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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.038
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 37  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0003-2638 - ISSN (Online) 1467-8284
Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [424 journals]
  • Weak generics

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      Pages: 405 - 409
      Abstract: AbstractSome generic sentences seem to be true despite the fact that almost all the members of the relevant kind are exceptions. It’s controversial whether generics of this type express relatively weak generalizations or relatively strong ones. If the latter, then we’re systematically mistaken about their truth, but they make no trouble for our semantic theorizing. In this brief note, I present several arguments for the former: sentences of the relevant type are weak generics.
      PubDate: Mon, 02 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac005
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • The reverse ontological argument

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      Pages: 410 - 416
      Abstract: AbstractModal ontological arguments argue from the possible existence of a perfect being to the actual (necessary) existence of a perfect being. But modal ontological arguments have a problem of symmetry; they can be run in both directions. Reverse ontological arguments argue from the possible nonexistence of a perfect being to the actual (necessary) nonexistence of a perfect being. Some familiar points about the necessary a posteriori, however, show that the symmetry can be broken in favour of the ontological argument.
      PubDate: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab077
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • (Almost) all evidence is higher-order evidence

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      Pages: 417 - 425
      Abstract: AbstractHigher-order evidence is evidence about what is rational to think in light of your evidence. Many have argued that it is special – falling into its own evidential category, or leading to deviations from standard rational norms. But it is not. Given standard assumptions, almost all evidence is (in part) higher-order evidence.
      PubDate: Sun, 08 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab081
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • A puzzle about the fixity of the past

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      Pages: 426 - 434
      Abstract: AbstractIt is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle is in conflict with standard views about knowledge and the semantics for ‘actually’. I also consider many possible responses to the argument.
      PubDate: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab092
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Losing grip on the third realm: against naive realism for intuitions

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      Pages: 435 - 444
      Abstract: AbstractNaive realism in philosophy of perception is the view that (factive) perception involves a direct relation between perceiving subjects and the world. The naive realist says that your perception of a cat on the mat is a worldly relation that is partially constituted by the cat and the mat; a spatio-temporal chunk of the world is presenting itself to you. Recently, Elijah Chudnoff and John Bengson have independently developed an extension of this view to intellectual experiences, or intuitions, for traditionally a priori domains. We argue that this view, which we call ‘intuitional naive realism’ (INR), will not have the epistemic advantages that Chudnoff and Bengson claim that it does. In perception, but not intuition, there is a deeper explanation of what makes it the case that one experience is constituted by the world while another is not. Whether or not INR is true, then, it does no interesting epistemological work for traditionally a priori domains.
      PubDate: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab087
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • The dream of recapture

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      Pages: 445 - 450
      Abstract: AbstractAs a response to the semantic and logical paradoxes, theorists often reject some principles of classical logic. However, classical logic is entangled with mathematics, and giving up mathematics is too high a price to pay, even for nonclassical theorists. The so-called recapture theorems come to the rescue. When reasoning with concepts such as truth/class membership/property instantiation, (These are examples of concepts that are taken to satisfy naive rules such as the naive truth schema and naive comprehension, and that therefore are compatible with a solution to paradox cast in the logics considered below. Other notions of similar kind can be added to the list.) if one is interested in consequences of the theory that only contain mathematical vocabulary, nothing is lost by reasoning in the nonclassical framework. This article shows that this claim is highly misleading, if not simply false. Under natural assumptions, some well-established approaches to recapture are incorrect.
      PubDate: Fri, 06 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac004
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Fitch’s paradox and truthmaking: Why Jago’s argument remains
           ineffective

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      Pages: 451 - 454
      Abstract: AbstractRecently, there have been several attempts to use the kind of reasoning found in Fitch’s knowability paradox to argue for rather sweeping metaphysical claims: Jago (2020) uses such reasoning to argue that every truth has a truthmaker, and Loss (2021) does so to argue that every fact is grounded. This strategy has been criticized by Trueman (2021), who points out that the same kind of reasoning could be used to establish entirely opposite conclusions. In response, Jago (2021) has offered a revised argument that is meant to avoid Trueman’s objection. I argue that this revised argument is in fact undermined by an objection quite similar to Trueman’s.
      PubDate: Mon, 02 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac001
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Does racism equal prejudice plus power'

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      Pages: 455 - 463
      Abstract: AbstractAn increasingly common view is that ‘racism’ can be defined as prejudice plus power. However, this view is ambiguous between two interpretations. The first proposes a descriptive definition, claiming that a prejudice plus power account of ‘racism’ best accounts for our ordinary usage of the term. The second proposes a revisionary definition, claiming that we should adopt a new account of ‘racism’ because doing so will bring pragmatic benefit. In this paper, I argue that the prejudice plus power view is unsatisfying on either interpretation.
      PubDate: Mon, 02 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac009
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Metaphysical semantics versus ground on questions of realism

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      Pages: 464 - 472
      Abstract: AbstractOne desideratum for a theory of fundamentality is to give us the conceptual tools to articulate fruitful metaphysical distinctions between the assortment of ‘realist’ and ‘anti-realist’ positions in a given domain such as meta-ethics. The ability to articulate such distinctions gives us a way to assess rival theories of fundamentality, such as Fine’s grounding theory and Sider’s metaphysical semantic theory. Indeed, Sider has argued that metaphysical semantic theories have an edge with respect to this desideratum and takes this as an important reason to prefer those theories over rival grounding theories. This paper takes a closer look at how the rival theories compare with respect to questions of realism and defends the grounding theorist’s ability to meet the desideratum.
      PubDate: Fri, 06 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab089
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Correction to: Be modest: you’re living on the edge

