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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 766 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Aesthetic Investigations     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Ahkam : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Aisthesis : Pratiche, Linguaggi e Saperi dell’Estetico     Open Access  
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
al-Afkar : Journal For Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Fikra     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
AL-Qadissiya Magzine for Human Sciences     Open Access  
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Alter : Revue de phénoménologie     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 40)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais de Filosofia Clássica     Open Access  
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access  
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analítica     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Analytica : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ancient Philosophy Today     Hybrid Journal  
Andrews University Seminary Student Journal     Open Access  
ANFUSINA : Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia     Open Access  
Annals in Social Responsibility     Full-text available via subscription  
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access  
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Astérion     Open Access  
Astrolabio     Open Access  
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Aurora : papeles del Seminario María Zambrano     Open Access  
Auslegung : A Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 56)
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Bergsoniana     Open Access  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bioethica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 19)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 39)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos de Ética e Filosofia Política     Open Access  
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã : Crítica e Modernidade     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access  
Cadernos Espinosanos     Open Access  
Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen     Open Access  
Cahiers Droit, Sciences & Technologies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Bioethics     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Ciência & Trópico     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Clotho     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Conciencia     Open Access  
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 24)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Convivium : Revista de Filosophia     Open Access  
Correspondences : Journal for the Study of Esotericism     Open Access  
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access  
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Cuadernos de pensamiento     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Culture and Dialogue     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dianoia     Open Access  
Diferencia(s)     Open Access  
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Discurso     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access  
Disputatio     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Doxa : Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Elpis - Czasopismo Teologiczne Katedry Teologii Prawosławnej Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku     Open Access  
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
En Líneas Generales     Open Access  
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Endowment Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Enrahonar : An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason     Open Access  
Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review     Open Access  
Environmental Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia     Open Access  
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Epoché : A Journal for the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 29)
Escritos     Open Access  
Essays in Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Estudios Nietzsche     Open Access  
Estudos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Etcétera : Revista del Área de Ciencias Sociales del CIFFyH     Open Access  

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Episteme
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.756
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 13  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1742-3600 - ISSN (Online) 1750-0117
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [353 journals]
  • EPI volume 18 issue 4 Cover and Front matter

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      Pages: 1 - 4
      PubDate: 2021-11-23
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2021.46
       
  • EPI volume 18 issue 4 Cover and Back matter

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Pages: 1 - 4
      PubDate: 2021-11-23
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2021.48
       
  • The Threshold Problem, the Cluster Account, and the Significance of
           Knowledge

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      Authors: Immerman; Daniel
      Pages: 693 - 710
      Abstract: The threshold problem is the task of adequately answering the question: “Where does the threshold lie between knowledge and lack thereof'” I start this paper by articulating two conditions for solving it. The first is that the threshold be neither too high nor too low; the second is that the threshold accommodate the significance of knowledge. In addition to explaining these conditions, I also argue that it is plausible that they can be met. Next, I argue that many popular accounts of knowledge cannot meet them. In particular, I lay out a number of problems that standard accounts of knowledge face in trying to meet these conditions. Finally, near the end of this paper, I argue that there is one sort of account that seems to evade these problems. This sort of account, which is called a cluster account of knowledge, says that knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of truth, belief and a cluster of epistemic properties and also that knowledge doesn't require having all members of the cluster, but merely some subset.
      PubDate: 2020-03-16
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.47
       
  • Finding Closure for Safety

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      Authors: Schulz; Moritz
      Pages: 711 - 725
      Abstract: There are two plausible constraints on knowledge: (i) knowledge is closed under competent deduction; and (ii) knowledge answers to a safety condition. However, various authors, including Kvanvig (2004), Murphy (2005, 2006) and Alspector-Kelly (2011), argue that beliefs competently deduced from knowledge can sometimes fail to be safe. This paper responds that one can uphold (i) and (ii) by relativizing safety to methods and argues further that in order to do so, methods should be individuated externally.
      PubDate: 2020-02-18
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.48
       
