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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Episteme
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.756
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 16  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1742-3600 - ISSN (Online) 1750-0117
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [352 journals]
  • EPI volume 19 issue 4 Cover and Front matter

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      Pages: 1 - 3
      PubDate: 2022-12-20
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2022.53
       
  • EPI volume 19 issue 4 Cover and Back matter

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      Pages: 1 - 2
      PubDate: 2022-12-20
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2022.54
       
  • The Importance of Forgetting

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      Authors: Basu; Rima
      Pages: 471 - 490
      Abstract: Morality bears on what we should forget. Some aspects of our identity are meant to be forgotten and there is a distinctive harm that accompanies the permanence of some content about us, content that prompts a duty to forget. To make the case that forgetting is an integral part of our moral duties to others, the paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I make the case that forgetting is morally evaluable and I survey three kinds of forgetting: no-trace forgetting, archival forgetting, and siloing. In §2, I turn to how we practice these forms of forgetting in our everyday lives and the goods these practices facilitate by drawing on examples ranging from the expunging of juvenile arrest records to the right to privacy. In §3, I turn to how my account can help us both recognize and address a heretofore neglected source of harm caused by technology and big data. In §4, I end by addressing the concern that we lack control over forgetting and thus can't be required to forget. I argue this challenge can be answered, but there's a harder challenge that can't. Forgetting is under threat. To address this challenge and preserve forgetting, we must change the world.
      PubDate: 2022-10-14
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2022.36
       
  • Rumination and Wronging: The Role of Attention in Epistemic Morality

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      Authors: Saint-Croix; Catharine
      Pages: 491 - 514
      Abstract: The idea that our epistemic practices can be wrongful has been the core observation driving the growing literature on epistemic injustice, doxastic wronging, and moral encroachment. But, one element of our epistemic practice has been starkly absent from this discussion of epistemic morality: attention. The goal of this article is to show that attention is a worthwhile focus for epistemology, especially for the field of epistemic morality. After presenting a new dilemma for proponents of doxastic wronging, I show how focusing on attention not only allows us to defuse that dilemma, but also helps to substantiate accounts of what goes wrong in cases of doxastic wronging.
      PubDate: 2022-11-21
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2022.37
       
  • Encroachment on Emotion

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      Authors: Fritz; James
      Pages: 515 - 533
      Abstract: This paper introduces a novel form of pragmatic encroachment: one that makes a difference to the status of emotion rather than the status of belief. I begin by isolating a distinctive standard in terms of which we can evaluate emotion – one sometimes called “subjective fittingness,” “epistemic justification,” or “warrant.” I then show how this standard for emotion could face a kind of pragmatic encroachment importantly similar to the more familiar encroachment on epistemic standards for belief. Encroachment on warranted emotion is a striking proposal that deserves attention. In fact, there are good reasons to think that encroachment on warranted emotion deserves to be considered the default view for those who already accept pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic status of belief. I support this parity claim by arguing for a principle that establishes a limited coordination between the conditions that warrant emotion and the conditions that justify belief.
      PubDate: 2022-10-26
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2022.38
       
  • Understanding, Idealization, and Explainable AI

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      Authors: Fleisher; Will
      Pages: 534 - 560
      Abstract: Many AI systems that make important decisions are black boxes: how they function is opaque even to their developers. This is due to their high complexity and to the fact that they are trained rather than programmed. Efforts to alleviate the opacity of black box systems are typically discussed in terms of transparency, interpretability, and explainability. However, there is little agreement about what these key concepts mean, which makes it difficult to adjudicate the success or promise of opacity alleviation methods. I argue for a unified account of these key concepts that treats the concept of understanding as fundamental. This allows resources from the philosophy of science and the epistemology of understanding to help guide opacity alleviation efforts. A first significant benefit of this understanding account is that it defuses one of the primary, in-principle objections to post hoc explainable AI (XAI) methods. This “rationalization objection” argues that XAI methods provide mere rationalizations rather than genuine explanations. This is because XAI methods involve using a separate “explanation” system to approximate the original black box system. These explanation systems function in a completely different way than the original system, yet XAI methods make inferences about the original system based on the behavior of the explanation system. I argue that, if we conceive of XAI methods as idealized scientific models, this rationalization worry is dissolved. Idealized scientific models misrepresent their target phenomena, yet are capable of providing significant and genuine understanding of their targets.
      PubDate: 2022-11-03
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2022.39
       
  • Suspending Judgment is Something You Do

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      Authors: Crawford; Lindsay
      Pages: 561 - 577
      Abstract: What is it to suspend judgment about whether p' Much of the recent work on the nature and normative profile of suspending judgment aims to analyze it as a kind of doxastic attitude. On some of these accounts, suspending judgment about whether p partly consists in taking up a certain higher-order belief about one's deficient epistemic position with respect to whether p. On others, suspending judgment about whether p consists in taking up a sui generis attitude, one that takes the question of whether p' as its content. In this paper, I defend an account on which suspending judgment about whether p is not a matter of taking up a doxastic attitude, but rather a way of intentionally omitting to judge whether p. I then close with a discussion of how an account like mine, which sees suspending judgment as fundamentally practical, rather than doxastic, can accommodate what appear to be distinctively epistemic reasons to suspend judgment.
      PubDate: 2022-10-13
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2022.40
       
 
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