness of word forms as opposed to concepts. This ignores the ubiquitous phenomenon of lexical ambiguity. Second, the criterion of abstract concepts that the instruction texts of rating studies rely on does not capture the notion that psychologists working on abstract concepts are normally interested in, i.e., concepts that could reasonably be sensorimotor representations. For many concepts that pick out physical objects, this is not reasonable. In this paper, I propose a characterization of concrete and abstract concepts that avoids these two problems and that may be useful for future studies in psychology.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00542-9
       
  • Interest, Disfluency, and Underlying Values: a Better Theory of Aesthetic
           Pleasure

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      Abstract: Abstract Over the last few decades, empirical researchers have become increasingly interested in explaining the formation of “basic” aesthetic judgments, i.e. simple judgments of sensory preferability and the pleasure that seems to accompany them. To that end, Reber et al. have recently defended a “processing-fluency” view, which identifies aesthetic pleasure with one’s ability to easily process an object’s perceptual properties (e.g. Reber 2012). While the processing-fluency theory is certainly an improvement over its competitors, it is currently vulnerable to several serious criticisms. In what follows, I aim to provide a more holistic, explanatorily robust, model of the processing-fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure by incorporating what the view neglects: the crucial role of perceptual disfluency, interest, and the underlying values that drive aesthetic appraisal.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00564-3
       
  • Contents of Unconscious Color Perception

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      Abstract: Abstract In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a negative thesis—that the main experimental paradigms used in studying unconscious color perception do not provide support for the position that conscious and unconscious color representations have the same type of content. More specifically, I claim that there is no significant support for the claim that unconscious vision categorically represents surface colors.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00552-7
       
  • Testing the Motivational Strength of Positive and Negative Duty Arguments
           Regarding Global Poverty

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      Abstract: Abstract Two main types of philosophical arguments have been given in support of the claim that the citizens of affluent societies have stringent moral duties to aid the global poor: “positive duty” arguments based on the notion of beneficence and “negative duty” arguments based on noninterference. Peter Singer’s positive duty argument (Singer 1972) and Thomas Pogge’s negative duty argument (Pogge 2002) are among the most prominent examples. Philosophers have made speculative claims about the relative effectiveness of these arguments in promoting attitudes and behaviors that could lead to the alleviation of poverty. In this article we present the results of two empirical studies that evaluate these claims, and suggest that both arguments have a modest effect on people’s attitudes and behaviors regarding global poverty. In a replication of the second study, the negative duty argument, in particular, had a statistically significant effect on donations. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of these results and suggest directions for further research on the role that philosophical arguments can play in engendering concern and action on pressing moral problems.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00555-4
       
  • Indirect illusory inferences from disjunction: a new bridge between
           deductive inference and representativeness

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      Abstract: Abstract We provide a new link between deductive and probabilistic reasoning fallacies. Illusory inferences from disjunction are a broad class of deductive fallacies traditionally explained by recourse to a matching procedure that looks for content overlap between premises. In two behavioral experiments, we show that this phenomenon is instead sensitive to real-world causal dependencies and not to exact content overlap. A group of participants rated the strength of the causal dependence between pairs of sentences. This measure is a near perfect predictor of fallacious reasoning by an independent group of participants in illusory inference tasks with the same materials. In light of these results, we argue that all extant accounts of these deductive fallacies require non-trivial adjustments. Crucially, these novel indirect illusory inferences from disjunction bear a structural similarity to seemingly unrelated probabilistic reasoning problems, in particular the conjunction fallacy from the heuristics and biases literature. This structural connection was entirely obscure in previous work on these deductive problems, due to the theoretical and empirical focus on content overlap. We argue that this structural parallelism provides arguments against the need for rich descriptions and individuating information in the conjunction fallacy, and we outline a unified theory of deductive illusory inferences from disjunction and the conjunction fallacy, in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00543-8
       
  • Development, Resilience Engineering, Degeneracy, and Cognitive Practices

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      Abstract: Abstract Drawing on a range of literature, I introduce two new concepts for understanding and exploring distributed cognition: resilience engineering and degeneracy. By re-examining Ed Hutchins’ (1995) ethnographic study of the navigation team I show how a focus on the developmental acquisition of cognitive practices can draw out several crucial insights that have been overlooked. Firstly, that the way in which agents learn and acquire cognitive practices enables a form of resilience engineering: the process by which the system is able to overcome and adapt to errors and the vagaries of nature. Secondly, that the best way to engineer a resilient system is through promoting degeneracy – how differing structures produce the same function – at the level of cognitive practices. These two features show that focusing on cognitive practices and developmental trajectories is important for both greater explanatory leverage; and is also useful in regard to the practicalities of designing real-world cognitive systems.
      PubDate: 2022-09-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00550-9
       
 
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