  • The Priority of the Epistemic

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      Authors: Scheall; Scott, Crutchfield, Parker
      Pages: 726 - 737
      Abstract: Epistemic burdens – the nature and extent of our ignorance (that and how) with respect to various courses of action – serve to determine our incentive structures. Courses of action that seem to bear impossibly heavy epistemic burdens are typically not counted as options in an actor's menu, while courses of action that seem to bear comparatively heavy epistemic burdens are systematically discounted in an actor's menu relative to options that appear less epistemically burdensome. That ignorance serves to determine what counts as an option means that epistemic considerations are logically prior to moral, prudential, and economic considerations: in order to have moral, prudential, or economic obligations, one must have options, and epistemic burdens serve to determine our options. One cannot have obligations without doing some epistemic work. We defend this claim on introspective grounds. We also consider how epistemic burdens distort surrogate decision-making. The unique epistemology of surrogate cases makes the priority of the epistemic readily apparent. We then argue that anyone who accepts a principle similar to ought implies can is committed to the logical priority of the epistemic. We also consider and reject several possible counterarguments.
      PubDate: 2020-02-18
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.56
       
  • How Intellectual Communities Progress

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      Authors: Ross; Lewis D.
      Pages: 738 - 756
      Abstract: Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge – for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I argue that we should think of progress relative to the epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry (rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism.
      PubDate: 2020-02-18
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2020.2
       
  • Shared Epistemic Responsibility

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      Authors: Millar; Boyd
      Pages: 493 - 506
      Abstract: It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared (or joint) moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, I argue that we have epistemic obligations to perform actions of the sort that can be performed in conjunction with other people, and that consequently, we are often jointly blameworthy when we violate shared epistemic obligations. Second, I argue that shared responsibility is especially important to doxastic responsibility thanks to the fact that we don't have the same kind of direct control over our beliefs that we have over our actions. In particular, I argue that there are many cases in which a particular individual who holds some problematic belief only deserves epistemic blame in virtue of belonging to a group all the members of which are jointly blameworthy for violating some shared epistemic obligation.
      PubDate: 2019-08-28
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.21
       
  • Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief

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      Authors: Egeland; Jonathan
      Pages: 507 - 513
      Abstract: A standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual conditionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can help us take advantage of justification that we already have, thereby enabling us to form new doxastically justified beliefs. More specifically, according to the view I advocate, imagination can contribute to one's satisfaction of the proper basing condition – which turns propositional justification into doxastic justification – but without conferring any new justification that the subject isn't already in possession of upon their beliefs. Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position.
      PubDate: 2019-08-28
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.22
       
  • One More Twist ~ Knowledge How and Ability

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      Authors: Mizumoto; Masaharu
      Pages: 514 - 522
      Abstract: According to Bengson et al.’s (2009) Salchow case, Irina is a novice skater who (1) has a mistaken belief about what amounts to a Salchow, but also (2) has a neurological abnormality which, unknowingly to her, affects both her movement and her sense of it. As a result of this twist, she (3) always ends up succeeding in jumping the Salchow whenever she tries. This story was presented as a counterexample to a variant of anti-intellectualism, and as Bengson and colleagues expected, the vast majority of participants in their survey judged both that Irina is able to do the Salchow and that she does not know how to do it. But the three conditions above leave some ambiguity about the story. That is whether Irina is aware of her own ability, or whether she is aware of what she is doing when she performs it, and therefore the fact that she can reliably perform the Salchow. However, as we report here, disambiguating this point will radically change the responses of people, which rather poses a serious challenge to intellectualism.
      PubDate: 2019-08-29
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.23
       