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      Pages: 473 - 473
      Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab003
      PubDate: Sun, 24 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac024
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Correction to: Conglomerability, disintegrability, and the comparative
           principle

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      Pages: 474 - 474
      Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab012
      PubDate: Thu, 05 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac013
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Précis

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      Pages: 477 - 479
      Abstract: Relativism: New Problems of Philosophy By BaghramianMaria and ColivaAnnalisaRoutledge, 2019. 332 pp.
      PubDate: Sat, 15 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac044
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • The Coherence of Giving Up Frege’s Constraint: Comments on Baghramian
           and Coliva’s Relativism

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      Pages: 480 - 492
      Abstract: In their book Relativism, Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva (B&C; 2020) offer a panoramic view of various forms of relativism and their history. They make a considerable effort to engage sympathetically with relativists and to portray the motivations and advantages of the various forms of relativism they discuss. They bravely opt for an approach that attempts to articulate a common core in many views that have been thought of as forms of relativism, and this enables them to approach their subject matter in a systematic, unifying way. This is surely a good feature of the book.
      PubDate: Fri, 01 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac026
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Equal Validity or Nonneutrality' A defense of relativism1

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      Pages: 492 - 498
      Abstract: Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation10.13039/501100004837FJC2020-045045-I
      PubDate: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac043
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Equal Validity and Disagreement: Comments on Baghramian and Coliva’s
           Relativism1

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      Pages: 499 - 506
      Abstract: I applaud Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva (henceforth B&C) for writing this book. Like Baghramian’s earlier book of the same title (Baghramian 2004), it aims to be a comprehensive critical survey, but unlike the earlier book it engages extensively with the large literature on relativism that emerged in the first two decades of this century. This is, to my knowledge, the first survey of relativism that covers this recent literature, in dialogue with earlier relativist traditions.
      PubDate: Wed, 03 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac027
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Establishing Moral Norms by Convention: Comments on Baghramian’s and
           Coliva’s Relativism

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      Pages: 506 - 513
      Abstract: Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva (henceforth, B&C) have written a superb, compendious book on various kinds of relativism (2019). While they give nuanced and sympathetic reconstructions of these views, it is illuminating to see them show, repeatedly and in detail, how each of these views succumbs to a familiar dilemma: a relativistic view requires that it be possible for two judgers to genuinely disagree with one another, even while their views count as ‘equally valid’. However, it is not possible to make sense of this combination: in each and every case, the view either fails to specify a genuine disagreement, or it fails to make sense of equal validity.
      PubDate: Fri, 01 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac029
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Replies to Commentators

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      Pages: 514 - 525
      Abstract: As is predictable, several comments raise issues about our characterization of relativism. We will focus on these first before discussing Paul Boghossian’s comments, which focus on one particular argument of the book concerning Gilbert Harman’s version of moral relativism.
      PubDate: Fri, 01 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac028
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Me and My Imaginary Friend: Critical Study of Virtual Subjects, Fugitive
           Selves

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      Pages: 526 - 536
      Abstract: Jonardon Ganeri’s recent book – henceforth, ‘Virtual Subjects’ – is an intriguing introduction to some aspects of the philosophical thought of Fernando Pessoa, and an exploration of potential applications of those aspects beyond what Pessoa himself considered.11 Ganeri’s book is not a general introduction to Pessoa’s philosophical writings, which cover a variety of topics, including, but not limited to, the nature of sensations, a development of a version of rationalism and animadversions against human free will.22 I suspect that the general philosophical public to which Ganeri’s book is addressed will be unfamiliar with Pessoa as a philosopher, and perhaps even as an author, and so a short prefatory chapter that provides an overview of his work would have been welcome, although there is much to be said in favour of keeping things short and to the point as the book Ganeri actually wrote does. Regardless, Virtual Subjects is wonderful, full of interesting ideas and arguments. And we should be grateful that Ganeri continues to widen the contemporary philosophical landscape by bringing interesting underexplored figures such as Pessoa into the conversation.
      PubDate: Wed, 18 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac019
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • New Work for a Theory of Instrumental Rationality

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      Pages: 537 - 551
      Abstract: In recent decades, the theory of rationality has become an area of philosophy in its own right, with a substantial literature focusing directly on questions about the nature of rationality. Of course, philosophers have been thinking about such questions for much longer than that – the more recent development is the direct focus on answering such questions on their own terms, and not just in the service of answering other normative questions in ethics or epistemology. This shift has brought with it many influential articles written about the nature of rationality (see, e.g., Broome 2005, 2007, Kolodny 2005, Scanlon 2007, Lord 2017, Worsnip 2018, Fogal 2020), as well as several important books (see, e.g., Broome 2013, Kiesewetter 2017, Lord 2018, Comesaña 2020, Worsnip 2021).
      PubDate: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac020
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Building Trust for a Better Democracy

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      Pages: 552 - 560
      Abstract: In Trust in a Polarized Age, Kevin Vallier gives himself the unenviable and yet essential task of diagnosing and responding to the problem of democratic governance in a polarized society.11 Focusing his attention on the USA, he argues compellingly that the scale and fervour of our political disagreements are tied to a steady collapse of social and political trust. Surveys suggest that we have little trust in our government institutions. Not only do we distrust politicians from the other political party, but we also distrust people who vote for the other political party. What’s worse, Vallier provides evidence that suggests that affective polarization has also gone way up. We don’t merely distrust each other, we are growing to hate each other as well. A cursory glance at social media would provide further evidence.
      PubDate: Sat, 23 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac042
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Perception, Flux and Learning

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      Pages: 560 - 571
      PubDate: Wed, 03 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac040
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Social connection, interdependence and being sure of ourselves

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      Pages: 571 - 584
      PubDate: Thu, 28 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac041
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 3 (2022)
       
 
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