Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Miller; J.T.M. Pages: 511 - 537 Abstract: One feature of language is that we are able to make mistakes in our use of language. Amongst other sorts of mistakes, we can misspeak, misspell, missign, or misunderstand. Given this, it seems that our metaphysics of words should be flexible enough to accommodate such mistakes. It has been argued that a nominalist account of words cannot accommodate the phenomenon of misspelling. I sketch a nominalist trope-bundle view of words that can. PubDate: 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000226
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Authors:Cordeiro-Rodrigues; Luís, Agada, Ada Pages: 539 - 561 Abstract: Are the existence of God and evil logically compatible' Philosophers have been dwelling on this question since the era of Ancient Greek philosophy. Most responses to this philosophical problem have come from a Western viewpoint. This article aims to answer this question by considering an African cosmological and ethical groundwork. Working conceptually within this cosmology and ethic, we argue that if the evil in the world is understood as a lesser evil, then a good God can plausibly allow evil to happen. This is the case because God preventing evil will lead to a worse state of affairs which will result in a worse world. Allowing a lesser evil is the best possible outcome. We assert that this view offers a better theory than the theodicy defended by some mainstream Western philosophers according to which a greater good is achieved through evil. PubDate: 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000214
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Authors:Schipper; Arthur Pages: 563 - 595 Abstract: This paper presents an abductive argument for realism and truthmaker realism as follows. A metaphysical theory is better if it ontologically accounts for truths better than its rivals (the Abductive Principle). Truthmaker realism gives us a better ontological account for truths than its antirealist truthmaker rivals (Abductive Step). So, truthmaker realism is better than antirealist rivals. It presents the truthmaker project as an abductive project which asks us what accounts best ontologically for our truths. Antirealisms, especially idealisms, fail against their realist rivals on various abductive criteria.Truthmaker realism is plagued by three main objections. Presenting an abductive argument for realism does two important things. First, it dissolves the standard objections. Second, it shows how truthmaker realism is overall better motivated than antirealist, pluralist, and neutralist rivals. Simple truthmaker principles added to a plausible abductive package of principles give us a straightforward argument for realism and against antirealism or any neutralist middle ground. PubDate: 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000238
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Authors:Raleigh; Thomas Pages: 597 - 623 Abstract: I argue that the term ‘naturalism’ is so empty of meaning that it is not suitable for serious theorizing in philosophy. In particular, I argue that the question of whether or not some theory or thesis should count as naturalistic is an empty verbal dispute with no further theoretical significance. I also discuss naturalism construed as a methodological thesis and argue that any plausible version will collapse into triviality. Lastly, I briefly discuss the idea that naturalism is not a thesis at all but rather a ‘stance’ and suggest that this too succumbs to the charge of emptiness. I conclude that we should stop talking about naturalism altogether. PubDate: 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000172
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Authors:Rinner; Stefan Pages: 625 - 638 Abstract: In ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game’, David Lewis famously compares conversations to playing baseball. Just like baseball, conversations have a score which, together with rules for correct play, determines which utterances are acceptable or even true in the course of a conversation. For all similarities, however, there is a crucial difference between conversations and baseball games. Unlike the score of a baseball game, conversational score adjusts in such a way that the utterances made in the course of a conversation count as correct play. This is also known as accommodation. Starting from this scorekeeping approach to language use, the overall aim of the present paper is to provide a better understanding of how the methods and interventions of talking therapies work from a linguistic point of view. According to the scorekeeping model, the methods and interventions of talking therapies are effective by changing the score of the therapeutic conversation, in particular in the form of accommodation. This has significant implications for the therapeutic practice, as it highlights the importance of training therapists in the linguistic aspects of therapeutic methods, in particular in the use of accommodation. PubDate: 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000160
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Authors:Lavelle; Jane Suilin Pages: 639 - 665 Abstract: There is a worry within psychology that its researchers experience too many degrees of freedom in formulating their hypotheses, resulting in experiments being designed to test implausible hypotheses which then do not successfully replicate. A popular diagnosis of this problem is that psychological theories are too vaguely specified, and that formalising them will add the constraints necessary to solve the problem. This paper argues for a different strategy, namely, for more theory-lite observational research to be conducted. This appears antithetical to the restraint urged by others, but I argue that it is a necessary precursor to forming well-established foundational theories. I discuss two case studies to support my arguments. PubDate: 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000202
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Authors:Edwards; Mary L. Pages: 667 - 672 PubDate: 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000184
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