  • The Myth of Stochastic Infallibilism

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      Authors: Bricker; Adam Michael
      Pages: 523 - 538
      Abstract: There is a widespread attitude in epistemology that, if you know on the basis of perception, then you couldn't have been wrong as a matter of chance. Despite the apparent intuitive plausibility of this attitude, which I'll refer to here as “stochastic infallibilism”, it fundamentally misunderstands the way that human perceptual systems actually work. Perhaps the most important lesson of signal detection theory (SDT) is that our percepts are inherently subject to random error, and here I'll highlight some key empirical research that underscores this point. In doing so, it becomes clear that we are in fact quite willing to attribute knowledge to S that p even when S's perceptual belief that p could have been randomly false. In short, perceptual processes can randomly fail, and perceptual knowledge is stochastically fallible. The narrow implication here is that any epistemological account that entails stochastic infallibilism, like safety, is simply untenable. More broadly, this myth of stochastic infallibilism provides a valuable illustration of the importance of integrating empirical findings into epistemological thinking.
      PubDate: 2019-08-27
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.24
       
  • Epistemic Existentialism

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      Authors: Callahan; Laura Frances
      Pages: 539 - 554
      Abstract: Subjectivist permissivism is a prima facie attractive view. That is, it's plausible to think that what's rational for people to believe on the basis of their evidence can vary if they have different frameworks or sets of epistemic standards. In this paper, I introduce an epistemic existentialist form of subjectivist permissivism, which I argue can better address “the arbitrariness objection” to subjectivist permissivism in general. According to the epistemic existentialist, it's not just that what's rational to believe on the basis of evidence can vary according to agents’ frameworks, understood as passive aspects of individuals’ psychologies. Rather, what's rational to believe on the basis of evidence is sensitive to agents’ choices and active commitments (as are frameworks themselves). Here I draw on Chang's work on commitment and voluntarist reasons. The epistemic existentialist maintains that what's rational for us to believe on the basis of evidence is, at least in part, up to us. It can vary not only across individuals but for a single individual, over time, as she makes differing epistemic commitments.
      PubDate: 2019-08-28
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.25
       
  • Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism

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      Authors: Fratantonio; Giada
      Pages: 555 - 575
      Abstract: In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard's own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard's response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three interpretations comes without problems. I conclude that, until we have a clear and unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the Access Problem remains a challenge for Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism.
      PubDate: 2019-08-27
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.26
       
  • Entitlement, Epistemic Risk, and Scepticism

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      Authors: Moretti; Luca
      Pages: 576 - 586
      Abstract: Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn't elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright's contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don't remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don't actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright's responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi's argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright couldn't answer Moruzzi's challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification.
      PubDate: 2019-08-28
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.27
       
  • The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism'

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      Authors: Mulligan; Thomas
      Pages: 587 - 602
      Abstract: Disagreement is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and philosophers have dutifully attended to it. One important question related to disagreement is epistemological: How does a rational person change her beliefs (if at all) in light of disagreement from others' The typical methodology for answering this question is to endorse a steadfast or conciliatory disagreement norm (and not both) on a priori grounds and selected intuitive cases. In this paper, I argue that this methodology is misguided. Instead, a thoroughgoingly Bayesian strategy is what's needed. Such a strategy provides conciliatory norms in appropriate cases and steadfast norms in appropriate cases. I argue, further, that the few extant efforts to address disagreement in the Bayesian spirit are laudable but uncompelling. A modelling, rather than a functional, approach gets us the right norms and is highly general, allowing the epistemologist to deal with (1) multiple epistemic interlocutors, (2) epistemic superiors and inferiors (i.e. not just epistemic peers), and (3) dependence between interlocutors.
      PubDate: 2019-09-13
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.28
       
  • Esoteric Reliabilism

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      Authors: Ahlstrom-Vij; Kristoffer
      Pages: 603 - 623
      Abstract: Survey data suggest that many philosophers are reliabilists, in believing that beliefs are justified iff produced by a reliable process. This is bad news if reliabilism is true. Empirical results suggest that a commitment to reliable belief-formation leads to overconfident second-guessing of reliable heuristics. Hence, a widespread belief in reliabilism is likely to be epistemically detrimental by the reliabilist's own standard. The solution is a form of two-level epistemic consequentialism, where an esoteric commitment to reliabilism will be appropriate for an enlightened few, while a form of epistemic fetishism – on which some heuristics are treated as fundamental epistemic norms – is appropriate for the rest of us.
      PubDate: 2019-10-30
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.39
       
  • A Defence of Lichtenberg

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      Authors: Merlo; Giovanni
      Pages: 624 - 639
      Abstract: Cartesians and Lichtenbergians have diverging views of the deliverances of introspection. According to the Cartesians, a rational subject, competent with the relevant concepts, can come to know that he or she thinks – hence, that he or she exists – on the sole basis of his or her introspective awareness of his or her conscious thinking. According to the Lichtenbergians, this is not possible. This paper offers a defence of the Lichtenbergian position using Peacocke and Campbell's recent exchange on Descartes's cogito as a framework for discussion. A thought-experiment will be presented involving two communities with radically different conceptions of the metaphysics of the self. The purpose of the thought-experiment is to suggest that a substantive metaphysical thesis, whose truth cannot be a priori known, is presupposed by any justified transition from one's introspective awareness of a certain mental activity to the self-ascription of that activity.
      PubDate: 2019-11-14
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.40
       
  • Direct Inference, Reichenbach's Principle, and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

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      Authors: Horgan; Terry
      Pages: 640 - 653
      Abstract: A group of philosophers led by the late John Pollock has applied a method of reasoning about probability, known as direct inference and governed by a constraint known as Reichenbach's principle, to argue in support of ‘thirdism’ concerning the Sleeping Beauty Problem. A subsequent debate has ensued about whether their argument constitutes a legitimate application of direct inference. Here I defend the argument against two extant objections charging illegitimacy. One objection can be overcome via a natural and plausible definition, given here, of the binary relation ‘logically stronger than’ between two properties that can obtain even when the respective properties differ from one another in ‘arity’; given this definition, the Pollock group's argument conforms to Reichenbach's principle. Another objection prompts a certain refinement of Reichenbach's principle that is independently well-motivated. My defense of the Pollock group's argument has epistemological import beyond the Sleeping Beauty problem, because it both widens and sharpens the applicability of direct inference as a method for inferring single-case epistemic probabilities on the basis of general information of a probabilistic or statistical nature.
      PubDate: 2019-11-11
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.41
       
  • The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism

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      Authors: Ye; Ru
      Pages: 654 - 673
      Abstract: The debate between Uniqueness and Permissivism concerns whether a body of evidence sometimes allows multiple doxastic attitudes towards a proposition. An important motivation for Uniqueness is the so-called ‘arbitrariness argument,’ which says that Permissivism leads to some unacceptable arbitrariness with regard to one's beliefs. An influential response to the argument says that the arbitrariness in beliefs can be avoided by invoking epistemic standards. In this paper, I argue that such a response to the arbitrariness argument is unsuccessful. Then I defend a new response: contrary to common conception, the arbitrariness resulted by Permissivism is acceptable. The basic idea is that the arbitrariness resulted by Permissivism is analogous to the arbitrariness in permissive actions and the latter arbitrariness is intuitively acceptable. I answer three possible objections against this analogy, which are all motivated by the thought that beliefs aim at the truth. In addressing the last objection, I draw inspiration from the recent debate on transformative experience.
      PubDate: 2019-12-05
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.42
       
  • Conspiracy Theories and Religion: Reframing Conspiracy Theories as Bliks

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      Authors: Bezalel; Glenn Y.
      Pages: 674 - 692
      Abstract: Conspiracy theories have largely been framed by the academy as a stigmatised form of knowledge. Yet recent scholarship has included calls to take conspiracy theories more seriously as an area of study with a desire to judge them on their own merits rather than an a priori dismissal of them as a class of explanation. This paper argues that the debates within the philosophy of religion, long overlooked by scholars of conspiracy theories, can help sow the seeds for re-examining our understanding of conspiracy theories in a more balanced and nuanced way. The nature of religious belief is elemental to understanding the epistemological foundations of the conspiracy theorising worldview amidst what we may call ‘conspiratorial ambiguity’. Specifically, R.M. Hare's concept of bliks, which are unfalsifiable but meaningful worldviews, offers a way forward to reframe our approach towards the theory of conspiracy theories.
      PubDate: 2019-12-20
      DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.46
       
 
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